Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  The peltasts took down several hoplites with their missiles and then retreated. The Spartans had the baggage-carriers that always accompanied them take the wounded into Lechaion and sent out their youngest soldiers to chase the attackers. Unable to catch their fleeter foes, these Spartan out-runners turned about only to be attacked on the way back by the missilemen. This set the pattern for what was to follow. Iphicrates' troops advanced time after time to hurl javelins into the Spartans, pull away, and then inflict even greater damage against any attempt at pursuit by the slower hoplites. Even when the Spartan horsemen showed up after completing their escort duty, there was no relief. This was because those inept riders did no more than keep even with their out-running infantry cohorts to suffer along with them.

  As more and more of the Spartans fell, those remaining began to lose heart and finally withdrew in desperation onto a small hill close to the sea. But the missiles kept coming at them and, when the enemy phalanx began to close on their badly depleted ranks as well, they gave way at last. Some escaped with the horsemen and others swam out to friendly boats that had drawn near. Behind them, they left 250 dead, over 40 percent of their number lost without having done any damage at all to the enemy. It was a small victory over the Spartans compared to the reverses at Nemea River, Coronea and the Long Walls, which had cost the allies thousands of casualties; still, this was a great propaganda triumph that tarnished the image of Spartan invincibility.

  The Athenians also scored against Sparta in Asia during 390. The island of Lesbos there off the Ionian coast had allied with the Spartans save for its leading city of Mytilene. In an effort to address this, the Athenian admiral Thrasybulus landed at that city with a 40-ship fleet from which he off-loaded its hoplite marines (epibatai). These numbered 400 at ten per vessel (Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.28). He then added spearmen from Mytilene, which might have come to 600 if a quarter had gone into exile (see Ray [2009, 160] for a discussion of manpower potential on Lesbos). Exiles from the other Lesbian cities that had fled to Mytilene joined him as well (maybe 300-400 at a quarter of the spearmen from the rest of the island) to total 1,3001,400 hoplites in all. Light support would have been on the order of 300-500 foot skirmishers including both locals and oarsmen from the fleet. Leading this combined force from the city, Thrasybulus advanced on Methymna, which sat at the northern end of the north-south elongate island and hosted the local Spartan governor.

  Therimachus of Sparta learned of Thrasybulus' approach and collected an army of his own. He could call upon a body of marines (perhaps on a par with Thrasybulus' at 400-500), the hoplites of Methymna (around 400-500 sans reserves and defectors) and some Mytilenian exiles (200 or so). This let him offer battle outside the city with a heavy-armed array that was probably only slightly smaller than that of his Athenian opponent. Sadly, we have no description of this engagement save Diodorus' claim that Thrasybulus made a "brilliant fight" (14.94.4) in which Therimachus died in action (per Xenophon) and many Methymnaeans lost their lives in a pursuit that drove the survivors back inside the city walls. Thrasybulus wouldn't long survive this victory, as he later sailed to the Asian mainland and took his fleet into the Eurymedon River to prey upon the communities along its banks. Striking back, some of the locals made a nighttime attack on the Athenians' camp that claimed Thrasybulus and several others and chased the fleet back to sea.

  Acarnania and Cremaste (389 B.c.) and Tripyrgia (388)

  Achaea in the north-central Peloponnese had interests across the Gulf of Corinth in Aetolia and was in conflict there with the Acarnanians, members of the anti-Spartan alliance whose land lay above the mouth of the Gulf in northwestern Greece. The Achaeans threatened in 389 to withdraw from their pact with Sparta unless it promised to attack Acarnania. The Spartans agreed and sent out Agesilaos with two morai (2,000 hoplites) and a matching contingent of allied troops along with some cavalry to join the entire Achaean levy (perhaps 2,000-3,000 spearmen). The Acarnanians withdrew to their walled cities and refused demands by the Spartan king that they pledge fealty to his polls, causing him to respond by spoiling their land. After enduring considerable economic damage, the Acarnanians finally united to attack the invading force as it camped on a mountain slope. Acarnania was a pastoral nation that had many slingers among its herdsmen and large numbers of these fired their bullets down from the upper slope as comrades threw rocks. Caught in this dangerous hail, Agesilaos and his men retreated onto the narrow plain of the valley below, where they camped beside a lake as the Acarnanians drew off at nightfall.

