Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  On 27 September, the ceremonial signing of the Tripartite Pact took place in Berlin.32 In the agreement, which was valid for ten years, Japan recognized ‘Germany’s and Italy’s leading role in the creation of a new order in Europe’, while the two European powers recognized Japan’s similar role in the ‘greater Asian area’. The three powers promised each other mutual support in the event that one of them was ‘attacked by a power that is not at present involved in the European war or in the Sino–Japanese war’. Article 5, in which the three powers declared that the agreement did not affect their current respective positions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, clearly shows that the promise of mutual support was aimed primarily at the United States.

  Hitler tried to reassure Mussolini about the threat from the United States at the Brenner meeting referred to above.33 To begin with, he outlined in detail to the ‘Duce’ his plans for defeating Britain: ‘Only five days of decent weather were needed to achieve air superiority. Then, 8 to 10 days of calm weather for crossing the sea . . .’. But so far they had been waiting in vain for four weeks for this period of good weather. Britain’s hopes of an intervention by the United States or the Soviet Union were, according to Hitler, unfounded. The United States would merely provide armaments – and even that to only a limited extent – and he reckoned a military intervention by the Soviet Union was ‘out of the question’. In any case, they were fully prepared for a Soviet intervention. The Russians, according to Hitler, represented ‘no problem for Germany even under the worst-case scenario’.

  At this meeting Hitler still did not consider it necessary to inform Mussolini that a German military mission had been sent to Romania. It was only eight days later, on 12 October, that Germany’s engagement in Romania was made public in an official announcement. According to an entry in Ciano’s diary, Mussolini was so furious about this fait accompli that he decided to give Hitler a similar surprise by attacking Greece, thereby restoring the balance between the two allies.34 Thus Hitler learnt that the Italians had decided to attack Greece against his wishes only on his return from his visit to France at the end of October.35 On hearing the news. he had his special train redirected to Florence, where he met Mussolini on 28 October, only hours after Italy had launched the attack from Albania.36 In fact, the advance soon stalled and the Italians had to withdraw to Albanian territory. The German leadership realized that, if they were to prevent Britain from sending troops and establishing a foothold in the Balkans, they would have to intervene militarily themselves.37 Preparations were under way in November.38

  Molotov: A tough opponent

  The visit of Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, to Berlin in the middle of November represented the climax of the diplomatic soundings and negotiations that Hitler initiated during the autumn of 1940. The Soviet visitor was given a cool reception in Berlin. Goebbels had ensured that the visit took place with little involvement on the part of the Berlin population.39 The interpreter Schmidt noted that no ‘cheering crowds’ had been organized to welcome him.40

  A few days before the visit, at a meeting with Keitel, Jodl, and Halder, Hitler told them that Russia ‘was the main problem for Europe. Everything must be done to prepare for the great showdown.’41 Immediately before the visit, Hitler issued Directive No. 18 of 12 November ‘for the conduct of war in the near future’, in which he definitively stated that, regardless of the results of the discussions with Molotov, ‘all preparations for the East that have already been orally ordered, [are] to be continued’. France ‘for the time being [will] have the role of a non-belligerent power’. The primary task of the French was ‘the defensive and offensive protection of their African possessions . . . against England and the de Gaulle movement’. From this task ‘the participation of France in the war against England [may] develop to a full extent’. Spain would shortly be joining in the war; the Italian offensive against Egypt would, if sufficient success was achieved, be supported by the Wehrmacht, in particular in order to mine the Suez Canal from the air. In addition, preparations were to be made for a German advance from Bulgaria into northern Greece, so that Luftwaffe units could be deployed in the eastern Mediterranean. An invasion of Britain in the course of the spring was conceivable.42

