Though Phocis had now lost its third warlord in as many years, it was still game. Phalaeccus, the son of Onomarchos, advanced to the leadership in accordance with the deathbed wishes of his uncle, who also directed that the youth be overseen by Mnaseas, an experienced general. This arrangement was short lived, however, as Mnaseas soon fell victim along with some 200 other Phocians to a Boeotian night attack reminiscent of the one at Abai. Now on his own, the inexperienced Phalaeccus then suffered a reverse in a mounted fight near Chaeronea, losing "a large number of his cavalry" (Diodorus 16.38.7). Still, the war would not end. Phalaeccus managed to retain his position through the rest of that year and the next four as well by engaging in numerous small actions while avoiding a major battle.
Orneai I and II, Telphusa and Messenia I-III (352 B.c.)
Even as the Sacred War devolved into a series of minor border clashes in the later half of 352, another conflict arose in the Peloponnese. Sparta had chosen this time when its old enemy Thebes was busy in central Greece to wage war on the Theban-allied Messenians of Megalopolis. The Megalopolitans couldn't match the Spartans and called for help. This came right away from their fellow Messenians plus Sicyon, while Argos also joined the cause and more distant Thebes sent 4,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry to their aid. But before the Argives could muster and the Thebans arrive, the Spartan king Archidamus III (Agesilaos' son now on the throne) led out his army.
Archidamus had perhaps 4,000 of his own hoplites (four of six moral), nearly 500 cavalry and some modest light infantry when he advanced out of Sparta to meet reinforcements from Phocis (3,000 mercenary hoplites) and the exiles of Pherae (150 horsemen). Striking with dispatch, he invaded Argos and took Orneai. It was outside that city where he then fought a battle with the Argives. Based on casualties, Argos had gathered only about 60 percent of its army on short notice, fielding some 4,000 hoplites with maybe 1,000 or so foot skirmishers and a mere handful of cavalry. Considering this estimate of strength, the Argives' decision to accept battle appears rash. However, it might well have been colored by high passions (in the wake of so sudden a strike on their homeland) as well as poor scouting that missed the mercenaries attached to Sparta's usual manpower. Regardless of the odds, the men of Argos assembled their formation, engaged Archidamus and promptly got beat. Argos seems to have lost 200 of its men in this action (Diodorus 16.39.4). In fact, at 5 percent of its hoplites, this would have been quite typical for a bested phalanx that suffered the sort of weak pursuit normally associated with Spartan victories. Archidamus' losses must have been very light in contrast, perhaps amounting to no more than 1-3 percent.
The men from Thebes now arrived under Cephision, who regrouped the Argives and collected the rest of his allies. Replacing casualties and adding perhaps 2,000-3,000 hoplites from Sicyon and 3,000-4,000 Messenians, he now had twice as many spearmen as Archidamus. Yet Diodorus claimed that his collection of militiamen was "inferior in discipline" (16.39.4); and, indeed, when finally engaged against the more steady Spartans and mercenaries, it came up short. In an action once more near Orneai, the armies must have spent most of the day organizing, with Archidamus setting up by late afternoon in a phalanx four or six shields deep to counter enemy files of eight or twelve. The ensuing fight proved to be both stubborn and lengthy. With exhaustion setting in, Cephision saw that his troops had made very little progress despite their edge in heavy manpower and decided to withdraw. Backing away behind a screen of cavalry and skirmishers, the Theban ceded both field and fight to Sparta. Neither party was likely to have been badly hurt, with losses maybe coming to less than 3 percent on either side. Yet in now disbanding, the allies would give Archidamus a strategic success to go with the tactical one his crack hoplites had so brilliantly earned in combat. Turning about, the Spartans sacked the Messenians' Arcadian ally Helisson and marched home.
When the coalition army broke up, its Peloponnesian troops went back to their own cities while the Thebans relocated to Megalopolis. At this point, it seems that the Spartans began spoiling districts tied to Megalopolis using small contingents of their Phocian hirelings and Thessalian cavalry, but the Boeotians caught one such raiding party near Telphusa in Arcadia. The mercenaries, maybe a lochos of 400-500 men, were likely badly outmanned by a Theban regiment of hoplites and horsemen with nominal complements of 1,000 and 100 respectively. The Boeotians drove their foes off, killing perhaps 20 percent of them in an action with chase that also took more than 60 captive along with their commander. Nor did this turn out to be an isolated incident, as two more of these detached elements fell victim to the Thebans under what must have been similar circumstances, the only likely variation being that they were probably operating on actual Messenian rather than nearby allied soil.
