Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  83. PA 1938, Nos 1992, 2015, 2056, and 2075; Goebbels TB, 23 April 1939: ‘On the Führer’s orders I invite 20,000 Sudeten Germans to the Breslau Gymnasts’ Festival’.

  84. Ibid, 17 July 1938: ‘Our campaign against Prague is boring the public a bit. One can’t keep a crisis going for months on end’.

  85. See above p. 529.

  86. Goebbels TB, 30 November 1937.

  87. Adam, Judenpolitik, 174ff.

  88. For the start of Jewish persecution in annexed Austria see Botz, Nationalsozialismus, 126ff.; Longerich, Politik, 162ff.; Rosenkranz, Verfolgung, 20ff.

  89. Goebbels TB, 11 April 1938: ‘The Führer wants to force all the Jews out of Germany. To Madagascar or somewhere else’.

  90. For details on the ‘Berlin action’ see Longerich, Politik, 172ff.; see, in particular, Wolf Gruner, ‘Lesen brauchen sie nicht zu können. . . . Die “Denkschrift über die Behandlung der Juden in der Reichshauptstadt auf allen Gebieten des öffentlichen Lebens” vom Mai 1938’, in Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 4 (1995), 305–41.

  91. Goebbels TB, 23 April 1938.

  92. Ibid., 25 April (Meeting with Helldorf ), 30 April (Hitler’s approval) and 31 May 1938 (Goebbels/Helldorf ).

  93. Ibid., 2, 3, 4, and 11 June 1938.

  94. Longerich, Politik, 177; OA Moscow, 500-1-261, Minute. Head of the SD Jewish department 8 June 1938. According to this, it was stated confidentially at a meeting with Heydrich on 1 June that, in order to carry out important earth works, on the ‘Führer’s’ orders asocial and criminal Jews were to be arrested throughout the Reich.

  95. Longerich, Politik, 179f.; OA Moscow, 500-1-261, SD Jewish department to SD Higher Section South, 29 June 1938: This stopped the action. In the fair copy the words ‘on the Führer’s orders’ were replaced by ‘on orders from above’.

  96. Longerich, Politik, 182f.

  97. Goebbels TB, 25 July 1938.

  98. Longerich, ‘Davon’, 114; Goebbels TB, 9 July 1938 (on Stuttgart).

  99. Longerich, ‘Davon’, 114.

  100. Domarus, 1, 880ff.

  101. Müller, Beck, 339ff.

  102. Müller, Beck/Studien No. 49 (also the draft, 15 July 1938, No. 48).

  103. Ibid., No. 50f.

  104. Ibid., No. 52.

  105. For this interpretation (summing up) see Müller, ‘Struktur und Entwicklung der national-konservativen Opposition’, in Thomas Vogel (ed.), Aufstand des Gewissens. Militärischer Widerstand gegen Hitler und das NS-Regime 1933 bis 1945. Begleitband zur Wanderausstellung des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes (Hamburg, 2001), 334.

  106. Müller, Beck/Studien, No. 54.

  107. Müller, Beck, 351ff. (on 4 August).

  108. Engel, Heeresadjutant, 18 July 1938; Hitler also expressed negative views on the memorandum to Brauchitsch on 24 July (ibid.).

  109. Below, Adjutant, 112.

  110. IMT 28, 1780-PS, 373f.; Müller, Heer, 338; Müller, Beck, 355.

  111. Müller, Heer, 339, and Müller, Beck, 356; Below, Adjutant, 115; Anton Hoch and Hermann Weiss, ‘Die Erinnerungen des Generalobersten Wilhelm Adam’, in Benz (ed.), Miscelleanea, 54f.; If Z, ED 109/3, Adam Memoirs (about 15 August), and ED 1, Liebmann, Personal experiences during the years 1938/39; Keitel, Leben, 224.

