Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  What now ensued must have been a fairly disorderly fight; the Syracusans had been caught unaware and many lacked experience, while their generally more seasoned opponents had rushed to form up with very little preparation. Dion played a prominent role at the head of his mercenary troops, perhaps half of these being on hand with the rest stationed back in the city. Having superior hoplite gear and being better schooled in close-ordered combat than either their amateur companions or barbarians on the other side, the rebel professionals were able to lance and shove their way ahead for a space; however, the enemy's considerable depth absorbed this pressure without breaking and the front soon stalled as Dion's troops tired and intensity of their weaponstrikes and othismos faded. It was at this point that an already battered Dion took a wound to his right hand from an enemy spear.

  The veterans ranked about Dion managed to get him clear and to the rear. Hurt but still thinking clearly, the rebel leader saw that the contest was now stalemated, with neither force able to drive its foe from the field and both rapidly nearing exhaustion. Sensing an opportunity, Dion mounted and rode to fetch his remaining mercenaries (perhaps 400 spearmen plus some skirmishers) as well as any men fled from the wall that he could rally. He then returned to the battleground, where he found the armies still locked together like spent prizefighters clinching toward the final bell.

  Dion swiftly massed his heavy-armed reinforcements into a compact body and launched them at the enemy, likely targeting the wing where the less shock-proficient Spaniards held post. Tightly arrayed in phalanx, Dion's improvised tactical reserve moved past tired companions, who stumbled out of the way as these fresh troops charged into the frayed enemy line. Hitting with telling force, they smashed through to roll up that flank and send the tyrant's men into flight along the entire front. What followed was a slaughter, with the Syracusans cutting down their beaten foes from behind as they scrambled to get back across the fallen counter-wall and safely within Ortygia's defenses. This defeat cost Dionysius dearly, with 800 of his men giving up their lives per Diodorus (16.12.5); in contrast, Plutarch (Vol. II Dion, 556) claimed that the rebels lost just 74 hoplites. Though Dion's victory in front of Ortygia failed to deliver Syracuse into his hands immediately, Dionysius would eventually withdraw to Italy. However, factional disputes then led to Dion's assassination and subsequent rebel disunity eventually allowed the dictator to return in 346 and resume control of the city.

  Chios (357 B.c.)

  The insurrection at Syracuse saw its match that same year when a revolt of Athens' allies erupted on the other side of the Greek world. The islands of Rhodes, Cos and Chios in the eastern Aegean raged at what they felt were oppressive aspects of the maritime league known today as the Second Athenian Confederation. The Athenians had founded this union 22 years earlier as a means to insure that Greeks in the East kept their autonomy from Sparta; however, it had since turned into a vehicle for empire, complete with tribute and political interference in the form of imposed governors and garrisons. Encouraged by the Carian ruler Mausolus (who had his own designs on the region) as well as the independent city of Byzantium, these poleis overthrew their democracies and broke from Athens. This led to a two year fight with the Athenians in what is now called the "Social War" (from socii, the Latin term for allies).

  Athens sent out its generals Chares and Chabrias with 60 ships (Diodorus, 16.21.1) to mount an attack on Chios, strongest of the rebel states. Our sources don't record their armament's manpower, but comparison to a fleet that put down a similar uprising on Lesbos in 412 could give us some clues. Transports made up about 30 percent of the vessels in that comparable effort, suggesting that the fleet of 357 might have had 18 such troop carriers if designed along the same lines, with the other ships being fast triremes. This would have let the Athenians land nearly 4,000 hoplites on Chios at 150 per transport and 30 per trireme (ten heavy marines remaining aboard each of the latter). These probably came ashore on the northeast just above the island's capital (also called Chios). Beaching the troop carriers to form a temporary camp, Chares took charge of land operations. In addition to his spearmen, he would have had just over 1,000 rowers from the transports for use as light infantrymen.

