by Polybius
26. Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and transfer the war there, in order that the Carthaginians might find the danger affecting themselves and their own country rather than Sicily. But the Carthaginians were determined to prevent this. They knew that Libya was easily invaded, and that the invaders if they once effected a landing would meet with little resistance from the inhabitants; and they therefore made up their minds not to allow it, and were eager rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at sea. The one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their crossing; and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle. The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy’s soil. Accordingly they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the whole force which they meant to take on board into four divisions. Each division had alternative titles; the first was called the “First Legion” or the “First Squadron,” — and so on with the others. The fourth had a third title besides. They were called “Triarii,” on the analogy of land armies. The total number of men thus making up the naval force amounted to nearly one hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship as carrying three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, made their preparations almost exclusively with a view to a naval engagement. Their numbers, if we reckon by the number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine, strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and the vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them itself could hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the number of men and ships.
Now the Romans had two facts to consider: First, that circumstances compelled them to face the open sea; and, secondly, that their enemies had the advantage of fast sailing vessels. They therefore took every precaution for keeping their line unbroken and difficult to attack. They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those, namely, on which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius respectively were sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a line with each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind the other in single file — the first squadron behind the one, and the second squadron behind the other. These were so arranged that, as each ship came to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from each other; the vessels being also stationed one behind the other with their prows inclining outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in single file so as to form a wedge, they stationed the third division in a single line at its base; so that the whole finally presented the appearance of a triangle. Behind this base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-ropes to the ships of the third squadron. And to the rear of them they placed the fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak or wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong; while the whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time difficult to break up.
[1] οἱ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν παρακαλέσαντες τὰ πλήθη διὰ βραχέων καὶ συνυποδείξαντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι νικήσαντες μὲν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ περὶ Σικελίας ποιήσονται τὸν πόλεμον, ἡττηθέντες δὲ περὶ τῆς σφετέρας πατρίδος κινδυνεύσουσιν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, οὕτως αὐτοῖς παρήγγειλαν ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. [2] προθύμως δὲ πάντων ποιούντων τὸ παραγγελλόμενον διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, εὐθαρσῶς ἀνήγοντο καὶ καταπληκτικῶς. [3] θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων τάξιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἁρμοζόμενοι τὰ μὲν τρία μέρη τῆς αὑτῶν δυνάμεως ἐπὶ μίαν ἔταττον ναῦν, πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀνατείναντες τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, ὡς κυκλώσοντες τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, πάσας ἱστάντες ἀντιπρώρρους τὰς ναῦς τοῖς πολεμίοις. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εὐώνυμον τῆς ὅλης τάξεως ἐποίουν, [4] ἐν ἐπικαμπίῳ νεῦον πρὸς τὴν γῆν. [5] ἡγοῦντο δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τοῦ μὲν δεξιοῦ κέρως, ἔχων ἐπίπλους καὶ πεντήρεις τὰς μάλιστα ταχυναυτούσας πρὸς τὴν ὑπερκέρασιν, Ἄννων ὁ περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα λειφθεὶς τῇ παρατάξει: [6] τῶν δ᾽ εὐωνύμων εἶχε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν Ἀμίλκας ὁ περὶ τὴν Τυνδαρίδα ναυμαχήσας: ὃς τότε κατὰ μέσην τὴν τάξιν ποιούμενος τὸν κίνδυνον ἐχρήσατό τινι στρατηγήματι κατὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοιῴδε. [7] τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων συνθεασαμένων ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐκτεταμένους τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ ποιησαμένων τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ μέσους, τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ὁ κίνδυνος ἔλαβε τοιαύτην. [8] ταχὺ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰ μέσα Καρχηδονίων ἐκ παραγγέλματος κλινάντων πρὸς φυγὴν χάριν τοῦ διασπάσαι τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τάξιν, οὗτοι μὲν ὑπεχώρουν μετὰ σπουδῆς, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι κατόπιν ἠκολούθουν ἐκθύμως. [9] ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος καὶ δεύτερος στόλος ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον στρατόπεδον ἀπεσπᾶτο, τῶν μὲν ῥυμουλκούντων τὰς ἱππηγοὺς ναῦς, τῶν δὲ τριαρίων συμμενόντων καὶ συνεφεδρευόντων τούτοις. [10] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ἱκανὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐδόκουν ἀπεσπακέναι τόπον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, συνθήματος ἀρθέντος ἐκ τῆς Ἀμίλκου νεὼς μετεβάλοντο πάντες ἅμα καὶ συνέβαλον τοῖς ἐπικειμένοις. [11] ἀγῶνος δὲ συστάντος καρτεροῦ, τῷ μὲν ταχυναυτεῖν ἐκπεριπλέοντες καὶ ῥᾳδίως μὲν προσιόντες ὀξέως δ᾽ ἀποχωροῦντες πολὺ περιῆσαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, [12] τῷ δὲ βιαιομαχεῖν κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκὰς καὶ συνδεῖν τοῖς κόραξιν τοὺς ἅπαξ ἐγγίσαντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ συναγωνιζομένων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐν ὄψει τῶν ἡγουμένων ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἧττον ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶχον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὰς ἐλπίδας. [13] ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τούτους μάχη τοιαύ
27. Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies’ ships they adapted their own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a s
ingle line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar. The former was the general who had been defeated in the engagement at Agrigentum. He now commanded the right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy. The latter, who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now describe. The battle began by the Romans charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth “legions” had become detached and were left behind, — the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the “Triarii” because they kept their station with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar’s ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest became one of sheer strength: their engines, the “crows,” grappled all that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle.
