Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  29. PA 1939, Nos 1275, 1343, and 1383. The campaign reached an initial climax with two Goebbels articles in the VB against the allegedly anti-German tendencies in Poland; in a statement aimed at the rest of the press the propaganda ministry referred to a ‘warning shot’. See the VB [B], 5 May 1939, ‘Quo Vadis, Polonia?’, and 13 May 1939, ‘Bajonette als Wegweiser’; PA 1939, No. 1458.

  30. Goebbels TB, 2 May 1939.

  31. PA 1939, Nos 1338, 1343, and 1363. On the provisional attitude of reserve see also Goebbels TB, 7 May 1939.

  32. PA 1939, Nos 1362, 1378, 1380, 1566, and 1862; extensive material on the ‘attempt to make the Wehrmacht popular’ in Sywottek, Mobilmachung, 166.

  33. Domarus, 2 1189f.; see the continuous reporting in the VB from 16 to 19 May 1939, which, as was the case with the rest of the press and despite all its efforts, was criticized as inadequate by the propaganda ministry.

  34. ADAP D 6, Nos 377 and 385. This was launched by a Goebbels leader in the VB (B), 20 May 1939, ‘Die Einkreiser’.

  35. ADAP D 6, Nos 78 and 131.

  36. Schulthess’ 1939, 338f. and 424f.

  37. On the Anglo-Turkish solidarity pact see ibid., 353; DBFP 3/5, No. 506. See also ADAP D 6, No. 413.

  38. On German–Italian relations since early 1939 see Graml, Weg, 216ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 714ff.

  39. Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Umsiedlung Südtirol 1939–1940, 2 vols (Vienna, 1985); Leopold Steurer, Südtirol zwischen Rom und Berlin 1919–1939 (Vienna, Munich, and Zurich, 1980).

  40. Toscano, Origins, 153ff.; Ciano, Diary, 3, 6, and 8 March 1938.

  41. ADAP D 4, Nos 543, 547, 549, and 555; on the increasingly controversial response to the project in Japan see the reports of the German embassy in Tokyo in April and May 1939 (ADAP D 6, Nos 254, 266, 275, 298, 306, 322, 326, 339, 344, and 363); on the decision-making process in the Japanese cabinet see ibid., Nos 400, 410, and 427. In the end the Germans failed to receive any news about a Japanese decision, which Ribbentrop complained about via the German embassy in Tokyo (ibid., No. 447). Toscano, Origins, 105.

  42. Ibid., 307ff.

  43. ADAP D 6, Nos 52 and 205.

  44. Ibid., No. 341; see also ibid., 367ff. Mussolini had told Ciano before the negotiations that Italy still needed three more years of peace. See Toscano, Origins, 289f. On the further course of the negotiations see ADAP D 6, Nos 369–71 and 386; Schmidt, Statist, 445.

  45. ADAP D 6, No. 426.

  46. Ciano, Diary, 21–23 May 1939.

  47. ADAP D 6, No. 459.

  48. See the documents in ibid., Appendix, 929ff., among them, in particular, I, III, VI, IX, und XII.

  49. Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 738ff.; Graml, Weg, 221ff.

  50. Peter Klefisch, Das Dritte Reich und Belgien 1933–1939 (Frankfurt a. M., 1998), 247ff.; ADAP D 5, No. 475.

  51. ADAP D 6, No. 461.

  52. Ibid., No. 485; Treaties: RGBl. 1939 II, 945f. and 947f.

  53. Schulthess’ 1939, 130.

  54. Johann Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch–jugoslawischen Beziehungen von 1933 bis 1945 (Stuttgart, 1969), 121ff. On the German attempts to persuade Yugoslavia to quit the League of Nations see ADAP D 6, Nos 474, 534, 637, 675, 720, 733, and 745.

  55. Ibid., Nos 578 and 712.

  56. Ibid., No. 784.

  57. Ibid., No. 433; see Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 256ff.

  58. See above p. 592.

  59. Tooze, Ökonomie, 363ff.

  60. BAF, RH 15/151, 7 February 1939 includes another version from 8 February. According to Bernhard R. Kroener, Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm. ‘Der starke Mann im Heimatkriegsgebiet’. Eine Biographie (Paderborn, 2005), 318, this report was sent to Hitler on 10 February 1939.

