Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Our best clue that Alexander altered the hypaspists' weaponry going into India might be what he did with their defensive gear. These were his picked shock troops, men who had great pride in their special standing, and that status was marked above all by equipment that differed from what their less lionized Macedonian comrades used (even had the asthetairoi been outfitted as aspis-bearing spearmen). Alexander maintained this tradition by issuing new panoplies that continued to set them apart as picked men. The smaller shields they now carried were shod in silver rather than being of common, painted bronze like those of everyone else. This let them adopt the lofty title of agyraspides (agyraspidai or "Silver Shields" [Justin 12.7.51). Furthermore, their cuirasses were to be decorated with precious metals (Curtius 8.5.4); after all, Alexander certainly had enough gold and silver on hand from his plundered Persian treasure troves. Of course, he couldn't slight his equally select horsemen in doing this, so he gave them elegant fittings too. The hetairoi got gilded bits for their horses and breast plates with ornamentation up to the Silver Shields' standard.

  This period also saw Alexander make a significant move beyond the military realm when he finally took a wife. She was the Bactrian princess Roxanne. Many of his advisors had been urging him to marry since before he left Macedonia, fearing that their combat-happy king might die without siring an heir. The only legitimate successor at the moment was his older halfbrother Arrhidaeus (Philip's son by Philine of Larissa), who had been born mentally deficient. In truth, however, given that Roxanne was only twelve years old, Alexander seems to have now accepted a bride less to find a quick solution to the problem of succession than to cement an important relationship with the Bactrians, who would be at his back once he set off for India. After all, such diplomatic marriages had been one of his father's specialties.

  In the spring of 327, Alexander carried out a final round of campaigning in southeastern Persia prior to setting out for India. This included the capture of an elevated stronghold at the Sogdian Rock. He took this site by having a small band scale the height at night to get above its defenders and bluff them into surrender. Alexander then moved into Pareitakene, which lay immediately southeast of Sogdiana and northeast of Bactria. Here, he chased opposition forces off yet another fortified "rock" and co-opted their leader into an alliance, receiving provisions in return. Still, other local chiefs remained opposed to a Macedonian takeover and Alexander, eager to get on toward his Indian objective, left the general Craterus to deal with them. Craterus had command of 600 hetairoi (no doubt with some light infantry support) and four taxeis of pikemen (6,000 men). He engaged the resistance forces in a pitched battle of which we have no description beyond its being "fierce" (Arrian 4.22.2). Judging by reported casualties, the barbarian force might have numbered 600-800 in cavalry and ten times that many footmen, yielding a fair match in numbers for the Macedonians. Craterus must have been able to engage the enemy infantry so that his phalangites could pin them in place while his superior cavalry eventually carried the day on one or both flanks. Barbarian losses were 120 riders and 1,500 footmen (20-30 percent). We've no casualty report for Craterus, but can assume only minor losses (1-3 percent), mostly among the hetairoi. The Macedonians captured some of the defeated men, including one of their leaders, and returned to deliver these to Alexander in Bactria.

  The Indian Campaign

  Alexander finally set out for India in the summer of 327 with a force of 120,000 men per Curtius (8.5.4). In assessing this number, we can assume that he might have had some 15,000 Macedonian heavy footmen. These were the 3,000 cross-trained hypaspists in three regiments and 12,000 pikemen now in eight taxeis. There were probably some 3,000 foot skirmishers as well for a total of around 18,000 native Macedonian infantry. Greek allies and mercenaries might have added about 8,000 hoplites. (This is based on 13,000 at Gaugemela plus nearly 20,000 subsequent arrivals less combat casualties and detachments including garrisons and settlements. These reductions came to some 17,000 [Holt 2005. 97. 107] in the Sogdian/Bactrian campaigns alone; and had the spearmen equaled their share of the army [55 percent], they would have kicked in around 9,000 to that sum. Other dispersals since Gaugemela had taken at least 8,000 hoplites and about as many were left behind with Amyntas.) Allied and mercenary foot skirmishers probably supplied another 6,000 men. These counted Greek and Thracian peltasts (including 1,000 Agrianians) and archers (Cretans and those normally with the Agrianians, maybe 2,000 combined). All of this suggests that there were perhaps 32,000 foot soldiers in Alexander's host.

