Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  Thus during the spring and in the late summer of 1936 Hitler, influenced by political developments abroad, took a number of fundamental domestic decisions to boost preparations for war. Chief among these were the appointment of Himmler as Chief of the German Police, which was linked to a reorientation of police activity as a whole towards ‘preventive’ measures, and the two-stage establishment of a clear economic policy: in the spring through the appointment of Göring as Commissar for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, and in the summer through the implementation of the Four-Year Plan. By establishing this clear policy direction he succeeded in resolving the conflict between the rapid pace of rearmament and the need for food supplies, for which more foreign exchange was now available. At the core of this new economic strategy was the aim of ‘autarky’, in other words supplying the demand for goods as much as possible from domestic production and in particular from the production of substitute raw materials, regardless of cost. Preliminary decisions about how the plundering of Jewish property might be extended were directly linked to this. The fact that Hitler launched the Volkswagen project at the same time demonstrates that in view of the strains being put on the economy he wished to provide a predominantly middle-class audience with a glimpse of the future prosperity of the Nazi state.

  Following on from 30 June 1934 and the Nuremberg laws of September 1935, Hitler’s interventions in the spring and summer of 1936 represented the third important change of direction in domestic politics. As he had done before, although in both cases only after prolonged crises and equally long periods of hesitation, Hitler established clear domestic priorities in order to maintain the pace of rearmament. The foreign policy measures he took in parallel with these indicate clearly that he was now convinced he had overcome the weakness of his position during his first years in office and could now begin to engage much more confidently in power politics.

  Plans for the anti-communist bloc

  While Hitler had spent the late summer above all on pushing ahead with rearmament, in the autumn foreign policy was top of the agenda. The steps he now took were the result of a process of gradual reorientation that had begun during the preceding months.

  Whereas up to the spring of 1936 Hitler’s ideas on foreign policy had been determined by the view that as a result of Italy’s conflict with Abyssinia and the reactions provoked by it among the western powers the opportunities in the medium term for some kind of cooperation with Italy and in the long term for an alliance with Britain had improved, in the summer he believed he could see a pro-communist bloc forming and aimed to respond by setting up a ‘counter-bloc’. The formation in France in June 1936 of a popular front government ruling with the support of the communists conjured up for him the threat of an alliance led by the ‘Bolshevist’ Soviet Union. Spain might possibly join it and, for safety’s sake, Czechoslovakia should be regarded as part of it. The fact that the new French prime minister Léon Blum was a Jew confirmed Hitler’s deeply rooted prejudice. For him Blum was a ‘conscious agent of the Soviets, a Zionist, and a destroyer of the world’.91 As a counterweight to this he had visions of a pact, founded on a German–Italian alliance, that would include Poland, parts of south-eastern Europe, conceivably Spain, now that it had been ‘rescued’ from communism, and in the longer term Britain. In addition, Japan would be a partner in East Asia. On the other hand, he was dilatory in responding to a proposal made in July 1936 by the three Locarno powers, Britain, France, and Belgium, that Germany and Italy should be part of a successor to the Locarno Pact. Such a ‘Western Pact’ was diametrically opposed to his thinking at that time.92

  During the autumn of 1936 he spoke on numerous occasions to Goebbels of the ‘fight against Bolshevism’ as the regime’s coming great challenge, reprising in other words the topic that he had emphasized so strongly at the Party Rally and which since then had been used heavily in propaganda.93 Confrontation would, he said, be unavoidable at the latest if France became communist, which he considered likely. German rearmament would, however, only be completed in 1941,94 and thus a danger period was opening up of several years. He put his main efforts, therefore, into rapidly consolidating relations with Italy and Japan. During the Peasants’ Rally on the Bückeberg at the beginning of October Hitler had a private conversation with the Italian Propaganda Minister Alfieri. As Hitler told Goebbels regarding this discussion, he would be ‘glad to see Italy out of Geneva. Then we would be free to act. He won’t move against Italy. He wants ideological détente. He’s invited Mussolini to Germany. They’ll talk things through face to face.’ Alfieri in turn let Hitler know that for their part the Italians had decided to send Giuseppe Renzetti, who from the 1920s to 1935 had acted as Mussolini’s personal go-between with the Nazis in Berlin, back to the German capital. He had been withdrawn from California, where he had been Consul General, because of the cooling of relations with the United States.95