This infuriating string of minor reverses spurred the Spartans to action. They marched out in search of a decisive engagement and found their enemy obliging. We've no details on the resulting combat, but Diodorus distinguished it from the foregoing small encounters by calling it "an important battle" (16.39.6). This suggests that it pitted the full strength immediately to hand on both sides. As such, the Spartans (presumably once more led by Archidamus) could have deployed some 6,000-7,000 hoplites (4,000 of their own and the rest mercenaries) and better than 600 horsemen (including over 100 from Thessaly) along with a force of foot skirmishers. The Thebans and Messenians were able to match this with 6,000-7,000 spearmen, 500 riders and plenty of light infantry. Tellingly though, the disparity in troop quality that had brought Cephision to grief at Orneai had not gone away. Therefore, the Spartans, who had essentially equal manpower this time, carried the day with what must have been relative ease. As before, we might suspect that there were less than devastating casualties on the losing side as a consequence of enduring no more than a short pursuit. Whatever the costs, this battle brought the current round of warfare in the Peloponnese to an end, sending the bested Thebans home and allowing the Spartans to gain an armistice to their liking from Megalopolis.
Chalcidice, Euboa and Central Greece
Other conflicts came to the fore in the early 340s as fighting dropped to low ebb in the Sacred War. The first of these was in the far north, where the Greek cities of the Chalcidian League had a long record of interfering in Macedonia and now once more took to meddling with their neighbor's affairs in violation of the treaty that they had signed with Philip back in 357. It seems that their offense was to harbor the king's two surviving half-brothers, whom he had chased into exile when first coming to the throne. Philip naturally took strong exception and promptly invaded when the Chalcidians failed to give these men over.
Olynthus III and IV (348 B.C.)
Philip moved against the Chalcidice in 349, bringing 4,000 hypaspists, 12,000 phalangites, 3,000 of his own foot skirmishers and 1,200 hetairoi as well as perhaps some 7,500 heavy and light mercenary infantry. His initial victim was the town of Stageira, which he razed so brutally after a siege that several other sites then gave up peacefully and accepted garrisons of Philip's hirelings to avoid the same fate. Philip briefly broke off to deal with trouble in Thessaly, but came back by spring 348. Meanwhile, the Chalcidian center at Olynthus, clearly his ultimate target, sent for help to Athens, where Demosthenes presented its case. The Athenians (Spence [1993, 1251 from Philochoros) sent Chares with a contingent of mercenaries that totaled 2,000 javelinmen and 150 in cavalry. Later, they pulled Charidemus from the Chersonese to replace Chares along with another 4,000 peltasts and 150 horsemen (Worthington 2008, 197). Operating in the company of strong local forces, Charidemus hit some of the places that had fallen to Philip, yet couldn't prevent a final descent on Olynthus.
When the Chalcidians finally confronted Philip as he closed on their capital, they probably fielded around 10,000 hoplites, 1,300 horsemen (including the 300 from Athens) and up to 9,000 peltasts (Athenian mercenaries plus locals). The Macedonian monarch would have set up to meet this menace with his hypaspists on the far right at a likely depth of twelve and mercenary spearmen (maybe only
4,000 after providing garrisons) next left standing eight-deep, completing his phalanx with phalangites in files of ten. The companion cavalry must have then split off either end of the line to be joined after some forward skirmishing by all the light infantry. Compelled to match fronts, the Chalcidians no doubt filed their own heavy infantry at under eight shields, dividing riders and foot skirmishers outboard on either side. There is no surviving description of the battle that followed; yet, given their vast strength in light footmen, it's doubtful that it was a failure on the Greeks' flanks that brought about their defeat. The Chalcidians more likely found themselves stymied on the right, where there was nothing to be had regardless of how hard they raged against the overlapping rows of opposing pikes. At the same time, Philip's deeper array had been steadily forcing back League spearmen on the other wing. Breaking through the Chalcidian left, his hypaspists must finally have sent the whole enemy formation into retreat with a threatened turning around that flank. Their edge in foot skirmishers would then have again favored the Greeks, cutting losses by giving cover to allow a withdrawal absent strong pursuit.
