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Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

Page 341

by Polybius


  [1] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβη τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους εὐλαβέστερον διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθέσεις, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους φυλακτικώτερον χρῆσθαι ταῖς προνομαῖς. [2] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀντεξῄεσαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πλὴν ἕως ἀκροβολισμοῦ, διελόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰς δύο μέρη τὴν δύναμιν τῷ μὲν ἑνὶ περὶ τὸ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἀσκληπιεῖον ἔμενον, θατέρῳ δὲ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Ἡράκλειαν κεκλιμένοις μέρεσιν τῆς πόλεως. [3] τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς πόλεως ὠχυρώσαντο καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐντὸς αὐτῶν τάφρον προεβάλοντο χάριν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἐξιόντας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀσφαλείας, τὴν δ᾽ ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν περιεβάλοντο, φυλακὴν ποιούμενοι τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπιθέσεων καὶ τῶν παρεισάγεσθαι καὶ παρεισπίπτειν εἰωθότων εἰς τὰς πολιορκουμένας πόλεις. [4] τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέδων διαστήματα φυλακαῖς διέλαβον, ὀχυροποιησάμενοι τοὺς εὐκαίρους τῶν τόπων ἐν διαστάσει. [5] τὰ δὲ χορήγια καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι πάντες ἥθροιζον αὐτοῖς καὶ παρῆγον εἰς Ἑρβησόν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως οὐ μακρὰν ὑπαρχούσης ἄγοντες καὶ φέροντες συνεχῶς τὰς ἀγορὰς δαψιλῆ τἀναγκαῖα σφίσι παρεσκεύαζον. [6] πέντε μὲν οὖν ἴσως μῆνας ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν διέμενον, οὐδὲν ὁλοσχερὲς προτέρημα δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων πλὴν τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀκροβολισμοῖς συμβαινόντων. [7] συναγομένων δὲ τῷ λιμῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συγκεκλεισμένων ἀνδρῶν — οὐ γὰρ ἐλάττους πέντε μυριάδων ὑπῆρχον — δυσχρηστούμενος Ἀννίβας ἤδη τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν πολιορκουμένων δυνάμεων, διεπέμπετο συνεχῶς εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα τήν τε περίστασιν διασαφῶν καὶ βοηθεῖν παρακαλῶν. [8] οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι τῶν ἐπισυνηγμένων στρατιωτῶν καὶ θηρίων γεμίσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν πρὸς Ἄννωνα τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγόν. [9] ὃς συναγαγὼν τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ δυνάμεις εἰς Ἡράκλειαν πρῶτον μὲν πραξικοπήσας κατέσχε τὴν τῶν Ἑρβησέων πόλιν καὶ παρείλετο τὰς ἀγορὰς καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων χορηγίαν τοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων στρατοπέδοις. [10] ἐξ οὗ συνέβη τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐπ᾽ ἴσου πολιορκεῖν καὶ πολιορκεῖσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο συνήγοντο τῇ σιτοδείᾳ καὶ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὥστε πολλάκις βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ λύειν τὴν πολιορκίαν. [11] ὃ δὴ καὶ τέλος ἂν ἐποίησαν, εἰ μὴ πᾶσαν σπουδὴν καὶ μηχανὴν προσφερόμενος Ἱέρων τὰ μέτρια καὶ τἀναγκαῖα σφίσι παρεσκεύαζε

  18. The result was that thenceforth the Carthaginians were somewhat less forward in making such attacks, and the Romans more cautious in foraging.