  As Chabrias led the now cargo-free triremes off to threaten Chios' harbor, Chares marched his army down toward the city walls. Based on past fleet capacity, the islanders could probably muster around 4,000 prime-age hoplites in total, with perhaps another 1,000 being available in old age/youth reserves. However, it's likely that no more than a third or so of these were attached to Chios city, the rest residing around (and concerned with defending) the large island's numerous other settlements. As such, Chares presumably expected to come against something less than 2,000 spearmen from the targeted town and its very nearest neighbors. What he got was much more. Not only had Cos and Rhodes sent ships and troops to aid Chios, but other reinforcements had come from both Byzantium and Carla, likely including many veteran mercenaries. These allied troops plus the Chians were enough to later man 100 triremes at a probable 40 hoplites each and still leave an adequate defense ashore, thus indicating that 4,000 spearmen may be about right for the reinforced garrison sans reserves. Therefore, when the Chians rushed out to form up before their city, Chares and his men found that they didn't have the expected better than 2 to 1 advantage; rather, they were facing a foe with equal or even slightly greater heavy-equipped manpower, at least some it well-experienced. Moreover, the defenders would have had a decidedly hefty edge in light footmen against the Athenians' modest corps of armed rowers.

  What little we know of the following battle via Diodorus (16.7.3) supports the idea that the combatants were fairly evenly matched, as neither proved able to dominate for a decisive victory. All the same, it was the exhausted invaders from Athens who ended up giving way at day's end, pulling their phalanx from the engagement to retreat toward the beach. No doubt equally drained, the Chians and their allies let them go, content in having repulsed any attempt on the city's walls. With neither side broken and pursued, casualties must have been light all around (maybe 2-3 percent). Nonetheless, it was a serious strategic set back for the Athenians. Nor did the bad news stop there, as their fleet had also hit greater than anticipated opposition in its run on the harbor. The result was a defeat that cost Chabrias his life, that famed general having committed suicide to avoid capture after his trireme had been rammed and rendered unable to flee with the rest (Diodorus 16.7.4; Nepos 12.4.2). Fearful of being trapped on the island, Chares embarked his surviving force and withdrew.

  Eastern Expansion and a Proxy War with Athens

  As Philip continued to drill his military throughout the winter of 358/57, he was able to further hone its tactical skills even as the restored highland levies began to swell his ranks. His sarissa-bearing troops soon came to number around 9,000, perhaps still including a couple of thousand foreign hires. These phalangites formed six regiments (taxeis) of equal size. The hoplites, meanwhile, grew in strength until they filled three 1,000-man units (possibly two of hypaspists and one of mercenaries). At the same time, light-armed foot troops rose to a probable 3,000 strong, with some making up the dedicated cavalry screen and the rest providing advance skirmishing and flank support. As for the hetairoi, they reached a count of 1,200, probably forming six squadrons of 200 lances apiece.

  Given Philip's shortage of cash when he gained the throne, he must have issued only small sums to his local levies in payment for relatively brief terms of service. However, early on during the army's expansion, he took the momentous step of turning it into a true professional force. He probably had little option on this. The intensity and length of his training regimen required nothing short of a paid, fulltime commitment from the native troops, who would also have wanted compensation on a par with what their hired companions were getting. From this time forward, all Macedonian military units became standing entities.

  Philip went on the offensive again that spring, besieging Amphipolis and taking it by late summer. During the
course of this operation, he made a secret pact with the Athenians, who were eager to regain that city along their route for vital grain imports from the Black Sea. The deal required yielding Amphipolis to Athens in return for Pydna (a town on the Thermaic Gulf that had come under Athenian influence in the mid 360s). However, once he had Amphipolis in hand, Philip ignored this arrangement and went on to capture Pydna as well. Outraged, the Athenians declared against him despite already being freshly involved in the Social War.

  Pherae I (357/56 B. c.)

  As the Thessalian League had appealed for help that winter, Philip now made a second incursion into Thessaly. He was to meet armed opposition this time. The site of the battle that followed is not known; however, keen to force a confrontation, the Macedonian might have marched directly on the enemy's center at Pherae. It's a good bet then that the engagement took place somewhere on the plains near that city. Philip would have had about two-thirds of his army along (leaving the rest to guard the many hazards still in play at home). We have no data on allied Thessalian League troops, but they must have consisted of some native light horsemen and hamippoi (javelineers accustomed to working with cavalry) in similar strengths (1,000 or so each) as well as mercenary forces to the tune of perhaps 500 additional light infantrymen in support of a couple of thousand hoplites.