Having battered the enemy without delivering a knockout blow, Philip pressed on toward Olynthus only to have the Chalcidians regroup and combat him once more. Scope of this second engagement could have been very similar to that of the first, with that earlier clash likely having claimed but few casualties (possibly no more than 1 percent in fatalities for the winners and at most 5 percent for the losers). However, the rematch would yield more decisive results. Again probably besting the Greek left wing, Philip's men undoubtedly instilled much greater panic in their beaten foes this time. The Chalcidians failed to screen as effectively and/or keep any semblance of order in their retreat as the Macedonians dealt them severe damage, taking tolls both physical (possibly 12-15 percent killed) and mental that drained much of the remaining fight from the Greeks. Following up this victory, Philip invested Olynthus while the Athenians sent yet another allotment of troops that tallied 2,000 citizen hoplites (more or less equal to combined Chalcidian losses to date) and 300 horsemen. Unfortunately for Olynthus, these reinforcements wouldn't arrive in time, as the city fell to internal treachery within a month and put an end to the Chalcidian League.
Tamynae (348 B.C.)
The other major conflict of the early 340s outside the Sacred War arose on Euboa, The Athenians had pulled that large island on their eastern coast back under their control in 357, but a new independence movement arose under Callias, tyrant of the Euboan city of Chalcis. Athens dispatched Phocion to Euboa with a modest force, intending for him to fill out his ranks with local men and then put an end to Callias' plans. But once on the scene, the Athenian general found the situation much worse than expected and was forced to fight for his very survival.
Euboan manpower might have come to some 3,000-3,500 hoplites based on the force sent in concert by the islanders to Nemea River in 394. Callias seems to have held the upper hand and may have had 2,000-2,500 of these, leaving his foe, Plutarch of Eritrea, with some 1,0001,500. Both would have had small local cavalry forces as well as bodies of hired spearmen. Callias' brother had brought in mercenaries from Phocis (Aeschines 3.87) and Plutarch's account (vol. II Phocion, 253) attests to the like-named Euboan leading such troops in battle as well. Again, we've no numbers, but can hazard a guess that there were around 1,000-2,000 hirelings on each side. As for Phocion, he probably sailed with only the tribal taxis of Pandionis (Aeschines 2.169) of no more than 1,000 hoplites along with what was likely a squadron of a hundred horsemen (Demosthenes 21.132-4). If so, he would have at best merely evened the odds.
Phocion had obviously expected stronger support; moreover, his allies were muddled, with everything being "in confusion" per Plutarch. This led him to take up a defensive stance near Tamynae where he could organize. Here, he sent to Athens for reinforcements (Demosthenes 21.162) and built a fortified camp on high ground set apart by a water-cut ravine from the level plain near town. His situation was very precarious, with no easy escape route through the highlands behind and the enemy moving into Tamynae to entrench and cut off access to the sea forward. Some of his local allies deserted at this point. Seeing his position deteriorate, Phocion realized that he needed to break out and, wary of the town's defenses, had his men stand to arms while he extended pre-battle sacrifices so as to give the opposing army time to emerge onto open ground. However, his local compatriot Plutarch lost patience. As soon as a portion of the rebel force emerged, he sallied with his mercenaries, apparently hoping to isolate and defeat the opposition's vanguard (likely some riders and their own hired spearmen). As a hasty infantry battle opened, Phocion's horsemen rushed forth to aid Plutarch, but did so in a haphazard fashion that caused their leading elements to be turned back and trigger a rout. And once the cavalry began to flee, Plutarch and his hoplites were soon to follow as Callias' mercenaries pressed on in a body, hoping now to follow up by capturing the Athenian fortification. It was at this crucial juncture that Phocion finally led out the remainder of his troops and went on the attack.
