Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

by Polybius

  94. The Romans who were guarding the gorge, no sooner saw these fiery fagots advancing to the heights, than, quitting the narrow part of the pass, they made for the ridge to meet the enemy. But when they got near the oxen, they were puzzled by the lights, imagining them to be something more dangerous than they really were; and when the Carthaginian light-armed troops came on to the ground, after some slight skirmishing between the two parties, upon the oxen rushing in among them, they separated and took up their positions on different heights and waited for daybreak, not being able to comprehend what was taking place.

  Partly because he was at a loss to understand what was happening, and, in the words of the poet, “some deep design suspecting;” and partly that, in accordance with his original plan, he was determined not to risk a general engagement, Fabius remained quietly within his camp: while Hannibal, finding everything going as he designed, led his army and booty in safety through the gorge, the men who had been set to guard the narrow road having abandoned their post. At daybreak, seeing the two troops fronting each other on the heights, he sent some Iberian companies to the light-armed troops, who engaged the Romans, and, killing a thousand of them, easily relieved his own light-armed troops and brought them down to the main body.

  Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain, Hannibal thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in which to winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after having inspired the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities and inhabitants of Italy.

  Though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among the common people, for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless refused to abandon his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting injunctions, not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the enemy, as to avoid receiving one himself. Marcus, however, paid no heed to the advice, and, even while Fabius was speaking, had wholly resolved to risk a general engagement.

  [1] τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοιαύτην εἶχε τὴν διάθεσιν. [2] κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξεσιν Ἀσδρούβας ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας στρατηγὸς κατηρτικὼς ἐν τῇ παραχειμασίᾳ τὰς ὑπὸ τἀδελφοῦ καταλειφθείσας τριάκοντα ναῦς καὶ δέκα προσπεπληρωκὼς ἄλλας, ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας ἀνήχθη τετταράκοντα ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις ἐκ Καινῆς πόλεως, προχειρισάμενος Ἀμίλκαν τοῦ στόλου ναύαρχον. [3] ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν πεζὴν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ἡθροικὼς δύναμιν ἀνέζευξε: καὶ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ παρὰ τὴν χέρσον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, τοῖς δὲ πεζοῖς τὴν πορείαν παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλόν, σπεύδων ἀμφοτέραις ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καταζεῦξαι πρὸς τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν. [4] Γνάιος δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς συλλογιζόμενος τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλετο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπάντησιν. [5] ἀκούων δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς παρασκευῆς τὸ μὲν κατὰ γῆν ἀπαντᾶν ἀπεδοκίμασε, συμπληρώσας δὲ πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα ναῦς καὶ λαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ πεζικοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἄνδρας πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβατικὴν χρείαν ἀνήχθη καὶ κατῆρε δευτεραῖος ἐκ Ταρράκωνος εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν τόπους. [6] καθορμισθεὶς δὲ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν ἀποστήματι περὶ τοὺς ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους προαπέστειλε κατασκεψομένας δύο ναῦς ταχυπλοούσας Μασσαλιητικάς: καὶ γὰρ προκαθηγοῦντο καὶ προεκινδύνευον οὗτοι καὶ πᾶσαν ἀποτόμως σφίσι παρείχοντο τὴν χρείαν. [7] εὐγενῶς γάρ, εἰ καί τινες ἕτεροι, κεκοινωνήκασι Ῥωμαίοις πραγμάτων καὶ Μασσαλιῶται, πολλάκις μὲν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἀννιβιακὸν πόλεμον. [8] διασαφούντων δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκοπὴν ἐκπεμφθέντων ὅτι περὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ συμβαίνει τὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὁρμεῖν στόλον, ἀνήγετο κατὰ σπουδήν, βουλόμενος ἄφνω προσπεσεῖν τοῖς

  95. While these things were going on in Italy, Hasdrubal, who was in command in Iberia, having during the winter repaired the thirty ships left him by his brother, and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer, from New Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at the same time collected his land forces, and led them out of their winter quarters. The fleet coasted up the country, and the troops marched along the shore towards the Iber. Suspecting their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from his winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But hearing of the number of their troops, and the great scale on which their preparations had been made, he gave up the idea of meeting them by land; and manning thirty-five ships, and taking on board the best men he could get from his land forces to serve as marines, he put to sea, and arrived on the second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came to anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and sent two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the sailors of Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty and danger, and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever was required of them; and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished itself above all other places, before and since, in fidelity to Rome, and never more so than in the Hannibalian war. The ships sent to reconnoitre having reported that the enemy’s fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put to sea with all speed, wishing to surprise them.

