Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Alcetas didn't wait to be attacked; instead, he set up his phalanx and charged out in front of it with his horsemen. His immediate targets were 1,000 mounted troops that Antipater had spread along his front. However, these had much greater light infantry support than that available to Alcetas and his riders and, despite taking considerable damage in the ensuing fight, were able to use both this and their uphill stance to gain the upper hand. Antigonus then led out his remaining 6,000 horsemen from where they hid behind either flank, sweeping around and down to threaten the phalanx on the flat below. Seeing that he might be cut off from his infantry, Alcetas hurriedly rode back to his lines. In doing so, he left most of his cavalry behind to be savaged by the more numerous imperial troopers.

  Antigonus now gave the signal for his phalanx to advance and it came down the slope in a broad array. This was likely 2km across with pikemen covering the left half at 16-deep and the hoplites over the rest in files of eight. The rebels, ignorant of true enemy strength, had set up their formation at a uniform depth of eight along its entirety. They thus spanned a width of only about 1,300m. Thinning their spearmen into files of four would now have let them match fronts, but the rapidity of the imperials' charge plus assaults from their elephants in front gave no time for proper realignment. Facing serious overlaps on either flank from the opposing infantry line and being struck at side and rear by Antigonus' cavalry with very few of their own horsemen left to counter, Alcetas' troops fell apart in an utter rout. The defeated men quickly surrendered to join Antigonus, turning over many of their leaders including Attalus. Alcidas escaped for the moment along with his Pisidian friends; however, he eventually committed suicide when some of these made to betray him.

  Shortly after the battle at Cretopolis, word went out that Antipater had died of an illness after leaving Polyperchon in charge back in Macedonia. Cassander, the son of Antipater, had become second in command at his father's passing, but wanted the top post. He now allied with Ptolemy toward usurping power. Nor was Cassander alone in having higher ambitions. Indeed, Antigonus desired to become an emperor and had a huge military with which to pursue that end. His royal army in Asia now counted 60,000 foot soldiers (perhaps 36,000 phalangites, 12,000 hoplites and 12,000 light footmen) and 10,000 horsemen plus 30 elephants (Diodorus 18.50.3). He also had access to funds for hiring more men if needed.

  Antigonus set out to take over the Asian satrapies and replace their governors with his own men. First on his list was Hellespontine Phrygia. The satrap there, Arrhidaeus, had recently attacked nearby Cyzicus and thus made himself a prominent (and popular) target. Sending a force to expel Arrhidaeus, Antigonus at the same time marched on Lydia to deal with that province's satrap, Cleitus. While Arrhidaeus sent an army to free Eumenes from Nora and enlist his aid, Cleitus strengthened his garrisons and went himself to Macedonia to inform Polyperchon of the situation in Asia. Meanwhile, Antigonus proceeded to capture cities throughout Asia Minor by either force or persuasion. He and Cassander formed a pact at this time, both hoping to use the other to their own advantage.

  By winter of 319/18, Cassander in Europe, Antigonus in Asia and Ptolemy in Africa had joined in a loose alliance of convenience, each with his own private agenda. Against these stood Polyperchon in Macedonia and many of the Asian satraps with Eumenes, these last throwing in with the kings under Polyperchon's control. Eumenes had escaped Cappadocia ahead of a pursuing army with about 500 horsemen and more than 2,000 infantry. He had agreed to serve as imperial supreme commander in Asia with a force that included the storied hypaspists of the Silver Shields regiments. Under royal orders, these had come up from their post guarding a royal treasury to meet Eumenes as he arrived in Cilicia. (A majority of the 3,000 Silver Shields must have joined the ranks as replacements over the years; still, some of those over 40 years of age had served since the beginning of Alexander's career.) Flush now with royal funds, Eumenes sent out agents to hire mercenaries and soon had added more than 10,000 foot soldiers and 2,000 horsemen. He then headed for Phoenicia, where he intended to collect a fleet as well. Meanwhile, there was a great deal of maneuvering in Greece during the spring and into the summer of 318 between the forces of Cassander and Polyperchon. Though no significant battle was fought, the latter was able to gain an advantage by granting the Greek cities greater autonomy within the empire. The focus then shifted to the Bosporus. There, Polyperchon's forces fought a successful naval battle, but were caught ashore by Antigonus, who launched a night attack and followed it up at sea in the morning to gain a major victory.