  61. BAF, RH 15/151; Kroener, Fromm, 319.

  62. BAF, RH 15/152.

  63. Ibid., Brauchitsch to Keitel, 19 June 1939.

  64. IMT 36, 28-EC, S. 112ff.; Tooze, Ökonomie, 362f., refers to this address, which starkly outlined the weaknesses in German armaments production in 1939.

  65. On the military preparations in Britain see Marian Zgórniak, Europa am Abgrund – 1938 (Münster, Hamburg, and London, 2002), 235ff.

  66. Tooze, Ökonomie, 365f. (on the basis of German documents in the Imperial War Museum, London).

  67. Ibid, 367ff.; Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, ‘Durch das “strategische Fenster” in den zweiten Weltkrieg. Die Motive Hitlers’, in Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, and Rainer Zitelmann (eds), Die Schatten der Vergangenheit. Impulse zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt a. M., 1990), esp. 367f.

  68. PA 1939, Nos 1819, 1922, 1951, 1960, 1993, and 2015.

  69. Domarus, 2, 1204.

  70. Ibid., 1205ff., quotes 1207f.; PA 1939, No. 1731.

  71. Domarus, 2, 1209ff., quote 1211.

  72. Ibid., 1212f.; Below, Adjutant, 168f.

  73. DBFP 3/6, No. 136.

  74. Domarus, 2, 1215.

  75. Goebbels TB, 5 July 1939.

  76. Leaders in the VB, 20 May 1939, ‘Die Einkreiser’; 27 May 1939, ‘Nochmals: Die Einkreiser’; 3 June 1939, ‘Klassenkampf der Völker?’; 19 June 1939, ‘Erkläre mir, Graf Oerindur . . .’; 24 June 1939, ‘Die abgehackten Kinderhände’; 30 June 1939, ‘Das schreckliche Wort von der Einkreisung’. Speeches: VB (B), 22 June 1939, ‘Die Sonnwendfeier des Gaues Berlin’ (headline); 24 June 1939, ‘Dr. Goebbels sprach vor Berliner Arbeitern’; on the Goebbels speech at the Essen Gau Day on 25 June see the report in Der Angriff of 26 June 1939. The propaganda ministry had instructed the press to give prominence to the Danzig speech. It was a ‘sounding balloon intended to test the international atmosphere for the settlement of the Danzig question etc.’. See PA 1939, No. 1890; VB (B), 19 June 1939, ‘Danzig – Pflegestätte unserer Kultur’.

  77. On the campaign see PA 1939, Nos 1975, 2060, 2101, 2182, 2200, 2254, and 2379. Sywottek, Mobilmachung, 180ff. on the main propaganda topics (Living space) 199ff. (Encirclement) and 186ff. (War guilt).

  78. Goebbels TB, 5 and 9 July 1939.

  79. VB (B), 14 July 1939, ‘So sieht Englands Propaganda aus’; Goebbels TB, 5, 8, 9, and 12–14 July 1939; PA 1939, Nos 2237, 2296, 2310, also No. 2346. See VB (B), 19 July 1939, ‘Neue Enthüllungen über King-Hall’ (headline).

  80. Domarus, 2, 1219f.

  81. Goebbels TB, 23 and 25–28 July 1939. See also Speer, Erinnerungen, 165, who stated that Hitler sent the Goebbelses back to Berlin.

  82. On the customs conflict see Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission 1937–1939 (Munich, 1960), 336ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 730.

  83. ADAP D 6, Nos 774 and 780.

  84. PA 1939, Nos 2659, 2661, 2681, 2695, and 2707.

  85. In its official reply of 10 August 1939 the Polish government pointed out that there was no legal basis whatsoever for Germany’s interference in Danzig’s affairs. See ADAP D 7, No. 10. ADAP D 6, No. 785, concerning Forster’s stay at the Berghof from 7 to 9 August 1939.