  A short time later, still in October, the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano, made an official visit to Germany. First of all he agreed a joint protocol with Neurath in which both states bound themselves in writing to cooperate on a series of issues: the League of Nations, their shared opposition to ‘Bolshevism’, and their policy towards Spain and Austria.96 On 24 October Hitler received Ciano at the Berghof, where, if Ciano’s record is to be believed, Hitler opened up to his guest much broader possibilities of German–Italian cooperation. Their future alliance was to be at the heart of a European front against Bolshevism. In addition, Hitler told Ciano, Germany would be ready for war in three to five years’ time and he sketched out the two powers’ spheres of interest: Germany was to expand into eastern Europe and Italy in the Mediterranean. The invitation to join forces in a large-scale war of aggression could hardly have been framed more clearly.97 Mussolini took only a week to respond. In a speech made in Milan he spoke of a Berlin–Rome axis, around which ‘all European states can move if they have a desire for cooperation and peace’.98

  Parallel to his courting of Italy, Hitler was also trying to win Japan as a partner in his future strategy of conquest. On 25 November the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, negotiated by Ribbentrop, was signed in Berlin. According to it the Communist International was to be opposed through the exchange of information. In a secret appendix both states gave mutual assurances that they would remain neutral in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union and in addition pledged not to conclude any treaties that ran counter to the ‘spirit of the agreement’.99 Since the summer of 1936, the German government had been trying to involve Poland in the emerging Anti-Comintern Pact but Poland had shown no interest. These efforts, which were ultimately fruitless, can be traced up to the autumn of 1937.100 Hitler regarded Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, as first and foremost an ally of the Soviet Union, as a Soviet ‘aircraft carrier’, as it was referred to in propaganda.

  It is striking that from the end of the summer Hitler (and Göring) had been dropping hints to Balkan politicians close to Germany that they should prepare for an imminent conflict between the ‘authoritarian’ states and the Soviet Union. These hints also pointed unmistakably to a coming conflict with Czechoslovakia. When the Hungarian head of state and Regent, Miklós Horthy, made a private visit to Germany in August 1936 Hitler spoke to him about the inevitable imminent conflict between the ‘countries ruled by Bolshevism and those ruled by conservative authoritarian governments’.101 Two months later, while in Budapest to attend the funeral of prime minister Gömbös, Göring declared quite openly to the Foreign Minister that Germany would annex Austria sooner or later and not stand by any longer while ‘the Sudetenland, which is German to the core, is bleeding to death under Czech rule’.102 In mid-December Hitler announced to the Hungarian Interior Minister, Miklós Kozma, that he was working to ‘build a united front’ against ‘Bolshevism’, to which Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic States should belong. In connection with this he also attempted to direct Hungary’s revisionist policy and desire to regain l
ost territory towards Czechoslovakia, which was digging ‘its own grave’ by its pro-Soviet stance.103 A month previously Hitler had expounded similar ideas to the Romanian politician Gheorghe Bratianu.104