  The rest of that year saw Antigonus go into Phoenicia and flush Eumenes and his men, who fled eastward to avoid a fight. They then suffered attacks from hostile locals as well as from the forces of Seleucus, the Babylonian satrap. Slipping away, Eumenes made his way into Media to shelter for the winter. He had added another 800 horsemen to total around 15,000 infantry and 3,300 cavalry (Diodorus 18.72.4). Meanwhile, Eumenes' friends in Europe were in retreat. Lack of success in the field there had degraded Polyperchon's stock. This caused many of the Greek states to bolt and Cassander even found some support in Macedonia itself during a brief campaign into his foe's heartland. The following months would thus see Polyperchon fighting off intrigues by the wife of King Arrhidaeus in an attempt to align her husband with Cassander. However, Polyperchon soon reasserted control. He now favored Alexander's offspring, and Olympias, who had returned to Macedonia to aid the rule of her grandson, brought about Arrhidaeus' death.

  Cop rates and Paraetacene (317B.c.)

  Eumenes moved in early 317 to gain funds from the royal treasury at Susa as well as pull in troops from the Upper Satrapies. The latter had recently repulsed an attempt at conquest by the Median satrap Pithon and Eumenes' emissaries found their forces already in the field under Peucetes, governor of Persia and former bodyguard to Alexander. His command came to 18,700 infantry and 4,600 cavalry (Diodorus 19.14.8). Meanwhile, at Susa, Eumenes was able to collect a plentiful sum of money. It's also probable that it was here that he took on another 3,000 elite hypaspists who later appear in his army, these likely having been on guard over the treasury there much as per the Silver Shields' assignment in Cilicia. Eumenes now headed east to unite with the satrapal host.

  Antigonus had done some more recruiting of his own on the coast and then marched landward to oppose Eumenes. Reaching Babylon, he received more troops from Seleucus and Pithon before setting out again, moving through Susa and into the desolate country beyond in the midst of summer. This forced march cost him a good many men due to the extreme heat, but he eventually reached the Coprates River and camped on the western bank. Eumenes had by this time come on the scene as well, his camp sitting only a short distance away on the east side of another stream, the Pasitigris (a tributary of the Tigris into which the Coprates flowed).

  Antigonus began crossing the Coprates using local boats, sending a squadron of 400 horsemen along with two taxeis of Macedonian pikemen (3,000) to form a bridgehead. He then landed some 6,000 light infantry so that they could forage on the far bank. Eumenes suddenly came against these advance detachments with a flying column of 4,000 infantry (probably hoplites and possibly including at least 1,000 of the hypaspists from Susa) and 1,300 mounted troops. His horsemen fell upon the enemy foot skirmishers and cavalry, catching them completely disordered to initiate a rout. As for the phalangites, these managed to pull into a fighting for mation; however, they ended up fleeing at first onset of Eumenes' phalanx, which was easily able to overlap them and had supporting cavalry to wrap around their flanks. The bested men fled to the river in a mob and tried to re-board, but only swamped their boats in an undisciplined rush to get away. A few swam across, many more drowned and the rest were either killed or captured as Antigonus watched, unable to help as he had no boats on his side of the river. Before it was over, Eumenes and his men had taken 4,000 prisoners and slain perhaps as many more at very little cost.

  With all of his boats gone and the enemy alert, Antigonus could see no safe wa
y across the Coprates and withdrew. He decided to march to Ecbatana in Media where he could establish a base and plan another approach to the Upper Satrapies. This proved a difficult trek. With hostile locals picking at his column along the way, Antigonus lost a bounty of men, warhorses and pack animals before reaching the more settled part of Media. Once at Ecbatana, however, he was able to gather 2,000 horsemen, 1,000 replacement mounts and enough beasts of burden to restore his losses. Then, when his army had briefly rested and regained its morale, Antigonus marched for Persia, having learned that his foes were now in its capital of Persepolis. Eumenes set out to meet this advance and the two armies crossed in Paraetacene, the border region of Persia northeast of Suza and adjoining Media.

