Tug of War

by Shelfold Bidwell

  He took steps to establish his command post ashore, not wishing to be shanghaied again, and made fresh dispositions to meet the threat of attack. General Walker was ordered to relieve the battalion from the 45th Division on the La Cosa stream and replace the two battalions in Persano with one of his own so as to free the 179th RCT to join the 157th north of the river, thus concentrating General Middleton’s two formations. To Middleton’s left an engineer battalion acting as infantry was posted to hold Bivio Cioffi, so as to meet a second request from McCreery to move the inter-corps boundary north in his favour. General Walker now had a front of fourteen miles to cover with seven battalions, having already lost one to reinforce the US Rangers in the Sorrento peninsula, and one other destroyed at Altavilla.

  ‘On the other side of the hill” von Vietinghoff and his corps commanders were making their plans to strike west and south from their embattled centre, when an extraordinary piece of intelligence or, rather, a rumour reached them that the invader was preparing to re-embark. The scene was now set for the stirring events of the next two days, the so-called “crisis” of the Battle of Salerno.

  * By Nebelwerfers Rocholl meant the multi-barrelled launchers mounted on landing craft operated by the Royal Navy.

  5

  VON VIETINGHOFF SHOOTS HIS BOLT

  On September 12 the time had come for the Tenth Army to prepare for a final effort to drive the invaders into the sea, or retreat. There could be no half measures. Allied strength was growing every day, the German counter-attacks on the northern sector withered under tremendous cannonades from land and sea and the holders of the ring, the tank crews and panzer grenadiers of the 16th Panzer Division, were tired out. Protracted defence could only end in the immolation of the defenders under a sustained artillery bombardment cruel even by the standards of the Russian front. By this time, Sieckenius, whose soldiers had so far faced four times their number with great gallantry, was a disillusioned realist. General Herr, 76th Corps, was beginning to pick up the threads of the battle, and was devoid of false optimism, but his strong sense of what was practicable in a military sense was overruled by the insistent demands for success from von Vietinghoff at HQ Tenth Army, remote from the realities of the battle. Herr had hoped to launch his part of the Gegenangriff, the full-scale, coordinated counterattack of complete divisions on the 13th, but as the remainder of the 29th Panzer Grenadiers could not arrive until after dark on the 12th, and the infantry of the 26th Panzer on the 13th and subsequent days, he decided to postpone it until daylight on the 14th. (In fact, only four out of six battalions of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division fought at Salerno. The Reconnaissance Battalion of 26th Panzer Division took part in the attack towards Persano on the 13th, one battalion of its 9th was at Eboli that day and the other on the evening of the 14th. One company of tanks reported in from the north to reinforce the 16th Panzer Division on the 13th. The 67th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 26th Panzer Division, the rearguard facing Eighth Army, did not fight at Salerno at all.)

  The experience of the Blitzkrieg and the rapidity with which German commanders reacted to a sudden threat, to say nothing of the elan displayed by the troops as they threw themselves into the attack, like Meierkord on D-day, have led to the false impression that the German Army dashed into action like so many berserkers. Nothing of the kind. Its operations were carefully reconnoitred, the plan carefully made, units briefed, all in an orderly sequence. The German secret was simple: a combination of system and speed. Not a minute was wasted.

  The direction of the counter-offensive of the 76th Corps front was left, by German custom, to Sieckenius, for he was already gripping the battle and knew every inch of the ground. His outline plan was to use the left wing of his division (basically KG von Doering, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the Reconnaissance Battalion of 26th Panzer Division) to capture the bridge over the Sele near the tobacco factory, cross the river and establish itself at Persano. When that operation was complete the 71 st Panzer Grenadier Regiment together with other elements of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division and any elements of the 26th Panzer and the 1st Parachute Division that had arrived would strike due west towards the coast and if this prospered turn right, or north-west up the coast into the rear of the British 10th Corps. At the same time the 64th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (KG Stempel) was to attack along Highway No. 18, clear the remaining enemy lurking in the western edge of Battipaglia and open the road as far as Bellizzi. Simultaneously the 14th Corps would attack south from Ponte Fratte and San Mango, so that the British would be squeezed on both flanks.

