Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

by Polybius

  But the comparative peace in the Peloponnese was again broken in B.C. 189 by the Spartans seizing a maritime town called Las; the object being to relieve themselves of the restraint which shut them from the sea, and the possible attacks of the exiles who had been banished by Nabis, and who were always watching an opportunity to effect their return. Philopoemen (Strategus both 189 and 188 B.C.) led an army to the Laconian frontier in the spring of B.C. 188, and after the execution of eighty Spartans, who had been surrendered on account of the seizure of Las, and of the murder of thirty citizens who were supposed to have Achaean proclivities — Sparta submitted to his demand to raze the fortifications, dismiss the mercenaries, send away the new citizens enrolled by the tyrants, and abolish the Lycurgean laws, accepting the Achaean institutions instead. This was afterwards supplemented by a demand for the restoration of the exiles banished by the tyrants. Such of the new citizens (three thousand) as did not leave the country by the day named were seized and sold as slaves.

  Sparta was now part of the Achaean league, which at this time reached its highest point of power; and its alliance was solicited by the most powerful princes of the east. It is this period which Polybius seems to have in mind in his description of the league at its best, as embracing the whole of the Peloponnese. And it was in this third period of the existence of the renewed league that his father Lycortas came to the front, and he himself at an early age began taking part in politics.

  But the terms imposed on Sparta were essentially violent and unjust, and, as it turned out, impolitic. Cowed into submission, she proved a thorn in the side of the league. The exiles continually appealed to Rome; and after Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) the affairs of the league began more and more to come before the Roman Senate. As usual, traitors were at hand ready to sell their country for the sake of the triumph of their party; and Callicrates, sent to Rome to plead the cause of the league, employed the opportunity to support himself and his party by advising the Senate to give support to “the Romanisers” in every state. This Polybius regards as the beginning of the decline of the league. And the party of moderation, to which he and his father Lycortas belonged, and which wished to assert the dignity and legal rights of their country while offering no provocation to the Romans, were eventually included under the sweeping decree which caused them, to the number of a thousand, to be deported to Italy. We have already seen, in tracing the life of Polybius, how the poor remnants of these exiles returned in B.C. 151, embittered against Rome, and having learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. And how the old quarrels were renewed, until an armed interference of Rome was brought upon them; and how the victory of Mummius at Corinth (B.C. 146), and the consequent settlement of the commissioners, finally dissolved the league into separate cantons, nominally autonomous, but really entirely subject to Rome.

  The constitution of the league presents many points of interest to the student of politics, and has been elaborately discussed by more than one English scholar. I shall content myself here with pointing out some of the main features as they are mentioned by Polybius.

  The league was a federation of free towns, all retaining full local autonomy of some form or other of democracy, which for certain purposes were under federal laws and federal magistrates, elected in a federal assembly which all citizens of the league towns might if they chose attend. All towns of the league also used the same standards in coinage and weights and measures (2, 37). The assembly of the league (σύνοδος) met for election of the chief magistrate in May of each year, at first always at Aegium, but later at the other towns of the league in turn (29, 23); and a second time in the autumn. And besides these annual meetings, the Strategus, acting with his council of magistrates, could summon a meeting at any time for three days (e.g. at Sicyon, 23, 17); and on one occasion we find the assembly delegating its powers to the armed levy of league troops, who for the nonce were to act as an assembly (4, 7). Side by side with this general assembly was a council (βουλή), the functions and powers of which we cannot clearly ascertain. It seems to have acted as representing the general assembly in foreign affairs (4, 26; 22, 12); and, being a working committee of the whole assembly, it sometimes happened that when an assembly was summoned on some subject which did not rouse popular interest, it practically was the assembly (29, 24). Its numbers have been assumed to be one hundred and twenty, from the fact that Eumenes offered them a present of one hundred and twenty talents, the interest of which was to pay their expenses. But this, after all, is not a certain deduction (22, 10).