  [1] πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, σημηνάντων αὐτοῖς τῶν σκοπῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἅμα τὰς πεζικὰς ἐξέταττον δυνάμεις παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν καὶ τοῖς πληρώμασι παρήγγελλον ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. [2] ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων σύνεγγυς ὄντων, σημήναντες πολεμικὸν ἀνήγοντο, κρίναντες ναυμαχεῖν. συμβαλόντες δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις βραχὺν μέν τινα χρόνον ἀντεποιήσαντο τῆς νίκης, μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κλίνειν ὥρμησαν. [3] ἡ γὰρ ἐφεδρεία τῶν πεζῶν ἡ περὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν οὐχ οὕτως αὐτοὺς ὤνησε, θάρσος παριστάνουσα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ὡς ἔβλαψε τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας ἑτοίμην παρασκευάζουσα. [4] πλὴν δύο μὲν αὐτάνδρους νῆας ἀποβαλόντες, τεττάρων δὲ τοὺς ταρσοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ἔφευγον ἐκκλίναντες εἰς γῆν. [5] ἐπικειμένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων αὐτοῖς ἐκθύμως, τὰς μὲν ναῦς ἐξέβαλον εἰς τὸν αἰγιαλόν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἀποπηδήσαντες ἐκ τῶν πλοίων ἐσῴζοντο πρὸς τοὺς παρατεταγμένους. [6] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τολμηρῶς συν�
�γγίσαντες τῇ γῇ καὶ τὰ δυνάμενα κινεῖσθαι τῶν πλοίων ἀναδησάμενοι μετὰ χαρᾶς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἀπέπλεον, νενικηκότες μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, κρατοῦντες δὲ τῆς θαλάττης, εἴκοσι δὲ καὶ πέντε ναῦς ἔχοντες τῶν πολεμίων. [7] τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπικυδεστέρας εἰλήφει τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰς ἐλπίδας διὰ τὸ προειρημένον κατόρθωμα. [8] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ γεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, παραχρῆμα πληρώσαντες ἑβδομήκοντα νῆας ἐξαπέστειλαν, κρίναντες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης. [9] αἳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς Σαρδόν᾽, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πίσας τόπους τῆς Ἰταλίας προσέβαλον, πεπεισμένων τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων συμμίξειν ἐνθάδε τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. [10] ταχὺ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀναχθέντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥώμης ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς, πυθόμενοι τὸν ἀνάπλουν οὗτοι μὲν αὖθις ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Σαρδόνα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν εἰς Καρχηδόνα. [11] Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος ἔχων τὸν προειρημένον στόλον ἕως μέν τινος ἐπηκολούθει τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, συνάψειν πεπεισμένος, πολὺ δὲ καθυστερῶν ἀπέγνω. [12] καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῆς Σικελίας Λιλυβαίῳ προσέσχε: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταπλεύσας τῆς Λιβύης ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Κερκινητῶν νῆσον καὶ λαβὼν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν χρήματα τοῦ μὴ πορθῆσαι τὴν χώραν ἀπηλλάγη. [13] κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἀνάπλουν γενόμενος κύριος νήσου Κοσσύρου καὶ φρουρὰν εἰς τὸ πολισμάτιον εἰσαγαγὼν αὖθις εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον κατῆρε. [14] καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὗτος μὲν αὐτοῦ συνορμίσας τὸν στόλον μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον

  96. But being informed in good time by his look-out men that the enemy were bearing down upon him, Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the beach, and ordered his crews to go on board; and, when the Romans hove in sight, gave the signal for the attack, determined to fight the enemy at sea. But, after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short struggle for victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to attack, than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat. Accordingly, after losing two ships with their crews, and the oars and marines of four others, they gave way and made for the land; and when the Romans pressed on with spirit in pursuit, they ran their ships ashore, and leaping from the vessels fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans came boldly close to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be got afloat, and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the enemy at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken twenty-five of the enemy’s ships.