  At this point in this extraordinary battle the immensely experienced German General Staff fell victim to an inexplicable attack of self-deception. Beginning with von Vietinghoff they came to believe that the invaders were about to abandon the bridgehead and re-embark. How this came about has never been satisfactorily explained. It was certainly not based on a systematic evaluation of battlefield information. We can only conclude that it was partly due to the dynamics by which rumours spread, especially if welcome to men who, however hard-headed, had been for sleepless days and nights subjected to the stress of command in battle, and partly due to over-hasty deductions from fragments of information coming from the various battle-groups. The trigger appears to have been a propaganda broadcast from Berlin announcing that the defeated Allies were preparing to throw in the towel and take to their ships. Intended presumably to depress the morale of the Allies, this was seized upon in Tenth Army (never properly in the picture of the Salerno battle) as a fact. More or less by coincidence this flight of fancy was lent credence by reports from the lower echelons. At 10.45 a.m. on the 13th HQ 76th Corps reported that in the southern sector (that is, the US 6th Corps) the enemy had withdrawn from a number of points. This, certainly, was the “situation report” after the débâcle of the 11th/12th, when the attacks so thoughtlessly launched on Clark’s orders had been repulsed. It added that the invaders’ “will to resist pressure” may not be counted on, adding “we must stick to the enemy”, and referring to “commonly heard” radio reports that the British were evacuating Salerno town. At noon Dornemann, whose battle-group was still in that area, reported that “five cruisers” had moved inshore and were bombarding targets in his sector, adding, without giving any reason, “we are holding on as we get the impression that the enemy is going to re-embark”.1 The 64th Panzer Grenadiers reported that the enemy facing it, south of Highway No. 18 between Battipaglia and the “British” tobacco factory (from the 6th Grenadier Guards) had withdrawn slightly. HQ 76th Corps repeated the wholly erroneous information that Salerno town had been recaptured, and ordered the 64th Regiment (KG Stempel) to stand fast, as the 14th Corps was about to attack south-eastwards and drive the defenders of the northern sector into its arms. Coincidentally, and deceptively, the ever-active massed batteries of the invaders fell silent.

  Of these indications only two were factually correct: that in two areas the enemy had withdrawn a short distance, and the guns had temporarily stopped firing. They may simply have been replenishing their ammunition stocks. During the attacks on the right and right–centre of the 56th Division one artillery regiment fired forty-three defensive fire missions and the total expenditure of 25-pounder shell was 10,000 per day. There were two reasons why the idea that the invaders were about to embark persisted, or at least was not refuted. The first was that the news would be a spur to the tired troops about to be launched into the counter-attack, the second was that were it true it was an excellent reason to attack without delay before the enemy’s arrangements to cover so difficult an operation could be put in train. This in turn was made more urgent and was amplified by a message from no less than Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW), that the Fuehrer demanded an immediate success for political reasons. So, any faint-heartedness about the success of the attack or scepticism about the rumour seemed disloyal, even impious. One thing that is certain about this curious episode is that German Intelligence had no hint then or later
that the opposing commander, Clark, had in fact gone so far as to instruct Admiral Hewitt to draw up plans for re-embarkation, but this was not until twenty-four hours later when he had been shaken by the events of the 13th/14th in the 6th Corps sector.

  Such was the prevailing mood in the command and staff echelons of Tenth Army when at 10.45 a.m. on the 13th Sieckenius assembled his officers to work out the details of the plan of attack already described. He himself appeared to be somewhat sceptical. He stated that ten ships had arrived in the anchorage and were probably landing another enemy division. He considered that the first move should be to collect the scattered fragments of the 16th Panzer Division and its reinforcing units and establish a firm defensive line as the base from which to launch the attack the following day: standard tactics. What he lacked was up-to-date information about his opponent. Accordingly he ordered a Funkspaehtruppe – an armoured car patrol with radio – to move out from Battipaglia immediately and probe down Highway No. 18 as close to the coast as it could get and report exactly what was taking place there.2 Colonel von Doering was summoned to report on the situation on the lower reaches of the Sele river. Meanwhile the conference resumed, with von Doering in attendance, and all those practical soldiers agreed that despite the rumours of evacuation of the bridgehead, a full-scale attack would play into the hands of the enemy: “It saps morale, uses up men and ammunition and gives the enemy the chance to land further north.” (A prospect that was to remain an obsession of the German commanders.) At 11.30 a.m. Lieutenant Mueller, the reconnaissance troop commander, not an officer who allowed the grass to grow under his feet, reported that he was four kilometres south of Battipaglia and had met no enemy. He added that it appeared as if there were none between his present position and the bridge over the Sele at Albanella railway station. Sieckenius immediately ordered all units to reconnoitre to their front and the main bodies to halt and conserve petrol.

