by Lin Noueihed
65. ‘Fear Skyrockets as Reported Crime Holds Steady in Egypt’, Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, www.abudhabigallupcenter.com/149738/fear-skyrockets-reported-crime-holds-steady-egypt.aspx (accessed 3 November 2011).
66. Mogahed, Dalia, ‘Winning Back the Revolution’, Foreign Policy, 28 November 2011.
67. See US cable by Ambassador Margaret Scobey dated September 2008 and entitled ‘Academics See the Military in Decline but Retaining Strong Influence’, http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/09/08CAIRO2091.html (accessed 2 November 2011).
68. El Gundy, Zeinab, ‘Egypt's 29 July Protests Finally Named: The Friday of Unity and Popular Will’, Aramonline, 27 July 2011: http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/17496.aspx (accessed 11 November 2011).
69. Shadid, Anthony, ‘Islamists Flood Square in Cairo in Show of Strength’, New York Times, 29 July 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/07/30/world/middleeast/30egypt.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp (accessed 11 November 2011).
70. Ibid.
71. Voll, John O., ‘Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan’, in Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott, Fundamentalisms Observed. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 345–90.
72. Ibid.
73. Wright, Lawrence, ‘The Man Behind Bin Laden’, New Yorker, 16 September 2002. In his article, Wright describes the relationship between Bin Laden and Zawahri.
74. Programme of the Freedom and Justice Party 2011 (Arabic): http://hurryh.com/Uploadedimage/files/mainsystem.pdf (accessed 11 November 2011).
75. Ibid.
76. For a full analysis of the two platforms see al-Anani, Khalil, ‘Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party: To Be or Not To Be Independent’, Sada: Analysis on Arab Reform, Carnegie Endowment, 1 June 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/01/egypt-s-freedom-justice-party-to-be-or-not-to-be-independent/6b7p (accessed 11 November 2011).
77. See ‘In search of a Supreme Guide’, Bikya Masr, 11 December 2009, http://bikyamasr.com/6618/in-search-of-a-supreme-guide/ (accessed 6 November 2011).
78. Fadel, Leila, ‘Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Could be Unravelling’, Washington Post, 7 July 2011 www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-could-be-unraveling/2011/07/06/gIQAdMZp1H_story_1.html (accessed 6 November 2011).
79. ‘Egypt's Army Appeals for Unity after Christian Clash’, Reuters, 12 October 2011.
80. Interviews with the author, and author's eyewitness account of events.
81. ‘Two Copts Sentenced for Violence in Ain Shams Scuffle’, AFP, 30 May 2011, www.thedailynewsegypt.com/crime-a-accidents/two-copts-sentences-for-violence-in-ain-shams-church-scuffle.html (accessed 10 November 2011).
82. Interviews with the author in Cairo, October 2011.
83. ‘Former Regime Remnants Instigated Maspero Violence’, Ikhwanmisr, http://ikhwanmisr.org/iweb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32578:mb-chairman-to-german-press-agency-former-regime-remnants-instigated-maspero-violence&catid=10387:newsflash&Itemid=858 (accessed 5 November 2011).
84. ‘Egypt Bomb Kills 21 at Alexandria Coptic Church’, BBC, 1 January 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east–12101748 (accessed 6 November 2011).
85. ‘Attacks on Christians in Egypt’, Reuters, 10 October 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/us-egypt-clashes-coptic-idUKTRE7992W420111010 (accessed 6 November 2011).
86. Zayan, Jailan, ‘Egypt Warns of “Iron Hand” to Halt Religious Unrest’, AFP, 7 May 2011.
87. Osman, Tarek, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak. London/New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010, pp. 155–8.
88. Al Desoukie, Omnia, ‘Male-dominated Parliament Worries Experts, Candidates’, Daily News Egypt, 7 December 2011.
89. The Salafist Noor Party denied covering up the statue but a banner clearly bears its logo and the party was holding a rally nearby. A photograph appeared in the independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm, www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/511759 (accessed 6 November 2011).
90. Interview with the author in Cairo, October 2011.
91. Ibid.
92. This literacy statistic was accurate in 2006 and is the latest available from the government's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.
93. According to interviews with women's rights activists in Cairo, October 2011.
94. For a full interview with Ibrahim and an account of the case, see Deasy, Kristin, ‘Egypt: Samira v. the military’, Global Post, 23 October 2011, www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/111023/egypt-samira-vs-the-military (accessed 7 November 2011).
