Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

by Polybius

  104. “The best thing of all is that the Greeks should not go to war with each other at all, but give the gods hearty thanks if by all speaking with one voice, and joining hands like people crossing a stream, they may be able to repel the attacks of barbarians and save themselves and their cities. But if this is altogether impossible, in the present juncture at least we ought to be unanimous and on our guard, when we see the bloated armaments and the vast proportions assumed by the war in the west. For even now it is evident to any one who pays even a moderate attention to public affairs, that whether the Carthaginians conquer the Romans, or the Romans the Carthaginians, it is in every way improbable that the victors will remain contented with the empire of Sicily and Italy. They will move forward: and will extend their forces and their designs farther than we could wish. Wherefore, I beseech you all to be on your guard against the danger of the crisis, and above all you, O King. You will do this, if you abandon the policy of weakening the Greeks, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the invader; and consult on the contrary for their good as you would for your own person, and have a care for all parts of Greece alike, as part and parcel of your own domains. If you act in this spirit, the Greeks will be your warm friends and faithful coadjutors in all your undertakings; while foreigners will be less ready to form designs against you, seeing with dismay the firm loyalty of the Greeks. If you are eager for action, turn your eyes to the west, and let your thoughts dwell upon the wars in Italy. Wait with coolness the turn of events there, and seize the opportunity to strike for universal dominion. Nor is the present crisis unfavourable for such a hope. But I intreat of you to postpone your controversies and wars with the Greeks to a time of greater tranquillity; and make it your supreme aim to retain the power of making peace or war with them at your own will. For if once you allow the clouds now gathering in the west to settle upon Greece, I fear exceedingly that the power of making peace or war, and in a word all these games which we are now playing against each other, will be so completely knocked out of the hands of us all, that we shall be praying heaven to grant us only this power of making war or peace with each other at our own will and pleasure, and of settling our own disputes.”

  [1] ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀγέλαος τοιαῦτα διαλεχθεὶς πάντας μὲν παρώρμησε τοὺς συμμάχους πρὸς τὰς διαλύσεις, μάλιστα δὲ τὸν Φίλιππον, οἰκείοις χρησάμενος λόγοις πρὸς τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἤδη προκατεσκευασμένην ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ Δημητρίου παραινέσεων. [2] διόπερ ἀνθομολογησάμενοι πρὸς σφᾶς ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, καὶ κυρώσαντες τὰς διαλύσεις, ἐχωρίσθησαν, κατάγοντες εἰς τὰς οἰκείας ἕκαστοι πατρίδας εἰρήνην ἀντὶ πολέμου. [3] ταῦτα δὲ πάντα συνέβη γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸν τρίτον ἐνιαυτὸν τῆς ἑκατοστῆς καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος, λέγω δὲ τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων περὶ Τυρρηνίαν μάχην καὶ τὴν Ἀντιόχου περὶ Κοίλην Συρίαν, ἔτι δὲ τὰς Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Φιλίππου πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς διαλύσεις. τὰς μὲν οὖν Ἑλληνικὰς καὶ τὰς Ἰταλικάς, [4] ἔτι δὲ τὰς Λιβυκὰς πράξεις, οὗτος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τοῦτο τὸ διαβούλιον συνέπλεξε πρῶτον: [5] οὐ γὰρ ἔτι Φίλιππος οὐδ᾽ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων προεστῶτες ἄρχοντες πρὸς τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πράξεις ποιούμενοι τὰς ἀναφορὰς οὔτε τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε τὰς διαλύσεις ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη πάντες πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ σκοποὺς ἀπέβλεπον. [6] ταχέως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς νησιώτας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας τὸ παραπλήσιον συνέβη γενέσθαι: [7] καὶ γὰρ οἱ Φιλίππῳ δυσαρεστούμενοι καί τινες τῶν Ἀττάλῳ διαφερομένων οὐκέτι πρὸς Ἀντίοχον καὶ Πτολεμαῖον οὐδὲ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν καὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς ἔνευον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑσπέραν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν ἔβλεπον, καὶ τινὲς μὲν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους, οἱ δὲ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐπρέσβευον, [8] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, δεδιότες τὴν τοῦ Φιλίππου τόλμαν καὶ προορώμενοι μὴ συνεπίθηται τοῖς τότε περιεστῶσιν αὐτοὺς καιροῖς. [9] ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόσχεσιν σαφῶς, οἶμαι, δεδείχαμεν πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ δι᾽ ἃς αἰτίας αἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πράξεις συνεπλάκησαν ταῖς Ἰταλικαῖς καὶ Λιβυκαῖς, [10] λοιπὸν κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ποιησάμενοι τὴν διήγησιν ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἕως εἰς τοὺς καιρούς, ἐν οἷς Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν περὶ Κάνναν μάχην ἡττήθησαν, ἐφ᾽ ἣν τῶν Ἰταλικῶν πράξεων τὴν καταστροφὴν ἐποιησάμεθα, καὶ ταύτην τὴν βύβλον ἀφοριοῦμεν, ἐξισώσαντες τοῖς προειρημένοις καιροῖς.