  Thus, directly before the start of the negotiations with Molotov, Hitler was making it clear that he was committed, in the first instance, to an anti-British alliance without the Soviet Union, and that, irrespective of the consultations with Molotov, he was sticking to his plans for an attack on Moscow. From his point of view, therefore, the discussions had, above all, the function of keeping channels to the Soviet Union open, in order to prevent a possible Anglo-Soviet rapprochement. In view of his attitude in the conversations that followed, it must be doubted whether he was seriously contemplating an even temporary incorporation of the Soviet Union into an anti-British alliance. After a preliminary meeting between Ribbentrop and his Soviet counterpart,43 Hitler opened the discussions with Molotov on 12 November with a general, wide-ranging survey of the international situation.44 Molotov, however, was little interested in such a tour d’horizon; instead, he preferred to confront Hitler with a series of specific questions about the aims of German foreign policy. In fact, he largely succeeded in putting the ‘Führer’ on the spot, making him take refuge in vague statements and evasions. According to the interpreter, Schmidt: ‘No foreign visitor had ever spoken to him in such a way in my presence.’45

  Molotov’s forceful approach during the negotiations is explained by the fact that Stalin had given him a detailed set of instructions and questions to work through and clarify before the Russian dictator was prepared to sign up to a ‘four-power pact’ – an agreement he certainly did not dismiss out of hand.46 Molotov now asked Hitler what significance the Tripartite Pact actually had, and in what way the Soviet Union was going to be integrated into the new order in Europe and Asia. In addition, there were issues relating to Russian interests in the Balkans and the Black Sea concerning Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey that needed clarification.

  Hitler replied that the Tripartite Pact was ‘intended to regulate relationships in Europe as regards the natural interests of the European countries’ and that, consequently, Germany was now approaching the Soviet Union in order that she might express her views concerning the areas of interest to her. On no account would a settlement be made without Soviet Russian cooperation. The Tripartite Pact ‘represented the first concrete step, so to speak, towards comprehensive collaboration, with due consideration for the problems of Western Europe that were to be settled between Germany, Italy, and France, as well as for the issues of the East, which were essentially the concern of Russia and Japan, but in which Germany offered its good offices as mediator.’

  Molotov indicated that he was quite open to the idea of the Soviet Union participating in the Tripartite Pact, but wanted Russia to be treated not as an ‘object’ but as a ‘partner’. Hitler then broke off the meeting by mentioning the threat of an air raid; it was continued the following day. In the evening – the raid did not occur – Ribbentrop gave a reception in honour of Molotov in the Hotel Kaiserhof, which Hitler did not attend; nor did he appear at the reception Molotov gave the following day in the Soviet embassy.47

  The following day, Molotov continued to put his probing questions to Hitler. He complained that Germany’s activities in Finland contravened their previous year’s treaty, in which it had been agreed that Finland would be in the Soviet sphere of influence; in particular, Molotov objected to the stationing of German troops in the country. Hitler replied that these were simply troops being transported to Norway on a temporary basis. The discussion then reached a decisive point. While Molotov claimed for the Soviet Union the right to occupy Finland, which belonged to its sphere of influence,48 Hitler emphasized that he was not prepared under any circumstances to put up with a Finnish–Soviet war in the Baltic region: ‘A new war in the Baltic would put a serious strain on German–Russian relations and on future collaboration.’ Hitler
stated that he was afraid that, in the event of such a war, Britain might try to intervene in Finland; in fact, of course, he was primarily interested in using Finland as a base for his planned war on the Soviet Union.

  Molotov, however, stuck to his guns by making it clear that, by rejecting the use of force by the Soviet Union in Finland, Hitler was calling into question the demarcation of spheres of influence that had been agreed in 1939. The ‘Führer’ now tried to divert attention from this contentious issue by opening up a new perspective for Soviet expansion. Once the British Empire had been defeated, ‘a gigantic, bankrupt, world-wide estate of 40 million square kilometres would be up for grabs. This bankrupt estate would provide Russia with access to the ice-free and really open ocean.’ Molotov, however, was not prepared to engage with this point, as his instructions stated that the four powers – Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, Italy – should issue a declaration guaranteeing the existence of the British Empire (with the exception of Gibraltar and Egypt). Thus the Soviet Union was solely interested in eliminating Britain’s dominant position in the Mediterranean, and otherwise wanted to retain it as a major player in the international balance of power.49 Molotov kept returning to particular critical issues in German–Soviet relations, demanding definite commitments from Hitler. Among other things, he complained – ‘if I may be permitted to express myself so bluntly’ – that the German–Italian guarantee of Romania was directed against the Soviet Union, and asked ‘how Germany would respond if Russia gave Bulgaria, the country nearest to the Straits, a guarantee with the same conditions’.