  As for horsemen, between replacements from home, folding in the prodromoi and adding elite Asian recruits, Alexander might have brought his hetairoi contingent up to around 2,000 strong. His Greek and Thracian riders had numbered nearly 5,000 at Gaugemela and around 4,000 more had arrived later. Therefore, even if we subtract 3,000 for reductions and another 2,000 as being among 3,500 cavalry remaining with Amyntas, we might suspect around 4,000 Greek mercenary and Thracian horsemen were still on hand, perhaps split 40/60 in favor of the latter. Bactrian and Sogdian levies probably added another 2,000 troopers and there were 1,000 or so Scythian (Dahae) mounted archers. This suggests around 9,000 cavalry in all. Fighting men would thus have totaled no more than 40,000; therefore, if accurate at all, Curtius' tally must have included two non-combatants for each fighting man.

  Aspasia, Massaka, Bazira and Ora (327/326 B.c.)

  Alexander marched into the Hindu Kush and emerged on the south side of the mountain range that fall to demand fealty from those living west of the Indus River. This was the region of India formerly claimed for Persia by Darius I and a number of its tribal peoples quickly came to terms. There was also a pledge of support from the ruler of the important Indian city of Taxila, which lay beyond the Indus along the invasion's intended path. At this point, Alexander divided his army, sending his commanders Hephaestion and Perdiccas on with three taxeis of pikemen, half the hetairoi and all the mercenary horsemen (2,000) to clear the way and build a bridge over the Indus. Meanwhile, he moved with the rest of the army to secure his rear by putting down those locals still resistant. This campaign yielded early success with the capture of a series of cities by force, surrender and abandonment, though Alexander suffered a minor wound in one action when an arrow penetrated his armor to enter his shoulder.

  With winter nearing, reports came in from a foraging expedition that hostile Aspasian tribesmen had gathered in great numbers. Alexander tackled this by splitting his force. Leonnatos, one of his bodyguards, led a contingent with two regiments of pikemen. Ptolemy headed another with two pike taxeis, one regiment of hypaspists (probably armed in hoplite fashion), the Agrianians, all the archers and half the cavalry. The king himself commanded a third division. This had the final taxis of phalangites, the other two regiments of hypaspists (the royal agema as spearmen and the other perhaps with pikes), all of the Greek hoplites, most of the light infantry and the rest of the cavalry. Finding the Aspasii sitting on high ground, Alexander dispatched his subordinates' contingents to make indirect approaches to either side. He then led his own element straight at the enemy across an open field.

  The size of the opposing force is uncertain. Arrian's account seems dubious about Ptolemy's claim of more than 40,000 Aspasii prisoners taken in the battle's aftermath; still, it's clear that the barbarians must have outnumbered at least Alexander's division, since they held its size in contempt (Arrian 4.25.1). This suggests something on the order of 20,000-30,000 men (a third more to twice Alexander's strength) with 25,000 a fair average guess. Perhaps around half of these troops (12,000) might have been light archers that also carried javelins (thrust into the ground while using the bow) with a single-handed sword as a weapon of last resort. Another third or so (8,000) of the footmen were javelineers that held long, narrow shields, wore sparse body armor at best (confined to officers) and were also equipped with a sword. The rest of the infantry (3,000) was probably composed of swordsmen with wide-bladed, two-handed weapons. The horsemen (2,000) were mounte
d archers that also carried javelins (discharged first) and swords as a sidearm. (Head [1982, 135-139] has an excellent discussion of these various warrior types.)

  If he had advanced with his hoplites eight shields deep and pikemen anchoring his left in files of 16, Alexander's heavy array would have been a little more than a kilometer in width. His Asian horsemen (1,500) likely stood outboard of the pike units. This put the Greek and Macedonian cavalry (1,000 and 500 respectively) on the right with the light footmen split among their mounted comrades on each flank. The bulk of the Indians eagerly rushed down to engage, javelineers and swordsmen leading the way for their archers as the cavalry spread off either wing. What followed was a short and decisive clash in which Alexander's troops proved superior in all phases and prevailed "without much trouble" (Arrian 4.25.1). Indian horsemen don't seem to have been very formidable at any time and it must have been fairly easy for the savvy Central Asian riders to hold them at bay on one side of the line while the European cavalry drove them with ease from the other. Then, even as the hoplites and pikemen closed through a relatively ineffective spray of missiles to threaten an extremely unequal shock fight, the tribesmen fled toward the rear.