  105. This speech of Agelaus greatly influenced the allies in favour of peace; and Philip more than any one: as the arguments employed chimed in with the wishes which the advice of Demetrius had already roused in him. Both parties therefore came to terms on the details of the treaty; and after ratifying it, separated to their several cities, taking peace with them instead of war.

  These events all fell in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. I mean the battle of the Romans in Etruria, that of Antiochus for Coele-Syria, and lastly the treaty between Philip and the Aetolians.

  This then was the first point of time, and the first instance of a deliberation, which may be said to have regarded the affairs of Greece, Italy, and Libya as a connected whole: for neither Philip nor the leading statesmen of the Greek cities made war or peace any longer with each other with a view to Greek affairs, but were already all fixing their eyes upon Italy. Nor was it long before the islanders and inhabitants of Asia were affected in the same way; for those who were displeased with Philip, or who had quarrels with Attalus, no longer turned to Antiochus or Ptolemy, to the south or the east, but from this time forth fixed their eyes on the west, some sending embassies to Carthage, others to Rome. The Romans similarly began sending legates to Greece, alarmed at the daring character of Philip, and afraid that he might join in the attack upon them in their present critical position. Having thus fulfilled my original promise of showing when, how, and why Greek politics became involved in those of Italy and Libya, I shall now bring my account of Greek affairs down to the date of the battle of Cannae, to which I have already brought the history of Italy, and will end this book at that point.

  [1] Ἀχαιοὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς θᾶττον ἀπέθεντο τὸν πόλεμον, στρατηγὸν αὑτῶν ἑλόμενοι Τιμόξενον, ἀναχωρήσαντες εἰς τὰ σφέτερα νόμιμα καὶ τὰς διαγωγάς, [2] ἅμ᾽ Ἀχαιοῖς δ᾽ [καὶ] αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις αἱ κατὰ Πελοπόννησον, ἀνεκτῶντο μὲν τοὺς ἰδίους βίους, ἐθεράπευον δὲ τὴν χώραν, ἀνενεοῦντο δὲ τὰς πατρίους θυσίας καὶ πανηγύρεις καὶ τἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα νόμιμα. [3] σχεδὸν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ λήθην συνέβαινε γεγονένα�
� παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν προγεγονότων πολέμων. [4] οὐ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως ἀεί ποτε Πελοποννήσιοι, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων οἰκειότατα πρὸς τὸν ἥμερον καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον ἔχοντες, ἥκιστα πάντων ἀπολελαύκασιν αὐτοῦ κατά γε τοὺς ἀνώτερον χρόνους, μᾶλλον δέ πως κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἦσαν ἀεὶ πρασίμοχθοί τινες καὶ οὔποτε ἥσυχοι δορί. [5] τοῦτο δέ μοι δοκοῦσι πάσχειν εἰκότως: ἅπαντες γὰρ ἡγεμονικοὶ καὶ φιλελεύθεροι ταῖς φύσεσι μάχονται συνεχῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀπαραχωρήτως διακείμενοι περὶ τῶν πρωτείων. [6] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας φόβων ἀπελέλυντο καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἔχειν ἐδόκουν ἤδη βεβαίως, [7] χρώμενοι δὲ προστάταις Εὐρυκλείδᾳ καὶ Μικίωνι τῶν μὲν ἄλλων Ἑλληνικῶν πράξεων οὐδ᾽ ὁποίας μετεῖχον, ἀκολουθοῦντες δὲ τῇ τῶν προεστώτων αἱρέσει καὶ ταῖς τούτων ὁρμαῖς εἰς πάντας τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐξεκέχυντο, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων εἰς Πτολεμαῖον, [8] καὶ πᾶν γένος ὑπέμενον ψηφισμάτων καὶ κηρυγμάτων, βραχύν τινα λόγον ποιούμενοι τοῦ καθήκοντος διὰ τὴν τῶν προ

