Journey

by Norty Schwartz

  As I gazed out the windshield through the blue-green cockpit lighting, I felt more and more uneasy. We were precisely following the guidance data, but to me it appeared that we were coming in well below a typical glide path. Apparently I mumbled to myself, “This doesn’t look good.” Immediately everyone perked up and sat up in their seats. I called for an immediate go-around, and it’s a good thing that we did. Had we followed the computer’s internal guidance data we would have landed in the trees, well short of the runway.

  Later we learned one of the gimbals on the forward-looking infrared wasn’t calibrated properly, so the data it was providing for guidance was inaccurate in terms of degrees from the waterline (symbol that indicates relative pitch and roll angles of the aircraft when compared to the horizon). That slight miscalibration would have landed us about a quarter mile short.

  The lesson here is that good instincts in the special operations aircraft cockpit will always be essential to managing the inherent risks of and accomplishing that very demanding (and rewarding) special operations aviation mission.

  The data from this flight would be added to the vast amount that we had already collected. Eventually, it would all be compiled for analysis and presented in the final OUE report, along with our recommendations.

  The following night, we all got together for some beer to celebrate the birthday of one of our team members. I stood up and thanked everyone for their hard work and diligence, and they returned the favor by presenting me with a plaque. It was from the “Credible Sports,” which was what we called ourselves. All it said, in big, bold engraved letters, was THIS DOESN’T LOOK GOOD. Their way of saying, “When Schwartz talks, we listen.” The folks at Lockheed-Georgia corrected the calibration problem in such a way that it would never reoccur. We eventually perfected the autonomous landing technology, and it was an important contribution to the state of the art along the way.

  In the fall of 1982, Jerry Uttaro was reassigned to the Pentagon and I was given the honor of taking over as the director of the OUE test team, with Sam Galloway, Chris Armstrong, Mike Dredla, Tom Daignault, Dee Newberry, Ken Bancroft, Dave Metherell, and others as teammates.

  On one of our final test flights, we landed the airplane at Dobbins AFB in Atlanta right across the runway from the Lockheed plant. We were coming in at 140,000 pounds from fifty feet over the threshold with an approach speed of seventy-seven knots. Our landing roll was 991 feet. We were carrying about 11,000 inch-pounds of torque across all four engines. Performance like that was unheard of at the time. Those capabilities were only achievable because we created an aircraft that was aerodynamically unique.

  The issue was that flying the airplane in that regime was well behind the power curve, so there was considerable risk involved. If you lost an engine, your margin of safety was substantially reduced. At those speeds, there came a point on approach where you were committed to land if you lost an engine, whether you wanted to or not. Losing an engine at seventy-seven knots is not going to have a happy ending. There were additional risks associated with some of the additional aerodynamic surfaces that the airplane had. These were flight safety issues which we considered an acceptable risk because of the urgency of certain high-value special operations missions—certainly not the case across the entire fleet.

  In November 1982, we published the final OUE test report. The final report determined that the CREDIBLE SPORT II aircraft design, in its final configuration, was ready for production as the new Combat Talon II aircraft.

  Unfortunately, Tactical Air Command disagreed. They determined it to be too expensive and perhaps not high enough utility to be employed or implemented on a fleet-wide basis.

  While the model itself never went into production, elements of the YMC-130 we came up with led to the next generation of special operations fixed-wing airlift. The technology ultimately migrated into the newest version of the MC-130, the MC-130H—the first aircraft equipped with an autonomous landing system as “standard equipment.” The integration between sensors, flight dynamics, and CRT visualization was an early forerunner of today’s computerized cockpit display technology.