  Agesilaos decamped the next day and began to march out, but found the enemy in possession of the surrounding mountainsides from which they hurled javelins and stones. This harassed his column to the point that further progress became impossible once it was faced with exiting through a narrow pass. And any attempt to strike back that the Spartan's hoplites and horsemen made encountered the same problem the mora at Lechaion had met, with fleeter foes able to retreat and easily keep out of reach. Assessing the terrain in this dire situation, Agesilaos saw that the slope on his left was more accessible for his riders and spearmen and decided to have a go in that direction. The king sent his cavalry up in company with his youngest and most agile hoplites as he followed behind with the rest of the spearmen in formation.

  This time, the Spartan out-runners were able to catch and kill many light-armed men as they tried to scramble away; however, they had to break off pursuit once near the ridge's crest because the Acarnanians had hoplites in place there (perhaps 2,000-3,000 strong) along with the bulk of their peltasts. Agesilaos' riders retired to flank position and the younger spearmen rejoined his ranks as the escaping skirmishers passed through their own heavy array, which then closed order to meet the advancing phalanx. The Acarnanian peltasts now hurled javelins and a number of their hoplites cast their spears as well in a desperate attempt to turn back the Spartan charge. But though this deluge took down a few horses, it didn't deter the battle-savvy southern spearmen, who kept relentlessly closing. The Acarnanians, many now having disarmed themselves by exhausting their javelins or throwing away their spear, didn't wait for the deeper Spartan formation to strike and made to run off downhill in the other direction. Lunging up into the disintegrating enemy battle line, Agesilaos' front-fighters managed to kill about 300 of their foes (10-15 percent) before the rest escaped. The king then returned to his ravaging of the land before heading home in the fall, doing so thorough a job that the Acarnanians would surrender without further contest when faced with the prospect of another invasion the next summer.

  Meanwhile, events were heating up in the northern Aegean. The Spartans had sent Anaxibius there with three warships, perhaps 120 Spartan hoplites as marines and enough money to hire 1,000 mercenaries to deal with the Athenian forces in the Hellespontine region. He set up at Abydos, which had the best harbor on the Asian side of the Hellespont, and began raiding nearby cities and capturing Athenian cargo vessels. Athens reacted by dispatching Iphicrates with 1,200 mercenary peltasts on eight ships that also carried 80 epibatai. Iphicrates discovered that the Spartan had marched south to Antandrus with his marines, mercenaries (probably 600800 spearmen and 200-400 peltasts) and 200 hoplites from Abydos. He therefore landed at night to set up an ambush (Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.35-39). The chosen spot lay just below Abydos near Cremaste and beside the west-flowing Rhodios River that would serve as the Spartan's route home. And sure enough, Anaxibius and his men before long came down the path above the river bank, strung out along that narrow track and heedless of any danger in friendly country. Iphicrates allowed the Abydene spearmen in the van to pass down toward the stream and then sprang out to surprise the Spartans next in line. Seeing that the situation was hopeless, Anaxibius dismissed his men and turned to fight a suicidal delaying action along with a dozen local Spartan commanders who had gone with him on the Antandrus expedition. The peltasts overran this small rearguard and then chased the marines and others who had fled, dispatching many of the Spartans (maybe 20-30 percent) and
about 200 of their mercenaries plus 50 of the men from Abydos as well.

  Athens' Chabrias sprang a similar trap the next year (Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.10-13). This was on the island of Aigina in the Saronic Gulf, which lay just west off the shore of the Athenian homeland of Attica. Chabrias had brought 800 peltasts and 80 marines on ten ships of his own plus some more hoplites on vessels sent from Athens (possibly the remaining 18 triremes of 28 that had been in Athens' main harbor just to the east at Piraeus). Chabrias thus might have had up to 800 spearmen in all. Like Iphicrates, he made a night landing, coming ashore near where the Spartans were based. He set up an ambush in a hollow near the hill of Tripyrgia and had his hoplites ascend the rise next morning and make themselves known to draw out the enemy. The Spartan commander, Gorgopas, came with all his own epibatai (350-500 at around 30- 40 each from twelve ships), men drawn from his ship crews (perhaps 400-500 with makeshift weapons) and some spearmen from Aegina (citizens and resident aliens, maybe 600 or so). Unaware of the hiding peltasts, he was looking to have a near 2 to 1 advantage against the enemy arrayed on Tripyrgia.