95. Interview with the author, January 2012.
96. According to figures published by Egypt's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, www.capmas.gov.eg/pages_ar.aspx?pageid=1317 (accessed 7 November 2011).
97. ‘Egypt's Tourism Revenue to Suffer 25 pct Drop in 2011, Minister Says’, Reuters, 10 April 2011.
98. According to figures published by Egypt's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, www.capmas.gov.eg/pages_ar.aspx?pageid=1317 (accessed 7 November 2011).
99. Egyptian Ministry of Finance, the Financial Monthly, October 2011, www.mof.gov.eg/MOFGallerySource/English/Reports/monthly/2011/Oct2011/a-b.pdf (accessed 7 November 2011).
100. CAPMAS figures.
101. According to figures from the Central Bank of Egypt (accessed 12 November 2011).
102. According to interview by the author with Adel Zakaria, spokesman for CTWUS union movement, October 2011.
103. Kirkpatrick, David D. and Stack, Liam, ‘Prosecutors Order Mubarak and Sons Held’, New York Times, 13 April 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/world/middleeast/14egypt.html?pagewanted=2&_r=2 (accessed 8 November 2011).
104. Zayed, Dina, ‘Egypt's Judges Shoulder Hopes for Democracy’, Reuters, 2 November 2011.
105. In Portugal's Carnation Revolution, for instance, the army led a turbulent transition to democracy.
106. Droz-Vincent, Philippe, ‘Is Military Rule in Egypt Really Temporary?’, Sada Analysis on Arab Reform, Carnegie Endowment, 10 November 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/10/is-military-rule-in-egypt-really-temporary/71dj (accessed 12 November 2011).
107. Interview with the authors, Cairo, January 2012.
Chapter 6: Bahrain: An Island Divided
1. Cited in Heard-Bey, Frauke, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 338.
2. Friday sermon by Issa Qasim attended by the author on 25 March 2011.
3. According to the accounts of those living in the neighbouring building, who showed the author the room where Abdulaziz was found.
4. According to former parliament members from Wefaq who gave the author a list of missing people in March. Many more were later arrested.
5. Figures given by Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid bin Abdallah Al Khalifa in speech to parliament. See Sambidge, Andy. ‘Bahrain Minister Says 24 people Dead in Uprising’, Arabian Business, 29 March 2011, www.arabianbusiness.com/bahrain-minister-says–24-people-dead-in-uprisings–390813.html (accessed 21 November 2011).
6. Neighbours interviewed by the author on 25 March 2011 described the concerns about taking the wounded to hospital. The author also interviewed several doctors from Salmaniya hospital who described the conditions they had worked under. See Noueihed, Lin, ‘Bahrain Doctors, Casualties Caught up in Crackdown’, Reuters, 21 March 2011.
7. See ‘Bahrain: Investigate Shooting, Arrest of Man Caught up in Police Sweep’, Human Rights Watch, 23 March 2011.
8. See ‘A House Divided: The Scars from Bahrain's Protests are Still Felt on the Pitch’, Economist, 13 August 2011, www.economist.com/node/21525932 (accessed 21 November 2011).
9. According to Mansour Jamri, editor-in-chief of Al-Wasat, March 2011.
10. Ibid. Also see ‘Bahrain newspaper editors fined over unrest,’ Reuters, 11 October 2011.
11. Interview with the author, March 2011.
12. Author's eyewitness account, March 2011.
13. Interview with the author, March 2011.
14. Cole, Juan R., Sacred Space and Holy War: the Politics, Culture and History of Shi'ite Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002, pp.1–10.
15. Ibid.
16. Louer, Laurence, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 11–28.
17. Ibid., pp. 1–28.
18. Khuri, Fuad I., Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 2–4.
19. Al-Baharna, Husain M., ‘Iran's Claim to Sovereignty over Bahrain and the Resolution of the Anglo-Iranian Dispute over Bahrain’, Shaikh Ebrahim bin Mohammed Al Khalifa Center for Culture and Research, 2008.
20. For more on Al Khalifa's system of rule and the challenges it faced see Khalaf, Abdulhadi, ‘Contentious Politics in Bahrain: From Ethnic to National and Vice Versa’, paper given at the fourth Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle East in a Globalizing World, Oslo, 13–16 August 1998, www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/khalaf.html (accessed 22 November 2011).