  112. Müller, Beck, 357. For his farewell address see Hossbach, Wehrmacht, 129f.

  113. Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand – Staatsstreich – Attentat. Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich and Zurich, 1995), 109ff.; Müller, Heer, 345ff.; Müller, ‘Struktur’, 337ff.; Marion Thielenhaus, Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand: deutsche Diplomaten 1938–1941. Die politischen Aktivitäten der Beamtengruppe um Ernst von Weizsäcker im Auswärtigen Amt (Paderborn, 1984), 48ff.; Rainer A. Blasius, Für Großdeutschland – gegen den großen Krieg. Staatssekretär Ernst Freiherr von Weizsäcker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39 (Cologne and Vienna, 1981).

  114. ADAP D 2, Nos 248 and 284. On these initiatives see Hoensch, Revisionismus, 71f.

  115. ADAP D 2, No. 383 (with the quote) and No. 390. See also Helmut Krausnick et al. (eds), Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940. Mit weiteren Dokumenten zur Militäropposition gegen Hitler (Stuttgart, 1970), 108; Hoensch, Revisionismus, 76ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 593ff.

  116. Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 340ff. On the resumption of the campaign see PA 1938, Nos 2353 and 2372; VB (B), 26–30 August; MNN, 29 and 30 August; DAZ, 26–30 August.

  117. Paul Vyšný, The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia. Prelude to Munich (Houndmills, 2003).

  118. BAB, NS 10/125, 20 July 1938: ‘The Führer has ordered K. Henlein to be in Bayreuth on the 23rd at 17.00’; 23 July 1938: ‘17.00 K. Hähnlein’s [sic!] visit’. Goebbels notes Henlein’s presence in Breslau on 1 August 1938 (Goebbels TB).

  119. Groscurth, Tagebücher, 112f.; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 475; Goebbels TB, 2 and 3 September 1938; BAB, NS 10/125, 1 and 2 September 1938.

  120. ADAP D 2, No. 424. On the worsening of the Sudeten crisis in the late summer see Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 162ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 600ff.; Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 209ff.; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 497ff.

  121. Groscurth, Tagebücher, 104 and 111.

  122. Goebbels TB, 9 September 1938.

  123. PA 1938, Nos 2455–2461, 2465f. and 2468; Goebbels TB, 8 and 9 September. See, for example, the reporting of the VB (B), 8 September 1939, ‘Prager Regierung nicht mehr Herr ihrer Polizei’ (headline); 9 September, ‘Prag spielt mit dem Feuer’; see also Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 210f.; Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 350; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 478ff.

  124. Keitel, Leben, 227.

  125. ADAP D 2, No. 448.

  126. Domarus, 1, 897ff., quotes 901 and 904; Goebbels TB, 13 September 1938; Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 354ff.; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 497ff.

  127. Ibid., 493f.

  128. PA 1938, Nos 2524 and 2533; VB (B), 14 September 1938, ‘Feuerüberfälle, Morde, Standrecht’ (headline); 15 September 1938, ‘30 neue Opfer tschechischer Mordschützen’. Goebbels even contributed an aggressive leader to the main Party newspaper under a pseudonym. See VB (B), 14 September 1938, ‘Wie lange noch?’ On this climax of the crisis see Goebbels TB, 14 and 15 September 1938.

  129. Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 212f.

  130. PA 1938, Nos. 2533, 2549–2553, 2558–2562, 2569–2572, 2574f., and 2580–2584. According to Goebbels TB, 17 September 1938, these polemics were intended to continue until the start of the Godesberg meeting. See also Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 359f.

  131. Schmidt, Statist, 402.

  132. ADAP D 2, No. 487; Schmidt, Statist, 402ff.; DBFP 3/2, No. 895; Below, Adjutant, 122; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 523ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 611ff.; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 165ff.

  133. Leonidas E. Hill (ed.), Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, Part 2: 1933–1950 (Berlin, 1974), 143.

  134. Hitler told Goebbels on 17 September that the plebiscite being sought by Chamberlain ‘doesn’t quite suit us’. But if this solution was ‘being seriously proposed’ then ‘we can’t do much about it at the moment’. See TB, 18 September 1938.

  135. ADAP D 2, No. 532; later the Germans said that they would give the British delegation a copy of Schmidt’s transcript of the proceedings from memory. See ibid., No. 544.

  136. Goebbels TB, 19 September 1938.

  137. Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 540ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 618f.; ADAP D 2, No. 523; Goebbels TB, 20 September 1938.

