Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Empire's End

  In the Successor Wars, Antigonus' son Demetrius had landed in Greece during 307 to strike a blow against Cassander. He began then to gain his reputation as a master besieger by taking fortifications on the hill of Munychia and liberating Athens before next doing the same for Megara with another successful investment. Under orders from his father, he left the comfort of Athens the next year and sailed against Ptolemy. He put into shore on the Egyptian ruler's territory at Carpasia on the northeast tip of Cyprus. Securing the immediate vicinity, Demetrius marched down to threaten Salamis, where Ptolemy's brother Menelaus, who commanded on the island, was waiting for him with an army gathered from all of his outposts.

  Cyprian Salamis III (306 B.c.)

  Demetrius led a force of 15,000 foot soldiers (likely 3,000 hoplites, 9,000 pikemen and 3,000 skirmishers) and 400 horsemen (Diodorus 20.47.1-3). Arraying his phalanx on the plain just west of Salamis, he would have filed the entire heavy division eight men deep to cover a front of around 1,125m in close order while dividing his light-armed men (both mounted and afoot) off either wing. His spearmen no doubt stood on the right side of their phalanx. Emerging from the city, Menelaus fielded an army of 12,000 infantry (likely 9,000 hoplites and 3,000 light skirmishers) plus 800 cavalry. He must have lined up eight shields deep to match the enemy front and, like his opponent, spread all the horsemen and foot skirmishers outboard on either side. The battle that then took place was a victory for Demetrius in which the spearmen on his right wing perhaps overpowered troops of lesser quality on the enemy left. With his array flanked on one side, Menelaus was forced to pull back behind his walls, having lost 1,000 (8 percent) of his men in the fight. Worse still, 3,000 more had been taken prisoner. It's possible that those captured had stood on the enveloped wing (where most of the casualties would have been taken as well) and gave up in mass when cut off from the city. Demetrius' losses were probably less than 3 percent.

  Ptolemy sailed for Cyprus with a large fleet to recover this defeat, but was then himself bested in a naval action and returned to Egypt. With no hope now for relief from the siege, Menelaus gave up and turned his army over to Demetrius. (Plutarch put the surrendered force at 12,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry [vol. II Demetrius, 454]. If we are to reconcile these figures with those of Diodorus, Menelaus must have received reinforcement at some point after his defeat.) Gathering up men from across Cyprus, Demetrius went on to add another 16,000 infantry and 600 horsemen to his host. Both Antigonus and his son took the title of king in the aftermath of this triumph, and Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Seleucus would eventually follow suit. The Successor warlords thus all became self-made royalty save for Cassander, though others began to refer to him as a monarch as well.

  The fracturing of Alexander's empire into separate kingdoms was now well advanced, yet Antigonus still sought to reassemble the entire realm for himself. He therefore called Demetrius back from Cyprus and, putting him in charge of his fleet, set out to conquer Egypt. He had for this task a huge army of more than 80,000 foot soldiers, 8,000 horsemen and 83 elephants (Diodorus 22.73.2). But this grand campaign came to naught when Antigonus found Ptolemy's defenses too stout and, running short on supplies, returned to Syria. He had to content himself with sending Demetrius to Rhodes the next year (305), where he embarked on a siege to add that island to his father's domain. This concentration of effort in Asia left an opening for Cassander to attack Athens. However, the Athenian general Olympiodoros sailed to Phocis and brought its second largest city, Elatea, into revolt. Along with the Aetolians, he then broke an investment there, somehow besting a contingent of Cassander's army (Pausanius 1.26.3, 10.34.2). With this threat of a force at his rear, Cassander gave up on his effort in Attica and went home.

  Demetrius' assault on Rhodes turned into an epic operation, which only ended in 304 when the Rhodians came to terms, agreeing to ally with Antigonus in return for remaining free of a garrison. Demetrius next turned his efforts back to Greece, where he sailed to deprive Cassander first of Chalcis on Euboa and then all of Boeotia. He followed this by making an alliance with the Aetolians and moving into the Peloponnese in 303. There, he took Sicyon, Corinth and Arcadian Orchomenos. By 302, Cassander was becoming desperate and tried to come to terms with Antigonus. The aging king refused, being intent on a total victory that would deliver Greece into his hands alone. Cassander then pulled Lysimachus, Seleucus and Ptolemy into alliance so that they might save their kingdoms by putting an end to Antigonus' imperial ambitions.