  86. Domarus, 2, 1222.

  87. VB, 11 August 1939, ‘Der historische Protest’.

  88. Burckhardt, Mission, 339ff.

  89. This passage is missing from DFBP 3/6, No. 669, and is only in Burckhardt’s memoirs (Mission, 348).

  90. ADAP D 7, No. 43; see also Schmidt, Statist, 447; on Ciano’s meeting with Ribbentrop see Ciano, Diary, 11 August 1939; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 741ff.

  91. ADAP D 7, No. 47. Both meetings took place in Ribbentrop’s presence. On the stay in Berchtesgaden see also Ciano, Diary, 10–13 August 1939.

  92. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 3 vols (Stuttgart, 1962–64) (KTB), 1, 14 August 1939.

  93. See below pp. 664ff.

  94. Domarus, 2, 1229.

  95. Goebbels TB, 12 and 16 August 1939; PA 1939, Nos 2709, 2745, 2757, 2774, 2789, 2794, and 2810.

  96. Ibid., Nos 2836 and 2843. See also the reports in the VB and the DAZ during these days, which, from 16 August onwards, were
dominated by propaganda.

  97. Goebbels TB, 20 August 1939.

  98. See PA 1939, Nos 2871, 2888, 2921, 2923, 2976, 2986, and 3006.

  99. ADAP D 7, No. 119, The passing on of a report by Veesenmayer, according to which Forster intended to increase his demands to such an extent that the Poles would be unable to accept them. On the approval of the foreign ministry see ibid., No. 139. On the further course of the negotiations see ibid., Nos 188, 197, and 232.

  100. On the appointment see ibid., No. 224.

  101. Ibid., Nos 176 and 244. The military plans did not, however, at this stage envisage an attack on the Westerplatte. See Bertil Stjernfelt and Klaus-Richard Böhme, Westerplatte 1939 (Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1979), 68ff.

  102. ADAP D 6, No. 1. In a speech on 10 March Stalin had commented on reports in the Western press about alleged German plans to take over the Ukraine and had gone on to attack the western powers; the Soviet Union would be careful not ‘to be drawn into conflicts by those who wanted to provoke war and who were used to getting others to pull their chestnuts out of the fire’. After the war Ribbentrop, London, 171, maintained that this speech had prompted his change of stance towards the Soviet Union. However, according to Gustav Hilger, a member of the German embassy in Moscow, who was summoned to Hitler on 10 May 1939 to give his views on Soviet policy, at this point neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop were aware of Stalin’s speech. See Hilger, Wir und der Kreml. Deutsch-Sowjetische Beziehungen 1918–1941. Erinnerungen eines deutschen Diplomaten (Frankfurt a. M. and Berlin, 1955), 280; 274ff. on the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Reich in general. Hitler referred later to Stalin’s ‘chestnuts’ comment. See p. 630.

  103. On these signals see Graml, Weg, 253ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 718ff. This can be followed in detail in the following German documents: ADAP D 6, Nos 215, 332, 406, 424, and 478.

  104. Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 719ff.; Geoffrey Roberts, The Unholy Alliance. Stalin’s Pact with Hitler (London, 1989), 118ff.

  105. ADAP D 6, Nos 441f.; Graml, Weg, 258ff.

  106. ADAP D 6, Nos 446 and 451f.; Graml, Weg, 261f.

  107. For details see ibid., 265ff.

  108. ADAP D 6, Nos 583, 588, 628, and 700. Goebbels TB, 9 July 1939: Hitler ‘no longer believes that London and Moscow will reach agreement. Then the path will be clear for us.’