  Hitler once again tried to evade the issue: it would have to be raised with the Bulgarians as well as with Germany’s Italian allies. When Molotov persisted, he refused to see what Molotov was getting at. Once again, Hitler ended the meeting by mentioning the possibility of a British air raid.50 Later on that evening Ribbentrop continued the discussion with Molotov in the air-raid shelter. He gave his Soviet colleague the draft of a Four-Power Pact, de facto an extension of the Tripartite Pact to include the Soviet Union. However, Molotov now had the bit between his teeth, bombarding Ribbentrop with a list of questions the Soviet Union definitely needed clarifying in order to determine its policy towards Germany. Apart from their relationship with Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, there was the issue of the two powers’ policy in relation to Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Sweden, and the question of access to the Baltic, all of which had to be sorted out. Ribbentrop finally gave up, admitting to his Soviet guest that he was ‘at a loss’.51

  On 26 November, after Molotov’s return to Moscow, the Soviet government submitted its conditions for participating in the Four-Power Pact sketched out by Ribbentrop on the 13 November: the withdrawal of German troops from Finland; the conclusion of a Soviet–Bulgarian mutual assistance pact; Turkey’s agreement to the construction of Soviet bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; the recognition of the area south of Batum and Baku ‘in the general direction of the Persian Gulf’ as ‘the main focus for the further southwards expansion of the Soviet Union’, and Japan’s renunciation of coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin.52

  The Soviet proposals did not receive a response. Hitler and his foreign minister were forced to conclude that their bid to tempt the Soviet Union into an anti-British coalition, even if only temporarily, with the vague prospect of participating in the break-up of the British Empire had failed as a result of the concrete conditions set by the Soviets for such an alliance. For these could not be fulfilled, as the Germans did not want to risk weakening their position prior to an attack on the Soviet Union. Also, given the highly specific conditions set by the Soviets, there was no point in continuing the negotiations, for they would almost certainly soon have to be broken off, leading to a fundamental diplomatic reorientation of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Germany. The Germans wanted to avoid this at all costs and so the matter was left in abeyance.

  After Molotov’s departure, Hitler continued to try to expand the Tripartite Pact – without the Soviet Union. On 18 November, he received various candidates for the alliance one after the other at the Berghof. The first was King Boris of Bulgaria, who was on a private visit to Germany. According to Jodl’s notes, they discussed the impending attack on Greece (which was going to cross Bulgarian territory).53 However, Hitler does not appear to have succeeded in binding Bulgaria any further to the Axis, as is clear from a letter he wrote to Mussolini two days later.54

  Only a few hours after Boris had been received by Hitler, Molotov offered the Bulgarian government a wide-ranging pact,55 which, however, was rejected.56 But, at the same time, Bulgaria was not prepared to damage its relations with the Soviet Union any further.57 At the beginning of December, Hitler tried in vain to convince the Bulgarian ambassador that if Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact, ‘Russia [would] automatically keep its hands off Bulgaria’.58 On 18 November, the Spanish foreign minister, Súñer, also came to the Berghof, where Hitler urged Spain to enter the war soon.59 However, Súñer avoided making a clear commitment, raising a whole series of difficulties. As ever, it was a question of deliveries of foodstuffs, which Spain was hoping to receive from both belligerents as a result of its temporizing tactics, and also the territorial concessions in Africa, which Germany was expected to make to Spain at the expense of France. Hitler responded that it would be ‘unwise to make demands, which, if they became known, would inevitably mean Morocco going over to de Gaulle’. Súñer repeatedly urged Hitler to be more precise about what territorial concessions in Africa Germany was prepared to make to Spain. Hitler, however, declined to do so.

