With nowhere to run, some of the beaten soldiers tried to give up, while others shed their gear and plunged into the sea in an attempt to reach a few Athenian ships that had rowed close to shore. A horrific massacre now took place that saw thousands either cut down where they stood or drowned, Onomarchos himself being among those meeting a watery death. The final price for the Phocians and their hirelings reached 6,000 dead (30 percent) with another 3,000 surrendering. Philip lashed out afterwards with great brutality, crucifying the Phocian leader's lifeless body and drowning his captives in the prescribed punishment for sacrilege.
Rather than moving south against Phocis in the battle's wake, Philip instead resumed his siege of Pherae. With that city's garrison and Chares' fleet still intact, it must have seemed sound to deal with these right away lest they come to menace his route home. And Chares would shortly validate that concern by striking for a small but galling victory. Our sources are quite sketchy on this action (see the excellent summary of Pritchett [1974, 80-81]), but the most logical and consistent interpretation suggests that the Athenian took advantage of Philip's withdrawal after Crocus Plain to pursue his original mission against Pagasae. Landing nearby, he was able to rapidly unship his men and advance on the port. Based on going rates and the fact that Chares later received a sum of 60 talents to cover the cost of his troops, he probably had as many as 4,000 hired hoplites with him. Light support for these would have come from some ship's archers and a large number of javelin-armed rowers.
Standing in opposition was Adaios, who normally led Philip's mercenaries. He had apparently remained behind at Pagasae to guard against just this kind of problem. Adaios' strength is highly uncertain, yet must have been but a portion of his usual command, consisting of somewhat fewer men than Chares had brought. The Macedonian should have kept within his walls until help arrived, but patience wasn't his long suit. Known as "The Cock" for his aggressive style, Adaios emerged to challenge Chares in open battle. Perhaps aided by a third or better edge in heavy-armed manpower, the Athenian's phalanx delivered a crushing defeat to Adaios, taking his life in the process. Still, things could have gone worse for Philip, since Chares lacked proper light-armed resources to mount an effective pursuit. As a result, the king's men probably took less than devastating losses (5-10 percent) before retiring inside Pagasae.
Athens' leaders had reacted rapidly after learning of Onomarchos' defeat, sending 5,000 citizen hoplites and 400 horsemen to block the pass at Thermopylae and preempt a march on Phocis. This proved prudent when Philip gained a quick surrender from Pherae in return for allowing its dictator, Lychophron, to leave with 2,000 of his mercenaries. There was no way now for Chares to sustain a threat to the Macedonian rear and his retreat freed Philip to head south. However, he chose to go home instead, satisfied with having added Thessaly to his domain. The way was then clear for Phayllos to pick up his brother's mantle at Phocis and promptly put together another army. Taking in combat survivors and the escapees from Pherae, he also tapped the wealth of Delphi to contract fresh troops. The Sacred War was thus destined to drag on in spite of what had looked like a decisive battle at Crocus Plain.
Phrygia and Lydia
In the same period that Philip II was overcoming the initial challenges to his career and country, another new monarch was facing like trials overseas. Artaxerxes III (Ochus) had come to the throne of Persia upon his father's death in 358. Mindful of his nation's woes during the recent satrapal revolts, he moved to head off more of the same by instructing that the last of the mercenary garrisons used to challenge royal authority be disbanded. Timing of this order isn't certain, but it likely came no later than 356. However, rather than precluding a new uprising, the decree actually reenergized open conflict when two of the affected governors refused to obey. Thus, Artaxerxes unexpectedly found himself having to send troops out to once more deal with mutinies strong in paid Greek fighters.
Phyrgia I, Sardis II and Tmolos Camp (355 B.c.)