  In spite of such threats, in autumn 1936 Hitler appears to have sanctioned an initiative by Albrecht Haushofer, who at this time worked with Ribbentrop in the latter’s Berlin ‘office’, to gauge the possibilities for fundamentally improving bilateral relations by means of informal talks with the Czech government. Hitler’s reaction to Haushofer’s report of 25 November on his talks with President Eduard Beneš and Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta has been preserved. Haushofer had proposed a ten-year non-aggression treaty with Prague (Hitler had made a similar offer in his 7 March speech occasioned by the occupation of the Rhineland). Hitler now rejected this. He appeared completely uninterested in measures to improve the situation of the Sudeten Germans. Instead, the possibility of concluding a trade agreement was his main concern, as well as the issue of how Czech neutrality could be guaranteed in the event of a Soviet attack (a treaty of mutual support had existed since the previous year between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union) and the activities of German-speaking emigrés in Prague curtailed. Haushofer continued to put out feelers, but in January 1937 Hitler made it clear to him that he was not interested in pursuing the matter. At the beginning of 1937 he was utterly convinced that Czechoslovakia belonged in the enemy camp. He had evidently regarded Haushofer’s efforts as a test that finally persuaded him that he was right to take an aggressive line with Czechoslovakia.105 The episode demonstrates that Hitler was altogether prepared to allow some temporary ambivalence in German foreign policy, as long as he was still in control.

  At the end of 1936 and beginning of 1937, as we can infer from a series of statements made by Hitler or by those around him, his perception of foreign policy suddenly became sharply focused.

  In an address lasting three hours on 1 December, Hitler expounded to the cabinet his estimation of the situation. No other record of this appears to exist apart from the account contained in Goebbels’s diary. According to Goebbels, Hitler claimed that Europe was already divided into two camps. Soon France and Spain would capitulate to the communist drive for expansion. If communist regimes were to be established there, a Europe-wide crisis would result. They (the Germans) could only hope that this crisis could be ‘delayed until we are ready’. Therefore: ‘Rearm. Money must be no object.’ In the final analysis, however, the ‘authoritarian states (Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary)’ could not be relied on. The only ‘firmly anti-Bolshevist states’ were ‘Germany, Italy, Japan’ and ‘agreements’ could be made with them. ‘England will get involved if a crisis develops in France.’ At least with his closest followers, therefore, Hitler maintained the impression that his increasingly aggressive foreign policy would in the end lead to the hoped for alliance with Great Britain.106

  The measures approved by the cabinet on 1 December emphasized the seriousness of the situation and the need underlined by Hitler to ramp up even further the hectic pace of rearmament. One of the measures was a law against economic sabotage that provided for heavy penalties, even the death penalty, for those who moved wealth abroad.107 The other provided for a legal change in how foreign exchange was handled; so-called security measures were introduced against persons suspected of transferring wealth abroad.108 Both laws laid the foundation for the practice of confiscating Jewish property more or less arbitrarily and sentencing its owners to long prison terms as ‘economic saboteurs’.109 The anti-Semitic impulse behind these new laws reveals once again the ideological context uniting Hitler’s domestic and foreign policy. German Jews were to be expressly targeted to finance rearmament for the fight against ‘Jewish Bolshevism’. In addition, at the end of November 1936 the government issued a law imposing a general price freeze, following on from the appointment in October of Gauleiter Josef Wagner as the new Reich Prices Commissioner.110

  On 17 December 1936, at a gathering of ‘leading German businessmen’ in Berlin, Hitler demanded an increase in production in every sector. His challenge ended in the slogan ‘With this there’s no such word as “impossible”.’ Hitler commended Göring to his audience as a man of ‘unbending will’ to whom he had given the task of delivering the Four-Year Plan. For his part, Göring spurred the industrialists on to achieve the utmost to support rearmament. It was a matter of ‘victory or destruction’; if Germany won through, ‘business would be well recompensed’.111

  The military prospects for any future war between Germany and its allies and the Soviet Union and its satellites now assumed increasing importance in Hitler’s mind. A conversation that took place in January 1937 between Goebbels and Ribbentrop, two of his most loyal admirers among the leadership, repeated Hitler’s line, including voicing the hope he still maintained that Britain would join them. Japan was ‘a firm ally. . . . Everyone is hostile to Russia’, as Goebbels noted. In the process ‘Czechoslovakia will be caught in the crossfire . . . Everything in flux. England holds the key to a solution. In the end it must be on our side.’112