  Both sides having scouted the other, the contending forces arrayed for action behind protection from river-cut ravines, yet neither general was willing to risk a charge across such disadvantageous terrain. After some skirmishing and maneuvering, Eumenes got the jump on a withdrawal toward the city of Gabene (Gabiene), which offered a good source of supplies for whichever army got there first. Antigonus led a cavalry pursuit with his infantry trailing as best it could. Catching up with the rear of Eumenes' column, he and his horsemen paraded across some high ground, acting as if their entire army was present and preparing for battle. They thus gave Eumenes pause and gained a long enough delay for their foot soldiers to catch up and turn this fiction into reality when Antigonus led his full array down from the heights late in the day.

  Eumenes had set up for battle, aligning his phalanx with more than 6,000 mercenary hoplites on the left and about 5,000 pantodapoi next in line. On the far right, he placed the 3,000 or so Silver Shields inside of the better than 3,000 hypaspists from Susa. Plutarch's description (vol. II Eumenes, 33-34) of the Macedonian troops (Silver Shields and other hypaspists) makes it clear that they were armed with sarissai, as were the pantodapoi. Given their posting to the left, there is some reason to think that the mercenaries might also have been armed with pikes as was the Macedonian custom on that wing. However, it seems more probable that most (if not all) of them were traditional hoplites, which was clearly the norm for hired heavy infantry in this period. If so, the phalanx would have stretched across a front of around 2.4km in close order with files of eight for the pikemen and four for the spearmen. In front of this infantry array were 40 elephants, spread widely with light infantry between each beast. Off the left wing, Eumenes assigned 3,150 horsemen and put 150 Indian riders and 50 lancers outside of them to cover the space up to anchoring high ground on that flank. The entire left wing mounted array would have spanned nearly 850m at a depth of eight. In front of the cavalry on this side were 45 elephants set at 15m intervals with foot archers and slingers filling the interstices. Cavalry off the right wing consisted of 2,300 riders, including 900 hetairoi lancers. Spread eight-deep along some 600m, these horsemen were backed at their far end by a separate group of 300 picked riders and fronted by a body of 100 more horsemen. The latter along with another 200rider squadron angled beyond the end of the main line were to serve as hedges against a potential sweep by the enemy around the unanchored right flank of Eumenes' formation. There were 40 elephants in front on that side of the field, spaced every 15m with light footmen in the intervals. In all, Eumenes' line must have stretched almost 4km onto the plain.

  Antigonus observed these arrangements and adjusted his array accordingly as sundown drew near. Coming down at last onto the flat to fight, his phalanx had more than 9,000 mercenary hoplites on its left wing next to 3,000 Lycians and Pamphylians (hoplites with aspides and auxiliary javelins). On the right of the spearmen were more than 8,000 pantodapoi with pikes. His crack Macedonian phalangites held the right wing at nearly 8,000 strong. Antigonus' numerical advantage in heavy-armed troops would have let him set the hoplites six to eight-deep and file his phalangites at 16, yet still match fronts with the enemy's much thinner formation. Antigonus placed a majority of his cavalry alongside the left wing. This included 1,000 mounted archers and lancers plus 200 riders equipped in the "Tarantine" style (javelins and small shields) and other cavalry to reach a total of around 5,000. (Bennett and Roberts [2009, 63] provide a good discussion of Diodorus' exaggerated claim [19.29.2] that there were 2,200 Tarantines here.) Containing the lightest armed horsemen, this force was meant to wheel about and overwhelm the smaller mounted contingent deployed on the open end of Eumenes' line. On his right, Antigonus took station with the remaining 3,500 or so riders, including all of his heavier troopers. These counted 1,000 hetairoi under his son Demetrius and an agema of 300 companion lancers (with whom Antigonus himself rode), which had backing from 100 Tarentines. It was Antigonus' design to use these elite horsemen on the closed/right side of the field in conjunction with his Macedonian pikemen on that wing to win the battle. Further to this purpose, he placed the 30 finest of his elephants out in front on his right, spreading them like those of Eumenes with light footmen in between. Antigonus divided his other 35 pachyderms between fronting his phalanx and leading for the left-side cavalry.