How large was the counterinsurgency effort? At the start of Artaxerxes' reign, hoplitefronted units of kardakes like those created in the late 370s by Datames likely cored Persia's regular army. Drafted out of special military colonies, divisions (baivaraba) of these warriors formed a combined-arms force along the main line of battle while cavalry and screening footmen supported forward and off the wings. Based on past campaigns and others from later in the 4th century, an all-out effort would have been on the order of eight baivaraba with additional bodyguards should a monarch be present. But for a lesser expedition such as that of 355, a force of only about half that size seems more probable. This suggests no more than four divisions of footmen and a like number of cavalry regiments with supporting skirmishers. Wishing to deal at once with both revolts, and no doubt expecting only weak resistance, the royals split into two columns, one headed for Phyrgia and the other marching on toward Mysia. Each of these task forces at 80 percent establishment strength would have had 16,000 line infantry and 1,600 cavalry plus some light footmen. This is consistent with a report (Olmstead 1948, 425) that Artaxerxes ordered a force of 20,000 men (nominal for two baivaraba) be deployed into Phyrgia.
Artabazus led the revolt in Phyrgia as governor of that satrapy. He gathered cavalry from sympathetic local Persian settlers, enrolled native Phrygian javelinmen and sought to obtain a force of heavy infantry. He did the latter by reaching out to Chares, the general prosecuting Athens' ongoing Social War against its rebellious Asian allies. Chares duly delivered an army that seems to have had both Greek and (per Isocrates 8.42) Asian troops, the latter presumably including Ionian and Carian spearmen recently put on the market by the Great King's ban. Seeing some potential advantages, Athens turned a blind eye to this move, doing so in part because it lacked funds to pay the mercenaries anyway. Artabazus, who on his own had "only a few soldiers" (Diodorus 16.22.1), could now surprise his foes with quite a large hoplite phalanx under an experienced and able field commander.
What was the size of the rebel armament? Parke (1933, 122) has proposed that Chares headed a force in which some 10,000 mercenaries taken in from former satrapal garrisons formed only a portion. This would fall into line with the suggestion of Demosthenes (4.19) that Athens' hired armies at this time could have some 10,000-20,000 men "on paper." Likewise, Diodorus described the 5,000 soldiers that Artabazus later acquired via Thebes as "an auxiliary force" (16.33.4), implying that the satrap's army (inherited from Chares) was larger still. We might then propose a possible parade strength of some 15,000 men. This would likely have been around 12,000 hoplites and 3,000 (20 percent) in light infantry. Local troops would then have added to Chares' muster in the form of the aforementioned Phrygian peltasts and horsemen.
Chares was able to defeat the troops sent against Artabazus, a feat that he compared to Athens' victory at Marathon in a boastful letter home (Parke 1933, 123). Unfortunately, we lack details on this action, and Diodorus' spare report seriously overstates the scale of the fight in citing a Persian deployment of more than 70,000 men. Nevertheless, even the much smaller armies proposed here suggest quite a sizeable engagement. In fact, battle lines likely stretched more than 1.5km for the heavy corps alone (filed ten-deep for the kardakes and at around eight for Chares' hoplites). The rebels seem to have kept Persian cavalry from sweeping their flanks, either through use of terrain or by exploiting an advantage in light footmen. This let their hoplites break through the kardakes' leading rows of spearmen. The lightly armed Persian afterranks would then have rapidly lost an uneven fight and beat a swift retreat. Given their strong edge in mounted forces for cover, the imperials no doubt got away without undue slaughter. Their dead might thus have been some 10-12 percent of the infantry deployed. Fatalities among the insurgents would have been significantly less, yet may still have reached 5 percent. Toward the upper end for victors in a phalanx battle, this reflects casualties inflicted by the kardakes' missilemen in addition to those normally absorbed as a result of shock combat. As it turned out, this action would earn Ath
ens considerable blowback. The Great King threatened to retaliate with a large naval force and compelled the Athenians to bring Chares home and concede the Social War.
Meanwhile, things initially took quite a different turn for the other insurgency in progress. Here, the satrap Aroandus (Orontes) had awaited the king's response to his uprising on open ground near Sardis in Lydia. He had a force of 12,000-13,000 Greek heavy infantry that he backed with horsemen (and probably javelinmen as well) from his home province of Mysia. It seems that Aroandus suffered a defeat in his first encounter with the king's men. Again, we have no details, leaving it open as to why the rebel effort fell short. However, given Aroandus' strength in spearmen, this most likely was a case of poor flank security allowing Persian mounted forces to envelop a wing. All the same, the satrap seems to have escaped with a good portion of his army intact (losses perhaps approaching 20 percent versus 3-5 percent for the opposition).