  * * *

  We left Hurlburt in July of ’83, honored to have served alongside the real pioneers of the special operations profession. It was a wonderfully challenging period that provided me the first steps in building multiple decades-long relationships that paid huge dividends. We were a band of youngsters with a quiet determination—cutting our teeth together and growing up to be senior leaders in the armed forces of the United States. This was the period when Pete Schoomaker, subsequently a commander of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), then chief of staff of the Army; Doug Brown, also commander of Special Operations Command; Eric Olson on the SEAL side, commander of Naval Special Warfare Command (the Navy component of SOCOM) and later SOCOM; and myself all worked together, grew together, and dedicated our lives to help build the most capable special operations force in the world.

  My service in our Air Force was profoundly influenced by my tours in the special operations community. Had I not experienced the intensity of the mission, associated with an array of remarkable joint teammates, and earned a reputation in the special operations community, I would never have had the opportunities to lead in our Air Force that I ultimately enjoyed.

  For those interested in specifics, here are some details taken directly from our CREDIBLE SPORT II final OUE evaluation report. The entire OUE report is available online at www.nortyschwartz.com/credible_sport2.

  PURPOSE AND MAJOR OBJECTIVES. The purpose of the CS II OUE was to satisfy prototype test requirements of those CS systems/capabilities proposed for CT II. The major objectives were as follows:

  a) Determine aircraft handling characteristics for operational use.

  b) Determine mission requirements for enroute navigation.

  c) Determine if CS II avionics meet mission requirements for approach accuracy.

  d) Determine if instrument/avionics lighting is compatible with night/minimum light operation.

  e) Determine if switchology/moding/panel configuration/displays are acceptable for operational use in normal and degraded operation.

  f) Determine if representative missions can he effectively accomplished using the two-man navigator (nav)/electronic warfare officer (EWO) suite.

  SIGNIFICANT RESULTS.

  1. The CS aircraft was more “stable” directionally than the MC-130E, particularly at slower airspeeds (130 knots indicated airspeed [KIAS] and less) and in turbulence. Pilot comments emphasized that handling qualities were significantly better, overall, than the MC-130E. Pilot workload during demanding flight maneuvers was decidedly lower than for the MC-130E.

  2. Average inertial navigation system (INS) accuracies were 1.95 nautical miles per hour (nm/hr) for all sorties (including overwater) in the Doppler/inertial mode, 1.23 nm/hr for overland sorties in the Doppler/inertial mode, and 1.35 nm/hr in the pure inertial mode. The independent Doppler provided 0.95 nm/hr accuracy. Although electromagnetic interference problems purportedly degraded INS performance, no consistently improved drift rates were achieved after a “fix” was installed. For example, a 0.77 nm/hr drift rate was experienced on 31 August. Additionally, use of the forward-looking infrared (FLIR) to update the navigation system during enroute operations was constrained by environmental conditions, limited field-of-view, and inability to properly cue the FLIR with the mapping radar.

  3. Fourteen approaches were flown in the conventional, 100 percent flap assault configuration using 3.0 degree glide paths. Safe landings were performed during day and night/blackout conditions from all approaches flown in the inertial mode. Accuracies varied, as did the flyability of the computer-generated guidance, but overall results were favorable. However, all approaches performed in the Doppler/C-12 (noninertial) mode were unsafe in that the guidance, if followed, would have landed the aircraft well short of the runway. Data collected on the laser were invalid because of a protective cover inadvertently left installed on th
e laser receiver by factory technicians. Subsequent to the OUE, performance of the laser with the cover removed was impressive.

  4. Cockpit/instrument lighting was adequate for test purposes, but workarounds were necessary. Several lights had to be taped and/or removed. The cathode ray tube (CRT) display created a hazard in that lowering the brightness for NVG compatibility caused the filtered FLIR video to disappear. In addition, a normal level of illumination was discernible from outside the aircraft—an undesirable characteristic in a combat environment.