  As the formations closed into combat, the light horsemen on Antigonus' left quickly began to gain an advantage, their arrow fire doing a great deal of damage. Eumenes reacted by bringing lighter equipped riders over from the other side of the field to join his supporting foot skirmishers in a fierce counter-attack. With the elephants on that flank chipping in as well, Eumenes troops then managed to repulse the mounted archers, Tarantines and other riders, driving them toward the highlands behind. Meanwhile, the phalanxes had been battling for some time all along the line. Neither side had been able to gain much advantage in this duel, since spearmen were facing deep and difficult to pierce pike arrays on either wing whose phalangites had little penetrating potential of their own. It was a struggle in which the hypaspists, led by the Silver Shields, were particularly effective, successfully stalemating the very best of Antigonus' hoplites. Now, with the mounted force that had been protecting their flank in retreat, those mercenaries were dangerously exposed and gave way, withdrawing before they could be enveloped. Their defeat doomed the rest of Antigonus' phalanx as each division's troops had to pull back when the flight of comrades on the left bared that side. Antigonus soon had his entire infantry array rushing rearward with the enemy striking hard at its trailing ranks. It was at this crucial juncture that the wily old general saw a golden opportunity to make good on his objective of winning the day on the right, though certainly not in the way he'd originally planned.

  Antigonus and his picked horsemen had held position along their portion of the line even as the enemy phalanx moved forward in pursuit off to their left. This created a gap behind the charging infantry array with the right end of its body of cavalry on that side of the field. Antigonus led his hetairoi into the opening and made a lateral attack on the opposing riders that sent them scurrying away. Therefore, as his foot soldiers regrouped upon reaching the foothills, he and his horsemen were now in command of half the ground and well positioned to threaten Eumenes' rear.

  There was an attempt by both generals to reorder at this point for a second round. However, it was now late evening and, though the moon shown bright, their men were exhausted and wouldn't reengage. Over Eumenes wishes, his troops retired, leaving Antigonus to hold the bat tlefield, control the bodies of the fallen and lay claim to a formal victory. All the same, he had lost 3,700 infantry (13 percent if these were all heavy-armed) as well as 54 horsemen. Eumenes, despite having over 900 wounded, suffered only 540 infantry fatalities (3 percent of his heavy array) while "very few of his cavalry fell" (Diodorus 19.31.5). Thus, once his dead were cremated and buried the next day, Antigonus arranged for his foes to take up their fallen on the following morning and marched off to put as much distance as he could between his badly damaged force and further action. Eumenes and his men were too tired to give chase and both armies went into winter quarters.

  Gabene (317/16B.c.)

  Antigonus was eager to take advantage of his still considerable edge in hea
vy manpower and, once he felt his troops were sufficiently recovered by late December, set out once more to engage Eumenes, marching via the shortest route toward his enemy's position in upper Media. Alerted to this threat, Eumenes sent out some men to delay his foe by posing as a confronting army. He then scrambled to gather up his real host from its widely scattered stations. When he had collected it, he rushed to meet Antigonus and his men on the open plain near Gabene. The armies involved were similar to those that had met at Paraetacene (minus the losses there plus a few recent recruits). Antigonus had 22,000 in heavy infantry (6,000 less than before) and 9,000 horsemen (a few more) and 65 elephants (Diodorus 19.40.1-4). Eumenes countered with 36,700 footmen (having added 1,700 local skirmishers), 7,000 in cavalry (versus 6,100 previously) and the same 114 elephants. His heavy infantry likely was no greater than the 17,000 he'd fielded just a few months earlier.

  Antigonus set up as he had Paraetacene, placing his Macedonian pikemen on the right with the pantodapoi next, all these at 16-deep; he then spread out his spearmen at a depth of eight to complete the phalanx. Eumenes, however, took a different tack. Arraying all of his heavy infantry in files of eight, he moved his pike-armed hypaspists to the left wing this time (the 3,000 Silver Shields again inside of the other 3,000, who were in flank position), seeking to generate the sort of offensive force that he'd lacked at Paraetacene by having his best troops have at similarly armed pikemen rather than the hoplites they'd faced in that previous engagement. He then deployed the pantodapoi next in formation and had his mercenary spearmen take the right wing. Eumenes intended to carry the fight on his stronger left against the opposition's top troops, refusing his weaker wing much in the past fashion of Epaminondas. Further to this end, he took station with the best of his cavalry (including many from the Upper Satrapies under Peucestes) off the left flank while posting his lesser riders to the right. He instructed the latter (and presumably their entire wing) to avoid combat until he had won the day on the other side of the field, where Antigonus and his crack Macedonians (both mounted and afoot) were standing. Both generals lined their elephants in front, placing bodies of light infantry in the intervals.