Frederick the Second

by Ernst Kantorowicz

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  The arrival of the Emperor had been anticipated with some anxiety; after a few months Frederick II was feared. “In the kingdom all bowed the neck before the Emperor,” announces the chronicler. After the Diet of Capua, followed by a short stay in Apulia and Calabria, Frederick crossed in May 1221 to the island of Sicily, leaving his generals and the loyal barons to prosecute the Molise campaign. He held a new Diet in Messina and issued new laws, not in brief judicial form but in a style which later he made his own. The law was accompanied by a statement of the causes that led up to it and the needs it was designed to meet. The Assizes of Capua had sketched out the ground plan and the primary organisation of the Sicilian state, the edicts of Messina regulated the affairs of subjects who were outside the feudal framework. Frederick sharply divided them off from his own citizens. There were laws dealing with players and blasphemers, with Jews and whores and wandering minstrels. These constituted a potential danger, and Frederick II set limits to their activities. Players were wont to curse and blaspheme. It was most unsuitable for them to keep company with clerics, since it was the churchman’s duty to “uphold the standard of right living in conduct and in speech.” The Jews were to stitch the yellow patch on their clothing and to let their beards grow… in imitation of the Lateran edict of 1215 against Muslims. Without such distinctive marks “the duties and the practices of the Christian faith will be confused.” Whores might not live in the town or frequent the bath with respectable women, “for one sick sheep infects the herd.” Players and wandering minstrels should be outlaws “if they dare to disturb the Emperor’s peace with ribald songs.” So the Emperor strove to separate out his own, according to the precept of the Church.

  The necessity to cleanse his land of foreign powers decided the next blow that Frederick struck on the island. On the ground of the Law of Privileges he withdrew their prerogatives from foreign sea-powers and hunted them from the ports of Sicily. Amalfi and Pisa, Genoa and Venice had formerly acquired numerous trading rights in the fertile island. Sicily was not only as of old one of the great “granaries” from which the merchant could fetch his corn and perhaps sugar too, and dates, hemp and flax, silk and wool. The harbours of Sicily were also important as dockyards and ports of call for sailors of the Levant, who on their outward or homeward voyage could sell their Eastern wares or exchange them for Sicilian corn. Since being sacked by the Normans in 1135 Amalfi had lost her share of world trade. Venice made use of the harbour of Brindisi—the island of Sicily lay off her direct route to the East—so it was Genoa and Pisa who were chiefly interested in Sicilian commerce. The geographical contiguity of the two mighty north Italian republics destined them to be rivals, and rivals they were in every sphere; at home, in the Ligurian Sea, in Sardinia and Corsica, in Provence, in the Holy Land, and also in Sicily. In Sicily they enjoyed almost identical privileges; each had a special quarter in all important harbours, a consulate, a warehouse—the “fondaco” taken over from the Arabs—and the enjoyment of free trade, which exonerated their merchants from the payment of taxes, duties, dues, levies, etc.

  In political matters the rivalry of the two towns had resulted in the Genoese allying themselves with their neighbours the Lombards as anti-Emperor, while the Pisans were correspondingly pro-Emperor. Pisa had always placed her fleet at the Emperor’s disposal. In Frederick’s youth, therefore, Pisa had supported Kaiser Otto, while Genoa had had leanings towards the young King of Sicily. By this connection with the Sicilian king the Genoese had gained ascendancy in the island, and in those early years had helped the young king against Pisa. When Otto IV came to grief, and Pisan politics with him, the predominance of Genoa in Sicily seemed assured.