  The conference was then joined by Colonel Fritz Ruenkel, chief of staff to Herr in HQ 76th Corps. His intervention was fateful and to understand why it is necessary to remind the general reader of the unique position of the German General Staff in the command system of the German Army. In the US and the British armies it would be unthinkable for a commander to send a junior staff officer with anything more than a personal message or instruction to one of his subordinates if its tenor required more tact or more emphasis than could be conveyed in a written signal. (At that very moment General Alexander’s chief of staff was visiting HQ Eighth Army to impress on Montgomery the urgent need to speed up his advance and take the pressure off Clark at Salerno.) He could be forceful, he could be candid, he could listen to objections, he could make offers of extra assistance, but his authority derived from his commander-in-chief and his duties were limited to conveying his commander’s views. By contrast, the German Ruenkel had full, delegated powers, inherent in his membership of the General Staff. He knew what was required – that there should be no faltering in the 16th Panzer Division. He could demand to have the full situation explained and then give out such orders, if necessary overriding those of the commander on the spot, as would achieve his chiefs, von Vietinghoff’s, aim. This was to gain at least a success that could be politically exploited, to administer a psychological shock to the invading army and enable the Tenth Army to withdraw in good order. He himself was whole-heartedly in favour of the aim and personally stage-managed the whole operation. He declared that the “American army should be cut in half by exploiting the existing gap and striking towards Albanella station”.3

  Ruenkel’s determination to force Sieckenius into immediate action was fortified by another report from the energetic and inquisitive Mueller. He was, he signalled, now four miles from Battipaglia having arrived at the road fork on Highway No. 18 at Bivio Cioffi and could see no enemy in the area. Ruenkel countermanded the decision to wait for the rest of the 26th Panzer and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions and launch an attack in strength on the 14th, and ordered Sieckenius to thrust forward with the troops already available and as soon as possible.4 What resulted certainly gave the 6th Corps an unpleasant shock and so alarmed the Fifth Army commander that he never swerved from the idea that his whole position was endangered. This gave birth to the legend of the crisis at Salerno averted by the courage and personal intervention of General Mark Wayne Clark. There is no question about his courage, or that his intervention in the battle was effective, for he was a man who always rose to an occasion. It could be said of him as it was of Massena, that “his faculties redoubled amid the roar of cannon”, but crisis there was not. Ruenkel’s attack was made from weakness. It was more of a raid in force, exploratory and opportunist in character, launched without proper reconnaissance or time to combine units from several divisions, and it failed.

  The attack of the afternoon of the 13th included a half-baked thrust made with the 2nd/64th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and about one and a half battalions of parachute infantry to clear an enemy mistakenly regarded as “weakened” in the Fosso–Bellizzi–Point 210 area. This ran into the 167th Brigade on its left and the 201st Guards Brigade on the right, and met with disaster. The 56th Division had been able to shorten its line further, thanks to General Clark, and had pulled back to better defensive positions and was able to fight the sort of battle the British were good at, a sturdy defence supported by their incomparable artillery. Between the defensive barrage and the controlled small-arms fire of the infantry this limb of the attack withered away. (The Grenadiers recorded that they loosed off no fewer than 55,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition on that day.) McCreery’s front was still over-extended and his tired battalions were subjected to some determined attacks on either flank, but they proved staunch and their line barely dented. The 76th Corps made better progress on its left against the Americans.