  Although he had not received a clear commitment from Spain, after Súñer’s visit Hitler issued orders to prepare for the implementation of Directive No. 19 (Operation ‘Felix’). This involved not only the conquest of Gibraltar, but also holding three divisions ready to neutralize a possible British counter-attack through Portugal. Preparatory studies had shown that, because of the poor road conditions and difficulty of maintaining supplies, the German attack on Gibraltar, which was intended to involve a reinforced division and over 200 artillery pieces, could only take place twenty-five days after the frontier had been crossed, and so there was no chance of carrying out a surprise attack.60 Although Franco gave his approval for the operation at the end of November,61 the German ambassador learnt from Súñer that he had attached various conditions to it, indicating his scepticism.62

  Hitler received Ciano on the same day, spelling out to him the negative impact of Italy’s unsuccessful attempt to go it alone in Greece, which he then explained to Mussolini in detail two days later in a letter. He pointed out the ‘negative psychological consequences’ of Italy’s action: the unwillingness of Bulgaria to enter the Tripartite Pact, the increased Soviet interest in the Balkans, and other problems. The construction of British air bases in Greece, from which they could reach the Romanian oil fields, had a negative military effect.63 In view of this situation, a whole series of measures had become necessary. Spain had to enter the war, which ‘it can be assumed will happen in six weeks or so’; this would enable the Mediterranean to be cut off from the West. They must try to ‘lure Russia away from the Balkans and direct it towards the East’; they had to persuade Turkey to reduce its pressure on Bulgaria. Yugoslavia must be persuaded to accept the Axis line on the Greek issue. Hungary had to accept the transporting of large German forces to Romania across its territory and, finally, Romania must accept an increase in the number of German forces stationed there. If British forces moved into Greece he, Hitler, was willing to counter them, but not before next March. The Italians ought to advance towards Egypt and establish an air base in the Mersa Matruh region, from which aircraft could reach the Suez Canal. Mussolini should also remove his aircraft based on the French Channel coast and deploy them against British targets in the Mediterranean.

  If the two air forces fought a coordinated campaign, Hitler continued, ‘within three or four months the Mediterranean would be the graveyard of the British fleet’, a
nd that was ‘the decisive precondition for the military operations, which, as far as Greece itself is concerned, in my opinion cannot start before the beginning of March’.64 In his reply of 22 November Mussolini endeavoured to justify the weak performance of his armed forces against Greece. As far as Hitler’s proposals for coordinated action in the Mediterranean were concerned, he wrote that he was quite prepared to cede Saloniki to Yugoslavia.65

  The position of the Axis appeared to have been strengthened when, on 20, 23, and 24 November respectively, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia joined the Tripartite Pact.66 On 23 November, Hitler received Antonescu in Berlin. The Romanian leader was supremely self-confident, launching into a lengthy monologue to equal any of Hitler’s usual tirades, glorifying the heroic history of the Romanians and complaining about the decisions of the Second Vienna Award. This was despite the fact that, prior to the interview, Ribbentrop had upbraided him for his critical comments.67 Hitler seems to have been impressed by the ‘Conducator’, indicating that, despite the Vienna Award, the issue of the Hungarian–Romanian border was still unfinished business.68

  Although the Tripartite Pact had been successfully strengthened, in December it became clear that the attempt to form an anti-British continental bloc, even in the reduced version left by the failure to achieve an alliance with the Soviet Union, had proved abortive. Plans for a comprehensive anti-British Mediterranean strategy, outlined in Hitler’s letter to Mussolini of 20 November, soon became obsolete. For on 7 December Franco vetoed the Gibraltar operation proposed by Hitler for 10 January. He explained his reasons for this to the Abwehr chief, Canaris, in Madrid, adding that Spain was prepared to enter the war at a later date; but it was clear that he had little enthusiasm for doing so.69 The Spanish position was elucidated by the German ambassador in Madrid. Franco was concerned about a threat to his regime if he failed to respond to the concerns of his military chiefs about entering the war; the catastrophic food situation added to the problem.70 Hitler’s attempt to persuade Spain to enter the war by promising them colonies after Britain had been defeated had failed. He, therefore, cancelled Operation ‘Felix’.71