Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

by Polybius

  [1] ἧι καὶ τοὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντας δύσκτητον εἶναι καὶ δυσανάγνωστον τὴν ἡμετέραν πραγματείαν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν βύβλων ἀγνοεῖν νομιστέον. [2] πόσῳ γὰρ ῥᾷόν ἐστι καὶ κτήσασθαι καὶ διαναγνῶναι βύβλους τετταράκοντα καθαπερανεὶ κατὰ μίτον ἐξυφασμένας καὶ παρακολουθῆσαι σαφῶς ταῖς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην πράξεσιν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ Πύρρον [καὶ Τίμαιον συγγραφέων καὶ καιρῶν ἐξηγήσεως] εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνος ἅλωσιν, [3] ταῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην οἰκουμένην ἀπὸ τῆς Κλεομένους τοῦ Σπαρτιάτου φυγῆς κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς μέχρι τῆς Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Ῥωμαίων περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν παρατάξεως, ἢ τὰς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γραφόντων συντάξεις ἀναγινώσκειν ἢ κτᾶσθαι; [4] χωρὶς γὰρ τοῦ πολλαπλασίους αὐτὰς ὑπάρχειν τῶν ἡμετέρων ὑπομνημάτων, οὐδὲ καταλαβεῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν βεβαίως οὐδὲν οἷόν τε τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ τοὺς πλείστους μὴ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γράφειν, [5] εἶτα διὰ τὸ τὰς καταλλήλους τῶν πράξεων παραλείπειν, ὧν ἐκ παραθέσεως συνθεωρουμένων καὶ συγκρινομένων ἀλλοιοτέρας ἕκαστα τυγχάνει δοκιμασίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος διαλήψεως, τῶν δὲ κυριωτάτων μηδὲ ψαύειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τὸ παράπαν. [6] ἀκμὴν γάρ φαμεν ἀναγκαιότατα μέρη τῆς ἱστορίας εἶναι τά τ᾽ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὰ περὶ τὰς αἰτίας. [7] θεωροῦμεν δὲ τὸν μὲν Ἀντιοχικὸν πόλεμον ἐκ τοῦ Φιλιππικοῦ τὰς ἀφορμὰς εἰληφότα, τὸν δὲ Φιλιππικὸν ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν, τὸν δ᾽ Ἀννιβιακὸν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Σικελίαν, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐσχηκότα διαθέσεις, πάσας δὲ συννευούσας πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. [8] ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ μὲν τῶν γραφόντων καθόλου δυνατὸν ἐπιγνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν, διὰ δὲ τῶν τοὺς πολέμους αὐτούς, οἷον τὸν Περσικὸν ἢ τὸν Φιλιππικόν, ἀδύνατον, [9] εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς παρατάξεις τις ἀναγινώσκων αὐτὰς ἐξ ὧν ἐκεῖνοι γράφουσιν ὑπολαμβάνει σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκέναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ σύμπαντος οἰκονομίαν καὶ διάθεσιν. [10] ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσῳ διαφέρει τὸ μαθεῖν τοῦ μόνον ἀκοῦσαι, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν ὑπολαμβάνω διαφέρειν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους συντάξεων.

  32. Another mistake is to look upon my history as difficult to obtain or master, because of the number and size of the books. Compare it in these particulars with the various writings of the episodical historians. Is it not much easier to purchase and read my forty books, which are as it were all in one piece, and so to follow with a comprehensive glance the events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus to the fall of Carthage, and those in the rest of the world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta, continuously, to the battle between the Achaeans and Romans at the Isthmus? To say nothing of the fact that the compositions of these historians are many times as numerous as mine, it is impossible for their readers to get any certain information from them: first, because most of them differ in their account of the same transactions; and secondly, because they omit contemporary history, — the comparative review of which would put a very different complexion upon events to that derived from isolated treatment, — and are unable to touch upon the most decisive events at all. For, indeed, the most important parts of history are those which treat the events which follow or accompany a certain course of conduct, and pre-eminently so those which treat of causes. For instance, we see that the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip; that with Philip from the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the Sicilian war: and though between these wars there were numerous events of various character, they all converged upon the same consummation. Such a comprehensive view may be obtained from universal history, but not from the histories of particular wars, such as those with Perseus or Philip; unless we fondly imagine that, by reading the accounts contained in them of the pitched battles, we gain a knowledge of the conduct and plan of the whole war. This of course is not the case; and in the present instance I hope that there will be as wide a difference between my history and such episodical compositions, as between real learning and mere listening.