  The officers of the league were: First, a President or Strategus who kept the seal of the league (4, 7), ordered the levy of federal troops, and commanded it in the field. He also summoned the assemblies, and brought the business to be done before them, which was in the form of a proposal to be accepted or rejected, not amended. He was not chairman of the assembly, but like an English minister or a Roman consul brought on the proposals. He was assisted by a kind of cabinet of ten magistrates from the several towns, who were called Demiurgi (δημιουργοὶ 23, 5). This was their technical name: but Polybius also speaks of them under the more general appellation of οἱ ἄρχοντες (5, 1), οἱ συνάρχοντες (23, 16), αἱ ἀρχαὶ (22, 13), αἱ συναρχίαι (27, 2). Whether the number ten had reference to the ten old towns of the league or not, it was not increased with the number of the towns; and, though we are not informed how they were elected, it seems reasonable to suppose that they were freely selected without reference to the towns from which they came, as the Strategus himself was. There was also a vice-president, or hypo-strategus, whose position was, I think, wholly military. He did not rule in absence of the Strategus, or succeed him in case of death, that being reserved for the Strategus of the previous year; but he took a certain command in war next the Strategus (5, 94; 4, 59). Besides these we hear of a Hipparch to command the league cavalry (5, 95; 7, 22), an office which seems to have been regarded as stepping-stone to that of Strategus. This proved a bad arrangement, as its holder was tempted to seek popularity by winking at derelictions of duty among the cavalry who were voters. There was also a Navarch to command the regular squadron of federal ships (5, 94), who does not seem to have been so important a person. There are also mentioned certain judges (δίκασται) to administer the federal law. We hear of them, however, performing duties closely bordering on politics; for they decided whether certain honorary inscriptions, statues, or other marks of respect to king Eumenes should be allowed to remain in the Achaean cities (28, 7).

  The Strategus, on the order of the assembly, raised the federal army (4, 7). The number of men raised differed according to circumstances. A fairly full levy seems to have been five thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry (4, 15). But the league also used mercenaries to a great extent. And we hear of one army which was to consist of eight thousand mercenary infantry, with five hundred mercenary cavalry; and in this case the Achaean levy was only to be three thousand infantry, with three hundred cavalry (5, 91).

  The pay of the mercenaries and other league expenses were provided for by an εἰσφορά or contribution from all the states (5, 31, 91). The contributing towns appear to have been able to recover their payments as an indemnification for damage which the federal forces had failed to avert (4, 60).

  The regular federal squadron of ships for guarding the sea-coasts appears to have consisted of ten triremes (2, 9; δεκαναία μακρῶν πλοίων 22, 10).

  Such was the organisation of the Federal Government. It was in form purely democratic, all members of thirty years old being eligible for office, as well as possessing a vote in the assemblies. But a mass assembly where the members are widely scattered inevitably becomes oligarchic. Only the well-to-do and the energetic will be able or will care to come a long journey to attend. And as the votes in the assembly were given by towns, it must often have happened that the votes of many towns were decided by a very small number of their citizens who were there. No doubt, in times of
great excitement, the attendance would be large and the vote a popular one. But the general policy of the league must have been directed by a small number of energetic men, who made politics their profession and could afford to do

  ROMAN CAMP FOR TWO LEGIONS CONTAINING 4,068,289 SQUARE FEET

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  Praetorium.

  T T’.

  Tents of the Tribuni Militum of two legions.

  E E’.

  Equites of two legions.

  P P’.

  Principes”“

  H H’.

  Hastati”“

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  Triarii”“

  ES ES’.

  Equites of Socii of two legions.

  PS PS’.

  Pedites”““

  PE PE’.

  Equites of the Praetorian Cohort of two legions.

  PP PP’.

  Pedites”“““

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  Pedites extraordinarii of two legions.

  EE EE’.

  Equites ““

  Q.

  Quaestorium.

  F.

  Forum or market-place.

  V V’.

  Foreigners or volunteers.

  BOOK I

  1. Had the praise of History been passed over by former Chroniclers it would perhaps have been incumbent upon me to urge the choice and special study of records of this sort, as the readiest means men can have of correcting their knowledge of the past. But my predecessors have not been sparing in this respect. They have all begun and ended, so to speak, by enlarging on this theme: asserting again and again that the study of History is in the truest sense an education, and a training for political life; and that the most instructive, or rather the only, method of learning to bear with dignity the vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the catastrophes of others. It is evident, therefore, that no one need think it his duty to repeat what has been said by many, and said well. Least of all myself: for the surprising nature of the events which I have undertaken to relate is in itself sufficient to challenge and stimulate the attention of every one, old or young, to the study of my work. Can any one be so indifferent or idle as not to care to know by what means, and under what kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought under the dominion of the single city of Rome, and that too within a period of not quite fifty-three years? Or who again can be so completely absorbed in other subjects of contemplation or study, as to think any of them superior in importance to the accurate understanding of an event for which the past affords no precedent.