  Ptolemy had meantime approached the Indian position from one side, doing his best to pick his way across the rougher terrain there and find a reasonably accessible path. Facing a deeply filed but very lightly equipped enemy, his men were able to fight their way upslope under cover of their own missilemen. Mostly unarmored, the Indians had no chance in such an action, the slender shields plied by their leading ranks proving wholly inadequate against the spears and sarissai being thrust and jabbed up into them by much better protected foes. In the end, they had to give way. At the same time, Leonnatos and his phalangites, though probably standing more on the defensive rather than attacking up over what must have been worse ground than on Ptolemy's front, were successful as well. This all served to funnel the Aspasii down onto lower ground, where the cavalry herded them together to be captured in large numbers.

  Alexander continued campaigning that winter. He now moved out front with a modest detachment against the Assakanians, whose territory lay just above that of the Aspasii. His detachment included the hetairoi (1,000), two taxeis of pikemen (3,000) the mounted javelinmen (2,000 Greeks, Bactrians and Sogdians) and the Agrianians and archers. The Assakanians were said to have 2,000 horsemen, 30,000 infantrymen and 30 elephants (Arrian 4.25.5); yet, they refused open battle upon the Macedonians' approach and withdrew to their cities. Once the rest of the army had caught up with him, Alexander went against the largest of the enemy towns, Massaka, which had hired 7,000 mercenaries from farther east in India to aid its defense. Alexander was confident in the ability of his men to rout anything that the enemy could throw at him and wanted to fight far from town so that he could mount a long pursuit. He therefore turned about shortly after forming up in front of Massaka and fell back toward a hill that sat at a distance from the city walls. And just as expected, the Assakanians took the bait. They ventured out to attack, giving chase as fast as they could and in great disorder.

  Alexander waited until the enemy had almost gotten within bow range and then wheeled his phalanx about. If fully deployed, his heavy formation might have featured the phalangites on the left over a front of better than 600m at eight-deep and the hypaspists on the right in files of four across another 750m, all backed by a second phalanx of hoplites in case the highly mobile Indians tried to encircle. This reserve formation could have been either eight shields deep or only six, the latter allowing for a similar width as for the fronting array. Closing with the heavy footmen, Alexander sent out his mounted javelineers supported by the Agrianians and archers to skirmish in front. It seems that the Indians didn't stand to meet the phalanx, but turned tail before that deadly heavy array could even get near. Thus, despite Alexander's best efforts to deal them a severe blow, they escaped leaving just 200 dead behind - a mere 3 percent if only the mercenaries (in the lead) were brought to combat by pursuing skirmishers. The large numbers of Indian bowmen present must have been a key factor in screening this retreat by firing arrows to discourage a tight chase. Indeed, even Alexander, who was standing with the royal hypaspists, had a shaft graze his ankle.

  Denied a crushing victory in the field, Alexander put Massaka under siege and, after a hard fight that cost him 25 of his men, gained a negotiated surrender of the Indian mercenaries. These emerged under an agreement to serve the Macedonians; however, when they attempted to escape instead, Alexander slaughtered them using his entire army. He then took the weakened city by storm. After this, Alexander reduced other strong points in the region, during which at least two other small battles were fought. One of these took place at the city of Bazira. Coenus was in command of the investment there, but had been ordered to join Alexander. Establishing a guard force in a fortified position to maintain the siege, he marched away. The Bazirans saw this as their best chance to break out and sallied against the troops Coenus had left behind. Our sources don't give a scope for this engagement, but it likely involved a garrison of 2,000-3,000 hoplites and some light infantry. The Indians might have had around 5,000 men, these being mostly bowmen and javelineers with a lesser number of swordsmen and cavalry. What followed was a sharp fight that gave the Greeks a victory and cost the losers nearly 500 killed (10 percent or so) with 70 more captured. This was no doubt another case of lightly equipped Indians collapsing once faced with shock combat against heavy, European-style infantry, with a majority of their casualties then coming at the hands of peltast pursuers. A similar tactical scenario likely played out at about the same time when the inhabitants of Ora sortied against a couple of taxeis of pikemen supported by some cavalry and light infantry. The Macedonians bested the attackers, "routing them easily" (Arrian 4.27.6) to keep the siege intact. The general size and results of this action probably closely resembled those at Bazira.