21. Al-Baharna, Husain M., ‘Iran's Claim to Sovereignty over Bahrain and the Resolution of the Anglo-Iranian Dispute over Bahrain’, Shaikh Ebrahim bin Mohammed Al Khalifa Center for Culture and Research, 2008.
22. For more on the role of Shia in political activism in Bahrain see al-Mdaires, Falah, ‘Shi'ism and Political Protest in Bahrain’, Domes 11(1), Spring 2002, p. 20.
23. Razavi, Ahmed, Continental Shelf Delimitation and Related Maritime Issues in the Persian Gulf, Publications on Ocean Development, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, pp. 122–8.
24. See DeAngelis, Jackie, ‘Bahrain's Saudi Links Vital to Economy: Minister’, CNBC, 27 July 2011.
25. See official website of King Fahd Causeway Authority, www.kfca.com.sa/en/pages.aspx?pageid=288 (accessed 17 November 2011).
26. For instance, Najaf-based but Iranian born cleric Ali al-Sistani was instrumental in encouraging Iraqi Shi'ites to cast their ballots in that country's first elections after the ouster of Saddam Hussein even though he does not possess the Iraqi nationality that would allow him to vote in that country himself.
27. This question of loyalty to a marjaa taqlid is openly discussed by Sunnis in Bahrain and elsewhere.
28. For the activists’ perspective on the plot, see this interview with Saudi Shi'ite activist Fouad Ibrahim: Abedin, Mahan, ‘Saudi Shi'ites: New light on an old divide’, Asia Times, 26 October 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ26Ak02.html (accessed 29 November). For an outline of the key political groups operating in Bahrain before and after the 2011 revolt, see ‘Popular Protests in the Middle East and North Africa III: The Bahrain Revolt’, Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report No. 105, 6 April 2011.
29. See ‘Gulf states see threat from Iran’, Reuters, 25 February 1982. For a detailed analysis of attacks and the move towards collective GCC security, also see Ramazani, Rouhollah, K. and Kechichian, Joseph A., The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis, University of Virginia Press, 1988, pp. 33–8.
30. Qubain, Fahim I., ‘Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain’, Middle East Journal 9(3), Summer 1955, pp. 269–71.
31. Interview with the author in Bahrain, March 2011.
32. Khuri, Fuad I., Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
33. Accounts of how the 1990s uprising began differ, with some authors citing the stoning of runners participating in a race that went past some conservative Shi'ite areas where demonstrators objected to the runners’ attire. Other accounts cite the unemployment picket but the push for the restoration of the constitution had started before either of these incidents.
34. For more on the role of Shia in political activism in Bahrain, see al-Mdaires, Falah. ‘Shi'ism and Political Protest in Bahrain’, Domes 11(1), Spring 2002, p. 20. Also see Fakhro, Munira A., ‘The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment’, in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion, eds. Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp. 167–88.
35. Notice, for instance, the excitement in blogger Mahmood Al Youssef's 2003 blog, which would be far more critical of the royal family by the end of the decade, at http://mahmood.tv/2003/12/28/Sitra-starts-to-breathe/
36. Parolin, Gianluca Paolo. ‘Generations of Gulf Constitutions: Paths and Perspectives’, pp. 65–70, in Khalaf, Abdulhadi and Luciani, Giacomo (eds), Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf, Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006.
37. See National Action Charter 2001, www.pogar.org/publications/other/constitutions/bahrain-charter–01e.pdf (accessed 21 November 2011).
38. Kapiszewski, Andrzej, ‘Elections and Parliamentary Activity in the GCC States: Broadening Political Participation in the Gulf Monarchies’, pp. 108–10, in Khalaf, Abdulhadi and Luciani, Giacomo (eds), Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf, Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006.
39. Parolin, Gianluca Paolo, ‘Generations of Gulf Constitutions: Paths and Perspectives’, pp. 65–70 in Khalaf, Abdulhadi and Luciani, Giacomo (eds), Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf, Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006.
40. See 2002 constitution of Bahrain on ConstitutionNet, www.constitutionnet.org/files/Bahrain%20Constitution.pdf (accessed 21 November 2011).
41. Kapiszewski, Andrzej, ‘Elections and Parliamentary Activity in the GCC States: Broadening Political Participation in the Gulf Monarchies’, pp. 108–10 in Khalaf, Abdulhadi and Luciani, Giacomo (eds), Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf, Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006.
42. Al-Derazi, Abdellah, ‘Old Players and New in the Bahraini Elections’, Sada: Analysis on Arab Reform, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 June 2011.