  The revised plan was for the weak battle-group KG Kleine Limburg accompanied by those of KG von Doering’s tired and depleted units still capable of a serious effort after five days of continuous fighting, to advance southwards along the north, or right bank of the Sele, cross it by the bridge near the tobacco factory and attack the American battalion believed to be in the Sele–Calore pocket. It would be followed by a parachute battalion to take over Persano village after it was captured, and the 2nd Battalion, 9th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the first contingent to arrive from the 26th Panzer Division’s 9th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, to cover the right flank of the advance. KG Kruger, made up of the 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the Reconnaissance battalion of the 26th Panzer Division, part of 29th Panzer Grenadier Division in position at the Ponte Sele, was to drive down the left bank of the Sele on to Persano, thus squeezing the defenders front and rear, after which Ruenkel intended a somewhat ambitious “internal envelopment” by KG von Doering and KG Kleine Limburg moving once more south along the right bank of the Sele, recrossing it by the bridge at Albanella and taking La Maida, M. Chirico and rolling up the American defence line behind the La Cosa stream from west to east. All this appears to a British or an American officer a terrible muddle, better suited to a war-game board than a real battlefield, but the German Army was immensely skilled at rapid manoeuvre by groups formed ad hoc and quick to move to the aid of each other or seize on any mistake by the defence. The weakness of this final throw was the weariness of the units, the lack of tanks, the 16th Panzer having lost over half its strength already, and a total absence of ground support from the Luftwaffe; two vital ingredients of Blitzkrieg-type tactics.

  General Clark’s fear of an attack on the left–centre of the 6th Corps was, therefore, not unjustified, based though it may have been on intuition. What is difficult to understand, even with all the advantages of hindsight, is why he made no attempt to correct the weaknesses of its current disposition, and even aggravated them by ordering that another attempt to secure Altavilla be made on the 13th. As a result of his generous, but entirely necessary extension of the 6th Corps front in favour of the 10th the American sector had been not only overextended
but its units fragmented and mixed together. The front of the 45 th Division was extended again to the left of the engineer battalion of the 36th Division at Bivio Cioffi by a battalion of the 141st RCT, from the same division. The attack to recapture Altavilla had to be made by separate battalions from the 142nd and the 143rd RCTs. The orderly arrangement of RCTs under the infantry regimental commanders had in fact disintegrated, and General Walker had to resort to employing three brigadier-generals to coordinate the sectors of his front: his own deputy commander, the redoubtable O’Daniel and one borrowed from the staff of Fifth Army. Owing, perhaps, to the fact that Clark, by virtually usurping the command of the corps from Dawley, was blurring the spheres of responsibility, no one had coordinated the defensive arrangements at the junction of the 36th and 45th Divisions, or noticed that the right flank of the battalion at Persano was open, just where Ruenkel’s blow was about to fall.

  It will be recalled that after the fiasco of the offensive on the 11th initiated by Clark, the 2nd Battalion 143rd Infantry had been sent to Persano to relieve the 179th RCT which side-stepped to its left and joined its fellow, the 157th, concentrating General Middleton’s command north of the Sele. Slipshod staff work by the two divisional staffs, unnoticed and uncorrected by 6th Corps HQ, resulted in the 2nd/143rd being dangerously isolated. There was a yawning gap between its left-hand company and the forward battalion of the 157th RCT covering the tobacco factory, and the bridge over the Sele had been left unguarded by either division. Its right was completely exposed, be-cause after the repulse on the 12th General Walker’s line of forward localities followed the south bank of the Torrente la Cosa. To make matters worse, the battalion commander himself adopted a faulty disposition. The terrain between the two rivers was ideal for tanks; hard, dry, whale-backed in section, falling away to the two river valleys. (It was an Italian Army exercise ground and firing range.) Persano village was overlooked by rising ground a mile to the north-east, so that the battalion commander, correctly, took up a position there with three of his companies, but for no apparent reason pushed out the fourth 2,000 yards up the range road. The divisional artillery had not been told the exact positions of the battalion, nor do there appear to have been attached observers, which inhibited its defensive fire. When KG Kruger came rolling down the range the battalion commander gave his troops the ridiculous order to lie low instead of engaging with every weapon available. All these errors combined to give Ruenkel a temporary success and General Clark an unpleasant shock.