  5. The crew stations were functional, but deficiencies were identified which require additional design attention. These include inadequate CRT display flexibility, symbology, format, and video presentation. The computer display units (CDUs) were generally difficult to use, were programmed using different formats, and did not provide the operator with adequate feedback, control flexibility, equipment status monitoring, or access. The FLIR target tracking control (joystick) was poorly positioned on the navigator table, did not incorporate an integral “designate” function, and provided different radar and FLIR sensor slew rates. The Collins flight director did not incorporate a hearing pointer; displayed true rather than magnetic heading to the pilot; and did not provide automatic course intercept steering in the computer mode, adequate approach, or dedicated Doppler steering. Additionally, the attitude direction indicator (ADI) climb indexes were not NVG compatible, and airspeed indicators were poorly graduated and difficult to interpret.

  6. The single navigator was able to perform all navigation tasks with minimum assistance—albeit with a high workload at times. Areas of unusually intense concentration/activity included system programming, enroute navigation updating, turnpoint procedures, and self-contained approach duties. The degree of task saturation experienced by the single navigator was directly related to the level of system degradation, inaccuracy of the inertial reference, and modest automation inherent in the CS II design.

  MAJOR DEFICIENCIES. The overall CS II aircraft and avionics design represents a significant improvement over equipment now being used. However, five major deficiencies were identified.

  a) Inertial navigation system inaccuracy.

  b) Unreliability of noninertial approach modes.

  c) Night lighting and CRT/NVG compatibility.

  d) Man-machine interface/system automation.

  e) Lack of internal software reasonableness testing to avoid unsafe flight conditions.

  MAJOR CONCLUSIONS.

  1. The handling characteristics of the test aircraft are superior to those of the MC-130E. A production aircraft equipped with CS flight control technology will perform the mission better and will enjoy improved margins of safety.

  2. LN-15S navigation system accuracies are unacceptable while Dopper enroute accuracies are adequate.

  3. Approach accuracies in the inertial and Doppler/inertial modes are acceptable. The Doppler/C-12 approach mode is unsafe.

  4. The test aircraft CRT displays and formats are manageable and effective but only with extreme mental concentration. They are not adequate for prolonged safe and effective operation. Nevertheless, the FLIR video is a real asset during blackout operations.

  5. The central avionics computer (CAC) CDU is completely unacceptable because of insufficient readout, display, and simultaneous operations capability.

  6. The split configuration of the nav/weapon systems officer (WSO) station is not acceptable.

  7. Processing of self-contained approach guidance by the Collins flight director yields unusable steering commands.

  8. The software is immature and requires further development to improve operator interface, minimize aircrew workload, and achieve consistent patterns of mission reliability and performance.

  9. Cockpit and avionics lighting is adequate for safe night operations but NVG compatibility enhancements are required to perform representative missions.

  10. The two-man nav/EWO suite allows effective accomplishment of representative CT missions.

  MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS.

  1. In addition to the CAC derived height-above-touchdown display at the navigator station, the current radar altitude must he displayed for qualitative assessment of CAC operation and flight safety. A barometric altimeter and radar altimeter should also be installed at the radio operator crew station. Additionally, a warning/caution annunciator, similar to the pilot’s, is needed.

  2. A truly multimode, high-resolution radar must he procured that is capable of simultaneous precision ground mapping and terrain following operations.

  3. The software must incorporate internal self-test features which will alert the operator when reasonableness parameters are exceeded. An “above-glide-path” computation which exceeds current radar altitude, for example, should not go unnoticed by the aircrew.

  4. A reliable airborne barometric calibration procedure must be incorporated in production software.

  5. A reliable alternative to the inertial approach modes must be developed to allow for graceful system degradation.

  6. An accurate and redundant INS must be provided. Consistent performance must be verified in the mission environment prior to production. Inadequate INS performance will incapacitate the CT II avionics architecture.

  7. The navigation software must be optimized for the C-130 including automatic course intercept steering, automatic sequential steering, additional waypoint/target storage with elevation, and multiple offset aimpoint capability.

  8. Design attention must he focused in the area of night lighting and NVG compatibility. Areas of greatest concern should he CRT design and cockpit/instrument light/annunciation control.