  Finding that the Carthaginians would not come out to meet them at close quarters any more, the Roman generals divided their forces: with one division they occupied the ground round the temple of Asclepius outside the town; with the other they encamped in the outskirts of the city on the side which looks towards Heracleia. The space between the camps on either side of the city they secured by two trenches, — the inner one to protect themselves against sallies from the city, the outer as a precaution against attacks from without, and to intercept those persons or supplies which always make their way surreptitiously into cities that are sustaining a siege. The spaces between the trenches uniting the camps they secured by pickets, taking care in their disposition to strengthen the several accessible points. As for food and other war material, the other allied cities all joined in collecting and bringing these to Herbesus for them: and thus they supplied themselves in abundance with necessaries, by continually getting provisions living and dead from this town, which was conveniently near. For about five months then they remained in the same position, without being able to obtain any decided advantage over each other beyond the casualties which occurred in the skirmishes. But the Carthaginians were beginning to be hard pressed by hunger, owing to the number of men shut up in the city, who amounted to no less than fifty thousand: and Hannibal, who had been appointed commander of the besieged forces, beginning by this time to be seriously alarmed at the state of things, kept perpetually sending messages to Carthage explaining their critical state, and begging for assistance. Thereupon the Carthaginian government put on board ship the fresh troops and elephants which they had collected, and despatched them to Sicily, with orders to join the other commander Hanno. This officer collected all his war material and forces into Heracleia, and as a first step possessed himself by a stratagem of Herbesus, thus depriving the enemy of their provisions and supply of necessaries. The result of this was that the Romans found themselves in the position of besieged as much as in that of besiegers; for they were reduced by short supplies of food and scarcity of necessaries to such a condition that they more than once contemplated raising the siege. And they would have done so at last had not Hiero, by using every effort and contrivance imaginable, succeeded in keeping them supplied with what satisfied, to a tolerable extent, their most pressing wants. This was Hanno’s first step. His next was as follows.

  [1] τῶν χορηγίων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θεωρῶν ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους ὑπό τε τῆς νόσου καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀσθενῶς διακειμένους διὰ τὸ λοιμικὴν εἶναι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς κατάστασιν, τὰ δὲ σφέτερα στρατόπεδα νομίζων ἀξιόχρεα πρὸς μάχην ὑπάρχειν, [2] ἀναλαβὼν τά τε θηρία περὶ πεντήκοντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἅπασαν προῆγε κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἡρακλείας, παραγγείλας τοῖς Νομαδικοῖς ἱππεῦσι προπορεύεσθαι καὶ συνεγγίσασι τῷ χάρακι τῶν ἐναντίων ἐρεθίζειν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι τοὺς ἱππεῖς αὐτῶν ἐκκαλεῖσθαι, κἄπειτα πάλιν ἐκκλίνασιν ἀποχωρεῖν, ἕως ἂν αὐτῷ συμμίξωσι. [3] πραξάντων δὲ τὸ συνταχθὲν τῶν Νομάδων καὶ προσμιξάντων θατέρῳ τῶν στρατοπέδων, εὐθὺς οἱ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῖς ἐξεχέοντο καὶ θρασέως ἐπέκειντο τοῖς Νομάσιν. [4] οἱ δὲ Λίβυες ὑπεχώρουν κατὰ τὸ παράγγελμα, μέχρι συνέμιξαν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄννωνα: λοιπόν τ᾽ ἐκ μεταβολῆς περιχυθέντες ἐπέκειντο τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν α
ὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἕως εἰς τὸν χάρακα συνεδίωξαν. [5] γενομένων δὲ τούτων ἐπεστρατοπέδευσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄννωνα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, καταλαβόμενοι τὸν λόφον τὸν καλούμενον Τόρον, ὡς δέκα σταδίους ἀπέχοντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων. [6] καὶ δύο μὲν μῆνας ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, οὐδὲν ὁλοσχερὲς πράττοντες πλὴν ἀκροβολιζόμενοι καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν. [7] τοῦ δ᾽ Ἀννίβου διαπυρσευομένου καὶ διαπεμπομένου συνεχῶς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν Ἄννωνα καὶ δηλοῦντος ὅτι τὰ πλήθη τὸν λιμὸν οὐχ ὑπομένει, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους αὐτομολοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, ἔγνω διακινδυνεύειν ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, οὐχ ἧττον ἐπὶ τοῦτο φερομένων καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας. [8] διόπερ ἐξαγαγόντες ἀμφότεροι τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὸν μεταξὺ τόπον τῶν στρατοπέδων συνέβαλλον ἀλλήλοις. [9] ἐπὶ πολὺν δὲ χρόνον γενομένης τῆς μάχης τέλος ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς προκινδυνεύσαντας μισθοφόρους τῶν Καρχηδονίων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι. [10] τούτων δὲ πεσόντων εἰς τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τάξεις τὰς ἐφεστηκυίας συνέβη πᾶν συνταραχθῆναι τὸ τῶν Φοινίκων στρατόπεδον. [11] γενομένου δ᾽ ἐγκλίματος ὁλοσχεροῦς οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι διεφθάρησαν αὐτῶν, τινὲς δ᾽ εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἀπεχώρησαν: οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν τε πλείστων ἐκυρίευσαν θηρίων καὶ τῆς ἐπισκευῆς ἁπάσης. [12] ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτός, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων χαρὰν καὶ διὰ τὸν κόπον ῥᾳθυμότερον ταῖς φυλακαῖς αὐτῶν χρησαμένων, ἀπελπίσας Ἀννίβας τὰ πράγματα καὶ νομίσας ἔχειν εὐφυῆ καιρὸν πρὸς σωτηρίαν διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, ὥρμησε περὶ μέσας νύκτας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἔχων τὰς ξενικὰς δυνάμεις. [13] χώσας δὲ φορμοῖς ἀχύρων σεσαγμένοις τὰς τάφρους ἔλαθε τοὺς πολεμίους ἀπαγαγὼν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν δύναμιν. [14] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπελθούσης συνέντες τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ τῆς οὐραγίας τῆς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐπὶ βραχὺ καθαψάμενοι μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες ὥρμησαν πρὸς τὰς πύλας. [15] οὐδενὸς δ᾽ ἐμποδὼν αὐτοῖς ἱσταμένου, παρεισπεσόντες διήρπασαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ πολλῶν μὲν σωμάτων, πολλῆς δὲ καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἐγένοντο κατασκευῆς ἐγκρατεῖς.

