by Peter Yule
[5 July 2006]
Paul-E P ˚alsson, President of Kockums 1987–91 [18 November
2006]
Olle Person, diesel engine consultant, Kockums and Hedemora
[13 November 2006]
Forbes Peters (Commander RAN), submariner; engineer; navy
supervisor of Waller refit [31 March 2006]
Bob Phillips, scientist, DSTO
John Prescott, Managing Director of BHP; co-author of
McIntosh-Prescott Report; Chairman of ASC [12 April 2006]
Robert Ray, Minister for Defence 1990–96
Peter Reith, Minister for Defence 2000–01
Dick Riddell (Rear Admiral USN), submariner; chief US naval
research and development adviser to allied navies
Simon Ridgway, engineer, ASC [31 March 2006]
Chris Ritchie (Vice Admiral RAN), Chief of Navy 2002–05
John Ritter, scientist, DSTO [21 March 2006]
Juergen Ritterhoff (Professor), head of IKL design team
[22 November 2006]
Terry Roach (Commodore RAN), submariner; leading
submarine policy maker [17 May 2006]
Trevor Robertson (Commander RAN), first CO of HMAS
Collins [8 February 2007]
Mick Roche, head of DMO 1999–2004
Geoff Rose (Commodore RAN), submariner; third Project
Director 1993–97 [20 August 2006]
L I S T O F K E Y P E O P L E
xiii
Bill Rourke (Rear Admiral RAN), Chief of Naval Materiel; early
advocate of building in Australia [2 March 2006]
Jeff Rubython, executive, Wormald and ASC
Hans Saeger, headed HDW bid [22 November 2006]
Alan Saunders, ASC engineer, ex-Cockatoo Island
Kevin Scarce (Rear Admiral RAN), DMO division head for
naval project & support [30 March 2006]
Bill Schofield, DSTO scientist, head of aeronautical and
maritime research laboratories
David Shackleton (Vice Admiral RAN), Chief of Navy
1999–2002 [17 May 2006]
Rick Shalders (Commodore RAN), head of submarine squadron
[8 August 2006]
David Simcoe, DMO naval engineer [19 June 2007]
Peter Sinclair (Captain RAN), CO of HMAS Collins during sea
trials [16 June 2006]
Tony Smith (Commander RAN), submariner; worked for ASC,
Boeing and Raytheon [1 February 2006]
Keith Snell, consultant involved at many times during project;
principal SMA [27 July 2006]
Roger Sprimont, Swedish submariner; head of Kockums’ bid;
chairman, ASC 1987–89 [10 November 2006]
Karl Bertil Stein, combat system and weapons engineer,
Kockums [20 November 2006]
Pelle Stenberg, Swedish submariner; executive, Kockums
[16 November 2006]
Greg Stuart, project senior platform engineer [21 August 2006]
Tore Svensson, design engineer, Kockums [17 November 2006]
Ebbe Sylven, Swedish submariner; Swedish representative on
Australia-Sweden government steering committee
[14 November 2006]
John Taylor, welding engineer, ASC
Rod Taylor (Vice Admiral RAN), Chief of Naval Staff 1994–97
Jock Thornton, ASC engineer; ex-RN submariner
Ted Vanderhoek, software specialist with SWSC and submarine
project [16 August 2006]
Patrick Walters, national security correspondent for major
metropolitan dailies [7 August 2006]
Graham White (Captain RAN), first Project Director 1982–85
[5 August 2005; 6 August 2006]
xiv
L I S T O F K E Y P E O P L E
Hugh White, staff member to Defence Minister Kim Beazley;
Deputy Secretary under Defence Minister John Moore
[27 March 2006]
John White, ran campaign to build in Australia and the
unsuccessful HDW bid [20 March 2006]
Don Williams, Managing Director, ASC 1988–93
Jim Williams, head of research, BHP Wollongong
David Wyllie, DSTO scientist; chief of the Maritime Platforms
Division in 1998 [5 May 2006]
Sandy Woodward (Vice Admiral RN), Falklands War
commander and Flag Officer Submarines
Alan Wrigley, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defence
1979–85; queried basis for submarine project;
Director-General of ASIO 1985–88 [15 November 2006]
Charles Yandell, production manager, ASC; ex-Cockatoo Island
John Young, Chairman of the Management Board, Atlas
Elektronik [31 January 2006]
L I S T O F A C R O N Y M S
ACTU
Australian Council of Trade Unions
AMS
Australian Marine Systems Pty Ltd
ASC
Australian Submarine Corporation Pty Ltd
CBI
Chicago Bridge and Iron Inc.
