Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC
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The Phoenicians added hired fighters to their citizen soldiers and asked for aid from Egypt. That ally sent 4,000 hoplites under a Rhodian named Mentor (Diodorus 16.42.2). Perhaps fielding a Persian styled division of native heavy footmen (similar to hoplites, but with dual-purpose spears) beside a force of locally subscribed mercenaries to equal those obtained from Egypt, the insurgency could more than match the invading satraps. No account survives, but had all filed at a depth of ten, the armies would have spread their heavy units across 1,600m or so with cavalry and skirmishers off the wings. After engaging, Mentor and his men (probably on the far right) are likely to have rapidly broken their immediate foes, thus carrying the fight before any enemy mounted advantage could affect the outcome. Losses were no doubt quite light for the rebels (1-2 percent) and modest (3-6 percent) for even the losers in that they should have had a strong light-armed screen for their withdrawal. As it turned out, this action didn't achieve a lasting effect due to Mentor and his troops switching sides once the Persian monarch arrived with his whole host. Their defection set off a round of surrender that swiftly ended the rebellion and freed Artaxerxes to head on to Egypt.
Pelusium and Nile West Bank (344 B.c.)
The Persians reached the Nile after a difficult march and invested the fortress of Pelusium. Diodorus gives some overblown numbers for native elements of their army (16.40.6); however, these are more likely to have been eight baivaraba of kardakes plus another of royal guards along with nine regiments of cavalry (one a guards unit) and screening light infantry. Prior to any losses on the march, this provided something like 74,000 kardakes, 7,400 riders and as many as 16,000 foot skirmishers. Adding to these were a number of Greek contingents. Three of them were allied (Diodorus 16.43.2-4): 1,000 Theban spearmen under Lactates, 3,000 hoplites from Argos under Nicostratus and 6,000 Ionian spearmen from various cities. Also on hand was Mentor, the traitor at Sidon, who brought his band of around 3,000 hoplites. This yielded more than 100,000 combatants in an army larger than any seen since the invasion of Greece in 480.
Huge as the Persian host was, the Egyptian king Nectanebos (Nekht-har-hebi) had gathered a counter force of nearly equal magnitude (Diodorus 16.47.5-6). This included 20,000 Grecian mercenaries (perhaps 80 percent hoplites), nearly 20,000 Libyans (mostly Carthaginian-style heavy footmen) and six divisions of Egyptians with spears and large shields (60,000 men nominal, but perhaps more like 48,000 actual) from the caste known as "The Warriors." These troops held post within a number of strong points that guarded entrances to the Nile and other key sites. At Pelusium, 5,000 Greeks (likely 4,000 spearmen and 1,000 in light infantry) under the spartiate Philophron formed the garrison's backbone. And it was these hired men that drew first blood when Lactates' Thebans, camped close to the city's walls and, eager to display their skills, recklessly made an unsupported late day attempt on the fortress. Maybe 1,000 hoplites defending that portion of the walls sallied to engage the men from Thebes. Diodorus claimed (16.46.9) that these bitter rivals battled severely, with the fight coming to an inconclusive end only with the fall of night.
Artaxerxes broke his Greeks into three teams the next day. He let them keep their own generals, but paired one of his own men with each so as to prevent any more adventurism like that of Lactates and his band. The rash Thebans and 4,000 Ionians comprised one group, Mentor and his contingent another and the troops from Argos along with the rest of the Ionians made up the third. It was this last unit that shortly afterwards fought the campaign's pivotal engagement. This came after Nicostratus carried his men on 80 triremes through a canal to land and set up camp in a secluded district on the western side of the Nile. Unknown to him, the local mercenary chief, Cleinius the Coan, had this area under watch. Moving quickly, Cleinius attacked with at least 7,000 soldiers, possibly 5,000-6,000 hoplites with light infantry support. Undoubtedly posting large numbers of armed rowers on his flanks, Nicostratus formed up his 5,000 spearmen into phalanx formation and closed for a combat that saw his men earn a brilliant and crushing victory. Diodorus' figure of over 70 percent lost among those defeated (16.48.5) seems too high; still, it at least indicates that the losses were exceptional. The best explanation for such a lopsided result is a double envelopment. Aided by an overwhelming edge in lightarmed troops off the wings (the triremes could supply many thousands of skirmishers), Mentor's Argives probably folded in from either side to slaughter Cleinius and a startling number (maybe 30-60 percent) of his men.