Phocion smashed into the hired men of Callias as they rushed ahead in poor order. Killing some outright, the Athenian forces cut down others as they tried to run. Phocion then pulled back and rapidly redressed his best men, these being the taxis from Athens and the more outstanding of his allies. Leaving a still jumbled Euboan majority behind to collect those of Plutarch's beaten corps now straggling back, he next led his 1,000-1,500 select troops against the enemy remnants of some 2,000-2,500 heavy militia under the Chalcian tyrant. A sharp action then ensued on the outskirts of Tamynae near its hippodrome. Phocion's horsemen rallied there to join their foot skirmishers on his flanks as the Athenians "showed themselves brave men, and conquered the enemy in a pitched battle" per Aeschines (3.88). Given that Aeschines, who fought here as a hoplite, went on to characterize those defeated as being "unworthy foes," it's likely that these inexperienced amateurs, despite probably standing nearly twice as deep, lost heart and simply gave way to hand Phocion the victory. However, Phocion's success on the battlefield did not end the rebellion, and Athens finally had to drop its hold on all the island's cities save Carystus.
Hyampolis, Coronea IV and Western Boeotia (347 B.C.)
The Third Sacred War had for some time been simmering without a significant field engagement, but in 347 things came to a higher boil. The Boeotians at that time crossed into Phocis to plunder the area around Hyampolis (Hya) where they defeated a counterstrike. Apparently of modest proportions, this action cost the losers 70 men, suggesting that they might have had 1,000-1,500 troops to start the fight, these perhaps being 1,000 or so hoplites with a few hundred light footmen and some cavalry. The Boeotians likely were operating with a full regiment of up to 1,000 spearmen, 100 riders and 300-400 foot skirmishers. If so, this was a relatively even match and we don't have a record of how it was resolved; however, success on a wing by a larger and more capable Boeotian mounted contingent seems the probable solution.
The Phocians responded quickly to this setback. Regrouped and probably reinforced, they returned to chase the raiders back into Boeotia, bringing them to battle near Coronea. Perhaps very similar in scope to the action at Hyampolis, the combat went in Phocis' favor this time and Diodorus noted (16.56.2) that their foes "lost many men" (maybe 100 or more at 10-12 percent). This exchange of small victories was followed by another raid by the Boeotians, who reacted to the loss of several towns by marching into Phocis and destroying grain fields. The Phocians again responded by mounting a pursuit that caught the raiding force on its way home. The resulting battle probably was much like the summer's earlier actions in size, involving less than 2,000 hoplites on either side with proportional light-armed support. Phocian arms gained yet another small triumph in this engagement that let them pay back their foe's spoiling of crops by killing maybe 5-10 percent at but a small price to themselves (no more than 1-3 percent lost).
These border clashes had turned up the heat, and in 346 the Sacred War
threatened to once more explode into a wider ranging conflict as Phocis appealed to Sparta and Athens while the Boeotians turned to Macedonia. The Spartans obliged by sending their king Archidamus with 1,000 men (seemingly a mora of citizen hoplites on this occasion) and the Athenians provided a fleet of 50 well-manned ships. Philip trumped this aid by then marching south with a large army. Phocis' Phalaeccus had some 8,000 hired spearmen to go along with his allied forces in opposition, but still felt that he was no match for the Macedonians. He therefore negotiated a settlement that let him retire with his mercenaries to the Peloponnese (some of these hirelings would attach themselves to Archidamus a few years later and campaign with him on behalf of Taras in southern Italy, where the Spartan fell in a skirmish at Manduria in 338.) Phocis was now left with neither warlord nor army and surrendered to Philip, bringing an end at last to the Third Sacred War after ten long and bloody years.
Phoenicia and Egypt
Persia's Artaxerxes III had failed in a campaign against Egypt in 351 and was not able to mount another effort to regain that highly prized holding until the mid-340s. At that time, he began gathering troops and caching supplies for a truly massive expedition. However, he suffered an annoying setback in these preparations when the Phoenicians suddenly revolted in 345.
Sidon (345 B.c.)
The satraps Belesys of Syria and Mazaeus of Cilicia were first to respond to the uprising in Phoenicia, moving against the rebel center at Sidon in hopes of quickly resolving the situation. Their army's makeup is extremely speculative, but might have consisted of royal units on hold in their provinces pending the march on Egypt. These likely would have been two infantry divisions plus two regiments of cavalry with supporting light footmen. At 80 percent nominal strength, such an armament would have had some 16,000 kardakes and 1,600 riders backed by a force of peltasts.
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 24
