Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Sparta replaced the fallen Phoebidas that winter with a new commander, who arrived with a mora of spearmen via ship across the Corinthian Gulf. The move to reinforce with citizen hoplites as well as their method of travel show that things were not going well. Dispatch of a full mora accords with a need to compensate for a large number of dead and wounded from the battle at Thespiae. It also implies that morale among the allies in Boeotia was slipping as a result of that setback and needed a boost from the presence of actual Spartans. As for choosing sea transport over an overland march, this suggests that there was trouble in the pass to Plataea. The Boeotians, emboldened by their victory, might have been contesting its control. Pressure was thus mounting for the Spartans to achieve greater success in the next campaign season toward reversing a rapidly declining situation.

  Graos Stethos (377 B.C.)

  Agesilaos ordered his Boeotian garrison to advance the next spring and hold the Cithaeron pass, where he joined it to unite his forces and create an army equal in strength to the one he had employed a year earlier. He then descended on Plataea and gave every indication that he intended to next move on to Thespiae. This caused the Boeotians to muster between Thespiae and Thebes that they might meet any threat against the latter from along their western front. Instead, the king suddenly led his troops on a forced march in the opposite direction. Looping around, he took his foes by surprise to quickly breach the outlying barrier system that had so vexed him earlier and close on the city from the south. Agesilaos now raided previously untouched Boeotian land on the east while advancing to the friendly polls of Tanagra, where he installed Panthoedas with a large garrison and then swung back in the direction of Thebes.

  Agesilaos found on the return march that the Boeotians had united to set up for battle along his route. They occupied a long hill called Graos Stethos (aka "The Old Woman's Breast"), which sat in front of the barrier works to the east of the city. Again refusing to engage at a disadvantage against opposition holding high ground, the king bypassed this upland and made for Thebes. His foes saw this and, fearful lest they be cut off from home, hurried down to make a run for town. This gave at least two fortuitously positioned Spartan moral (one containing the Sciritae lochos) an opportunity to attack. Some of the retreating men got up another small hill that sat along their path within sight of the city and hurled javelins into this Spartan charge, but they and their comrades on the flat were soon put to flight. The Sciritae and some of Agesilaos' horsemen, who had led the way in taking the hill, now themselves exploited its elevation to shower missiles down on the last of the enemy rushing past. However, once the Boeotians had reached their nearby city wall, they spun about to threaten a counterattack and the Sciritae and mounted men withdrew without a fight.

  Agesilaos camped for the night and started for Thespiae the next day. As he left, mercenary peltasts in Theban employ began harassing the back of his column with trailing support from Chabrias and a contingent of Athenian hoplites. Olynthian cavalry serving Sparta in this campaign turned on the javelinmen, who had become too far separated from their heavy infantry. The horsemen chased these peltasts up a slope and killed many while scattering the rest. With his rear elements thus clear to move, the king marched on to his base at Thespiae. He helped secure that site by settling a local political dispute and then headed back over Cithaeron, disbanding what an anecdote from Polyaenus (2.1.20) suggests was a seriously dispirited army. He'd managed some successful maneuvers this time out, yet in the end, another campaign season had passed with Thebes remaining as free as ever.

  Tanagra III (376 B.c.)

  Agesilaos was unable to take the field in the spring of 376 due to an attack of phlebitis. Cleombrotus took his place in command, but could not lead an army into Boeotia as the enemy had taken control of the pass to Plataea that winter. Stuck south of the mountain, Cleombrotus had to dismiss his levies and abandon the campaign. With their foes now blocking entry for reinforcements from the Peloponnese, the Spartans were dependent on the forces already in place at Thespiae and Tanagra for any operational potential in Boeotia. But these garrisons remained mostly on the defensive since they were well separated and lacked sufficient manpower for chancing a major action individually. It was therefore the Boeotians that would take the initiative as the summer wore on, launching a campaign against Tanagra, which was probably the slightly weaker of the two Spartan outposts.