Though Nectanebos' losses were to date far from crippling, he appears to have fallen into a profound funk. Ignoring his Greek military advisors, he retired to Memphis. His ensuing inactivity then led to one city after another falling to the Great King. Finally, Nectanebos accepted that his situation was hopeless and fled into Ethiopia as Artaxerxes reclaimed all of Egypt.
Timoleon's Campaigns on Sicily
Dionysius II was still holding onto power in Syracuse in his second tour as the city's despot; however, pressure had been building to once more overthrow his rule. Working with the tyrant Hicetas of Leontini, a group of Syracusans went to their mother city of Corinth for help. The Corinthians agreed to limited aid and sent out 700 soldiers (men who had served Phocis in the Third Sacred War [Parke 1933, 170; Trundle 2004, 701) under Timoleon. In his mid-60s at the time, this still hardy and energetic soldier had quite a reputation for hating tyrants, having been involved in the killing of a brother accused of plotting dictatorship.
Syracuse/Leontini (344 B.C.)
Hicetas had not stood idle during the discussions in Corinth, moving to invest Syracuse with an army perhaps approaching 10,000 strong. This was "a large force" per Diodorus (16.68.1), who was to later characterize 5,000 troops gathered at Adranum as being only the tyrant's "best soldiers" (16.68.9). On the upside, we might suspect 6,000-8,000 hoplites with 1,500-2,000 foot skirmishers and a few hundred horsemen. When this effort stalled after running low on supplies, Hicetas broke off and headed back to Leontini. Dionysius mounted a hot pursuit with a force that was probably not much smaller or he wouldn't have exposed it. As such, he may have had 6,000-6,500 spearmen and 1,000-1,500 light infantry plus some cavalry. But disaster was to befall the Syracusan despot as he overtook and struck at the rear of the retreating column. Without warning, his prey put about, formed a phalanx and counter-attacked to deadly effect. The Leontines promptly routed what must have been a shocked and unready opposing array, pursuing to bring down 3,000 among its broken remnants (Diodorus 16.68.3). Having lost perhaps 40 percent of his army, Dionysius could no longer offer an active threat and holed up on Ortygia while Hicetas overran the rest of Syracuse.
It now became clear that the Leontine tyrant meant to claim Syracuse on his own behalf and had for some time been secretly conspiring with Carthage toward that end (Plutarch Vol. I Timoleon, 330). With Dionysius shut in on Ortygia, he sent word to Timoleon (who had reached Rhegion three days after the fall of Syracuse) that he should turn back as there was no longer any need for his help. At the same time, a Carthaginian fleet arrived to bar the Corinthian's way. But Timoleon was able to slip past the blockade and make landfall on Sicily at Taruomenium. Meanwhile, Hicetas was operating against Adranum (Hadranum), which had rejected his rule. Sensing an opportunity for a surprise attack, Timoleon gathered up his Corinthian spearmen, added 300 hoplites from Taruomenium along with some foot skirmishers plus a few horsemen and set out for the siege site. Arriving undetected, he found Hicetas with 5,000 men encamped before the city. The Corinthian and his small force hit while their foes were at dinner; capturing the camp, they killed more than 300 men and took about 600 more as prisoners (Plutarch Vol. I Timoleon, 334)..
Before the dust had settled on this success, Timoleon marched with all possible speed to Syracuse. He was thus able to seize half of that city before those bested at Adranum could reach home and give warning. This left Syracuse cut in three pieces, with Timoleon holding the southern boroughs, Hicetas in control of Achradina on the northeast plus Epipolae to the northwest and Dionysius
still in place on Ortygia. Further complicating matters, a Punic fleet then sailed into the Great Harbor. Yet the situation was to turn in a flash, as Corinth sent more assistance (2,000 hoplites and 200 horsemen), local allies began flocking to Timoleon's cause and the Carthaginians, only reluctantly committed and suspicious of Hicetas, went home. Dionysius then went into exile for the final time and Hicetas, left with little support, fell back upon Leontini. Timoleon was now master of all Syracuse, where he set up a fairly inclusive, moderate oligarchy (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996, 1464, 1528; R.J.A Talbert in Tritle 1997, 155) and began restoring the city's depleted population.
Crimisus River (341 B.c.)