Aroandus took up a strong position with his surviving troops inside a fortified camp on nearby Mount Tmolos (Polyaenus 7.14.2, Excerpts 19.2.5). Investing this site, the Persians couldn't prevent their foe from making a nighttime sortie with his cavalry against their supply line along the road to Sardis. The renegade satrap then coordinated a sally out of the camp with a surprise strike from his horsemen against the enemy rear. Taken front and back, the besiegers fell apart as the Greeks killed many and captured others at little cost to themselves (maybe 1-3 percent fatalities). Aroandus later tested the discipline of his remaining contingent of about 10,000 hoplites, having them hold fast against a large-scale cavalry attack near Cyme (Polyaenus 7.14.3). He next ravaged Lydia and marched on Ephesos, where the fearsome reputation of his mercenaries gave him a bloodless triumph. This came when he disguised some of his Asians as Grecian spearmen and their foes fled after seeing these faux fighters maneuver to commands in Greek (Olmstead 1948, 428)
Phrygia II and III (354 B.c.)
Artabazus cast about for a Greek partner to replace Athens and found the Thebans willing. Thebes sent Pammenes to Phrygia along with a 5,000-man mercenary force, probably consisting of 4,000 hoplites and the rest light infantry. Their pact no doubt called for the rebel leader to pick up the tab for both the general (directly enriching Thebes) and his men. The agreement gave Artabazus not only an excellent phalanx tactician to lead his army, but also pumped that force up to something like 15,000 hoplites, 3,000-4,000 skirmishers and a small yet effective contingent of cavalry. It's likely that the imperial reaction was to double down on a single front. This called for gathering the four baivaraba split between two efforts during 355 into a united force, ignoring Aroandus for the moment so as to concentrate entirely on Phrygia. As a result, Persia now marched on Artabazus with something like 32,000 kardakes and 3,200 horsemen plus proportional light infantry support.
These armies clashed twice in what Diodorus called "great battles" (16.34.2), the rebels winning out each time. That there were two engagements indicates that, regardless of how clearcut a tactical success the first might have been for Pammenes, its strategic impact was modest enough to require a rematch. Once again, we might suspect that the Greek hoplites enjoyed enough flank protection to allow their penetration of the kardakes' fore-ranks, yet screening by its much larger mounted contingent then let the Persian host retreat at less than ruinous cost. If so, perhaps only about 10 percent of the imperial footmen died against 1-3 percent among their foes. Accounts in Frontinus (2.3.3) and Polyaenus (5.16.2, Excerpts 19.3) of what must have been Pammenes' second action in Phrygia appear to support this idea. Though a bit confused on some points, these seem to portray the Greek commander's countering of horsemen as being critical to then gaining a decisive victory with that Theban tactical specialty of long standing, an unbalanced hoplite array.
The most straightforward reading of our sources suggests that Pammenes faced off against the kardakes (these standing in what Polyaenus called a "phalanx") along a front some 2.5km wide. This reflected around 26,000 Persians (a roughly 20 percent reduction due to deaths and wounds from the previous action) filing ten-deep and some 14,000 Greek spearmen (reduced about 5 percent) in an arrangement favoring their right wing (that half of the formation standing eight-deep versus only four on the left). Cavalry took post off either end, with the imperials targeting a heavier mounted effort against Pammenes' left. Closed into combat, the wily Theban withdrew the light forces shielding his left, playing upon his foe's hopes that they could turn the battle on that wing. Keeping enough skirmishers to check enemy cavalry on his right, he then sent his own horsemen from there to attack the rear of the pursuing Persian riders and foot skirmishers across the way. This caught these foes in a vice when their supposed quarry spun about to hit from the front as well. With the opposition's mobile units now broken on the left and stalled elsewhere, Pammenes and his deep right wingers broke through the kardakes and put them to rout. Having been at least partially enveloped and with more than half their screening cavalry in disarray, the Persians must have suffered serious casualties (possibly 20-30 percent killed and many more wounded).