  19. He saw that the Romans were reduced by disease and want, owing to an epidemic that had broken out among them, and he believed that his own forces were strong enough to give them battle: he accordingly collected his elephants, of which he had about fifty, and the whole of the rest of his army, and advanced at a rapid pace from Heracleia; having previously issued orders to the Numidian cavalry to precede him, and to endeavour, when they came near the enemies’ stockade, to provoke them and draw their cavalry out; and, having done so, to wheel round and retire until they met him. The Numidians did as they were ordered, and advanced up to one of the camps. Immediately the Roman cavalry poured out and boldly charged the Numidians: the Libyans retired, according to their orders, until they reached Hanno’s division: then they wheeled round; surrounded, and repeatedly charged the enemy; killed a great number of them, and chased the rest up to their stockade. After this affair Hanno’s force encamped over against the Romans, having seized the hill called Torus, at a distance of about a mile and a quarter from their opponents. For two months they remained in position without any decisive action, though skirmishes took place daily. But as Hannibal all this time kept signalling and sending messages from the town to Hanno, — telling him that his men were impatient of the famine, and that many were even deserting to the enemy owing to the distress for food, — the Carthaginian general determined to risk a battle, the Romans being equally ready, for the reasons I have mentioned. So both parties advanced into the space between the camps and engaged. The battle lasted a long time, but at last the Romans turned the advanced guard of Carthaginian mercenaries. The latter fell back upon the elephants and the other divisions posted in their rear; and thus the whole Punic army was thrown into confusion. The retreat became general: the larger number of the men were killed, while some effected their escape into Heracleia; and the Romans became masters of most of the elephants and all the baggage. Now night came on, and the victors, partly from joy at their success, partly from fatigue, kept their watches somewhat more carelessly than usual; accordingly Hannibal, having given up hope of holding out, made up his mind that this state of things afforded him a good opportunity of escape. He started about midnight from the town with his mercenary troops, and having choked up the trenches with baskets stuffed full of chaff, led off his force in safety, without being detected by the enemy. When day dawned the Romans discovered what had happened, and indeed for a short time were engaged with Hannibal’s rear; but eventually they all made for the town gates. There they found no one to oppose them: they therefore threw themselves into the town, plundered it, and secured a large number of captives, besides a great booty of every sort and description.