  9. System and procedural changes must be made to alleviate navigator workload “crunchpoints.” The objective should be to minimize/consolidate the number of steps and separate switches/keyboard operations needed to program, select update modes, and manage the avionics system. Additionally, a detailed procedural/task analysis must be conducted to identify nav/WSO tasks that may be shared.

  10. CS flight control technology should be pursued for incorporation in the production aircraft.

  11. Computer control must be optimized for simultaneous operations and provide annunciation of system moding, function, and system status for all crewmembers.

  12. A FLIR video recorder should be installed for mission reconstruction, evaluation, and intelligence collection.

  Once we completed the CREDIBLE SPORT project, I enthusiastically stepped back into the hectic pace of one of five crew commanders of the 8th SOS. Real-world missions were supplemented with exercises that honed established tactics and procedures, and experimented with new ones. An embryonic special operations aviation force was beginning to mature. Here are a few key operations and exercises that contributed to that growth:

  Operation Night March was an around-the-world mission intended to perfect our skills at moving aircraft in a very low-visibility fashion, completely “off the radar” so to speak. It’s a strategy that’s as vital today as it was back then. Recently we’ve used it moving aircraft to Korea and the Middle East.

  It involved a single airplane that I piloted, and it did not go well. Coincidentally, I was flying Combat Talon 64-0567, the very aircraft flown by Colonel Brenci, Major Meller, Major Uttaro, and Captain Thigpen on November 26, 1979, the very first mission to utilize NVGs.

  This was an important mission that commanded the very best crew: There was no more proficient loadmaster than Taco Sanchez. If there was any question about that (which there wasn’t), it would have been put to rest on April 24, 1980, when Taco was loadmaster on “Dragon 1,” Combat Talon 64-0565, the lead plane into Iran on Operation EAGLE CLAW. Lt Col Bob Brenci piloted that flight. On that afternoon, before commander Colonel Charlie Beckwith stepped onboard, Taco had already coordinated a load that took every square inch of the cargo compartment. He’d loaded fifty-six operators, twelve Rangers (for roadblocks), two Iranian generals (advisors), six Iranian truck drivers, seven Farsi-speaking American drivers,
John Carney and his CCT (Combat Control Team), aviation mission commander Colonel James Kyle, and 1st SOW deputy commander, Colonel Thomas J. Wicker. And they were in addition to the vehicles and equipment that previously had been packed inside. There was the gun-jeep for the roadblock team, a portable TACAN to be used to help the helicopters find the LZ, three motorcycles to be used by the rangers to provide mobility for the roadblock force, and two by Carney’s team to mark a second parallel runway. Two large sheets of aluminum planking were loaded in, just in case the aircraft became mired in the desert sand.

  Along with Sanchez, Dee Newberry would also be a vital member of our crew as flight engineer. Dee had also been a part of Desert One, going in on Jerry Uttaro’s “Republic 6” aircraft.

  Our objective was to make the trip in one single “invisible” hop from the Philippines to South Sudan, where we would perform a tactical airdrop insertion and then continue, undetected, direct to Mogadishu. It did not take long for the problems to rear their ugly head.

  Equipment breakdown caused a navigation failure over the ocean. Under normal circumstances, this was something we could work around. Any deviations from our intended route would be covered by the extra fuel we’d take on during our IFR. But when we arrived at what we believed to be our intended rendezvous point—no tanker. By that point we were running low on fuel, and black ops radio silence complicated our attempts to rendezvous.

  Eventually we did land in Mogadishu, only to find that our reception party (combined Central Command and intelligence personnel) had dropped the ball with inadequate homework, leaving us to fly into a shitstorm. They were supposed to have coordinated in detail with the host government or air force, but to my knowledge, this never happened. That left me to face penetrating questions from the host government air traffic control—unanticipated questions that were a challenge for me to manage. The more I spoke, the worse it became. Mogadishu authorities were not buying my story. Tensions escalated.