Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  36

  The Winter Crisis of 1941/42

  In the middle of October 1941, Army Group Centre’s offensive towards Moscow appeared to be on the brink of success. In a state of euphoria Hitler and his generals were not only assuming that they would soon have Moscow surrounded, but would be able to continue the offensive beyond the Russian capital before winter arrived. Thus the OKH envisaged withdrawing significant forces from the projected siege of Moscow and deploying them in wide-ranging movements to the north and south of the capital.1 Confident of victory, Hitler strongly supported removing powerful panzer forces from the advance on Moscow in support of these operations.2

  In the middle of October, on the assumption that the Russian operations would soon be successfully concluded, the OKH ordered the transfer of five divisions from the central sector of the front to the West.3 At the end of the month, Hitler informed Mussolini in a letter that the campaign in the East had not only been ‘won, but . . . had basically been finally decided’. A few days before, Ciano had made the generous offer for Italian troops to take part in future campaigns in India.4

  During the second week in October, however, the usual autumn weather set in in the occupied eastern territories: heavy rain ensured that the mostly unpaved roads soon became quagmires, thereby seriously hindering all army operations as well as the supply of the troops.5 Quartermaster General Wagner, who bore the main responsibility for army supplies, wrote to his wife on 20 October: ‘We can no longer ignore the fact that at the moment we are literally stuck in the mud.’6 Under the impact of the poor weather conditions the advance on Moscow slowed and, by the end of the month, had effectively come to a halt.7 This meant that the German ‘Blitzkrieg’ in Russia had ultimately failed. The Wehrmacht had to gear itself to a winter war in Russia and the German population be prepared for the fact that the victory that had been declared in October had been postponed.

  As a result of the altered war situation, the whole propaganda approach had to be revised. Hitherto the popular ‘mood’ had been buoyed up by the overwhelming impression of great military victories. Their failure to materialize inevitably made it sink, as reflected in the official reports.8 In order to prevent the emergence of a general sense of depression, Goebbels now set about trying to alter the public’s expectations. Over-optimistic reports, above all those that suggested that the war in the East would soon be over, were banned; instead, a moderately positive attitude was adopted. Above all, the population was geared to expect greater hardships and burdens in the future.9 At the same time, over-pessimistic and negative statements were to be completely excised from the official reports on the population’s mood, so that internal sources for rumours, pessimism, and nervousness could be blocked.10 At the beginning of January, Hitler intervened personally to ban reports on the mood on the eastern front.11

  From November onwards, Goebbels supervised this reorientation of propaganda in close consultation with Hitler. The new line was inaugurated in the speech Hitler gave on 8 November in Munich commemorating the 1923 putsch.12 To begin with, Hitler spoke about ‘international Jewry’, the ‘inspirer of the world coalition against the German people and against the German Reich’. This fitted in with the propaganda line that was dominating these weeks. Then he once again offered a detailed justification for his decision to attack the Soviet Union, describing the progress that had been hitherto achieved in this ‘struggle for existence’. Finally, however, he made it clear that the war in the East could not be concluded before the end of the year: ‘If our opponents say: well then, the fight will go on until 1942 – it can go on as long as it likes – the last battalion in the field will be a German one!’13

  The following day an article written by Goebbels,14 which had been discussed with Hitler and approved by him,15 appeared in the weekly, Das Reich, and took a similar line. A special edition was distributed in millions of copies to the soldiers at the front.16 As far as the matter of the end of the war was concerned, it stated, the important thing was not when the war would come to an end, but how. If it were lost then ‘our national life would be completely and entirely’ lost. All further discussion of how long the war would last was pointless and damaging; every effort must be concentrated on achieving victory.17 That represented a clear ban on any further discussion of the length of the war. A few days later, Hitler once again expressly approved as a propaganda theme the need for ‘toughness’ in the conduct of the war as emphasized in the article.18

  On the day the article appeared Hitler gave a confidential speech to the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters in Munich.19 He used it to demand from the Party elite an ‘uncompromisingly tough attitude’. Should a real crisis engulf the Fatherland ‘they would find him with the last division’. At this point it was not a matter of ‘when the war was going to end’, but ‘how it would end’. He was hoping within four weeks ‘to have achieved the goals that could still be achieved before the onset of winter, and then the troops would take up their winter quarters’. He thought that, under favourable weather conditions, within a matter of ten days or a fortnight, they would be able to seal off the Caucasus, encircle Moscow, and reach the Volga in several places’. They would take up the offensive again in the spring. ‘One couldn’t say how long the war against the Soviet Union would last. Whether a peace treaty would ever be signed was entirely unclear.’ In certain circumstances they could still be fighting in the East for years without that affecting living conditions in the rest of Europe. ‘On the contrary, it would be really good for our youth to be continually trained and toughened up in the process’.