  [1] οἱ δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις — τὴν γὰρ παρέκβασιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιησάμεθα — διακούσαντες τὰ παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν εἶπαν, [2] ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτατος αὐτῶν δείξας τοῖς ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ τὸν κόλπον ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς ἔφη καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην φέρειν: ἐκβαλὼν οὖν, ὁπότερον ἂν κελεύσωσιν, ἀπολείψειν. [3] ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖς φαίνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκέλευσε. [4] τοῦ δὲ Ῥωμαίου φήσαντος τὸν πόλεμον ἐκβαλεῖν, ἀνεφώνησαν ἅμα καὶ πλείους τῶν ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου, δέχεσθαι φάσκοντες. οἱ μὲν οὖν πρέσβεις καὶ τὸ συνέδριον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐχωρίσθησαν. [5] Ἀννίβας δὲ παραχειμάζων ἐν Καινῇ πόλει πρῶτον μὲν διαφῆκε τοὺς Ἴβηρας ἐπὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν πόλεις, βουλόμενος ἑτοίμους καὶ προθύμους παρασκευάζειν πρὸς τὸ μέλλον. [6] δεύτερον δ᾽ Ἀσδρούβᾳ τἀδελφῷ διέταξε πῶς δεήσει τῇ τε τῶν Ἰβήρων ἀρχῇ καὶ δυναστείᾳ χρῆσθαι ταῖς τε πρὸς Ῥωμαίους παρασκευαῖς, ἐὰν αὐτὸς χωρίζηταί που. [7] τρίτον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ προυνοεῖτο πραγμάτων. [8] πάνυ δ᾽ ἐμπείρως καὶ φρονίμως ἐκλογιζόμενος ἐκ μὲν Λιβύης εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, ἐκ δ᾽ Ἰβηρίας εἰς Λιβύην διεβίβαζε στρατιώτας, ἐκδεσμεύων τὴν ἑκατέρων πίστιν εἰς ἀλλήλους διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας. [9] ἦσαν δ᾽ οἱ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Λιβύην Θερσῖται, Μαστιανοί, [10] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ὀρῆτες Ἴβηρες, Ὀλκάδες, οἱ δὲ σύμπαντες ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν ἐθνῶν ἱππεῖς μὲν χίλιοι διακόσιοι, πεζοὶ δὲ μύριοι τρισχίλιοι ὀκτακόσιοι πεντήκοντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Βαλιαρεῖς ὀκτακόσιοι ἑβδομήκοντα, [11] οὓς κυρίως μὲν καλοῦσι σφενδονήτας, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς χρείας ταύτης συνωνύμως καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν προσαγορεύουσι καὶ τὴν νῆσον. [12] τ�
�ν δὲ προειρημένων τοὺς μὲν πλείους εἰς τὰ Μεταγώνια τῆς Λιβύης, τινὰς δ᾽ εἰς αὐτὴν Καρχηδόνα κατέταξεν. [13] ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πόλεων τῶν Μεταγωνιτῶν καλουμένων ἀπέστειλεν ἄλλους εἰς Καρχηδόνα πεζοὺς τετρακισχιλίους, ὁμηρείας ἔχοντας καὶ βοηθείας ἅμα τάξιν. [14] ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἀπέλιπεν Ἀσδρούβᾳ τἀδελφῷ πεντήρεις μὲν πεντήκοντα, τετρήρεις δὲ δύο καὶ τριήρεις πέντε: τούτων ἐχούσας πληρώματα πεντήρεις μὲν τριάκοντα δύο, τριήρεις δὲ πέντε. [15] καὶ μὴν ἱππεῖς Λιβυφοινίκων μὲν καὶ Λιβύων τετρακοσίους πεντήκοντα, Λεργητῶν δὲ τριακοσίους, Νομάδων δὲ Μασυλίων καὶ Μασαισυλίων καὶ Μακκοίων καὶ Μαυρουσίων τῶν παρὰ τὸν Ὠκεανὸν χιλίους ὀκτακοσίους, [16] πεζοὺς δὲ Λιβύων μυρίους χιλίους ὀκτακοσίους πεντήκοντα, Λιγυστίνους τριακοσίους, Βαλιαρεῖς πεντακοσίους, ἐλέφαντας εἴκοσι καὶ ἕνα. [17] οὐ χρὴ δὲ θαυμάζειν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀναγραφῆς, εἰ τοιαύτῃ κεχρήμεθα περὶ τῶν ὑπ᾽ Ἀννίβου κατ᾽ Ἰβηρίαν πεπραγμένων οἵᾳ μόλις ἂν χρήσαιτό τις αὐτὸς κεχειρικὼς τὰς κατὰ μέρος πράξεις, οὐδὲ προκαταγινώσκειν, εἰ πεποιήκαμεν παραπλήσιον τοῖς ἀξιοπίστως ψευδομένοις τῶν συγγραφέων. [18] ἡμεῖς γὰρ εὑρόντες ἐπὶ Λακινίῳ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἐν χαλκώματι κατατεταγμένην ὑπ᾽ Ἀννίβου, καθ᾽ οὓς καιροὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τόποις ἀνεστρέφετο, πάντως ἐνομίσαμεν αὐτὴν περί γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιόπιστον εἶναι: διὸ καὶ κατακολουθεῖν εἱλόμεθα τῇ γραφῇ ταύτῃ.