  109. ADAP D 6, No. 729.

  110. Ibid., Nos 758 and 760; Graml, Weg, 269ff.

  111. ADAP D 7,/ No. 50.

  112. Ibid., No. 56.

  113. Roberts, Alliance, 141.

  114. ADAP D 7, No. 70.

  115. Ibid., No. 75.

  116. Ibid., No. 105.

  117. Ibid., No. 113.

  118. Ibid., No. 131.

  119. Ibid., Nos 125 and 132.

  120. Referred to in ibid., No. 142.

  121. Ibid., No. 142.

  122. According to Peter Herde, Italien, Deutschland und der Weg in den Krieg im Pazifik 1941 (Wiesbaden, 1983), 12, in the Japanese view the treaty, a breach of the appendix to the Anti-Comintern Pact, represented the ‘nadir’ in their mutual relations. Foreign Minister Ciano told the German Finance Minister, Schwerin-Krosigk on 23 August that, unlike Hitler, he did not believe that the pact would prevent the western powers from going to war. See ADAP D 7, No. 227.

  123. Domarus, 2, 1233; also: PA 1939, Nos 2861ff. and 2870.

  124. Winfried Baumgart, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung’, in VfZ 19 (1971), 120–49.

  125. So far the following sources have emerged: 1. Two unsigned transcriptions from the files of the OKW, which Winfried Baumgart with some justification has attributed to Admiral Canaris (798-PS and 1014-PS, both in IMT 26, 338ff. and 523ff.); 2. A record by Chief of the General Staff, Halder, in note form that closely matches document 1 (Halder, KTB, 1, 22 August 1939); 3. an account by Admiral Boehm, which he placed at the disposal of the defence in the Nuremberg Trial and which does not contain the much tougher statements in documents 1 and 2. At the beginning of the 1970s Boehm disputed the authenticity of the other two documents in these crucial points, IMT 41, 16ff.; Hermann Böhm, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939’, in VfZ 19 (1971), 294–300, and Baumgart’s ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939. Erwiderung’, in VfZ 19 (1971), 301–4; 4. A report by General Liebmann (published in Baumgart, ‘Ansprache’, 141–8, also If Z ED 1, Persönliche Erlebnisse); 5. A relatively brief account by Admiral Albrecht (published in Baumgart, ‘Ansprache’, 148f.); 6. A record by an unknown author that was leaked to Louis Lochner in 1939. This document contains the most aggressive statements, including Hitler’s announcement that after Stalin’s death he would move against the Soviet Union. In view of the uncertainty of its authorship and provenance this document is problematic (ADAP D 7, 171f.); 7. A record by the person who kept the official diary of the OKW, Greiner. It is not however, based on his own notes but essentially on document 1, Percy Ernst Schramm (ed.), Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), 4 vols. (Frankfurt a. M., 1961–65) (KTB, OKW, 1, 947); 8. A brief and relatively superficial report by Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant (Below, Adjutant, 180f.); 9. Notes by the Abwehr officer, Groscurth, concerning a conversation with Canaris, in which the latter reported details of the speech (Groscurth, Tagebücher, 179f.), a diary entry that supports Baumgart’s claim for Canaris’s authorship. The following account is based largely on versions 1 and 2. Important additions from other sources will be duly noted.

  126. On his intention to attack Poland see the Liebmann version; on the decision taken early that year see the Albrecht version.

  127. Albrecht version: ‘Germany’s favourable situation, which compels us to embark on this conflict now, since it will happen sooner or later anyway.’

  128. Liebmann: ‘The German people will have to get used to fighting, and the Polish campaign will be good practice.’

  129. On the assumption that the western powers would not intervene see Liebmann (Baumgart, ‘Ansprache’, 146) and Albrecht (ibid., 148).

  130. Liebmann (Baumgart, ‘Ansprache’, 146) and Albrecht (ibid., 148).

  131. IMT 26, 798-PS, 338ff.

  132. Liebmann: ‘that at the last moment some guy will put a spanner in the works by offering to mediate’ (Baumgart, ‘Ansprache’, 146). After the speech Hitler told his Army adjutant, Engel, that the only thing he was afraid of was that ‘some bleeding heart could ruin it all by coming up with a whole lot of wimpish proposals’. See Engel, Heeresadjutant, 22 August 1939.