  The Athenians' javelineers let the opposing van of marines go past and then rose to shower missiles on the rest of the thin enemy column. At the same time, their hoplites began to descend off Tripyrgia, attacking in formation to destroy the disorganized lead element that had been allowed beyond the ambush site. Among those who fell there were Gorgopas and eight spartiates who were with him, their deaths sending the remaining vanguard to join their entire force in flight. Those killed with Gorgopas' advance section probably amounted to 100-150 men, while the crewmen and locals present lost another 350 (around 30 percent) against what must have been negligible casualties among the victors.

  The campaign season of 388 saw Sparta's King Agesipolis lead another foray by his polls' levy into Argos, but the war on land in Greece remained largely stalled as fall arrived. There was a major turning point at sea early the next year, however, as the Spartans took advantage of Athenian overconfidence after their success on Aegina to launch a strike into the harbor at Piraeus under the command of Agesilaos' brother Teleutias. It was a stunning insult to the pride and reputation of the Athenian navy. What followed was a very successful campaign by Teleutias against Attic coastal sites and commercial shipping that dealt a heavy economic blow to Athens.

  It was at this point that the Persians and Spartans finally came to an understanding to end their fighting in Asia. This called for Sparta to concede Ionia in return for Artaxerxes' pledge to join the Greek states in recognizing the independence of all mainland poleis. Agreed between Antalcidas for Sparta and Artaxerxes II as Great King, this pact was known variously as the Peace of Antalcidas or the King's Peace. With Persian backing and aid from Syracuse, Antalcidas was now able to confine the Athenian fleet within the Bosporus and close the route that Athens relied upon for vital grain shipments from the Black Sea region. With the allies' naval champion thus crippled and ready to give up, Agesilaos headed a conference in Sparta during the winter of 387/86 in which all of the belligerents agreed to the terms set out in the Peace of Antalcidas to bring the long Corinthian conflict to an end.

  Tactical Discussion: 400-387 B. C.

  Grecian tactical practices during the early 4th century very much continued those of the recent past. The largest phalanx actions saw Spartans dominate by sweeping around (cyclosis) or pushing through the opposing left. A well worn method described by Thucydides at Mantinea I in 418 (5.71-73), this was a deliberate exaggeration of the natural tendency for hoplites to drift rightward during advance so as to move closer to the protection of their line-mate's shield on that side. After this maneuver, if needed, they would then reform to engage any foes still remaining on the field. Variations in the subject era included Agesilaos making his second engagement at Coronea II (394) into a frontal assault (rather than the usual flank attack) and employment of a field work at the Long Walls of Corinth (392). The former proved a costly mistake not to be repeated and the latter was unique as well due to its singular setting. Another notable trend was that ambushes were unusually common. Such surprise attacks were factors in half a dozen engagements, nearly a quarter of the total, and every one was successful. The most telling of these by a Grecian army came against the Persians at Sardis in 395. Yet this ploy had precedent in that Demosthenes of Athens had sprung a very similar trap against the Spartans at Olpae in 426/25 (Thucydides 3.107-198).

  Perhaps the tactical event in this era most often seen as revolutionary was the light-armed attack that destroyed the mora at Lechaion (390). However, this too had pre-existing roots. Javelineers from Athens backed by hoplites had defeated Spartan spearmen in much the same fashion at Spaectaria back in 425 (Thucydides 4.29-37). The only truly new approach to pitched combat during this period belongs to Xenophon at Colchis (400). His use there of long, multiple columns interspersed with light infantry was a very creative solution to the challenge of fighting in difficult terrain and foreshadowed specialized formations to be employed later by Alexander the Great in some of his lesser actions against tribal foes.