  33. To resume the story of the Carthaginians and the Roman deputies. To the arguments of the former the ambassadors made no answer, except that the senior among them, in the presence of the assembly, pointed to the folds of his toga and said that in them he carried peace and war, and that he would bring out and leave with them whichever they bade him. The Carthaginian Suffete bade him bring out whichever of the two he chose: and upon the Roman saying that it should be war, a majority of the senators cried out in answer that they accepted it. It was on these terms that the Senate and the Roman ambassadors parted.

  Meanwhile Hannibal, upon going into winter quarters at New Carthage, first of all dismissed the Iberians to their various cities, with the view of their being prepared and vigorous for the next campaign. Secondly, he instructed his brother Hasdrubal in the management of his government in Iberia, and of the preparations to be made against Rome, in case he himself should be separated from him. Thirdly, he took precautions for the security of Libya, by selecting with prudent skill certain soldiers from the home army to come over to Iberia, and certain from the Iberian army to go to Libya; by which interchange he secured cordial feeling of confidence between the two armies. The Iberians sent to Libya were the Thersitae, the Mastiani, as well as the Oretes and Olcades, mustering together twelve hundred cavalry and thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot. Besides these there were eight hundred and seventy slingers from the Balearic Isles, whose name, as that of the islands they inhabit, is derived from the word ballein, “to throw,” because of their peculiar skill with the sling. Most of these troops he ordered to be stationed at Metagonia in Libya, and the rest in Carthage itself. And from the cities in the district of Metagonia he sent four thousand foot also into Carthage, to serve at once as hostages for the fidelity of their country, and as an additional guard for the city. With his brother Hasdrubal in Iberia he left fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five triremes, thirty-two of the quinqueremes being furnished with crews, and all five of the triremes; also cavalry consisting of four hundred and fifty Libyophenicians and Libyans, three hundred Lergetae, eighteen hundred Numidians of the Massolian, Massaesylian, Maccoeian, and Maurian tribes, who dwell by the ocean; with eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligures, five hundred of the Balearic Islanders, and twenty-one elephants.

  The accuracy of this enumeration of Hannibal’s Iberian establishment need excite no surprise, though it is such as a commander himself would have some difficulty in displaying; nor ought I to be condemned at once of imitating the specious falsehoods of historians: for the fact is that I myself found on Lacinium a bronze tablet, which Hannibal had caused to be inscribed with these particulars when he was in Italy; and holding it to be an entirely trustworthy authority for such facts, I did not hesitate to follow it.