  By analog with the attempt made against Thespiae in 378, the effort on Tanagra must have involved the entire Boeotian levy. This would mean some 7,000 hoplites, around 2,000 light infantrymen and maybe 700 horsemen. The city's defenders responded by sallying in an attempt to head off a siege, fielding maybe 4,000 spearmen. This reflects that no more than a third of the militiamen that constituted Sparta's Peloponnesian levy could have been stationed longterm in Boeotia, thus the troops left at Tanagra in 378 must have been but a portion of the allies previously posted to Thespiae. Given the presence of a citizen mora at or near the latter since the winter of 378/77, this gave a pool of 6,000 spearmen to now divide between western and eastern outposts. We know that the Spartan mora continued to operate in the west (see Tegyra below), therefore 3,000 allied hoplites probably made up Tanagra's allotment. Additionally, the garrison could call upon 1,000 Tanagran spearmen in line with that city's past Boeotian League allotments. Light infantry in proportion might have come to around 1,000 at 20 percent of the Peloponnesian contingent and 25 percent of the Boeotians. If Agesilaos had assigned around half of the allied horsemen at Thespiae as well, then these would have joined some 100 Tanagrans for a total cavalry force 200-500 strong.

  Details on the ensuing battle are sadly lacking. We only know from Plutarch (vol. I Pelopidas, 394) that Panthoedas and a sizeable array went down to a defeat that cost the Spartan his life. It's most likely that the Boeotians managed to use their significant advantage in numbers to gain a substantial victory, probably turning the Tanagran right wing if the death of Panthoedas is any indication. As in the Boeotian success at Thespiae two years earlier, it's at least possible that an overloaded left wing of Thebans might have played a key role in achieving this envelopment, but we have no definitive proof. Along with the opposing general, the victors must have eliminated a fair number of enemy troops (perhaps 10-15 percent) and a weakened Tanagra would fall by no later than the following spring (Munn 1993, 172).

  Seaborne action added an entirely new element to the Boeotian conflict in 376. Frustrated to date in their ground campaigns, Sparta turned offshore that summer to launch a naval blockade. The Spartans made piratical raids against Athens' shipping and shoreline from Aigina as well as the islands of Ceos and Andros in the Cyclades off the southeast Attic shore. But this strategy came to naught when Chabrias led a fleet to victory over Spartan forces near the Cyclades island of Naxos. Sparta was therefore left reeling at the end of the year, having suffered reverses on both land and sea.

  Tegyra (375 B.c.)

  Spartan sea power suffered further in early 375 with another Athenian naval success coming off the northwestern Greek coast near Alyzeia in Acarnania. Still, when the Thebans began to show greater confidence by ranging outside of Boeotia to threaten Sparta's ally Phocis, enough ships were mustered to transport Cleombrotus across the Corinthian Gulf with four of the Spartans' moral and a full two-thirds muster of their Peloponnesian allies. The Boeotians retired in the face of this daunting force, trailing guards in their wake as they pulled through the passes lest they be pursued. But elsewhere a battle did take place that spring.

  Pelopidas had approached the western Boeotian town of Orchomenos with a lochos of 500 picked hoplites (Diodorus 15.37.1) including the entire Sacred Band (Plutarch vol. I Pelopidas, 394-395). (Note that Plutarch clashes here with Diodorus in claiming that only the Sacred Band was on hand; however, the latter's figure seems rather the more acceptable in light of probable identity and balance of the forces involved as noted below.) A modest body of horsemen rode with these heavy troops, undoubtedly in the company of some li
ght infantry. The Theban's mission was to scout Orchomenos, which was host for a mora (two lochoi) of 1,000 Spartan hoplites. (Note that there is much dispute regarding the strengths of Spartan units [see the discussion "Manpower" regarding Leuctra in 371 B.C] as well as the types actually present at Tegyra. Plutarch indicates two morai here, but Diodorus said that the Thebans faced "twice their number," which supports a single mora of around 1,000 men as being the correct identification.) These troops most likely were the latest replacements for the citizen regiment that sailed over with Phoebidas' successor in 378/77. Acting on information that this contingent was rotating out and crossing into nearby Locris (where it would march to the coast and board for home), Pelopidas came up with a plan to capture Orchomenos before its replacement could arrive.