  A week later, on 16 November, another important article appeared in Das Reich with the title ‘The Jews are to Blame!’20 It was an official reply to the negative responses of the population to the deportations from Germany that were taking place in full public view. In the light of the deteriorating military situation this potential source of discontent and criticism had to be stifled. In this article Goebbels referred back to Hitler’s prophecy of 30 January 1939: ‘At present we are experiencing the realization of this prophecy and so the Jews are meeting with a fate that may be harsh but is also more than deserved. In this case pity or regret is completely inappropriate.’ ‘World Jewry’, Goebbels continued, is now ‘suffering a gradual process of annihilation’. Referring specifically to Hitler’s approval, this provided a sufficiently clear answer to the question of what was happening to the Jews who were being deported from Germany.

  The article, which received a wide circulation,21 contained a list of detailed regulations governing people’s behaviour towards those Jews still living in Germany. Among other things, it stated: ‘If someone is wearing a Jewish star he is marked out as an enemy of the people. Anyone who has private contact with him, belongs with him and must immediately be regarded and treated as a Jew’.22 This made it clear that Hitler’s regime was determined to proceed against all ‘friends of Jews’ and critics of its anti-Semitic policy.

  In the meantime, Hitler’s army adjutant was noting that the top commanders were increasingly uncertain and unable to make decisions about how to continue operations in the East.23 In fact, the situation of the German armies in Russia was far from satisfactory. On 19 November, General Halder gave Hitler a summary of the overall situation. According to his account, it was proving impossible to maintain an unbroken line on the eastern front, but only a series of advance posts in fortified positions, which were having to attempt somehow to control the territory between them. Instead of 73 trains per day bringing supplies, in the past two weeks on average only 50 trains were arriving at the stations where the supplies were unloaded. Of the 50,000 motor vehicles in the eastern armies 30 per cent were beyond repair and 40 per cent in need of maintenance.24 The OKH estimated that, at the beginning of November, of the 3,580 assault guns and panzers in the eastern armies 2,009 had been lost and only 601 had been replaced.25 By 6 November, over 20 per cent of the troops in the eastern armies (686,000 men) were either dead, injured, or missing.26 The
combat strength of the infantry divisions had been reduced by an average of one third, that of the panzer divisions by two thirds.27

  In the middle of November, Army Group Centre resumed its offensive towards Moscow. Hitler and the military leadership were under the false impression, almost amounting to self-deception, that the Red Army had more or less been defeated and that a decisive blow would prevent it from reviving during the winter. The depressing impression created by Hitler’s admission during his speech of 8 November that the war could not be won that year was to be compensated for by the triumphal announcement of the capture of Moscow. At the start of the campaign Hitler had assigned priority to the conquest of Leningrad and of the sources of raw materials in the south of the Soviet Union over the capture of Moscow; now, having failed to achieve those goals, he clung to the hope of achieving a prestige success by capturing the enemy’s capital.28

  However, not only that: both Hitler and the military leadership continued to believe in their October plan whereby, in addition to capturing Moscow, two spearheads of Army Group Centre, advancing north and south of the capital, would be able to link up with the offensives of the other army groups. Before the winter had set in with full force, they could capture Stalingrad and, in the north, cut the railway line between Moscow and Leningrad, thereby blocking the supplies of Allied war matériel.29

  To begin with, the offensive towards Moscow did in fact make some progress. However, as a result of the onset of frightful winter conditions in the middle of November, the exhaustion of their own troops, and the tough resistance of their opponents, the advance came to a halt at the beginning of December.30 The same thing happened with the other army groups. Since the middle of October, in the Leningrad area Army Group North had been trying to link up with the Finns east of Lake Ladoga through an offensive by the 16th Army. Tichwin was captured on 8 November but it was impossible to advance further.31 In the south of the front the 1st Panzer Army captured Rostov on the Don on 20 November.32 In the middle of November, the 11th Army succeeded in conquering most of the Crimea, including Kerch. Only the fortress of Sebastapol remained in Soviet hands.33

  The attempt by the German forces to achieve further territorial gains, despite the onset of winter, resulted in the troops having no time to prepare fortified winter quarters. When they were forced to retreat a few weeks later, they found no line of defence in their rear, prepared for winter conditions, to which they could retire. The autumn offensive, with its requirement for more supplies, had also resulted in the winter equipment not arriving in time at the front, despite assurances given by the Quartermaster General to Hitler.34 Displays of winter equipment in five major German cities, with which the population was to be mentally prepared for the winter war, were initially postponed and then cancelled.35

  As victory had proved impossible before the onset of winter, Hitler concentrated on preparing plans for continuing the war during the following spring. On 19 November, he told Halder of his intention to launch an offensive towards the Caucasus and Russia’s southern border between March and April the following year. The Soviet Union’s combat strength had been seriously depleted, he claimed. All in all, his surprising conclusion was that ‘the recognition that the two combatants were unable to destroy each other [would] lead to a negotiated peace’. It appears that, following a renewed southern offensive, he was contemplating recognizing the existence of a rump Soviet state. In any event, there was no more talk of totally destroying Bolshevism and driving it east of the Urals.36 While Goebbels was still preoccupied with gearing up the population for another winter of war, at the end of November Hitler gently prepared his Propaganda Minister for the fact that the war was certainly not going to be concluded during the coming year; 1942, Hitler told him, would be ‘difficult’, while ‘during 1943 a much better situation would emerge’. After all, in the European part of the Soviet Union there were ‘huge amounts of foodstuffs’ as well as ‘sufficient quantities of almost all raw materials’ so that ‘our victory can no longer be endangered’.37 His remarks clearly demonstrate Hitler’s extraordinary ability to put a positive gloss on bad news.

