by Polybius
8. Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause of the Hannibalian war, besides the injury inflicted upon Saguntum, was the encroaching and ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal. “Having secured great power in Iberia, he returned to Libya with the design of destroying the constitution and reducing Carthage to a despotism. But the leading statesmen, getting timely warning of his intention, banded themselves together and successfully opposed him. Suspecting this Hasdrubal retired from Libya, and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at his own will without taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian Senate. This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a zealous supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to the command in Iberia he continued it: and accordingly, even in the case of this war with Rome, was acting on his own authority and contrary to the wish of the Carthaginians; for none of the men of note in Carthage approved of his attack upon Saguntum.” This is the statement of Fabius, who goes on to say, that “after the capture of that city an embassy arrived in Carthage from Rome demanding that Hannibal should be given up on pain of a declaration of war.”
Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put the following question to him? “What better chance or opportunity could the Carthaginians have had of combining justice and interest? According to your own account they disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they not submit to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state without the odium of doing it themselves, and secure the safety of their territory by ridding themselves of the threatened war — all of which they could have effected by merely passing a decree?” If this question were put, I say, it would admit of no answer. The fact is that, so far from doing anything of the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with Hannibal’s policy for seventeen years; and refused to make terms until, at the end of a most determined struggle, they found their own city and persons in imminent danger of destruction.
[1] τίνος δὴ χάριν ἐμνήσθην Φαβίου καὶ τῶν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου γεγραμμένων; [2] οὐχ ἕνεκα τῆς πιθανότητος τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀγωνιῶν μὴ πιστευθῇ παρά τισιν — ἡ μὲν γὰρ [παρὰ] τούτων ἀλογία καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξηγήσεως αὐτὴ δι᾽ αὑτῆς δύναται θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν — [3] ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀναλαμβανόντων τὰς ἐκείνου βύβλους ὑπομνήσεως, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα βλέπωσιν. [4] ἔνιοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ λεγόμενα συνεπιστήσαντες ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν λέγοντα καὶ λαβόντες ἐν νῷ διότι κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ὁ γράφων γέγονε καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου μετεῖχε τῶν Ῥωμαίων, πᾶν εὐθέως ἡγοῦνται τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τούτου πιστόν. [5] ἐγὼ δὲ φημὶ μὲν δεῖν οὐκ ἐν μικρῷ προσλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ συγγραφέως πίστιν, οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ δὲ κρίνειν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας τὰς δοκιμασίας. [6] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ γε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων πολέμου — τὴν γὰρ παρέκβασιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιησάμεθα — νομιστέον πρῶτον μὲν αἴτιον γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀμίλκου θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν ἐπικαλουμένου, πατρὸς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου γεγονότος. [7] ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐχ ἡττηθεὶς τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ τῇ ψυχῇ τῷ δοκεῖν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀκέραια διατετηρηκέναι τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἐφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς ἦν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἧτταν τοῖς καιροῖς εἴκων πεποιῆσθαι τὰς συνθήκας, ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς, τηρῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν. [8] εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ τὸ περὶ τοὺς ξένους ἐγένετο κίνημα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, εὐθέως ἂν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐποιεῖτο καὶ παρασκευὴν πραγμάτων, ὅσον ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνῳ. [9] προκαταληφθεὶς δὲ ταῖς ἐμφυλίοις ταραχαῖς ἐν τούτοις
9. I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of their wearing such an air of probability in themselves as to gain any credit, — for the fact is that his assertions are so contrary to reason, that it does not need any argument of mine to help his readers to perceive it, — but I wished to warn those who take up his books not to be misled by the authority of his name, but to be guided by facts. For there is a certain class of readers in whose eyes the personality of the writer is of more account than what he says. They look to the fact that Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the Senate, and assume without more ado that everything he says may be trusted. My view, however, is that we ought not to hold the authority of this writer lightly: yet at the same time that we should not regard it as all-sufficient; but in reading his writings should test them by a reference to the facts themselves.
This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is the war between Carthage and Rome. The cause of this war we must reckon to be the exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Hannibal. The result of the war in Sicily had not broken the spirit of that commander. He regarded himself as unconquered; for the troops at Eryx which he commanded were still sound and undismayed: and though he yielded so far as to make a treaty, it was a concession to the exigencies of the times brought on by the defeat of the Carthaginians at sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of revenge; and, had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage, he would at once have sought and made another occasion for bringing about a war, as far as he was able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the domestic war, and had to give his attention entirely to that.