  Alexander was eventually able to secure the entire region between the Indus and the mountains, taking Ora by storm and seizing the remaining cities after their defenders ran away, those at Bazira doing so in the middle of the night. The final pocket of resistance was on the Aornos Rock, a huge and lofty fortified site. The Bazirans and others holed up here for a last stand. However, Alexander and his men had already overcome such obstacles in Persia and did the same here, undertaking impressive engineering works to bring their bolt-throwing artillery to bear and force the site into surrender. From Aornos, the Macedonians marched to the Indus, arriving there intact after finding that the remaining hostiles in their path had fled.

  Hydaspes River (326 B.C.)

  Alexander crossed the bridge built over the Indus by his advance force. He then regrouped in the land of Taxila, which was the largest city between the Indus and Hydaspes rivers. Having already allied himself, the ruler there provided funds and food, joining other locals in adding 5,000 soldiers (including at least 700 horsemen) to the Macedonian host. Alexander incorporated these men into his army and did some minor reorganization. One alteration was to consolidate the pikemen into seven taxeis, cannibalizing the eighth to bring these up to full strength. Another change involved the hetairoi, who were now grouped into five units, each around 400 strong. News arrived at this time that the most powerful monarch beyond the Hydaspes River, Porus, was massing his forces in opposition. Alexander set out in the spring of 326 to take him on and camped on the Hydaspes directly across from the Indian's position. Porus was set up there on the defensive, using the river's monsoon swollen flood to advantage as he waited for promised allied support to arrive.

  We have various claims for the size of Porus' army from Diodorus (17.87.2), Curtius (8.13.6) and Arrian (5.15.4). The most realistic estimate would seem to be a conservative combination of figures from these sources, leaning toward intermediate values and those most in agreement. This suggests 30,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 300 chariots and 130 elephants. The infantry was probably 15,000 light bowmen, 10,000 shield-bearing javelineers and 5,000 two-handed sw
ordsmen. The cavalry consisted of low-quality mounted archer/javelineers, while the chariots were large, four-horse devices that carried two bowmen and two drivers. The latter pair provided a key redundancy and allowed the driver that was not currently in use to fight with javelins. Each vehicle had an escort of two javelineers with shields on foot. (See Head [1982, 178-179] for a discussion of what is known about these unusual vehicles.) The elephants had a driver (mahout) and passenger, both men being armed with javelins and the passenger plying a sword as well.

  Alexander was determined to fight this already impressive host before even more enemy soldiers could arrive. Concerned, however, about making a frontal attack on so strong a position, he sought an easier approach and carried out a series of troop movements up and down the river. This was meant to confuse the opposition as to just where the Macedonians might come across and included several feints toward discouraging close scrutiny of every move. A rumor was also floated for Porus' consumption that any offensive was going to wait until the river was below its current spring flood stage. Alexander then split his forces into three segments for a real attack. One division under Craterus was to remain in camp straight in front of Porus so as to keep his attention while Alexander led a strike contingent across the Indus at some distance upstream. The third group was to stand well back in reserve, ready to intervene should the enemy come over the river themselves. The reserve division consisted of three regiments of phalangites (4,500), the Greek hoplites (maybe 7,000 or so at this point) and the mercenary cavalry (about 1,600). Craterus had two taxeis of pikemen (3,000), the Indian allies (around 4,0004.300 mostly light infantry and 700-1,000 horsemen), one squadron of hetairoi (400) and the Sogdian and Bactrian horsemen (2,000). For his attack force, Alexander had the hypaspists (3,000, apparently all with pikes), two taxeis of phalangites (3,000), peltasts (2,000, half of them Agrianians), all the foot bowmen (2,000), the remaining companion cavalry (1,600), the Thracian horsemen (maybe 2,400) and the Dahae horse-archers (1,000).