  106. Directly the Achaeans had put an end to the war, they elected Timoxenus Strategus for the next year and departed to take up once more their regular ways and habits. Along with the Achaeans the other Peloponnesian communities also set to work to repair the losses they had sustained; recommenced the cultivation of the land; and re-established their national sacrifices, games, and other religious observances peculiar to their several states. For these things had all but sunk into oblivion in most of the states through the persistent continuance of the late wars. It has ever somehow been the case that the Peloponnesians, who of all men are the most inclined to a peaceful and civilised way of life, have hitherto enjoyed it less than any other nation in the world; but have been rather as Euripides says “still worn with toil and war’s unrest.” But to me it seems clear that they bring this upon themselves in the natural course of events: for their universal desire of supremacy, and their obstinate love of freedom, involve them in perpetual wars with each other, all alike being resolutely set upon occupying the first place. The Athenians on the contrary had by this time freed themselves from fear of Macedonia, and considered that they had now permanently secured their independence. They accordingly adopted Eurycleidas and Micion as their representatives, and took no part whatever in the politics of the rest of Greece; but following the lead and instigation of these statesmen, they laid themselves out to flatter all the kings, and Ptolemy most of all; nor was there any kind of decree or proclamation too fulsome for their digestion: any consideration of dignity being little regarded, under the guidance of these vain and frivolous leaders.

  [1] εστώτων ἀκρισίαν. Πτολεμαίῳ γε μὴν εὐθέως ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους πόλεμον. [2] ὁ γὰρ προειρημένος βασιλεὺς καθοπλίσας τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀντίοχον πόλεμον πρὸς μὲν τὸ παρὸν ἐνδεχομένως ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἠστόχησε: [3] φρονηματισθέντες γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Ῥαφίαν προτερήματος, οὐκέτι τὸ προσταττόμενον οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν ὑπομένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐζήτουν ἡγεμόνα καὶ πρόσωπον, ὡς ἱκανοὶ βοηθεῖν ὄντες αὑτοῖς. ὃ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν οὐ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον. [4] Ἀντίοχος δὲ μεγάλῃ παρασκευῇ χρησάμενος ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι, μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς θερείας ἐπιγενομένης ὑπερέβαλε τὸν Ταῦρον, καὶ συνθέμενος πρὸς Ἄτταλον τὸν βασιλέα κοινοπραγίαν ἐνίστατο τὸν πρὸς Ἀχαιὸν πόλεμον. [5] Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ παραυτὰ μὲν εὐδοκοῦντες τῇ γενομένῃ διαλύσει πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, ὡς ἂν μὴ κατὰ γνώμην αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολέμου προκεχωρηκότος — διὸ καὶ στρατηγὸν Ἀγέλαον εἵλοντο τὸν Ναυπάκτιον, δοκοῦντα πλεῖστα συμβεβλῆσθαι πρὸς τὰς διαλύσεις — [6] οὐδένα χρόνον διαλιπόντες δυσηρέστουν καὶ κατεμέμφοντο τὸν Ἀγέλαον ὡς ὑποτετμημένον πάσας αὐτῶν τὰς ἔξωθεν ὠφελείας καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐλπίδας, διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τινάς, πρὸς πάντας δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πεποιῆσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. [7] ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ὑποφέρων τὴν προειρημένην τοιαύτην ἀλογίαν καὶ μέμψιν παρακατεῖχε τὰς ὁρμὰς αὐτῶν: διὸ καὶ καρτερεῖν οὗτοι μὲν ἠναγκάζοντο παρὰ φύσιν.