  An episode that took place during the fighting in Frederick’s youth will illustrate the conduct of the sea-towns. Warlike Pisan merchants or seamen—corsairs at any rate—had taken advantage of the confusion prevailing in the kingdom to make themselves masters of Syracuse and had driven out bishop and people. Syracuse became a pirate fortress under the protection of Pisa, who used it as a base, at the same time that she officially disclaimed all responsibility for what happened there. In the summer of 1204 a body of homeward-bound Genoese chanced to meet in Crete others returning from Alexandria, so that a very considerable Genoese merchant fleet was accidentally assembled there. They took counsel together and decided to take Syracuse from the Pisans. The far-famed Genoese corsair, Alaman da Costa, who had just captured a Pisan ship laden with arms, was the originator of this scheme. He put himself at the head of the Genoese fleet. They sailed for Syracuse, via Malta, which was then a Genoese dependency, received the reinforcement of several war-galleys, attacked Syracuse, and in eight days were masters of the town. Alaman da Costa was their lord and signed all documents as “by the grace of God, of the king, and of the town of Genoa, Count of Syracuse and Officer of the King.” He proceeded to enlarge his Syracuse domain and to assert his influence in Sicilian politics. This Sicilian Corsair-Tyrant was subject to the mother-city of Genoa, who could raise certain other claims to Syracuse, based on a grant of Barbarossa’s. So Genoa held Malta, Syracuse and Crete, the most important bases on the route to the East.

  Genoa had thus built her nest in Sicily. Frederick had the kindliest feelings towards the Genoese, and was not unmindful that they had stood by him on his march to Germany. But there was no place in his new state either for a Genoese dukedom of Syracuse, or for preferential treatment of foreign commerce, be it Genoese or Pisan. Pisa was now in many respects better off, for Frederick treated the two rival sea-towns exactly alike. Pisans and Genoese had done him homage on the death of Kaiser Otto, and he had confirmed both parties in their imperial, while cancelling their Sicilian, rights and privileges. The Pisans, having a much smaller stake in Sicily, were well content, and preserved their traditionally loyal attitude, remaining faithful to Frederick throughout his whole reign, as they had once been faithful to the Welf. The Genoese, however, once the most highly-favoured sea-power in Sicily, were extraordinarily hard hit.

  Frederick II set at once to work. Count Alaman da Costa and his Genoese were driven out of Syracuse, a palace in Palermo which Genoa had used as a warehouse was confiscated under the Law of Privileges, and similar events took place in Messina, Trapani and elsewhere. The Sicilian admiral, William Porcus, was by birth a Genoese; he prudently saved himself by flight. The Law of Privileges, which cancelled all advantages, bore heavily enough on the Genoese, but they were still more severely hit by a law of the Capua Assizes which forbade all favours to foreigners at the expense of the native population, such as freedom from taxes and dues. All this was most painful to Genoa, who naturally accused Frederick of crass ingratitude. Frederick, however, could not imperil the structure of his state at the dictates of private gratitude, and he had to resign himself to the ever-growing ill-humour of the Genoese, which ultimately, in spite of his repeated efforts to placate them, developed into open hostility. The needs of Sicily came first: the state revenues from duties and harbour dues necessarily sank to a minimum when the most important commercial towns were untaxed. How considerable these losses to the state had been in the past is best proved by a Genoese writer, who complains in his chronicle that the Sicilian taxes on goods amount now to 10 per cent. and over.

  Frederick had broken the power of the feudal barons on the Italian continent, and set up a definite counter-force in his national defence; he now took corresponding measures in maritime affairs. The banishment of the foreign sea-powers made some new creation absolutely imperative: he must himself create a Sicilian fleet. Here again he utilised his Law of Privileges: previous exemptions were cancelled and an old Norman ordinance again enforced, which laid on certain districts the obligation to furnish seamen, and on the barons the duty of supplying wood for shipbuilding. The Emperor erected state wharves and shipyards without delay; but in any circumstances the building of ships takes time, so he created his first fleet chiefly by hire and by purchase. His methods were not a little inconsiderate: ship
masters from the Italian coast-towns or other merchant seamen who happened to call at Sicilian ports were invited to hire or sell their vessels voluntarily; failing this the ships were taken by force. The Venetians warned their captains who were touching in Apulia against such sales, and prosecuted those who sold. War galleys as well as merchant ships were thus commandeered—since merchantmen need warships for their protection—and the Emperor also set about building galleys for himself.