[1] καὶ περὶ ταύτας διέτριβε τὰς πράξεις. Ῥωμαίων δὲ μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προειρημένην ταραχὴν ἀπαγγειλάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβαινον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸ ταύτης βύβλοις περὶ τούτων δεδηλώκαμεν, [2] ὧν χωρὶς οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν συμπεριενεχθῆναι δεόντως οὔτε τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις οὔτε τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένοις ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν. [3] πλὴν οὐκ ἐντρεπομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ἐξεχώρησαν Σαρδόνος, συνεχώρησαν δ᾽ εἰσοίσειν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκείνοις ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς. [4] διὸ καὶ δευτέραν, μεγίστην δὲ ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα συστάντος πολέμου. [5] Ἀμίλκας γὰρ προσλαβὼν τοῖς ἰδίοις θυμοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀργὴν τῶν πολιτῶν, ὡς θᾶττον τοὺς ἀποστάντας τῶν μισθοφόρων καταπολεμήσας ἐβεβαίωσε τῇ πατρίδι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐθέως ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα, σ
πουδάζων ταύτῃ χρήσασθαι παρασκευῇ πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον. ἣν δὴ καὶ τρίτην αἰτίαν νομιστέον, [6] λέγω δὲ τὴν εὔροιαν τῶν κατ᾽ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων Καρχηδονίοις. ταύταις γὰρ ταῖς χερσὶ πιστεύσαντες εὐθαρσῶς ἐνέβησαν εἰς τὸν προειρημένον πόλεμον. [7] ὅτι δ᾽ Ἀμίλκας πλεῖστα μὲν συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καίπερ τετελευτηκὼς ἔτεσι δέκα πρότερον τῆς καταρχῆς αὐτοῦ, πολλὰ μὲν ἂν εὕροι τις εἰς τοῦτο: σχεδὸν δὲ πρὸς
10. When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary war, proclaimed war with Carthage, the latter at first was inclined to resist at all hazards, because the goodness of her cause gave her hopes of victory, — as I have shown in my former book, without which it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or what is to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to anything: and the Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force of circumstances; and though feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being quite unable to do anything, evacuated Sardinia, and consented to pay a sum of twelve hundred talents, in addition to the former indemnity paid them, on condition of avoiding the war at that time. This is the second and the most important cause of the subsequent war. For Hamilcar, having this public grievance in addition to his private feelings of anger, as soon as he had secured his country’s safety by reducing the rebellious mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian power in Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of operations against Rome. So that I record as a third cause of the war the Carthaginian success in Iberia: for it was the confidence inspired by their forces there which encouraged them to embark upon it. It would be easy to adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had been dead ten years at its commencement, largely contributed to bring about the second Punic war, but what I am about to say will be sufficient to establish the fact.
[1] πίστιν ἀρκοῦν ἔσται τὸ λέγεσθαι μέλλον. καθ᾽ οὓς γὰρ καιροὺς καταπολεμηθεὶς Ἀννίβας ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων τέλος ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐξεχώρησε καὶ παρ᾽ Ἀντιόχῳ διέτριβε, τότε Ῥωμαῖοι συνθεωροῦντες ἤδη τὴν Αἰτωλῶν ἐπιβολὴν ἐξαπέστειλαν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς Ἀντίοχον, βουλόμενοι μὴ λανθάνειν σφᾶς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως προαίρεσιν. [2] οἱ δὲ πρέσβεις ὁρῶντες τὸν Ἀντίοχον προσέχοντα τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ πρόθυμον ὄντα πολεμεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, ἐθεράπευον τὸν Ἀννίβαν, σπουδάζοντες εἰς ὑποψίαν ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον. [3] ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. προβαίνοντος γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως ὑπόπτως ἔχοντος ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ἐγένετό τις καιρὸς ὡς ἐπὶ λόγον ἀχθῆναι τὴν ὑποικουρουμένην ἀτοπίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς. [4] ἐν ᾧ καὶ πλείους ἀπολογισμοὺς ποιησάμενος Ἀννίβας τέλος ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο κατήντησε, δυσχρηστούμενος τοῖς λόγοις. [5] ἔφη γάρ, καθ᾽ ὃν