  Cassander sent his general Prepelaus to reinforce Lysimachus and the latter crossed the Hellespont. His invasion force might have numbered around 21,000 foot soldiers with 12,000 Macedonian pikemen, 6,000 hoplites (at least half of them mercenaries) and 3,000 Thracian peltasts. He also likely had a modest cavalry contingent of maybe 2,000 horsemen, perhaps all Thracian. Prepelaus split off with a third of the army to campaign as far down as Ephesos in Ionia while Lysimachus himself took the main force into the northern interior. In the course of his operations, Lysimachus captured both Synnada (where Antigonus' treasury sat in Phrygia) and Sardis in Lydia, their garrison commanders deserting to add more troops to his effort (perhaps 12,000 pantodapoi pikemen, 4,000 hoplite mercenaries and 3,000 foot skirmishes along with a few horsemen). Meanwhile, Seleucus was on his way to bring further reinforcement from the Upper Satrapies.

  Antigonus, though now 80 years old and in semi-retirement, reacted to the incursion into his territory by leading out what manpower he had on hand. This might have come to 18,000 pantodapoi with pikes, 6,000 mercenary hoplites, 10,000 light missilemen and 10,000 in cavalry. Seriously short of mounted support, Lysimachus was unwilling to engage until Seleucus could arrive with more horsemen; he therefore maneuvered to avoid a pitched battle. Eventually, Antigonus gave up the chase as winter approached. He had by now learned of the new threat from Seleucus and sent for his son from abroad so that they could combine strengths for a final showdown. Demetrius was in Thessaly facing Cassander's remaining 29,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry with his own host of 56,000 foot soldiers (8,000 Macedonians, 15,000 hired hoplites, 25,000 allied Greeks and 8,000 light-armed mercenaries) and 1,500 horsemen (Diodorus 20.110.4). But when he received the order to join his father, he made a hurried truce with Cassander and withdrew to Asia with his Macedonians and mercenaries.

  Demetrius landed at Ephesos and recovered that site. He then went on to take back the coastal region up as far as the Hellespont to block further entry from Europe. The Lycians and Pamphylians, who had joined against Antigonus, now switched sides and 2,000 Illyrian spearmen that Cassander had settled on the Thracian frontier also went over to the Asian monarch. Furthermore, when Cassander sent his brother Pleistarchus with more troops (12,000 infantry and 500 horsemen [Diodorus 22.112.1]), they couldn't cross at the Hellespont and had to sail along the Black Sea coast instead, doing so in three tranches due to a shortage of boats. The first of these sailings got through, but the second was captured and the third was almost completely lost in a storm (Pleistarchus himself barely surviving). Thus, only a third of this reinforcement ever reached Lysimachus (maybe 3,000 pikemen and 1,000 spearmen). Adding to allied woes, Ptolemy, who was coming with an army as well, didn't make it. After reaching Phoenicia, the Egyptian ruler heard a false report that Lysimachus was already defeated and returned to Africa. Things were beginning to look rather bleak for the Thracian king at this point; just then, however, he finally got some good news. Seleucus had arrived from the Upper Satrapies at last, bringing with him 20,000 infantry (maybe 1,000-2,000 mercenary spearmen and the rest lightarmed), 12,000 cavalry (all javelineers and archers), 480 elephants and more than 100 scythed chariots (Diodorus 20.113.4). As each side's forces now went into camp to ride out the winter, it was becoming clear that an epic confrontation would take place in the spring.

  Ipsus (301B.C.)

  The various contingents came together early in the next campaigning season to form two huge armies. These then closed on each other to array for
battle near Ipsus, which lay just north of Synnada on the broad Phrygian plain. Antigonus and Demetrius set up their phalanx across a front around 4km wide with their pikemen likely 16-deep and the hoplites and barbarian spearmen filed at eight shields. Based upon past deployments, the 8,000 Macedonian phalangites would have been at the tip of the right wing. Antigonus, too aged to ride with the cavalry, took his post there among his countrymen. Next in line were 18,000 pantodapoi phalangites, followed by the Lycian and Pamphylian spearmen (maybe 3,000) along with the Illyrians (2,000) and, finally, Greek mercenary hoplites (some 19,000) filling out the left wing. The mercenaries were those brought from Greece less about 2,000 left as part of garrisons (Diodorus 22.111.3) plus 6,000 that had been with Antigonus.