  138. Ibid., 20 September 1938.

  139. ADAP D 2, Nos 541 and No. 554; Hoensch, Revisionismus, 88ff.

  140. Wojciechowski, Beziehungen, 472ff., on the meeting, of which there is no German record. According to this, Hitler stated that they could move to recognize frontiers and he also raised the issue of the autobahn, but said it was a project for the future. See Lipski, Diplomat, Doc. 99. ADAP D 2, No. 553 (Polish notes to the Czech and British governments).

  141. Hoensch, Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostpolitik. Hli
nkas Slowakische Volkspartei zwischen Autonomie und Separation 1938/1939 (Cologne and Graz, 1965), 87ff.

  142. DBFP 3/2, Doc. 1005; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 623f.

  143. PA 1938, Nos. 2613–2615, 2623, 2627f., and 2632.

  144. Ibid., Nos 2596 and 2606–2608; see also the reporting in the VB (B), 20–22. September.

  145. Hitler had discussed this line with Goebbels and Ribbentrop the night before. See Goebbels TB, 22 and 23 September 1938. ADAP D 2, No. 562; Rönnefahrt, Sudetenkrise, 1, 581ff.; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 169ff.; Schmidt, Statist, 407ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 624ff.

  146. On the negotiations see ADAP D 2, Nos 572ff.; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise, 1, 585ff.

  147. ADAP D 2, No. 583f.

  148. Goebbels TB, 26 September 1938.

  149. See ADAP D 2, No. 619.

  150. Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 615; Goebbels TB, 27 September 1938.

  151. Schmidt, Statist, 414ff.

  152. Goebbels TB, 26 September 1938; VB (B), 26 September 1938 on the event.

  153. Domarus, 1, 923ff., quotes 924 and 932.

  154. PA 1938, Nos 2683f. and 2686f.; DAZ (E), 27 September 1938, Commentary: ‘Der Spieler’; VB (B), 27 September 1938, ‘Wir sind entschlossen’ (headline); Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 380f.

  155. ADAP D 2, No. 634f.

  156. Goebbels TB, 28 September 1938; Schmidt, Statist, 416; Kershaw, Hitler 2, 174; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 618f.

  157. Goebbels TB, 27 September; Hoensch, Revisionismus, 89 and 99f.; Kerekes (ed.), Allianz, 37.

  158. IMT 28, 1780-PS, 388.

  159. Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin. Ein deutsches Tagebuch (Munich, 1962), 5f.; Schmidt, Statist, 417f.; William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary. The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934–1941 (New York, 1942), 114f.; on the lack of enthusiasm for war see also Sopade 1938, 913ff.; Henderson, Fehlschlag, 183; Alfred Ingemar Berndt, Der Marsch, ins Großdeutsche Reich (Munich, 1939), 222. Kershaw, Hitler-Mythos, 170, claims that after the Sudeten crisis Hitler’s popularity was threatened for the first time.

  160. Below, Adjutant, 127.

  161. Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker-Papiere, 9 October 1938 and 171. Goebbels noted significantly that the division’s march past had ‘left behind everywhere a very depressing impression’. See Goebbels TB 29 September 1938.

  162. Meldungen 2, 72; Kershaw, Hitler-Mythos, 165ff., with examples from Bavaria; Auerbach, ‘Volksstimmung’, 282.

  163. On Hitler’s change of mind see Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 628ff.; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 175f.

  164. Goebbels TB, 29 September 1938.

  165. Ibid.; PA 1938, Nos 2704 and 2706. VB (B), 28 September 1938, ‘Massenkundgebung der NSDAP im Lustgarten’ (Announcement); 29 September 1938, ‘Millionen-Kundgebungen im ganzen Reich’; FZ (M), 29 September 1938, ‘Das Treuebekenntnis zum Führer’.

  166. On the immediate pre-history see Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 623ff.; David Faber, Munich. The 1938 Appeasement Crisis (London, 2009), 391ff.