Timoleon continued to war with Hicetas and other tyrants in Sicily's Grecian east and became strapped for funds with which to pay his mercenaries. Launching a raid on Carthaginian holdings in the western corner of the triangular island, he restored Entella from Punic control and made away with a good deal of loot. Timoleon was thus able to put his hired troops on long term contract, but reaped considerable trouble for this affront when the Carthaginians retaliated. Their punitive campaign most probably came in the summer of 341, though alternative dates as late as 339 have been proposed.
The generals Hasdrubal and Hamilcar landed at Lilybaeum in westernmost Sicily with what Nepos called "a huge force" (22.2.4). Diodorus (16.77.4) and Plutarch (Vol. I Timoleon, 345) gave them 70,000 men (with Timaeus their likely common source) and Polyaenus 50,000 (5.12.3). However, overblown Greek claims for barbarian hosts are the norm and seem certain here. Plutarch's comment (and the implication of Diodorus) that the Punic foot soldiers came on a fleet of 200 oared ships with horses and other gear traveling aboard sail-driven transports sounds a much more realistic note and allows for a reasonable calculation of manpower. The Punic galleys cited in our sources were undoubtedly triremes. Though larger vessels had been introduced by the early 4th century, these were generally reserved for specialized tasks and were maintained in only very small numbers until Hellenistic times. Thus the trireme, which was more versatile as well as cheaper to build and run, remained the standard warship (Rodgers 1937, 203, 212). The trireme's carrying capacity was, in fact, only some 150 soldiers at most. This called for boosting its regular top load of 40 by replacing 110 rowers in two of its tiers of oars with passengers, thus relying on only a single tier for propulsion. As such, 200 of these vessels could have carried no more than 30,000 troops. Sabin (2007, 163) has proposed the same upside for this armament using a different set of criteria, while Warmington (1960, 46) likewise came up with an identical strength for the Punic host that sailed to Sicily in 480 by means of a similar 200-trireme fleet. Interestingly, these figures also nearly match Diodorus' toll of the expedition's losses (16.80.5). He pegged these at 27,500, possibly repeating a tradition on total manpower rather than just those who died and fell prisoner.
Common mixes of troop types indicate that the Carthaginians might have had a rough 60/40 ratio of heavy to light infantry with at least 3,000 riders (equal to 10 percent of their footmen). Hoplite-style shock fighters cored the infantry. These probably were divisions with nominal strengths of 3,000 and counted full citizens (an elite division known among the Greeks as The Sacred Band), Liby-Phoenician perioeci (two divisions) and Libyan mercenaries (three divisions). Mounted troops included both conventional cavalry as well as three-man driver/archer teams. These latter rode on four-horse chariots, possibly 200 of them per Diodorus' claim for captured rigs. The lighter infantry consisted of hired Iberians, Celts, Italian Gauls and Numidians as well as teams attached to the chariot corps.
Timoleon met this menace by first calling upon his Syracusans, but got a pitiful turnout of only 3,000 hoplites. Fortunately for him, Sicilian allies stepped up to fill the gap with another 5,000 spearmen. And in a shocking sign of how dire things were looking, Timoleon's foe Hicetas chipped in to bring the Corinthian's hired hoplites up to 4,000 strong. Adding 1,000 horsemen and maybe 3,000-4,000 foot skirmishers, Timoleon set out to preempt the enemy by meeting them in their own territory. He had a setback in route when a thousand of his mercenaries deserted, yet was still able to approach the Punic army without being seen. Cresting a hill in a pre-storm mist that helped hide his presence, Timoleon saw the enemy host to the west on the other side of a ford along the Crimisus River. The Carthaginians now handed Timoleon a great tactical gift. Dividing their forces by divisions, they began to wade through the water right below his position, setting events in play that would lead to a grand engagement put down in some detail by both Diodorus (16.80.1-5) and Plutarch (vol. I Timoleon, 345-348).
First across the river were the chariots with their squads of foot skirmishers. Next came the best heavy infantry, consisting of the Sacred Band and the Liby-Phoenicians. At this point, there were something like 10,000 troops on the eastern bank of the Crimisus. (Note that Diodorus put the Sacred Band at 2,500 to fit this calculation in round numbers; however, Plutarch listed 3,000 citizens [presumably the Sacred Band] among his casualties for a better match with what seems to have been the normal establishment for a Punic division. The difference is fairly small, but remains worth marking, as the lesser figure might account for a sub-unit of bodyguards initially posted with the expedition's leadership.) Seeing a chance to take on just half of the enemy's heavy footmen and but a third of their total manpower, Timoleon struck with dispatch, sending his cavalry on ahead as he followed with the infantry.