  Intending to carry the fight with cavalry off the right wing, Demetrius was there along with the hetairoi and the best of his lighter horsemen, maybe 6,000 mounted troops in all out of 10,000 on hand. The remaining riders sat off the left flank with orders to hold back until Demetrius was victorious on the other end. The Antigonids had 75 elephants, enough to front (at 15m separation) the cavalry standing eight-deep and 2m wide per rider on the left flank. With light infantry between each beast, these would help defend that end of the line from opposing elephants. Demetrius would not need such aid for his attack from the right flank, while the phalanx in the center was no doubt equipped with caltrops to impede any enemy pachyderms that might come that way.

  Across the field, Seleucus seems to have held supreme command. He set up his phalanx to match fronts with that of the opposition by filing his pikemen at eight and the spearmen at six. In all likelihood, he placed his 15,000 Macedonian phalangites on the right and 12,000 pantodapoi with pikes in the center while his hypaspists (3,000 spearmen) and Greek hoplites (8,000) took the left wing. The cavalry was divided evenly with 7,000 riders taking post off each side of the heavy footmen. (Plutarch [vol. II Demetrius, 4621 put the allied horsemen at 10,500, but Diodorus indicated 12,000 with Seleucus alone. Lysimachus must have added a couple of thousand more including some heavier lancers.) Elephants were arrayed across the front of the entire formation, with around 40 leading the horsemen on each flank and 400 or so in place before the phalanx. As usual, these creatures stood 12-15m apart with foot skirmishers stationed in between. All of this looked to be very much in line with the tactics that Successor armies had been using for a couple of decades, emulating Alexander the Great by attacking with a strong right (though even more cavalry-dominant than in Alexander's day) and refusing the left. In fact, however, subsequent events would show that Seleucus was actually planning something quite a bit different.

  The action opened with the mobile forces off the wings going at it. This phase saw a fierce struggle between very evenly matched elephant contingents on the Antigonid left, where Lysimachus was in command on the allied side. On the right, though, Demetrius and his men swung wide around the advancing enemy pachyderms and, leaving light infantry behind to deal with the bypassed creatures, struck hard at the cavalry beyond. These were light horsemen from the Upper Satrapies who rode under Antiochus, the son of Seleucus. Demetrius' heavy lancers easily carried the fight here as Antiochus and his riders gave way and retired rearward in fairly good order. Seeing their foes retreating but still in sound fighting form, Demetrius led his troopers in pursuit that he might render them unable to rally before he turned against the opposing phalanx's rear and exposed left flank. It was at this crucial juncture that Seleucus sprang a major tactical surprise.

  Though Seleucus had arrayed the bulk of his elephants across the front of his phalanx, he never intended to have them mount an attack from there. He was well aware of how caltrops could neutralize such an assault (after all, it had been he and Ptolemy who had introduced Demetrius to that trick at Gaza in 312) and wasn't going to waste his time on such a doomed effort. Instead, he gave a signal and all the unengaged mahouts in advance of his phalanx turned their great beasts to the left and led them off with supporting light infantry squads running fore and aft of each animal. Once all were beyond the wing of their heavy array, the mahouts wheeled to the left as the foot skirmishers came up alongside and advanced toward where Demetrius was chasing Antiochus' men. It seems that they were actually drawing him away as part of a deliberate maneuver. In consequence, when Antigonus' son did eventually reverse course toward the allied phalanx, he unexpectedly found his way back hopelessly barred by hundreds of elephants and thousands of missilemen.

  BATTLE OF IPSUS (301 B.C.) (BOXES REPRESENTING FORCES ARE EXAGGERATED TO SHOW RELATIVE SIZES.)