  Sound as this plan might have been, it soon fell apart as news came that the relieving mora was already in the vicinity. It had apparently come across from the Peloponnese well prior to its counterpart's departure and thus had only just missed being able to make the transfer of assignments on the spot in Orchomenos. Caught out by this unforeseen development, the Thebans made to withdraw, moving in a circuitous manner to the north toward the town of Tegyra due to terrain restrictions imposed by marshland thereabout (the site being along the edge of ancient Lake Copais-see Pritchett [1982] for a discussion of the topography). However, this route put the fleeing men on a collision course with the rapidly approaching mora, which was emerging from the pass leading to Locris. The Spartans proceeded to block the Thebans' path. Acting with resolve, Pelopidas sent his horsemen out to skirmish as he covered behind them and readied his foot soldiers for a desperate fight.

  The Spartans spanned a passage that, though flat, featured impassable terrain on either side (the lake environs in one direction and broken and/or swampy ground in the other). This allowed them to anchor both ends of their array as a hedge against the opposing cavalry. It's not clear what depth of file was required to permit this, but subsequent events suggest that it might have been thinner than the usual eight men, possibly only six. Of course, this had potential to yield offensive advantage as well, since a longer line meant that the Spartans would overlap on at least one flank, even should the Thebans stack at four shields, which was the minimum depth for orderly maneuvering. But it was not the intention of Pelopidas to try and match his enemy's width. Instead, he arranged his spearmen very deeply (maybe fronting over a mere 20m with 25-man files per Theban density at Delium in 424) with the attacking horsemen serving to mask his formation's true form and exact position. (This would have called for Thebes' riders to spread out broadly in a very thin array across the entire front rather than compactly off the flanks as was normal practice. This seems to be the first time such a tack is described for Greek horsemen in a hoplite battle, though such wide dispersion must have been common in solely mounted actions.) When the cavalry then finally fell away and his overconfident foes began to advance, the Theban led his men forward at speed. They charged into what appears to be the right wing of the Spartan phalanx. Powerfully driven by othismos from extensive after-ranks, Pelopidas' front-fighters swiftly speared and pushed their way through a perhaps somewhat thin opposing formation, killing many of the enemy in the process (including both lochos commanders). The Thebans then wheeled on the opposition's exposed flank and backside to panic and scatter the remaining Spartans within minutes at most.

  Fearful that the mora that had just left for Locris might have turned about or that help would come for the Spartans from local troops at Orchomenos, the Thebans made only a very short pursuit. Returning to the battle site, they spoiled the enemy dead (perhaps as many as a hundred spearmen) and erected a trophy to mark the victory before continuing on their way home. The account of Plutarch (and to a lesser extent the shorter one of Diodorus) makes much of this event, claiming that it was the first loss that the Spartans had taken in open combat against an opponent inferior in numbers (or even at equal strength). Actually, it's possible that Tegyra really marked no more than a variation on tactics employed by the Thebans over the last three years: deeply filing their left wing to overpower the opposing right, thus taking out the enemy's best troops plus their leader(s). If so, then the only difference from the previous engagements was that there was no center or left wing in the Theban array this time, these having been rendered unnecessary by rapid victory on the right preempting the unengaged remaining opposition from even coming into play. This certainly seems to point the way for Epaminondas' sheltering of those same elements from the fight at Leuctra four years later. As such, Plutarch's comment that the triumph of Pelopidas here was "a prelude to Leuctra" is probably more appropriate than even he might have known. Regardless, Tegyra was a great morale booster for the Thebans and would prove the last land action of note before the Boeotian War came to an end.

  BATTLE OF TEGYRA (375 B.C.) (BOXES REPRESENTING FORCES ARE EXAGGERATED TO S110W RELATIVE SIZES.)

  Athens was growing concerned about how powerful the Thebans were becoming. They were currently allies, but had been bitter rivals in the past and would very likely be again at some point in the future. The Athenians were also at financial risk, not only due to the expense of maintaining their fleet on a wartime footing, but also from the cost of hiring large numbers of mercenary peltasts for the campaigns in Boeotia as well as to man the extensive defensive works along their western border. As a result, they took the initiative to send representatives to Sparta and arrange a peace treaty. This was a bilateral pact between the Spartans and Athens, with the latter having to drag its Theban allies along as reluctant participants. Thus, though the agreement put a formal end to the current war, tensions between the signatories remained high as a foretaste of even more deadly conflicts to come.