  Pherae's phalanx must have been quite a bit smaller than Philip's, possibly boasting no more than 4,000 hoplite hirelings. The latter represented less than half of what the tyrant Jason had reportedly been able to employ with the resources of a united Thessaly (Xenophon Hellenica 6.1.8). These spearmen were nonetheless seasoned pros that posed a real threat to the still green Macedonian phalanx. And elsewhere, the Pheraeans might not have been too far behind the Macedonians in their number of light-armed men. These would perhaps have included a little over 1,500 horsemen (around 50 percent of the region's full potential per a later estimate by Isocrates [8.118]), a like number of hamippoi and maybe 1,000 professional peltasts (one for each four hoplites).

  The northerners likely filed much as they had before, using depths of ten for their phalangites and eight to twelve for the hypaspists/hoplites. As for any League spearmen that might have been present, Philip probably extended his offensive wing by placing them left of his own mercenaries and for the first time having the hypaspists take the far right, all as per later known deployments for these troop types. Assessing the opposing array, the Pheraeans would have approximated its breadth by standing their own line infantry six deep across the entire front. The mounted and light contingents for both armies took post off the flanks, with the allied Thessalians next to Philip's pikemen. This latter is particularly notable in that it let the hetairoi and their screen deploy in full alongside the hypaspists, putting them in position to apply their entire strength against a single end of the opposing array.

  Going into action near simultaneously, both formations would have advanced with caution. However, once within a few dozen meters, the Pheraeans must have taken the lead, charging on signal to crash into the slower moving Macedonians, whose phalangites in particular had to keep a very deliberate pace to maintain their exceptionally close order and multi-layered array of spear points. Yet, within seconds of shock contact, the fight from Philip's center through left would have stalemated. The opposed light horsemen and skirmishers off that flank were more or less evenly matched, while the Macedonian pikemen were well able to absorb the opening blow and then fix their hoplite foes in place. It's probable that the phalangites had great benefit at this juncture from a certain amount of confusion among Pherae's mercenaries. Experienced though these were, they had never come up against an obstacle quite like that posed by the dense hedge of sarissai now barring their way.

  With action stalled elsewhere, Philip and the elite fighters on his right wing now must have set about their lethal work. This delivered a swift victory that would have had both infantry and mounted components. The king's heavy footmen surely led the way, using their greater depth to push through the opposing ranks. And even as this was happening, his companion cavalry must have chased away its opposite numbers and curled in to further disrupt the enemy line. Overwhelmed, the Pheraean left would then have fallen back to set a wholesale withdrawal into motion. Given heavy pressure from surging hoplites and darting hetairoi alike, there had to have been some serious bloodletting around the flank where the initial collapse took place. However, both the center and right side of the beaten army faced less mobile phalangites and, with a good bit of help from their light forces, they should have taken lighter damage. Overall, Pherae's losses might have come to around 1,000 hoplites, horsemen and skirmishers killed (roughly 12 percent of its army). The butcher's bill for Philip was no doubt much lower at perhaps 200 men or fewer each from his heavy and light contingents.

  Though far from an even match, this first encounter between the new Macedonian and old Doric phalanxes was a clear-cut victory for the former. And it certainly impressed the Thes salian League cities. They were now more eager than ever to maintain their relationship with Philip and his formidable military machine.

  Crenides, Grabaea and Odrysia I (356 B.C.)

  Recovered from his southern foray, Philip turned in early spring toward Crenides. This Greek colony, a recent foundation sitting inland some 65km east of Amphipolis, was seeking his help to fend off a Thracian coalition that included both local tribesmen and western Odrysians. Led by Cersobleptes, the latter were part of a now divided people that had long held sway over much of Thrace. The main appeal of this undertaking was the opportunity to gain control of Crenides' underdeveloped gold and silver mines, which held the promise of financing Philip's growing ambitions.