Despite its triumphs on the field of battle, the Phrygian revolt ultimately came to naught when Artabazus put a relative in Pammenes' place. This caused his army to eventually fall apart and sent him into exile at the court of Philip II. As for Aroandus, his uprising seems to have persisted for some time, as we hear of Athens concluding a commercial treaty with him in 349 (Olmstead 1948, 435). However, Artaxerxes appears to have regained control over the rebel satrap's territory by the mid-340s.
Phocis, Boeotia and the Peloponnese
The Sacred War continued to rage as Phayllos replaced the fallen Onomarchos and drew funds from Delphi to hire yet another army. He spread gifts around and called upon his allies in this. Per Diodorus (16.37.1-4), Sparta sent 1,000 foot soldiers, Athens 5,000 infantry and 400 horsemen, the exiled tyrants of Pherae threw in with 2,000 more mercenaries and some of the lesser states gave support as well. Adding these assets to what might have been another 1,500 footmen and 500 riders from his own militia, the Phocian warlord thus fielded perhaps 7,500 hoplites, 2,000 skirmishers and 900 in cavalry for a march into Boeotian territory.
Orchomenos, Cephissus River, Coronea III and Naryx II (352 B.c.)
Phayllos met the Boeotians along the shore of Lake Copais near the city of Orchomenos. We've no figures for the Boeotian force in the campaign of 352; however, based on past deployments, it might have been at worst only slightly smaller than that present for Phocis at some 7,000 hoplites, 700 horsemen and 2,500 in light infantry. In the ensuing battle, the Boeotians proved superior, besting Phayllos and causing him to lose "a great number of men" (Diodorus 16.37.5). What this means is debatable, but a heavy beating might well have cost the Phocian around 10-15 percent of his army at the price of a mere 1-3 percent for his foes. Still, Phayllos and most of his troops managed to get away in good enough shape to fall back westward and fight again alongside the Cephissus River just north and east of Chaeronea. But the Phocian wasn't able to do any better than before, going down to defeat with the loss of more than 900 killed and captured after probably inflicting no greater damage on his enemy than in their first engagement, though he did escape once again with most of his army intact. In both these encounters we can suspect that the Boeotian hoplites had been able to carry the engagement by rolling up a wing with a heavier allotment of troops along that part of the line per their standard practice since at least the days of Epaminondas. However, effective cover from the Phocians' skirmishers and cavalry let them retreat in reasonably good order that they might live to fight another day.
Though twice bested in the field at full strength, Phayllos was unwilling to give up on his campaign and seems to have settled on hitting back at the enemy by sending out small raiding parties. A common enough practice for invading Greek armies when holding a numerical advantage (as seen in Ozolian Locris in 356), this was a questionable approach where the Phocians had no such edge. Close to Coronea, the Boeotians (perhaps a full r
egiment of 1,000 hoplites, 100 riders and 350 light footmen) caught maybe 400 or so spearmen (an under-manned lochos) operating detached from the main body of their army with some 100 skirmishers and a like force of cavalry. The Boeotians overwhelmed these troops, quite possibly pulling off a double envelopment, and killed 50 while taking another 130 prisoner.
Finally, despairing of success in Boeotia, Phayllos turned northward into Locris. His luck now improved, as he was able to capture several cities there by one means or another. However, he had a setback at Naryx, which he'd taken by treachery only to then be expelled with a loss of 200 men. Leaving elements behind to prosecute a siege, Phayllos retired with his main force on Abai just inside the Phocian border. He then took heavy losses in a Boeotian night attack on his encampment and chose to retreat deeper into his homeland. The Boeotians followed with a sweep into Phocis' territory that netted a fair amount of booty. They next swung back to break the investment of Naryx with an army that after three victories in the field and a successful camp assault still probably numbered some 6,000 hoplites, 600 riders and 2,000 light infantrymen. But Phayllos wasn't through and had trailed his foes with a still potent host that might have counted 5,000 spearmen, 1,000-1,500 skirmishers and 600-800 horsemen. Taking advantage of the Boeotians' laxness, he sprang an unexpected attack that chased their hurriedly formed array from the field and probably inflicted fair casualties (5-10 percent) at very little cost (1 or 2 percent). Phayllos went on to re-take and plunder Naryx, but this would prove the swan song of his less than glorious career when he shortly thereafter died after suffering from a wasting disease.
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 23