CSA
Computer Sciences of Australia
CSC
Computer Sciences Corporation
DAO
Defence Acquisition Organisation
DMO
Defence Materiel Organisation
DSTO
Defence Science and Technology Organisation
FMV
F örsvarets Materielverk (Swedish Defence Materiel
Administration)
HDW
Howaltswerke Deutsche Werft
IKL
Ingenieur Kontor L übeck
MTU
Motoren und Turbine Union Friedrichshafen GmbH
RAN
Royal Australian Navy
RN
Royal Navy
SMA
Scientific Management Associates
SMCT
Submarine Capability Team
SSPA
SSPA Maritime Consulting AB, G öteborg, Sweden
SWSC
Submarine Warfare Systems Centre
USN
United States Navy
xv
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The construction of the Collins class submarines was Australia’s
largest, most expensive and most controversial military purchase.1
The project had its origins in the late 1970s and the last subma-
rine was delivered to the navy in 2003. During that period it was
subjected to an unprecedented level of media scrutiny and criti-
cism, became highly politicised and on several occasions faced the
prospect of being abandoned.
The general public perception of the submarine project is that
it was a hugely expensive failure and that the submarines are
noisy ‘dud subs’. These views are not shared by those who were
involved in designing, building or operating the submarines, or
by the navy leadership and military analysts who see the project
as an extraordinary industrial achievement and the submarines as
potent weapons and among the best of conventional submarines.
There is much that is unique about the Collins submarine
project. It was the first class of major warship designed specifically
for Australian requirements – earlier classes were either bought
from overseas or built to plans developed for other navies. Aus-
tralian industry was more heavily involved than with any other
modern military purchase. It was the largest electronics systems
integration project ever undertaken in Australia. The lengthy list
has led advocates for the project to compare it with the Snowy
Mountains Scheme for its ‘nation-building’ significance.
No
netheless the project encountered serious difficulties, and
for many different reasons these were not managed well. Even
with the benefit of hindsight there is passionate disagreement on
what went wrong, why it went wrong and what should have been
done. The only agreement among those involved in the project is
that the final result is a fleet of excellent submarines.
I was approached by Cambridge University Press to write this
book, principally, I think, because I was the only person they
xvii
xviii
I N T R O D U C T I O N
could find with no preconceptions of the submarine project. This
was accompanied by an absence of knowledge: I approached the
project as a blank canvas, to be filled in by talking to as many
of the protagonists as possible along with surveying the massive
quantity of documents generated during the project. My training
is in history and I have attempted to carry out the research and
analyse the evidence using the methods of a historian, although
historians are not trained to deal with the strong emotions still
felt about the project by many of those involved.
The aim of the book is simply to tell the story of the submarine
project from its origins to about 2005. It is an extraordinary story
with heroes and villains, intrigue, lies, spies and backstabbing. It is
also a story of enormous commitment and resolve to achieve what
many thought was impossible. There are lessons to be learnt from
the story, but they are for the readers to discover for themselves
rather than the authors to prescribe, and different people will see
different lessons.
The book deliberately avoids military jargon, ‘techno-speak’
and the universal euphemisms of military folk – where weapons
are called capabilities, assets, deterrents or systems, wars are con-
flicts or contingencies, and all military activities, however aggres-
sive in intent, come under the umbrella term ‘defence’. We have
also avoided the military’s compulsive tendency to over-use cap-
ital letters and acronyms. The style of the book will be foreign
for those of service background or military enthusiasts, but is
designed to make the story accessible to those confounded by sen-
tences like, ‘Raytheon has received a NAVAIR contract to further
develop the JSOW AGM-154C1 (formerly JSOW Block III)’. Nor
will the reader find such grandiloquent creatures as CINCPACFLT
or COMNAVSEASYSCOM. Both are (apparently) familiar
figures to modern sailors, though Nelson must be shuddering in
his grave.
This book is not an analysis of what has been written about
the project by journalists and academics and has generally avoided
using secondary sources. It is based on over 130 interviews with
people involved in almost every aspect of the project, and the doc-
uments, minutes, letters and diaries generated during the course of
the project. These include the major evaluation studies of industry
proposals, the Tender Evaluation Board Report and the Subma-
rine Evaluation Team Report, the minutes of the Force Structure
I N T R O D U C T I O N
xix
Committee and the Chief of Naval Staff Advisory Committee, the
Project Quarterly Progress Reports, the Vickers Cockatoo Island
Dockyard Report on the construction of submarines in Australia
and many other reports on the strategic and technical justifications
for the project, and departmental files on specific issues.
My task was made possible by the advice and guidance of my
co-author, Derek Woolner, a military analyst long exposed to the
ways of the Canberra bureaucracy. Derek carried out the docu-
mentary research in Canberra, wrote chapters 7–10, 15 and 20,
contributed sections for several other chapters and helped in many
other ways. Admirals Peter Briggs and Boyd Robinson provided
constant help and opened many doors, without in any way deter-
mining the conclusions reached. The staff of the submarine branch
of the Defence Materiel Organisation assisted in many ways and
Colin Cooper deserves special thanks for maximising the authors’
use of the official record by his management of the security restric-
tions of classified documents.