  Philip must have moved out with most of the armament recently employed against Pherae plus a few men from Crenides. The Thracians seem to have taken position in force nearby. Their leader, Cersobleptes, was one of a trio of Odrysian kings and thus likely had only a third the numbers later ascribed to his tribe as a whole. His infantry therefore would have amounted to no more than 8,000-9,000 peltasts and other skirmishers (6,000-7,000 of his own plus some allies from the immediate area). Not only were these fewer footmen than Philip could deploy, but their light arms denied them the shock potential needed to challenge a phalanx head-on. Cersobleptes did, however, hold an edge in the size of his mounted contingent, which probably had 3,000-4,000 riders (including a thousand or so locals). He therefore must have taken his stand on open terrain. This gave his horsemen free rein off the wings, where they might achieve dominance while their infantry compatriots kept the enemy at bay with missile fire in the middle of the field. Having encountered similar tactics in Paeonia, Philip was able to duplicate his victory there with relative ease. Mounted cover and ready routes for escape would have allowed for a running retreat that limited Thracian losses somewhat; regardless, the engagement was still decisive and taught an obvious lesson: light-armed forces like those of Thrace had little chance in pitched battle against Macedonia's potent new blend of heavy infantry and shock cavalry.

  Philip next besieged Potidaea, a key site on the tri-pronged peninsula of Chalcidice. Surviving sources present a confused chronology at this point, but the most consistent interpretation is that Philip became aware in early summer of a pending Athenian bargain with several of his regional foes. These were the Illyrian Grabaei (under Grabus), some resurgent Paeonian tribes (led by Lyppeius) and eastern Odrysians (under Centriporis). Once agreed, these three parties would act as Athens' proxies in its war with Macedonia. It would take the speediest of actions to preempt this developing menace and, rather than abandoning the ongoing investment, Philip took the bold step of splitting his forces. Thus, the king's most trusted general, Parmenio, immediately headed west with the bulk of the national host. He was to first strike the Illyrians and then move against Paeonia. Meanwhile, Philip himself would finish off Potidaea before dealing with the new Thracian threat in the east.

  Parmenio was well qualified for this job, having gained a wealth of e
xperience commanding the left side of the phalanx in all its previous actions. We can only guess at manpower for his campaign, but a force similar to that sent to Illyria two years earlier seems reasonable. This would have been around 6,000 phalangites (nearly all Macedonian citizens by this time), 2,000 hoplites (maybe still a mix of hired men and hypaspists, though mostly the latter), 2,000 light foot troops and 800 hetairoi. The horsemen were a bit over half the companions in service given likely growth over the last year. Standing on the other side was a tribal gathering that could have nearly matched the earlier army of Bardylis at something like 6,000-7,000 spearmen, 2,000-3,000 foot skirmishers and 300-400 horsemen.

  Diodorus' brief account of the Macedonian campaigns of mid-356 (16.22.3) indicates that the Illyrians, having lost to Philip two years ago, gave way without much effort. Yet it was actually the Dardanians who had suffered that defeat and not the Grabaei, whose lands lay untouched well north of Dardania. Moreover, Plutarch claimed (vol. II, Alexander, 141) that Parmenio bested the Grabaei in a "great battle" that Philip heard about on the same day that he learned of his son Alexander's birth. Thus, we can be fairly certain that a major action did indeed take place, likely resulting in a near point for point repeat of Philip's triumph at Lyncus Plain. As for the king, he had by this time taken Potidaea, which he promptly turned over to its rivals in the Chalcidian League (Diodorus 16.8.3, 5-6; Demosthenes 6.20). This shrewd move was requisite if Philip was to put a second army of adequate strength into the field, Potidaea being the price for an alliance with the Chalcidians' muscular military, which likely amounted to 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 horsemen (Demosthenes 19.230, 266) plus 2,000-3,000 foot skirmishers. Now in possession of a deep pool of allied manpower and with Parmenio securing his rear, Philip set out for Thrace.