  133. Halder: ‘Goal: Destruction of Poland – Removal of its vital strength’ Albrecht only: ‘Offensive, ruthless form of attack, Persecution’. Engel, Heeresadjutant, 22 August: After the speech Hitler had declared himself convinced ‘England and France were only bluffing’. According to the memoirs of Below (Adjutant, 177f.), the Wehrmacht was already preparing for the start of the war from 12 August onwards.

  134. Halder, KTB, 1, 23 August, on a meeting with Keitel, the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, and the Chief of Staff of the Navy: ‘Y=26.8. (Saturday) final decision – No more orders – X-Hour: 4.30 am?? – 4.15 am??.’

  135. See Liebmann’s report (Baumgart, ‘Ansprache’, 146).

  136. Hitler-Bild, 107ff.; Schmidt, Statist, 449f.; Below, Adjutant, 182ff., on Hitler’s response to the signing of the treaty.

  137. Ribbentrop, London, 178ff.

  138. ADAP D 7, Nos 205 and 210.

  139. Ibid., No. 228f.

  140. Ibid., Nos 200f.; DBFP 3/7, Nos 178 and 200.

  141. Weizsäcker records Hitler’s contradictory attitude during these days in his memoirs (Erinnerungen, 254).

  142. Goebbels TB, 24 August 1939.

  143. Domarus, 2, 1253.

  144. Ribbentrop, London, 186.

  145. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 254; Hitler-Bild, 118.

  146. ADAP D 7, No. 266.

  147. Ibid., No. 2
65; DBFP 3/7, No. 283f.; Henderson, Fehlschlag, 298ff.; Schmidt, Statist, 458f.

  148. Goebbels TB, 26 August 1939.

  149. ADAP D 7, 237, Editor’s note concerning the meeting on 25 August. See Robert Coulondre, Von Moskau nach Berlin 1936–1939 Erinnerungen des französischen Botschafters (Bonn, 1950), 422f.; Schmidt, Statist, 459ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 768f.

  150. Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker-Papiere, 25 August 1939; Halder, KTB, 1, 26 August 1939.

  151. ADAP D 7, Nr. 271; Schmidt, Statist, 461f.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 770ff.

  152. Hitler appeared ‘very affected’ by the bad news (Ribbentrop, London, 187), ‘extremely disappointed and disgruntled’ (Schmidt, Statist, 461f ), ‘rather downcast’ (Halder, KTB, 1, 26 August 1939). Goebbels TB, 26 August 1939: ‘The Führer ponders and muses. It’s a serious blow for him’. Engel, Heeresadjutant, 25 August 1939: ‘Führer was at first depressed. One could see that he was rather at a loss’.

  153. According to Halder, KTB, 1, the treaty was signed at 17.00 (25 August 1939) and was made public at 16.30 (28 August 1939).

  154. Ibid., 25 August 1939.

  155. For troop reinforcements see Graml, Weg, 292; If Z, F 34/1, Vormann, 11f.; Halder, KTB, 1, 27–31 August 1939; Engel, Heeresadjutant, 26 August 1939.

  156. Halder, KTB, 1, 26 August 1939.

  157. ADAP D 7, No. 277.

  158. Ibid., No. 301.

  159. Ibid., No. 307; Ciano, Diary, 25 August 1939: Ambassador Mackensen had asked him to make the list as comprehensive as possible in order to have a moderating effect on his government. On the formulation of the reply see ibid., 26 August 1939.

  160. ADAP D 7, Nos 317 and 320.

  161. Birger Dahlerus, Der letzte Versuch London-Berlin, Sommer 1939 (Munich, 1948), 19ff.

  162. Ibid., 51ff.

  163. Halder, KTB, 1, 26 August 1939.

  164. ADAP D 7, No. 324.

  165. Goebbels TB, 27 August 1939, also 28 August 1939 concerning the letter.

  166. ADAP D 7, No. 324, also note on 277 re: confidentiality, and No. 354.

  167. Halder, KTB, 1, 28 August, notes for Hitler’s address to the deputies; the content is consistent with the statements in Groscurth, Tagebücher, 190, and Hill, (ed.), Weizsäcker-Papiere, 28 August 1939. See Domarus, 2, 1276f.