  2. We shall best show how marvellous and vast our subject is by comparing the most famous Empires which preceded, and which have been the favourite themes of historians, and measuring them with the superior greatness of Rome. There are but three that deserve even to be so compared and measured: and they are these. The Persians for a certain length of time were possessed of a great empire and dominion. But every time they ventured beyond the limits of Asia, they found not only their empire, but their own existence also in danger. The Lacedaemonians, after contending for supremacy in Greece for many generations, when they did get it, held it without dispute for barely twelve years. The Macedonians obtained dominion in Europe from the lands bordering on the Adriatic to the Danube, — which after all is but a small fraction of this continent, — and, by the destruction of the Persian Empire, they afterwards added to that the dominion of Asia. And yet, though they had the credit of having made themselves masters of a larger number of countries and states than any people had ever done, they still left the greater half of the inhabited world in the hands of others. They never so much as thought of attempting Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya: and as to Europe, to speak the plain truth, they never even knew of the most warlike tribes of the West. The Roman conquest, on the other hand, was not partial. Nearly the whole inhabited world was reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind them an empire not to be paralleled in the past or rivalled in the future. Students will gain from my narrative a clearer view of the whole story, and of the numerous and important advantages which such exact record of events offers.

  3. My History begins in the 140th Olympiad. The events from which it starts are these. In Greece, what is called the Social war: the first waged by Philip, son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in league with the Achaeans against the Aetolians. In Asia, the war for the possession of Coele-Syria which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator carried on against each other. In Italy, Libya, and their neighbourhood, the conflict between Rome and Carthage, generally called the Hannibalian war. My work thus begins where that of Aratus of Sicyon leaves off. Now up to this time the world’s history had been, so to speak, a series of disconnected transactions, as widely separated in their origin and results as in their localities. But from this time forth History becomes a connected whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all is to unity. This is why I have fixed upon this era as the starting-point of my work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in this war, and their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most essential step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and to cross with an army into Greece and Asia.

  Now, had the states that were rivals for universal empire been familiarly known to us, no reference perhaps to their previous history would have been necessary, to show the purpose and the forces with which they approached an undertaking of this nature and magnitude. But the fact is that the majority of the Greeks have no knowledge of the previous constitution, power, or achievements either of Rome or Carthage. I therefore concluded that it was necessary to prefix this and the next book to my History. I was anxious that no one, when fairly embarked upon my actual narrative, should feel at a loss, and have to ask what were the designs entertained by the Romans, or the forces and means at their disposal, that they entered upon those undertakings, which did in fact lead to their becoming masters of land and sea everywhere in our part of the world. I wished, on the contrary, that these books of mine, and the prefatory sketch which they contained, might make it clear that the resources they started with justified their original idea, and sufficiently explained their final success in grasping universal empire and dominion.

  4. There is this analogy between the plan of my History and the marvellous spirit of the age with which I have to deal. Just as Fortune made almost all the affairs of the world incline in one direction, and forced them to converge upon one and the same point; so it is my task as an historian to put before my readers a compendious view of the part played by Fortune in bringing about the general catastrophe. It was this peculiarity which originally challenged my attention, and determined me on undertaking this work. And combined with this was the fact that no writer of our time has undertaken a general history. Had any one done so my ambition in this direction would have been much diminished. But, in point of fact, I notice that by far the greater number of historians concern themselves with isolated wars and the incidents that accompany them: while as to a general and comprehensive scheme of events, their date, origin, and catastrophe, no one as far as I know has undertaken to examine it. I thought it, therefore, distinctly my duty neither to pass by myself, nor allow any one else to pass by, without full study, a characteristic specimen of the dealings of Fortune at once brilliant and instructive in the highest degree. For fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men, yet never assuredly before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed. And of this we cannot obtain a comprehensive view from writers of mere episodes. It would be as absurd to expect to do so as for a man to imagine that he has learnt the shape of the whole world, its entire arrangement and order, because he has visited one after the other the most famous cities in it; or perhaps merely examined them in separate pictures. That would be indeed absurd: and it has always seemed to me that men
, who are persuaded that they get a competent view of universal from episodical history, are very like persons who should see the limbs of some body, which had once been living and beautiful, scattered and remote; and should imagine that to be quite as good as actually beholding the activity and beauty of the living creature itself. But if some one could there and then reconstruct the animal once more, in the perfection of its beauty and the charm of its vitality, and could display it to the same people, they would beyond doubt confess that they had been far from conceiving the truth, and had been little better than dreamers. For indeed some idea of a whole may be got from a part, but an accurate knowledge and clear comprehension cannot. Wherefore we must conclude that episodical history contributes exceedingly little to the familiar knowledge and secure grasp of universal history. While it is only by the combination and comparison of the separate parts of the whole, — by observing their likeness and their difference, — that a man can attain his object: can obtain a view at once clear and complete; and thus secure both the profit and the delight of History.