καιρὸν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἔξοδον μέλλοι στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἔτη μὲν ἔχειν ἐννέα, θύοντος δ᾽ αὐτοῦ τῷ Διὶ παρεστάναι παρὰ τὸν βωμόν. [6] ἐπεὶ δὲ καλλιερήσας κατασπείσαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ποιήσαι τὰ νομιζόμενα, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τοὺς περὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀποστῆναι κελεῦσαι μικρόν, αὐτὸν δὲ προσκαλεσάμενον ἐρέσθαι φιλοφρόνως εἰ βούλεται συνεξορμᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατείαν. [7] ἀσμένως δὲ κατανεύσαντος αὐτοῦ καί τι καὶ προσαξιώσαντος παιδικῶς, λαβόμενον τῆς δεξιᾶς προσαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν βωμὸν καὶ κελεύειν ἁψάμενον τῶν ἱερῶν ὀμνύναι μηδέποτε Ῥωμαίοις εὐνοήσειν. [8] ταῦτ᾽ οὖν εἰδότα σαφῶς ἠξίου τὸν Ἀντίοχον, ἕως μὲν ἄν τι δυσχερὲς βουλεύηται κατὰ Ῥωμαίων, θαρρεῖν καὶ πιστεύειν, αὐτὸν συνεργὸν ἕξειν νομίζοντ᾽ ἀληθινώτατον. [9] ἐπὰν δὲ διαλύσεις ἢ φιλίαν συντίθηται πρὸς αὐτούς, τότε μὴ προσδεῖσθαι διαβολῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπιστεῖν καὶ φυλάττεσθαι:
11. When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal had at last quitted his country and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the warlike attitude of the Aetolian league induced the Romans to send ambassadors to Antiochus, that they might be informed of the king’s intentions. These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined to the Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with Rome; they accordingly paid great court to Hannibal with a view of bringing him into suspicion with the king. And in this they entirely succeeded. As time went on the king became ever more and more suspicious of Hannibal, until at length an opportunity occurred for an explanation of the alienation that had been thus secretly growing up between them. Hannibal then defended himself at great length, but without success, until at last he made the following statement: “When my father was about to go on his Iberian expedition I was nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice to Zeus I stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed, my father poured the libation and went through the usual ritual. He then bade all the other worshippers stand a little back, and calling me to him asked me affectionately whether I wished to go with him on his expedition. Upon my eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish enthusiasm to be allowed to go, he took me by the right hand and led me up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim and swear that I would never be friends with Rome. So long, then, Antiochus, as your policy is one of hostility to Rome, you may feel quite secure of having in me a most thorough-going supporter. But if ever you make terms or friendship with her, then you need not wait for any slander to make you distrust me and be on your guard against me; for there is nothing in my power that I would not do against her.”
[1] πᾶν γάρ τι πρᾶξαι κατ᾽ αὐτῶν ὃ δυνατὸς εἴη. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίοχος ἀκούσας καὶ δόξας αὐτοπαθῶς ἅμα δ᾽ ἀληθινῶς εἰρῆσθαι, πάσης τῆς προϋπαρχούσης ὑποψίας ἀπέστη. [2] τῆς μέντοι γε δυσμενείας τῆς Ἀμίλκου καὶ τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως ὁμολογούμενον θετέον εἶναι τοῦτο μαρτύριον, ὡς καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῶν φανερὸν ἐγένετο τῶν πραγμάτων. [3] τοιούτους γὰρ ἐχθροὺς παρεσκεύασε Ῥωμαίοις Ἀσδρούβαν τε τὸν τῆς θυγατρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν υἱὸν Ἀννίβαν ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολὴν δυσμενείας. [4] Ἀσδρούβας μὲν οὖν προαποθανὼν οὐ πᾶσιν ἔκδηλον ἐποίησε τὴν αὑτοῦ πρόθεσιν: Ἀννίβᾳ δὲ παρέδωκαν οἱ καιροὶ καὶ λίαν ἐναποδείξασθαι τὴν πατρῴαν ἔχθραν εἰς Ῥωμαίους. [5] διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταττομένους χρὴ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον φροντίζειν ὡς τοῦ μὴ
λανθάνειν τὰς προαιρέσεις τῶν διαλυομένων τὰς ἔχθρας ἢ συντιθεμένων τὰς φιλίας, πότε τοῖς καιροῖς εἴκοντες καὶ πότε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡττώμενοι ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθήκας, [6] ἵνα τοὺς μὲν ἐφέδρους νομίζοντες εἶναι τῶν καιρῶν ἀεὶ φυλάττωνται, τοῖς δὲ πιστεύοντες ὡς ὑπηκόοις ἢ φίλοις ἀληθινοῖς πᾶν τὸ παραπῖπτον ἐξ ἑτοίμου παραγγέλλωσιν. αἰτίας μὲν [7] οὖν τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου τὰς προειρημένας ἡγητέον, ἀρχὰς δὲ τὰς μελλούσας λέ