  167. Schmidt, Statist, 425f.; Henderson, Fehlschlag, 190.

  168. ADAP D 2, Nos 670 and 674f. On the Munich conference see Jürgen Zarusky and Martin Zückert (eds), Das Münchener Abkommen von 1938 in europäischer Perspektive (Munich, 2013); Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 632ff.; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise, 1, 623ff.; Boris Celovsky, Das Münchner Abkommen 1938 (Stuttgart, 1958).

  169. Sarholz, Auswirkungen, 326.

  170. Wojciechowski, Beziehungen, 502ff.

  171. Hoensch, Revisionismus, 108f.

  172. See below, p. 586.

  173. Schmidt, Statist, 425.

  174. ADAP D 5, No. 676.

  175. ADAP D 4, No. 369; for an assessment see Franz Knipping, Die deutsch–französische Erklärung vom 6. Dezember 1938’, in Klaus Hildebrand and Ferdinand Werner (eds), Deutschland – Frankreich 1936–1939. Deutsch-französisches Historikerkolloquium des Deutschen Historischen Instituts Paris (Bonn 26. bis 29. September 1979) (Munich, 1981), 523–51.

  After Munich

  1. On the delay or ultimate refusal of Germany to give the guarantee see ADAP D 4, Nos 107, 168, 175f., 178, 183, and 370.

  2. Hoensch, Slowakei, 98ff. and 210ff.

  3. On the redefining of Germany’s position on the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukraine questions see the note for Hitler of 7 October by the head of the Foreign Ministry’s political department, Woermann (ADAP D 4, No. 45). See also ibid., Nos 46 and 50. See Hoensch, Revisionismus, 128f.

  4. Wojciechowski, Beziehungen, 533; Albert S. Kotowski, ‘“Ukrainisches Piemont”? Die Karpatenukraine am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, in Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas, new series 49 (2001), 78.

  5. ADAP D 4, No. 61.

  6. Ibid., No. 62; on the two meetings see Hoensch, Revisionismus, 142ff.

  7. On Hitler’s dissatisfaction with Hungary’s policies see also ADAP D 5, Nos 252 and 272f.

  8. ADAP D 4, No. 72; Hoensch, Revisionismus, 155f. Göring had already received the Slovak minister, ĎurČanský. See ADAP D 4, No. 68.

  9. Ibid., No. 99; on the Vienna conference see also Ciano, Diary, 2 and 3 November 1938.

  10. ADAP D 4, No. 128; Kerekes (ed.), Allianz, No. 47; Hoensch, Revisionismus, 216ff.

  11. Ribbentrop, London, 154.

  12. ADAP D 5, No. 81; Lipski, Diplomat, Doc. 124; Wojciechowski, Beziehungen, 539ff.

  13. ADAP D 5, No. 101.

  14. Mario Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel (Baltimore, 1967), 5ff.

  15. Ibid., 52ff.

  16. ADAP D 4, No. 400.

  17. Ibid, No. 542; Toscano, Origins, 122ff.

  18. Ibid., 153ff. On the background see ADAP D 6, 68f. (editor’s elucidations) and No. 270.

  19. Georg Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (1918–1943/45), ed. Wolfgang Birkenfeld (Boppard am Rh., 1966), 509. This states that, according to notes by Colonel Jansen, on 29 March 1940 Thomas told the inspectors: ‘Then came Munich day. I received instructions over the telephone: “Now, make all the preparations necessary for war against England. Deadline 1942!”.’ According to this, the source was not, as Tooze puts it in Ökonomie, 338, a diary entry by Thomas.

  20. IMT 27, 1301-PS, 160ff.

  21. PA 1939, No. 2955; see also Nos 3017 and 3079. From the beginning of November the Wehrmacht propaganda office published its own journal, Die Wehrmacht (No. 3095). However, on 1 November, instructions were once again given to be cautious when dealing with military matters (No. 3106), and Wehrmacht propaganda was only begun again on a large scale in spring 1939, which is not made clear in the account by Sywottek, Mobilmachung, 166ff.