  Frederick must have strained every nerve over his shipbuilding, for by 1221 two considerable squadrons sailed to Egypt to help the crusading army, and his intention was to have fifty transports and one hundred galleys ready for sea by 1225. Gradually he created a strong merchant fleet and a powerful fleet of war, which did him valiant service in his Italian campaigns and brought him many a welcome victory.

  It was of course at first a purely Sicilian fleet and was not to become an imperial fleet for some time to come. From the beginning it flew the banner of the Hohenstaufens—the imperial Roman eagle on a golden field. In Frederick’s day, for the first time in history, a German-Roman imperial fleet sailed the Tyrrhenian, Aegean and Ionian Seas, and for the first time merchants traded to Syria, Egypt and Tunis under imperial eagles. One of these ships was styled Aquila, another went by the name of “the half world,” Nisfu’d Dunya. The like was not seen again for three hundred years, till the time of Charles V. Frederick gave his new fleet a new admiral, Count Henry of Malta, like his runaway predecessor a Genoese by birth. He had been a daring pirate and was likely to prove dangerous; the Emperor forestalled his possible hostility by this appointment.

  Simultaneously with all this Frederick began to take over the island castles and put them under the Crown, and to establish a coastguard service both as a protection against hostile ships and in preparation for the future war against the Saracens, which he was not yet ready to attempt. The purging of Sicily from the foreigner had increased the unity of that country; the re-creation of the fleet had extended its authority. The new independence from foreign commerce and foreign shipping secured through the fleet made possible a new economic policy. With great versatility and clearsightedness Frederick immediately began to foster an active Sicilian trade which had no longer to compete against the crushing privileges of foreign powers. The full development of Kaiser Frederick’s much admired and wonderfully organised policy is not attained till later, but even in these early days it is possible to recognise in various occurrences Frederick’s passionate and indefatigable pursuit of unity and the uncompromising forcefulness and directness of his methods.

  In spite of the rigid enforcement of the Law of Privileges, which took cognisance of the last thirty years, the Pisans and Genoese still enjoyed many privileges and prerogatives dating from earlier times, so that the Sicilians were still handicapped in trade competition with them. Frederick might have rectified this by conferring on his own subjects corresponding rights and favours, and thus putting them on an equal footing with the foreigner. This expedient, however, would have stultified his entire policy, which had suppressed most of the privileges of the harbour towns. Foreign commerce had suffered somewhat by Frederick’s forcible purchase of ships belonging to the sea-powers—particularly because he thus withdrew for his own use tonnage from the foreign corn trade. He now drove them from the field without infringing their ancient Norman charters. The Emperor, at a later date, contrived to divert to his own coffers the enormous profits which accrued to the foreign sea-states from the purchase of relatively cheap Sicilian corn, by conveying the corn himself to the foreign markets in his state ships and selling it there himself at the high local prices. In these early years, however, while the imperial fleet was still in the making, and, moreover, subject to heavy claims on it in connection with the Crusade, the Emperor devised another scheme for preventing excessive gains by foreign profiteers.

  In 1224 he for a time forbade all export of corn, foodstuffs and cattle. The commercial powers might only purchase their corn direct from the Crown, and Frederick took care to fix the price so high that the old privileges were of no avail, while the Crown benefited most handsomely. The immediate result in Sicily itself was such a fall in food prices that the producers scarcely recovered their costs. The Emperor immediately seized this opportunity of making large purchases for the Crown. This had been a by-product—pleasant or unpleasant—of the embargo; it had not been the motive of the imperial measure, which was directed in the first place against the ancient privileges. Private trade (which, however, recorded the very next year considerable shipments to Venice) was inevitably injured by this arbitrary interference, a fact which will not greatly have disturbed the Emperor. For his emergency measure was necessary at the time unless the greatest gains were to be lost to the country, and the individual was not, in any case, in a position to reap them.