  [1] τῆς δ᾽ ἀγγελίας ἀφικομένης εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα, περιχαρεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐπαρθέντες οὐκ ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λογισμῶν οὐδ᾽ ἠρκοῦντο σεσωκέναι τοὺς Μαμερτίνους οὐδὲ ταῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολέμου γενομέναις ὠφελείαις, [2] ἐλπίσαντες δὲ καθόλου δυνατὸν εἶναι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς νήσου, τούτου δὲ γενομένου μεγάλην ἐπίδοσιν αὑτῶν λήψεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, πρὸς τούτοις ἦσαν τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ταῖς περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐπινοίαις. [3] τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις ἑώρων κατὰ λόγον σφίσι προχωροῦντα: [4] μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς τὸν Ἀκράγαντα πολιορκήσαντας οἱ κατασταθέντες στρατηγοὶ Λεύκιος Οὐαλέριος καὶ Τίτος Ὀτακίλιος ἐδόκουν ἐνδεχομένως χειρίζειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. [5] τῆς δὲ θαλάττης ἀκονιτὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικρατούντων ἐζυγοστατεῖτ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὁ πόλεμος: [6] ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἑξῆς χρόνοις, κατεχόντων αὐτῶν ἤδη τὸν Ἀκράγαντα, πολλαὶ μὲν πόλεις προσετίθεντο τῶν μεσογαίων τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀγωνιῶσαι τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἀφίσταντο τῶν παραθαλαττίων, καταπεπληγμέναι τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στόλον. [7] ὅθεν ὁρῶντες αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον εἰς ἑκάτερα τὰ μέρη ῥοπὰς λαμβάνοντ�
� τὸν πόλεμον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, ἔτι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἰταλίαν πορθουμένην πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, τὴν δὲ Λιβύην εἰς τέλος ἀβλαβῆ διαμένουσαν, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ συνεμβαίνειν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς τὴν θάλατταν. [8] διὸ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος οὐχ ἥκιστά με παρώρμησεν ποιήσασθαι μνήμην ἐπὶ πλεῖον τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου χάριν τοῦ μηδὲ ταύτην ἀγνοεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ δι᾽ ἃς αἰτίας πρῶτον ἐνέβησαν εἰς θάλατταν Ῥωμαῖοι. [9] θεωροῦντες δὲ τὸν πόλεμον αὑτοῖς τριβὴν λαμβάνοντα, τότε πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο ναυπηγεῖσθαι σκάφη, πεντηρικὰ μὲν ἑκατόν, εἴκοσι δὲ τριήρεις. [10] τῶν δὲ ναυπηγῶν εἰς τέλος ἀπείρων ὄντων τῆς περὶ τὰς πεντήρεις ναυπηγίας διὰ τὸ μηδένα τότε τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κεχρῆσθαι τοιούτοις σκάφεσιν, πολλὴν αὐτοῖς παρεῖχεν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δυσχέρειαν. [11] ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα συνίδοι τις ἂν τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ παράβολον τῆς Ῥωμαίων αἱρέσεως. [12] οὐ γὰρ οἷον εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχοντες, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀφορμὰς καθάπαξ οὐδ᾽ ἐπίνοιαν οὐδέποτε ποιησάμενοι τῆς θαλάττης, τότε δὴ πρῶτον ἐν νῷ λαμβάνοντες οὕτως τολμηρῶς ἐνεχείρησαν ὥστε πρὶν ἢ πειραθῆναι τοῦ πράγματος, εὐθὺς ἐπιβαλέσθαι Καρχηδονίοις ναυμαχεῖν τοῖς ἐκ προγόνων ἔχουσι τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν ἡγεμονίαν ἀδήριτον. [13] μαρτυρίῳ δ᾽ ἄν τις χρήσαιτο πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν νῦν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ λεγομένων καὶ πρὸς τὸ παράδοξον αὐτῶν τῆς τόλμης: ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησαν διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐχ οἷον κατάφρακτος αὐτοῖς ὑπῆρχεν ναῦς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ καθόλου μακρὸν πλοῖον οὐδὲ λέμβος οὐδ᾽ εἷς, [14] ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ταραντίνων καὶ Λοκρῶν ἔτι δ᾽ Ἐλεατῶν καὶ Νεαπολιτῶν συγχρησάμενοι πεντηκοντόρους καὶ τριήρεις ἐπὶ τούτων παραβόλως διεκόμισαν τοὺς ἄνδρας. [15] ἐν ᾧ δὴ καιρῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων κατὰ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐπαναχθέντων αὐτοῖς, καὶ μιᾶς νεὼς καταφράκτου διὰ τὴν προθυμίαν προπεσούσης, ὥστ᾽ ἐποκείλασαν γενέσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὑποχείριον, ταύτῃ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι τότε πρὸς ταύτην ἐποιοῦντο τὴν τοῦ παντὸς στόλου ναυπηγίαν, [16] ὡς εἰ μὴ τοῦτο συνέβη γενέσθαι, δῆλον ὡς διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν εἰς τέλος ἂν ἐκωλύ

 

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