Many people have read portions of the draft and the authors
thank them all for their helpful comments. We owe special thanks
for advice and encouragement to John Jeremy, Ron Dicker, Andy
Millar, Jim Duncan, Olle Holmdahl, Oscar Hughes, Graham
White, Greg Stuart and Hans Ohff. My visit to Sweden and
Germany in November 2006 was made possible by Roger
Sprimont, who arranged my interview program and helped greatly
in many ways. I received welcome help and hospitality from Pelle
Stenberg, Ulf Edman, P ˚ar Bunke, Hans Peder Loid, Karl Bertil
Stein, Kurt Blixt, Ebbe Sylven, Tomy Hjorth, Paul-E P ˚alsson, Olle
Person, G östa Hardebring, Roine Carlsson, Carl-Johan Åberg,
Hans Saeger and Juergen Ritterhoff. The staff of Kockums went
out of their way to assist me and Gunnar Öhlund, Tore Svensson
and Bo Benell provided me with much useful information. Simi-
larly, ASC Pty Ltd (formerly the Australian Submarine Corpora-
tion) gave me every assistance and I am grateful to Jayne Correll
for organising interviews with ASC staff.
Geoff Hook and Peter Nicholson have kindly given permission
to reproduce their cartoons, which encapsulate some of the more
acrimonious debates and controversial aspects of the submarine
saga. The following individuals and organisations have generously
allowed us to use their photographs to illustrate significant stages
of the project and some of the key people involved: Peter Sinclair;
xx
I N T R O D U C T I O N
the Royal Australian Navy; ASC Pty Ltd; Defence Science and
Technology Organisation, Department of Defence; Force Element
Group, Department of Defence.
Of the thousands of people involved in designing, building
and operating the Collins class submarines, no two people fully
agree on the ‘real story’ of the submarine project. Similarly few
people will agree with all details in the book, and many will be
angered by some of the conclusions reached. While the authors
accept responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation, the
lack of agreement on many issues remains one of the key features
of the Collins submarine project, with the noise of the disputes
still overshadowing the scale of the achievement.
Peter Yule
P A R T 1
Y O U C A N ’ T B U I L D
S U B M A R I N E S
I N A U S T R A L I A
C H A P T E R 1
‘The one class of vessel that it is
impossible to build in Australia’:
Australia’s early submarines
T H E N E W S U B M A R I N E S :
A R E T H E R E FATA L D E F E C T S ?
This headline appeared in the Melbourne Age, not in the 1990s,
but on 12 July 1928. It referred not to the Australian-built Collins
class submarines, but to
the British built O class. In 1925 two of
these submarines were ordered for the Royal Australian Navy
from Vickers’ shipyard at Barrow in the north-west of England.
Delivery was 12 months late due to industrial problems and short-
ages of skilled workers, but the worst problems were not seen until
the submarines, Oxley and Otway, had entered the Mediterranean Sea on their way to Australia. Cracks and fractures were found in
the diesel engines of both boats, and they were stranded in Malta
for eight months.
Inevitably the delay and cost led to debate in Australia. The
government and the navy were accused of buying an experimental
design that had not been properly tested and of hiding the truth ‘in
a fog of mystery’.1 Official responses were vague and misleading
and, failing to quell public concerns, led to ever more extreme
claims about the boats’ failings.2 The lack of open and public
3
4
T H E C O L L I N S C L A S S S U B M A R I N E S T O R Y
discussion led to a general belief that the faults were far worse than
they really were. Further, the debate was deliberately fanned by
leading figures in the navy and the government who were opposed
to having submarines at all.
Submarines have long been controversial in Australia. From
the earliest days of the navy the same topics have been debated.
Should the navy have submarines? If so, should they be built in
Australia or overseas? Does Australia have the ability to build
submarines? What are the most suitable submarines? Will they
prove too expensive? Will they perform as intended? The debates
have been more bitter and prolonged with the Collins class than
with any other, but most of the issues raised in the controversies
over Collins have familiar resonances over the century since Alfred
Deakin first proposed submarines for the Australian navy.
In April 1904 Admiral Sir John Fisher, the architect of British
naval policy before the First World War, described an incident he
observed during British naval exercises off Portsmouth:
Here . . . is the battleship Empress of India engaged in
manoeuvres and knowing of the proximity of Submarines, . . .
so self-confident of safety and so oblivious of the possibilities
of modern warfare that the Admiral is smoking his cigarette,
the Captain is calmly seeing defaulters down on the
half-deck, no one caring an iota of what is going on, and