[1] την εἶχε διάθεσιν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων Ἄννων, τὸ μεῖναν ἐν ἀποστάσει κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συμβολήν, τό τε πέλαγος ὑπεράρας ἐνέβαλε ταῖς τῶν τριαρίων ναυσὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε καὶ δυσχρηστίαν αὐτοῖς. [2] οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὴν γῆν τεταγμένοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων παραγεγονότες εἰς μέτωπον ἐκ τῆς προϋπαρχούσης τάξεως καὶ ποιήσαντες ἀντιπρώρρους τὰς ναῦς ἐνέβαλον τοῖς ῥυμουλκοῦσι τὰς ἱππηγούς: οἱ δ᾽ ἀφέμενοι τὰ ῥύματα συνεπλέκοντο καὶ διηγωνίζοντο τοῖς πολεμίοις. [3] ἦν δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς ὅλης συμπλοκῆς, καὶ τρεῖς ναυμαχίαι συνέστησαν πολὺ κεχωρισμέναι τοῖς τόποις ἀλλήλων: [4] τῷ δ᾽ ἑκατέρων πάρισα τὰ μέρη γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς χειρισμὸν ἐφάμιλλον εἶναι συνέβαινε καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον. [5] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ λόγον ἐν ἑκάστοις ἐπετελεῖτο περὶ τὴν μάχην, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ὅταν ᾖ παραπλήσια πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων. [6] οἱ γὰρ πρῶτοι κινδυνεύσαντες πρῶτοι καὶ διεκρίθησαν: τέλος γὰρ ἐκβιασθέντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν εἰς φυγὴν ὥρμησαν. [7] ὁ μὲν οὖν Λεύκιος ἀνεδεῖτο τὰς αἰχμαλώτους ναῦς: ὁ δὲ Μάρκος συνορῶν τὸν περὶ τοὺς τριαρίους καὶ τὰς ἱππηγοὺς ἀγῶνα κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει τούτοις, ἔχων τοῦ δευτέρου στόλου τὰς ἀκεραίους ναῦς. [8] συνάψαντος δὲ καὶ προσμίξαντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄννωνα, ταχέως ἀναθαρρήσαντες οἱ τριάριοι, καίπερ ἤδη κακῶς ἀπαλλάττοντες, πάλιν ἐπερρώσθησαν πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. [9] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, τῶν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτοῖς προσμαχομένων, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νώτου προσπιπτόντων, δυσχρηστούμενοι καὶ παραδόξως ὑπὸ τῶν βοηθησάντων κυκλούμενοι, κλίναντες πελαγίαν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ὑποχώρησιν. [10] κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ὅ τε Λεύκιος ἐπαναπλέων ἤδη καὶ θεωρῶν συγκεκλεισμένον πρὸς τῇ γῇ τὸν τρίτον στόλον ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐωνύμου κέρατος, ὅ τε Μάρκος ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ καταλιπὼν τὰς ἱππηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τριαρίους ὥρμησαν ἀμφότεροι βοηθεῖν τοῖς κινδυνεύουσι. [11] παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἦν ἤδη τὸ γινόμενον πολιορκίᾳ: καὶ πάντες ἂν ἀπολώλεισαν οὗτοί γε προφανῶς, εἰ μὴ δεδιότες τοὺς κόρακας οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι περιφράξαντες μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τῇ γῇ συνεῖχον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐμβολὰς διὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν εὐλαβῶς ἔχοντες οὐ προσῄεσαν. [12] ταχέως δ᾽ ἐπιγενόμενοι καὶ κυκλώσαντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους αὐτάνδρους μὲν ἔλαβον πεντήκοντα ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων, ὀλίγαι δέ τινες παρὰ τὴν γῆν ἐξελίξασαι διέφυγον. [13] ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ μέρος κίνδυνος τοιαύτην ἔσχε τὴν διάθεσιν, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς συμπάσης ναυμαχίας ἐγένετο κατὰ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. [14] διεφθάρη δὲ τούτων μὲν εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα σκάφη, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα. ναῦς δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων αὔτανδρος οὐδεμία τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐγένεθ᾽ ὑποχείριος, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ἑξήκοντα καὶ τέτταρες.
28. This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line, and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These latter let go the towing-ropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle.