  107. Ptolemy however immediately after these events became involved in a war with his Egyptian subjects. For in arming them for his campaign against Antiochus he had taken a step which, while it served his immediate purpose sufficiently well, proved eventually disastrous. Elated with their victory at Rhaphia they refused any longer to receive orders from the king; but looked out for a leader to represent them, on the ground that they were quite able to maintain their independence. And this they succeeded in doing before very long.

  Antiochus spent the winter in extensive preparations for war; and when the next summer came, he crossed Mount Taurus and after making a treaty of alliance with King Attalus entered upon the war against Achaeus.

  At the time the Aetolians were delighted at the settlement of peace with the Achaean league, because the war had not answered to their wishes; and they accordingly elected Agelaus of Naupactus as their Strategus, because he was believed to have contributed more largely than any one to the success of the negotiations. But this was scarcely arranged before they began to be discontented, and to find fault with Agelaus for having cut off all their opportunities of plundering abroad, and all their hopes of gain for the future, since the peace was not made with certain definite states, but with all Greeks. But this statesman patiently endured these unreasonable reproaches and succeeded in checking the popular impulse. The Aetolians therefore were forced to acquiesce in an inactivity quite alien to their nature.

  [1] ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος, ἀνακομισθεὶς κατὰ θάλατταν ἀπὸ τῶν διαλύσεων εἰς Μακεδονίαν, καὶ καταλαβὼν τὸν Σκερδιλαΐδαν ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει τῶν προσοφειλομένων χρημάτων, πρὸς ἃ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Λευκάδα πλοῖα παρεσπόνδησε, καὶ τότε τῆς μὲν Πελαγονίας πόλισμα διηρπακότα τὸ προσαγορευόμενον Πισσαῖον, [2] τῆς δὲ Δασσαρήτιδος προσηγμένον πόλεις, τὰς μὲν φόβῳ, τὰς δ᾽ ἐπαγγελίαις, Ἀντιπάτρειαν, Χρυσονδύωνα, Γερτοῦντα, πολλὴν δὲ καὶ τῆς συνορούσης τούτοις Μακεδονίας ἐπιδεδραμηκότα, [3] παραυτίκα μὲν ὥρμησε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς ἀνακτήσασθαι σπουδάζων τὰς ἀφεστηκυίας πόλεις, [4]
καθόλου δ᾽ ἔκρινε πολεμεῖν πρὸς τὸν Σκερδιλαΐδαν, νομίζων ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι παρευτρεπίσασθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πρός τε τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν διάβασιν. [5] ὁ γὰρ Δημήτριος οὕτως ἐξέκαιε τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῷ βασιλεῖ ταύτην συνεχῶς, ὥστε κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους τὸν Φίλιππον ταῦτ᾽ ὀνειρώττειν καὶ περὶ ταύτας εἶναι τὰς πράξεις. [6] ἐποίει δὲ ταῦτα Δημήτριος οὐ Φιλίππου χάριν — τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ τρίτην ἴσως ἐν τούτοις ἔνεμε μερίδα — μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους δυσμενείας, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον ἕνεκεν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐλπίδων: [7] μόνως γὰρ οὕτως ἐπέπειστο τὴν ἐν τῷ Φάρῳ δυναστείαν κατακτήσασθαι πάλιν. [8] πλὴν ὅ γε Φίλιππος στρατεύσας ἀνεκτήσατο μὲν τὰς προειρημένας πόλεις, κατελάβετο δὲ τῆς μὲν Δασσαρήτιδος Κρεώνιον καὶ Γεροῦντα, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν Λυχνιδίαν λίμνην Ἐγχελᾶνας, Κέρακα, Σατίωνα, Βοιούς, τῆς δὲ Καλοικίνων χώρας Βαντίαν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν καλουμένων Πισαντίνων Ὀργησσόν. [9] ἐπιτελεσάμενος δὲ ταῦτα διαφῆκε τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς παραχειμασίαν. ἦν δ᾽ ὁ χειμὼν οὗτος, καθ᾽ ὃν Ἀννίβας, πεπορθηκὼς τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους τόπους τῆς Ἰταλίας ἔμελλε περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον τῆς Δαυνίας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραχειμασίαν. [10] Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τότε κατέστησαν στρατηγοὺς αὑτῶν Γάιον Τερέντιον καὶ Λεύκιον Αἰμίλιον.