  22. On three trips in October see Domarus, 1, 949ff., 959, and 961f.

  23. IMT 34, 136-C, 477ff.

  24. Wildt, Volksgemeinschaft, 312ff.; Longerich, Politik, 190ff.

  25. OA Moskau, 500-1-316, SD situation report, Central Department II/1, 1–31 October1938.

  26. Ralph Weingarten, Die Hilfeleistung der westlichen Welt bei der Endlösung der deutschen Judenfrage. Das ‘Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees’ IGC 1938–1939 (Berne, 1981); Peter Longerich, Holocaust. The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews (Oxford, 2010), 125ff.

  27. On the background to and establishment of the Central Office see Hans Safrian, Die Eichmann-Männer (Vienna, 1993), 23ff.; Herbert Rosenkranz, Verfolgung und Selbstbehauptung. Die Juden in Österreich 1938–1945 (Vienna, 1978), 120ff.

  28. On the November pogrom 1938 see Dieter Obst, ‘Reichskristallnacht’ Ursachen und Verlauf des antisemitischen Pogroms vom November 1938 (Frankfurt a. M., 1991); Hans-Jürgen Döscher, ‘Reichskristallnacht’. Die Novemberpogrome 1938 (Frankfurt a. M., 1988); on the background see in more detail: Longerich, Politik, 190ff. Most recently, Alan E. Steinweis, Kristallnacht 1938. Ein deutscher Pogrom (Stuttgart, 2011).

  29. PA 1938, No. 3167 on the assassination, Nos 3176, 3178–3181, and 3184–3186.

  30. On the events in Kurhessen see Obst, ‘Reichskristallnacht’, 67ff.; Wolf-Arno Kropat, Kristallnacht in Hessen. Der J
udenpogrom vom November 1938. Eine Dokumentation (Wiesbaden, 1998), 21ff. On Goebbels’s role during the progrom see Longerich, Goebbels, 293ff.

  31. Goebbels TB, 9 November 1938.

  32. Kropat, Kristallnacht, 66ff. and 79ff.; for further details see Steinweis, Kristallnacht, 35ff.

  33. According to Below, Adjutant, 136, Hitler received the news in the afternoon in his flat. This is confirmed by Dietrich (Jahre, 55f.), though he was not present. According to Gauleiter Jordan, Erlebt, 180, the Party functionaries were already aware of the news before the event took place. Goebbels (TB, 10 November 1938) received the news in the afternoon.

  34. Ibid.

  35. Obst, ‘Reichskristallnacht’, 101ff.; Steinweis, Kristallnacht, 62ff.

  36. IMT 25, 374-PS, 376ff.; Goebbels TB, 10 November 1938.

  37. On these arrests see Harry Stein, ‘Das Sonderlager im Konzentrationslager Buchenwald nach den Pogromen 1938’, in Monica Kingreen (ed.), ‘Nach der Kristallnacht’. Jüdisches leben und anti-Jüdische Politik in Frankfurt am Main 1938–1945 (Frankfurt a. M., 1999), 19–54; Barbara Distel, ‘“Die letzte ernste Warnung vor der Vernichtung”. Zur Verschleppung der “Aktionsjuden” in die Konzentrationslager nach dem 9. November 1938’, in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 46 (1998), 985–990; Wolfgang Benz, ‘Mitglieder der Häftlingsgesellschaft auf Zeit: die “Aktionsjuden” 1938/39’, in Dachauer Hefte 21 (2005), 179–196.; Heiko Pollmeier, ‘Inhaftierung und Lagererfahrung deutscher Juden im November 1938’, in Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 8 (1999), 107–30; Obst, ‘Reichskristallnacht’, 279ff.; Steinweis, Kristallnacht, 111ff., on the fate of those imprisoned.

  38. BAB, NS 36/13, published in Peter Longerich (ed.), Die Ermordung der europäischen Juden. Eine umfassende Dokumentation des Holocaust 1941–1945 (Munich, 1989), 43ff.

  39. In Buchenwald alone 227 of the prisoners died in the first six weeks after their incarceration; in all the camps taken together it is estimated to have been around 400. See Stein, ‘Sonderlager’, 46f.

  40. Angela Hermann, ‘Hitler und sein Stoßtrupp in der “Reichskristallnacht” ’, in VfZ 56 (2008), 603–19.

  41. VB (M), 10 November, ‘Der Führer bei seinen SS-Männern’.