  The sea-powers were driven out, their warehouses abolished, and the supervision of the Sicilian harbours became possible. The Emperor did not fail to avail himself of the fact. In order to attract as large a supply of food into the island as possible during the Saracen war Frederick granted in 1222 complete freedom from import duties in Palermo. By the opening of this one port (together with the closing of the others, which we may assume) Frederick once more attracted trade and directed it to the very point which was most advantageous for his military operations. This proved most successful; the feeding of the army was assured.

  Similar autocratic measures are observable in other departments, though we have not always the clue to their interpretation. The export of the precious metals was sternly forbidden, and all payments to foreigners had to be made in the coarse newly-coined silver “imperials,” which became legal tender. Frederick guaranteed that this currency would be maintained and he watched carefully over it. Numerous fairs were abolished, which indicates an attempt to centralise trade, for the local fair frittered it away and brought advantage only to a few great folk. For the first time in 1223 Frederick began to impose a direct tax which was repeated every three, two or one years according to need, but in his later days became a regular annual tax. These “collections,” which were originally an extra-ordinary source of revenue, were thus conducted: the Emperor named the total sum required, and probably also dictated how it was to be distributed over the separate provinces; the further sub-division was then left to the provincial governors, the justiciars, who with the tax-collectors were responsible for actually getting the money in. Only when taken in conjunction with the Emperor’s later measures do these scattered individual ordinances give a complete picture of his economic policy. Even by themselves, however, they show a definite tendency: to seek a state unity even in commercial affairs, and to institute as far as possible a state trading-monopoly with the outside world.

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  The Saracen war has several times been mentioned. Frederick began it in 1222, his second Sicilian year. It was not his task to combat an independent Muslim amirate dating from the days of the Aghlabites, who had from Tunis conquered Sicily in the ninth century as heirs, in the second degree, of the Phoenicians. That had already been done by the Normans. He had to fight the scattered remnants of originally independent Saracens who still maintained themselves in the inaccessible highlands of the interior. They were strengthened by numerous fugitives from Palermo, who with a few of their big men had escaped a bloody massacre which the Christians of the capital had indulged in in 1190. Runaway Saracen serfs joined them, perhaps some clansmen also from Africa; be that as it may, they constituted a very considerable power, which for decades had owned allegiance to none, and had gradually got the whole centre of the island into their power.

  In the days of Pope Innocent’s guardianship these Saracens, like the continental knights and the corsairs of the coasts, had been redoubtable foes and much-coveted allies. They had been uniformly hostile to Frederick, the Pope’s ward, and in various ways had more than once sought his life. Just as the Genoese had established themselves in Syracuse, the Saracens had made themselves a ba
se at Girgenti, probably in order to maintain their communications with Africa. They had also taken the bishop prisoner and driven out a portion of the population, and had finally pursued their robber-raids northwards almost to the coast as far as Monreale just south of Palermo. A struggle with them was inevitable, for the Emperor’s writ ran only round a narrow strip of coast.

  The campaign developed into a weary and expensive petty war against these enemies in their mountain fastnesses. The details are little known. At the very outset, in the first summer, the chief Saracen fortress Yato had been besieged and even temporarily occupied. The Amir, Ibn Abbad, had abandoned all hope of victory and had set out with his sons to go to Frederick and sue for peace. The Emperor was in the highest degree incensed against Ibn Abbad—who had maltreated some imperial messengers. So enraged was he that a scene followed which recalls the passionate outburst of the seven-year-old Frederick. Ibn Abbad entered the imperial tent and flung himself at the Emperor’s feet; on the instant Frederick plunged his spur into the Amir and tore his side open. Frederick had him removed from the tent and a week later hanged him and his sons as rebels. Two merchants from Marseilles who happened to be captured at the same time as the Amir shared his fate. Ten years before they had hawked boys and girls of the Children’s Crusade in the slave markets of Tunis and Cairo, and had now been just in the act of betraying Frederick to the Amir.