  In the middle of November the Red Army launched a counteroffensive in the northern and southern sectors of the front.38 In the south it initially succeeded in recapturing Rostov on the Don.39 When, at the end of November, the 1st Panzer Army began to withdraw from Rostov westwards, Hitler intervened, demanding that the panzer army hold a line lying further eastwards than the army commander and Army Group South had envisaged. In the course of the dispute Hitler relieved the commander of Army Group South, Gerd von Rundstedt, of his command, replacing him with Walter von Reichenau, and subjected Brauchitsch to bitter accusations.40 However, Reichenau too was neither willing, nor indeed able, to hold the line Hitler was insisting on, which, in the end, the ‘Führer’ had to accept. At the beginning of December, he flew to the headquarters of the 1st Panzer Army, subsequently visiting Army Group South, in order to form a picture of the situation for himself on the spot, a clear demonstration of his lack of trust in the army’s commander-in-chief.41

  Back in his headquarters, on 6 December Hitler gave Halder his views of the situation. He did not regard the figure for the effective (i.e. not replaced) loss of 500,000 personnel from the eastern armies as dramatic, as he reckoned the Soviet losses were eight to ten million. He considered the fact that some of their divisions were forced to hold thirty kilometre-long sectors of the front as ‘proof of the enemy’s weakness. Thus numbers prove nothing.’ In the north of the front they must keep trying to link up with the Finns; in the south it was a matter of capturing the oil fields of Maykop. Only in the centre was he prepared to accept a shortening of the front line. Germany had no lack of soldiers but only of workers, and so Russian POWs must be increasingly employed. He did not want any reduction of the forces in the West. If the situation altered in North Africa then enough divisions must be made available for the occupation of southern France. In Norway even two or three extra panzer divisions were required, in case the British should attempt to land. They were also unable to withdraw troops from the Balkans.42

  However, Hitler had fundamentally underestimated the Red Army’s offensive capabilities. On 9 December, it managed to recapture Tichwin on the Leningrad front and, by the end of December, had driven the German troops back to the point from which they had started their offensive in October.43 On 7 December, the Red Army in the central sector launched a major offensive with over 100 divisions, forcing the German aggressors, whose forward units had come within 30 kilometres of Moscow, to retreat on a broad front.44

  Responding to the first alarming reports from the north and the centre, Halder concluded that the local commanders should be given the freedom to make their own decisions as to what territory should be given up. According to Halder, Hitler treated Brauchitsch like a ‘postman’. ‘The most awful thing, however, is that the top leadership doesn’t understand the condition our troops are in and prefers to try and simply patch things up, when major decisions are required.’45

  On 8 December Hitler issued Directive No. 39, a rather bizarre attempt to avoid having to admit the failure of the ‘Blitzkrieg’ against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, according to the directive, following the creation of an orderly defensive position, forces were to be assembled in order to return to the offensive as soon as possible.46 In the first sentence of the directive Hitler blamed the crisis on the ‘surprisingly early onset of winter in the east’, which required ‘the immediate halting of all major offensive operations and a move onto the defensive’. It is clear from further statements in Hitler’s directive that it was based on the assumption that the eastern army could withdraw to prepared defensive positions, where it would be protected from the winter and able to minimize losses. Moreover, above all, it would be in a position to withdraw the panzer and motorized divisions and ‘refurbish’ them in the rear areas in preparation for the planned offensive in the coming spring. However, as part of the ‘defensive warfare’
during the winter the following ‘special tasks’ had to be fulfilled: in the southern sector of the front Sebastapol, which was under siege, had to be taken. But, above all, the Army Group must do everything possible, during the winter, to capture the lower Don–Donetz line, thereby creating the preconditions for the ‘spring offensive towards the Caucasus’. Army Group North should link up with the Finns, thereby at long last securing the encirclement of Leningrad.

  The directive was based on a totally false perception of the situation on the eastern front. The German army in the East had used up its last reserves of energy in offensive operations and was now in retreat, in some cases abandoning its heavy weapons. During the final weeks, it had lacked the capacity to construct fortifications and so there were none to fall back on. Thus, the troops were forced to defend themselves under the most difficult winter conditions in the open or in ad hoc strongpoints that no longer formed a coherent front line. In these circumstances the idea of preparing resources during the winter for a spring offensive, let alone of mounting an offensive was completely absurd.