  Seleucus now triggered the next phase of his tactical plan, pulling mounted javelinmen and horse-archers from his right flank to send them against the Antigonid phalanx where Demetrius' charge and subsequent isolation had deprived it of any sort of cavalry screen. Riding all around the enemy heavy infantrymen, these Asian riders savaged them with missiles from a safe distance. Helpless to fight back, phalangites and hoplites alike began to fall into disorder, a few breaking away to flee and entire units lowering their weapons in surrender. Finally, when the allied phalanx began closing across the field to attack, Antigonus' army fell apart completely, with those of its men who didn't give up throwing away their weapons and shields to run. As for Antigonus, the old king gallantly stood fast as his bodyguard joined the flight, going down to his death amid a hail of javelins. There was nothing that Demetrius could do and he escaped with 500 of his horsemen, picking up a few foot soldiers in route as he made his way to Ephesos and took ship for Greece.

  MANPOWER, CHARIOTS AND ELEPHANTS • Ipsus is not well documented due to the loss of our best source for this period (Diodorus' account survives only in fragments). This leaves most of what we know to come from Plutarch (vol. II. Demetrius, 462-463). Unfortunately, his account is short, deficient in hard data and concentrates on Demetrius to the exclusion of much of what was happening elsewhere on the field. As a result, reconstruction of this battle in any depth requires a great deal of speculation. Fortunately, we have gross figures on the infantry and mounted contingents for both armies and can use data from previous related deployments to backfill likely details on the content and form of the contending formations. The general course of the action is then reasonably described; still, there remains tremendous uncertainty in two particular areas: What happened to the chariots and what was really going on with the elephants that stopped Demetrius from returning to the battle? The first of these questions seems best answered by proposing that the chariots never saw action. While every other arm (infantry, cavalry and elephants) gets its due in Plutarch's account of the engagement, the chariots receive no mention at all. Thus, they either didn't participate or their role was so peripheral as to be unworthy of note.

  As for the deployment of elephants against Demetrius, this is a vexing and crucial issue. The tack taken here is one proposed long ago by Tarn (1930, 68-69) that Seleucus had his son retreat to draw Demetrius and his horseman rearward so that a planned maneuver by the bulk of the allied elephant corps could cut him off. This seems entirely reasonable in that it's unlikely such a major evolution as that described for the elephants in this battle was improvised "on the fly." It must have been a carefully thought out and practiced exercise. If so, the elephants stationed in front of the allied phalanx were a tactical reserve and, when Demetrius fell for the false retreat, they carried out a well-drilled evolution to near perfection. Objections (see Bennett and Roberts [2009, 111]) that elephants had never before been employed as a reserve and that chancing such a stunt was unconscionable are rather weak.

  Since use of elephants in reserve is documented in later years, such an approach at Ipsus wouldn't be impractical, but rather simply something new. Moreover, our record of this tactic was by Alexander the Great's cousin, Pyrrhus of Epirus, and it's a trick that he might very well have learned at Ipsus. After all, he rode there beside his brother-in-law Demetrius as a youth and saw the maneuver's effectiveness first hand. The only innovation he then added was to place his own muc
h smaller team of pachyderms in the rear, rather than out front. Nor should we discount Seleucus' willingness to gamble. He needed some kind of trick like this if he was to better his odds against a phalanx twice as deep as his own. He also had plenty of light infantry to screen his exposed flank should the ploy have gone wrong.

  Demetrius tried to take refuge in Athens, but the Athenians, to his great surprise and bitter disappointment, denied him a landing out of fear of reprisal from the victors at Ipsus. He then headed toward the Thraceward region to initiate a sea-borne campaign there. Back in Asia, Lysimachus and Seleucus were carving up the Antigonid territories and the latter laid claim to lower Syria. Nominally part of Antigonus' holdings, this region was, in fact, disputed with Ptolemy, whose garrisons held much of the land. As long as they lived, Seleucus and Ptolemy would refrain from dueling over this prize, but their descendents would end up waging war for its possession. For his part, Lysimachus now held nominal control of Anatolia up to the Taurus Mountains. Yet there were disputes here as well. Many of the coastal cities still harbored hostile garrisons that were supporting Demetrius as he began to prey on Lysimachus' holdings in Thrace. And in rugged portions of the interior, there were local chieftains holding sway that would have to be subdued. Thus, in the end, this latest distribution of the remains of Alexander's empire didn't finally settle the succession, but merely acted as a spur for another round of fighting in the next century.