  The Peloponnese, Egypt and Corcyra

  Southern Greece was in political turmoil during the mid-370s. At least some of the uproar stemmed from the rise of democratic movements in the decade after the Corinthian War, which had bred disputes between democrats and oligarchs, leading to a number of confrontations and acts of violence. Within the Persian Empire, meanwhile, the Great King was preparing a grand campaign to reclaim his long lost province of Egypt. And, finally, still simmering enmity between Athens and Sparta was boiling up among the islands of western Greece, threatening to kick off yet another round of fighting between those old rivals.

  Phlius (374 B.C.)

  All the political unrest in the Peloponnese led to at least one significant land action. This happened when exiles from Phlius took control of a local stronghold and collected "a considerable number of mercenaries" (Diodorus 15.40.5) with the aim of ousting the popular party ruling their polis. In the battle that followed, these outcasts claimed victory and killed some 300 on the other side. This isn't much to go on; however, such casualties suggest (assuming they were spearmen at no more than 15 percent of the total) that the bested army might have been 2,000 strong in heavy infantry. Typical support for a hoplite contingent of this size would then have been on the order of 500 light footmen and 100 in cavalry. The victors might not have had any greater manpower and more likely fielded a somewhat smaller force. Had this been the case, it must have been the professional soldiers in their ranks that were decisive, intimidating and routing an opposing array of less capable amateurs. But the exiles had little time to enjoy their success. Their own hirelings delivered them to the people and 600 were captured and executed as the rest fled to Argos.

  Iphicrates' Egyptian Reforms and the Mendesian Mouth of the Nile (373 B.C.)

  The Persians had sought help from Athens in the early to mid 370s to obtain a commander for the Greek legion that they were assembling for their campaign into Egypt. Long a source of such mercenary captains, the Athenians sent out Iphicrates, who had led their own hired troops so well in the Corinthian conflict. However, when that general arrived at the Persian staging area in Phoenicia, he ran into a problem. He had inherited some 12,000 (Nepos 11.2.4) to 20,000 (Diodorus 15.41.1) hired men whose ranks included too hig
h a ratio of light to heavy infantry. Judging that he had significantly fewer hoplites than needed, he came up with a creative solution using the troops already in camp, expanding his heavy corps by rearming Greek skirmishers (Sekunda and Chow 1992, 26-27).

  Perhaps drawing elements from past experiences in Thrace (Best 1969, 141-142), Iphicrates outfitted these men for shock fighting with small (0.6m across) round and rimless shields and an elongated spear or pike. The new shields initially seem to have been held in the left hand while wielding the pike in the right; however, at some point (likely after Iphicrates' time in Persian service) these were slung across the shoulder or fixed on the left forearm to allow an option for holding the pikes to better effect with both hands. Per Diodorus (15.44.1-4), these lances were half again the length of a normal dory, putting them at around 3.7m. (Nepos [11.1.3] suggested they were twice the length of a dory. This was probably a confused reading of Ephorus' comments about doubling the length of swords, with Diodorus' paraphrasing from the same source likely being more accurate.) Other up-grades included an open-faced helmet (perhaps of the "Phrygian" style, with a coned, forward-leaning peak per the soft caps of northern Anatolia) and high leather boots called iiphicratides (Iphicrates, the son of a shoemaker, having come up with their design).

  We don't know what these new-style fighters were called, but modern writers have identified them variously as "Iphicratean peltasts" (from their small shields) or "Iphicratean hoplites" (based on use of a thrusting weapon). In fact, they fall between those two traditional categories, but are closer to hoplites in being shock troops. Yet, even so, these were certainly "hoplites on the cheap" and less shock-capable than traditional spearmen. They are probably best thought of as prototypes for the later pike-bearing troops that emerged in Macedonia under its renowned king and military mastermind Philip II. Like those soldiers, these "Iphicratean pikemen" lacked a large, concave shield and thus were incapable of a pushing attack (othismos). At the same time, plying their weapons underhand meant that only the leading rank could strike at enemy front-fighters, more forceful overhead blows weren't possible and targeting was confined to a foe's lower body. All this made for anemic offensive capability. Nonetheless, by projecting a barrier of overlapping pike points from at least the first three ranks, such troops could still perform the defensive role critical to a phalanx's center and off-wing. Iphicrates seems to have fully understood the specialized function of each section of his chosen formation and adapted his resources to match. The Athenian was to lose his position without having tested these newstyle soldiers against a live opponent, though he seems to have been able to accurately assess their potential over the course of a year or so of intense drills prior to his departure.