A fierce mounted action opened on the east side of the Crimisus. Timoleon's horsemen darted in and out against the charioteers, who cycled back and forth in front of their foot soldiers as these formed up for battle. The Greek riders couldn't break past the opposing machines and wheeled away on command to turn instead against the flanks of the Carthaginian infantry. As the chariots drew off in pursuit, Timoleon and his phalanx of 11,000 hoplites closed into shock contact with the Punic heavy array, which stood fully formed along the river with the Sacred Band in its accustomed slot on the right (Diodorus 20.10.6). The Greeks were likely filed at eight shields with Timoleon and 1,000 of the most capable of his mercenaries rightmost, the other 3,000 hired spearmen next left and then 1,000 of the best allied Sicilian hoplites completing that wing. The Syracusans held the center with the remaining allies on the left wing. Their foes stood somewhat thinner. Plutarch's account says that the Sacred Band had a front of 400 men, indicating a depth of seven to eight at most (if 3,000 strong), but maybe only six (if only numbering 2,500).
Whatever the formation mechanics might have been, Timoleon and his men held a strong hand going against troops caught by surprise and psychologically unprepared for combat. Adding to this and their small advantage in numbers was the weather. It seems that the storm that had been pending finally broke from the east over the battlefield, providing a wild display of lightening and driving sheets of rain and hail into the faces of the Carthaginians. Nearly blinded, being bested in front and perhaps suffering from cavalry on the flanks, the Punic phalanx "shattered at first onset" in the words of Diodorus. The resulting slaughter was intense as the Greeks drove their broken enemies into the river. The rest of the Punic host was meantime struggling to cross and join the fight. This was to prove an impossible task.
Moving to the river's edge, Timoleon's men played havoc with their foes as they tried to scramble up and engage. Plutarch's often anachronistic retelling makes much of their heavier armor and drenched clothing in explaining the Carthaginians' problems. Yet both their burden of gear (for the Libyans and, perhaps, a last detachment of the Sacred Band) and soaked garments would have been no worse than for the Greeks. In fact, it's much more likely that the real culprit was a bane familiar to attacking armies from time immemorial - mud. Clay-rich soil turned to paste and destroyed footing as a dense downpour saturated the riverbank. With their enemy suffering on even the slightest slope, Timoleon's hoplites had a field day as they thrust spears into anyone overcoming gravity and bad traction to top the bank. Occasionally they dealt a wound or even death, but always sent thei
r foes sliding back into companions still struggling in the wet and slime below. Whether cut down in action or drowned in the rising flood, the Africans died in great numbers (10,000 per Plutarch and 12,500 in Diodorus' estimate). Timoleon's forces laid claim to a total victory in the end as the Punic survivors drew back across the Crimisus and retreated all the way to Lilybaeum. Shortly thereafter, Carthage brought its battered army home, having neither punished the Greeks nor taken so much as a hectare of their land.
Hierae (c. 339 B.c.) and Damyrias and Abolus Rivers (338 B.C.)
Timoleon's campaign against tyranny on Sicily had great success, but endured some tough moments in its early stages. During this period, he was sending out mercenary troops in small bands that they might support various operations in Syracuse's interest. An account by Plutarch (vol. I Timoleon, 149) relates how such efforts sometimes met with failure and gives some details on what might have been the most costly of these at Hierae in the territory of Messana in the island's northeastern corner. A 400-man lochos of hired hoplites under Euthymus of Leucadia met its doom here in an ambush, said by Plutarch to have been sprung by another group of Greek mercenaries, these being in Carthaginian pay. Caught out of order, the Leucadian and his men were apparently surrounded and wiped out entirely by a force that might have outnumbered them by two or three to one.
Timoleon moved in 338 against allies of Hicetas at Calauria to the northeast of Syracuse. No sooner had he done this than the Leontine tyrant descended to raid into Syracusan territory with an army that might have had 4,000 spearmen and 1,000 skirmishers plus horsemen. Seemingly contemptuous of his aged opponent, Hicetas returned from this foray by a route that passed near Timoleon's position. This was a fatal mistake. Timoleon watched the raiders go by and then followed with a contingent of cavalry and light footmen in the lead. Aware of these on his tail, Hicetas crossed the Damyrias River and set up in a phalanx likely eight-deep along the steep far bank to receive the Corinthian's men. Timoleon and his hoplites (perhaps around 3,000 strong) caught up with their vanguard and deployed to ford and engage in files of probably no more than six.