43. Opposition activists openly accuse the prime minister of corruption, which will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. The prime minister's opposition to reform during the 2000s is well documented. It spilled into the open in 2008, when the king, urged by his son, the crown prince, was forced to step in and ask the government to cooperate with a body leading economic reforms.
44. According to a member of the royal family who spoke off the record.
45. Sager, Abdulaziz, ‘End the Saudi-Bahrain FTA Row’, Gulf Research Center, 1 January 2005, www.grc.ae/?frm_module=contents&frm_action=detail_book&sec=Contents&override=Articles%20%3E%20End%20the%20Saudi-Bahrain%20FTA%20Row&book_id=18463&op_lang=en (accessed 9 January 2012).
46. Fattah, Hassan, ‘Report Cites Bid by Sunnis in Bahrain to Rig Elections’, International Herald Tribune, 2 October 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/10/02/world/africa/02iht-web.1002bahrain.2997505.html (accessed 29 November 2011).
47. Hamada, Suad, ‘Bahrain Grants Citizenship to 7,012 People’, Khaleej Times, 3 December 2008, www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?section—iddleeast&xfile=data/middleeast/2008/december/middleeast_december31.xml (accessed 29 November 2011).
48. ‘Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge’, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 40, 6 May 2005, pp. 8–9.
49. One leaked US embassy cable quotes a Shia cleric claiming 100,000 people had been naturalized for political reasons. It casts doubt on this figure, quoting an Al Wefaq official giving a number closer to 38,000. See Monroe, William, ‘Prominent Shia Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia Outlook in Bahrain’, US embassy cable, WikiLeaks, 2007, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/04/07MANAMA328.html#par4 (accessed 29 November 2011).
50. Ereli, Adam, ‘Opposition Protest Highlights Political Naturalization’, US embassy Manama, WikiLeaks, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09MANAMA639.html (accessed 29 November 2009).
51. Nakhle, Emile, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society, Lanham/Boulder: Lexington Books, 2011, pp. 153–5.
52. ‘Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge’, Crisis Group Middle East R
eport, No. 40, 6 May 2005, pp. 8–9.
53. Monroe, William, ‘Prominent Shias Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia’, US Embassy Manama, WikiLeaks, 2007, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/04/07MANAMA328.html#par4 (accessed 30 November 2011).
54. ‘Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge’, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 40, 6 May 2005, pp. 8–9. Also a common complaint of protesters, one of whom said the royals behaved as if Rifaa was ‘a slice of heaven’ by not allowing Shi'ites to buy land there.
55. Central Informatics Organization, www.cio.gov.bh/StatPublication/11RecurrentRequest/AdjPop2001–2007.pdf and www.cio.gov.bh/cio_ara/English/Publications/Statistical%20Abstract/ABS2009/Ch2/2.37J.pdf (accessed 29 November 2011).
56. Ereli, Adam, ‘It Doesn't Add up: Shia MP Challenges GOB Population Figures’, US Embassy Manama, 8 February 2008, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/bahrain-wikileaks-cables/8334481/IT-DOESNT-ADD-UP-SHIA-MP-CHALLENGES-GOB-POPULATION-FIGURES.html (accessed 30 November 2011).
57. Crabtree, Steve, ‘Housing Shortage Stands out Among Bahrain's Woes’, Gallup, 31 March 2011, www.gallup.com/poll/146912/housing-shortage-stands-among-bahrain-woes.aspx (accessed 28 November 2011).
58. ‘Bahrain Announces $5.32 Billion Home Plan’, AFP in Khaleej Times, 9 March 2011, www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/middleeast/2011/March/middleeast_March160.xml§ion—iddleeast (accessed 30 November 2011).
59. Interviews with the author, March 2011.
60. Ibid.
61. ‘Bahrain National Guard to Recruit Former Soldiers from Pak’, Deccan Herald, 11 March 2011, www.deccanherald.com/content/144961/bahrain-national-guard-recruit-former.html (accessed 29 November 2011).
62. The Saudis were open about their concerns. See for instance, ‘Saudi king expresses support for Mubarak’, Reuters, 29 January 2011, and ‘Saudi minister denounces foreign meddling in Egypt,’ Reuters, 10 February 2011. Some analysts have also said the Saudis feared losing Egypt as another ally against Iranian influence.
63. According to a source in regular contact with the crown prince during this period.