  [1] Ἀννίβας δὲ πάντα προνοηθεὶς περὶ τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν τε κατὰ Λιβύην πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ λοιπὸν ἐκαραδόκει καὶ προσεδέχετο τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποστελλομένους: [2] σαφῶς γὰρ ἐξητάκει καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ὑπὸ τὰς Ἄλπεις καὶ περὶ τὸν Πάδον ποταμὸν χώρας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κατοικούντων αὐτήν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους τῶν ἀνδρῶν τόλμαν, [3] καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δυσμένειαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος πολέμου πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, ὑπὲρ οὗ διήλθομεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ χάριν τοῦ συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς νῦν μέλλουσι λέγεσθαι. [4] διόπερ εἴχετο ταύτης τῆς ἐλπίδος καὶ πᾶν ὑπισχνεῖτο, διαπεμπόμενος ἐπιμελῶς πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς Ἄλπεσιν ἐνοικοῦντας, [5] μόνως ἂν ὑπολαμβάνων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ συστήσασθαι τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον, εἰ δυνηθείη διαπεράσας τὰς πρὸ τοῦ δυσχωρίας εἰς τοὺς προειρημένους ἀφικέσθαι τόπους καὶ συνεργοῖς καὶ συμμάχοις χρήσασθαι Κελτοῖς εἰς τὴν προκειμένην ἐπιβολήν. [6] ἀφικομένων δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων καὶ τήν τε τῶν Κελτῶν βούλησιν καὶ προσδοκίαν ἀπαγγειλάντων τήν τε τῶν Ἀλπεινῶν ὀρῶν ὑπερβολὴν ἐπίπονον μὲν καὶ δυσχερῆ λίαν, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατον εἶναι φασκόντων, συνῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ὑπὸ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν. [7] προσπεπτωκότων δὲ προσφάτως αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος, ἐπαρθεὶς τῷ θυμῷ καὶ πιστεύων τῇ τῶν πολιτῶν εὐνοίᾳ παρεκάλει τὰς δυνάμεις φανερῶς ἤδη πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον, [8] ἐμφανίζων μὲν ὃν τρόπον ἔκδοτον αὐτὸν ἐγχειρήσαιεν αἰτεῖσθαι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ πάντας τοὺς τοῦ στρατοπέδου προεστῶτας, ὑποδεικνύων δὲ τὴν τῆς χώρας ἀρετήν, εἰς ἣν ἀφίξονται, καὶ τὴν τῶν Κελτῶν εὔνοιαν καὶ συμμαχίαν. [9] εὐθύμως δὲ τῶν ὄχλων αὐτῷ συνεξισταμένων, ἐπα
ινέσας καὶ παραγγείλας τακτὴν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ ποιήσεται τὴν ἔξοδον, τότε μὲν διέλυσε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.

  34. Though Hannibal had taken every precaution for the security of Libya and Iberia, he yet waited for the messengers whom he expected to arrive from the Celts. He had thoroughly acquainted himself with the fertility and populousness of the districts at the foot of the Alps and in the valley of the Padus, as well as with the warlike courage of the men; but most important of all, with their hostile feelings to Rome derived from the previous war, which I described in my last book, with the express purpose of enabling my readers to follow my narrative. He therefore reckoned very much on the chance of their co-operation; and was careful to send messages to the chiefs of the Celts, whether dwelling actually on the Alps or on the Italian side of them, with unlimited promises; because he believed that he would be able to confine the war against Rome to Italy, if he could make his way through the intervening difficulties to these parts, and avail himself of the active alliance of the Celts. When his messengers returned with a report that the Celts were ready to help him and all eagerness for his approach; and that the passage of the Alps, though laborious and difficult, was not, however, impossible, he collected his forces from their winter quarters at the approach of spring. Just before receiving this report he had learnt the circumstances attending the Roman embassy at Carthage. Encouraged by the assurance thus given him, that he would be supported by the popular sentiment at home, he no longer disguised from his army that the object of the forthcoming campaign was Rome; and tried to inspire them with courage for the undertaking. He explained to them how the Romans had demanded the surrender of himself and all the officers of the army: and pointed out the fertility of the country to which they were going, and the goodwill and active alliance which the Celts were prepared to offer them. When the crowd of soldiers showed an enthusiastic readiness to accompany him, he dismissed the assembly, after thanking them, and naming the day on which he intended to march.