  Three commanders that have gained lasting fame emerged at this time: Xenophon, Agesilaos and Iphicrates. Xenophon's exploits may be a bit overstated due to our record of them coming mostly from his own accounts, which likely were at least somewhat self-serving. Still, the tactical evolution at Colchis probably wasn't proposed by his conservative Spartan co-commander; thus, this and other progressive approaches outlined in the Anabasis may well be his own. All the same, where we know Xenophon held sole command (in 400 at Metropolis and Calpe Harbor III), he used very conventional tactics, suggesting that he was quite traditional most of the time. And Agesilaos, a general much lauded by Xenophon, was likewise only a modest innovator. He did, however, have a large bag of "tried-and-true" tricks as shown by his adeptness at indirect approaches (leading foes to misread the true destination of his marches) and the surprise attack at Sardis. Agesilaos was at his most progressive in the employment of cavalry. Based on experiences in Asia, his development of a strong mounted arm was daring in context of the intense focus on heavy infantry in his native Sparta. And his aggressive use of riders at Acarnania (389) turned a major pending defeat into victory. As for Iphicrates, he excelled at leading peltasts, both paired with hoplites (Lechaion) and on their own (Cremaste in 389). Possessed of a highly creative and practical mind, he would go on to have a significant impact on evolution of the Grecian fighting arts.

  The Spartans had overcome limitations of their insular state with regard to wealth, gross manpower and military capability beyond heavy infantry to bring the Corinthian War to a conclusion on favorable terms. But while Sparta could still claim to be Greece's leading power, with authority to enforce the conditions of the cease fire on its other signatories, the situation remained volatile. The Peace of Antalcidas was accepted only with great reluctance outside of Sparta, especially at Athens and Thebes. For the Athenians, betrayal of Ionian freedom was deeply resented, while the Thebans had seen the agreement's guarantee of autonomy for all poleis destroy their Boeotian confederacy. These issues along with a variety of individual agendas and the specters of Persia in the east and Carthage in the west all hung heavy over the Greek world as the new century continued to unfold.

  Battles Around the Mediterranean; Chalcidian, Boeotian and Spartan Wars (386-360 B.C.)

  [Lycurgus, the law-giver of Sparta, ordered] "that they should not make war often, or long, with the same enemy, lest that they should train and instruct them in war, by habituating them to defend themselves. And this is what Agesilaos was much blamed for, a long time after, it being thought that by his continual incursions into Boeotia, he made the Thebans a match for the Lacedaemonians."

  Plutarch (Vol. I Lycurgus, 64)

  The end of the Corinthian War offered the Greeks a great opportunity for an extended period of relative tranquility. Sadly, this was not to be. The next quarter century saw leaders that had risen to prominence defending their native lands and/or
the greater cause of Grecian freedom now spawn a widespread series of deadly conflicts. Thus, Evagoras I of Salamis would strive to liberate most of Cyprus from Persia, yet lose much of what he'd gained in a bid to extend his reach onto the Asian mainland. Likewise, Dionysius I of Syracuse, whose selfish efforts had nonetheless protected Sicily from Carthage, would initiate wars of aggression in a quest to expand hegemonic control across his island and well beyond. Meanwhile, Agesilaos II of Sparta, who had gained fame in the century's opening decade as a champion of the Greek cause in Asia, would in this new era turn his nation's fabled military might toward denying liberty to fellow Greeks, waging oppressive campaigns across a swath running from the Peloponnese all the way to Chalcidice in the far north. And, finally, Pelopidas and Epaminondas of Thebes would shine in leading a crusade to rid their land of foreign domination, only to then have their passions for spreading Theban power and polices lead them into aggressive and ultimately fatal foreign ventures.

  Cyprus, Italy and the Chalcidice

  Even as fighting in Greece ceased with the Peace ofAntalcidas at close of winter 387/86, another clash involving Greek arms had reached no more than mid-passage in what would ultimately be a decade-long run. This was the conflict between Persia and Evagoras, master of Salamis and nearly all the rest of the island of Cyprus. Evagoras' prolonged struggle against the forces of the Great King was largely a matter of long periods of preparation punctuated by city assaults, a naval action and siege, but generated at least one significant land battle.