  In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects had begun to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage, the Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it to be essential to their whole design that they should command the sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy, the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there. But the Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself, with a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and hearing of this expedition against them, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia, and thence returned to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of this Roman fleet, followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was far behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum, and afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina; and after receiving a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of not laying waste the country, he departed. On his return voyage he took the island of Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its small capital, returned to Lilybaeum. There he placed the fleet, and shortly afterwards went off himself to join the land army.

  [1] αὐτὸς ἀνεκομίσθη πρὸς τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις: οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονὸς προτέρημα διὰ τοῦ Γναΐου περὶ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ νομίσαντες χρήσιμον εἶναι, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μὴ προΐεσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίστασθαι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὔξειν, [2] προχειρισάμενοι ναῦς εἴκοσι καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπιστήσαντες Πόπλιον Σκιπίωνα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, ἐξαπέστελλον μετὰ σπουδῆς πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν Γνάιον, κοινῇ πράξοντα μετ᾽ ἐκείνου τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. [3] πάνυ γὰρ ἠγωνίων μὴ κρατήσαντες Καρχηδόνιοι τῶν τόπων ἐκείνων καὶ περιποιησάμενοι χορηγίας ἀφθόνους καὶ χεῖρας ἀντιποιήσωνται μὲν τῆς θαλάττης ὁλοσχερέστερον, συνεπιθῶνται δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, στρατόπεδα πέμποντες καὶ χρήματα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. [4] διόπερ ἐν μεγάλῳ τιθέμενοι καὶ τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον ἐξαπέστειλαν τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον. ὃς καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς Ἰβηρίαν καὶ συμμίξας τἀδελφῷ μεγάλην παρεῖχε χρείαν τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν. [5] οὐδέποτε γὰρ πρότερον θαρρήσαντες διαβῆναι τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀσμενίζοντες τῇ τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε φιλίᾳ καὶ συμμαχίᾳ τότε διέβησαν καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐθάρρησαν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῶν πέραν πραγμάτων, μεγάλα καὶ ταὐτομάτου συνεργήσαντος σφίσι πρὸς τοὺς περιεστῶτας καιρούς. [6] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καταπληξάμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὴν διάβασιν οἰκοῦντας τῶν Ἰβήρων ἧκον πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν, ἀποσχόντες σταδίους ὡς τετταράκοντα περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἱερὸν κατεστρατοπέδευσαν, [7] λαβόντες τόπον εὐφυῶς κείμενον πρός τε τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκ θαλάττης χορηγίαν: [8] ὁμοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνέβαινε καὶ τὸν στόλον ποιεῖσθαι τὸν παράπλουν. ἔνθα δὴ

  97. When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio’s naval success, believing it to be advantageous or rather essential not to relax their hold on Iberia, but to press on the war there against Carthage with redoubled vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty ships, and put them under the command of Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements already made, despatched him with all speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and carry on the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him. Their great anxiety was lest the Carthaginians should get the upper hand in Iberia, and thus possessing themselves of abundant supplies and recruits, should get a more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion of
Italy, by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding therefore the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they sent these ships and Publius Scipio to that country; who, when he arrived in Iberia, effected a junction with his brother and did most substantial service to the State. For up to that time the Romans had not ventured to cross the Iber; but had thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the friendship and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to attempt a movement on the other side: their designs being greatly favoured also by an accidental circumstance.