  Goebbels’s diary also tells us that at the end of January 1937 Hitler attended a presentation lasting several hours by Blomberg in the War Ministry about a study carried out by the army on the likely scenarios of a war between ‘Germany and its fascist allies’ and ‘Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania’. At the lunch following the presentation Hitler defined these ‘fascist allies’ as being in future ‘Romania, Yugoslavia, and, increasingly likely, Poland’ in addition to Italy. This indicates some change in the negative views he had expressed in December about Yugoslavia and Poland as potential partners. It is striking that the Soviet Union’s strongest potential ally, France, was missing from the theoretical war scenario (which, according to Goebbels, Hitler was hoping to delay ‘for another six years’). In a conversation with Goebbels Hitler also said that he was not excluding the possibility of a ‘reconciliation’ with France, provided that ‘we are strong enough’.113 Hitler’s reflections on alliances were therefore by no means over.

  In the speech he made to the Reichstag on 30 January, the fourth anniversary of the seizure of power, Hitler strove above all to create the impression that the reintroduction of conscription, the creation of the Luftwaffe, and the occupation of the Rhineland had ‘restored Germany to equal status’ with other nations. His last unilateral step towards a final annulment of the Treaty of Versailles was to announce that he was ‘solemnly’ withdrawing the signature at the end of the treaty that, amongst other things, forced Germany to accept that it had been to blame for the war. This, however, signalled ‘the end of these so-called surprises’. In eight points he again put forward his thoughts on a new ‘peace programme’ that covered a reform of the League of Nations, a general agreement on arms limitation, and security for national minorities. He took issue vigorously and at length with a speech made on 19 January to the House of Commons by the British Foreign Secretary, Eden. He opposed Eden’s demand for a moderate arms limit on the part of the European powers with a longwinded exposition of the dangers of Bolshevism. Finally, he turned to the subject of the British note of 7 May 1936, which was to his mind an outrageous interrogation of his precise intentions and so he had thus far left it unanswered. His response to the question posed by the British government of whether Germany now considered itself capable of concluding ‘real treaties’ was that ‘Germany will never again sign a treaty that is in any way in conflict with its honour, the nation’s honour, and that of the government representing it, or that in other ways is incompatible with Germany’s vital interests and therefore could not be upheld in the long run.’114

  He also issued a detailed demand to Britain for the restitution of German colonies. This additional demand did not, however, signify that at this point Hitler had already abandoned his cherished ambition of forming an alliance with Britain. Although in Mein Kampf and his pre-1933 speeches he had indeed rejected any return to German colonial policies in order to
encourage rapprochement with Britain, German colonies were for him reserved for the future when Germany would pursue ‘world power policies’ in different political circumstances. In the first years after 1933 he had therefore exercised restraint in this matter, particularly as his conservative coalition partners regarded the restoration of the colonies as being of indisputable national importance. Although he repeatedly emphasized that Germany would not settle for the loss of its colonies, he also made it clear that his government’s foremost foreign policy concerns lay elsewhere.115

  At the beginning of 1936, however, Hitler had begun to lay more emphasis on the restoration of the colonies.116 At the same time, he had coordinated the various colonial organizations in Germany, which were predominantly conservative, integrating them in the Reich Colonial League, which was close to the NSDAP, for he wished to ensure that a single line was followed in the political handling of the demand for restitution.117 In his speech of 30 January 1937 he focused again on this subject, although the tone of his demand was moderate and, as was usual in such instances, the press was instructed to show restraint in reporting it.118 As far as the issue of colonies was concerned, however, Hitler had not changed his view and continued to regard it in the light of the desired alliance with Britain, in other words tactically. But now he was no longer prepared to hold back on his demands in order to bring about this partnership, but rather intended to achieve it from a position of strength and if necessary through pressure. Just like the expansion of the German fleet, this more confident stance with regard to colonies was from his perspective one component in the complex of issues he intended to employ to prepare the way for an alliance with his future British ‘partners’. Surrendering claims to German colonies was no longer a small token but a major pledge that the British had to match.119