Tug of War

by Shelfold Bidwell

  2. Ibid. 131105.

  3. Ibid. 131250.

  4. Ibid. 140005:

  1a [i.e. chief operations officer]: It [KG Stempel] goes on attacking?

  Ruenkel: It goes on!

  1a: Is that an order?

  Ruenkel: You bet! That is the corps order!

  5. Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 130–2: f.n. p. 132.

  Chapter 6. Salerno — The Postscript, pp. 91–102.

  1. There are various accounts of the mutiny, e.g., Pond, Salerno, D. Hickey and G. Smith, Operation Avalanche (Heinemann, London, 1983), and a BBC television feature of dubious value. We incline to the view that the excuse offered by the ex-mutineers when interviewed is a rationalisation and the basic cause was the belief that all had been assured of following the 51st Highland Division home. For McCreery’s reaction, see Strawson. Molony does not mention the mutiny, which remained a secret so well kept that all except a very few in the bridgehead ever heard of it.

  2. US National Archives, Suitland, Maryland, 226/Infantry/143–04, 14 October 1943.

  3. Compare Molony pp. 244–6 with Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 141–3.

  4. Lucas, Diary.

  Chapter 7. Mines, Mud and Uncertain Trumpets, pp. 103–22.

  1. Martin van Creveld’s instructive Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance 1939–1945, pp. 69–71 and Table 7.2. He shows that in the US Army the ground combat arms, except the armoured corps, received a disproportionately low percentage of first-class recruits as classified on a scale of I to V. Curiously, the field artillery and engineers did worst of all, yet external observers of the US Army rated both arms highly for morale and efficiency.

  2. James M. Gavin, On to Berlin, pp. 77–9.

  3. C. Ray, Algiers to Austria: A History of the 78th Division in the Second World War, one of the better divisional/regimental histories, pp. 87–91.

  Chapter 8. An Odour of Gallipoli, pp. 123–41.

  1. Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 248. Lucas, Diary, November 23, 1943; Military History Institute, Carlisle Bar-racks, Pennsylvania.

  2. Blumenson, ibid. But Blumenson interprets Eisenhower’s predictions more charitably.

  3. Ibid., p. 180. “Eisenhower’s personal belief in the efficacy of waging a vigorous campaign during the fall and winter to capture the Po valley underwent a startling change about October 7.”

  4. Ibid., pp. 180, 183, 246.

  5. Ibid., pp. 180–1.

  6. Ibid., pp. 239–40.

  7. Ibid., p. 177. Marshall’s first estimate of the force levels required in the Mediterranean made about August 7 was Italy ten divisions, invasion of southern France, fourteen.

  8. For one assessment of Wilson, see Macmillan, War Diaries: the Mediterranean 1943–1945, pp. 367, 371.

  9. Report No. 24. Steiger papers, Directorate of History, Ottawa.

  10. Correspondence, General H. Kippenberger, Editor-in-Chief NZ official histories, National Archives, Wellington, 1A: 181/32/12, 6 March 1956.

  11. Ibid. Correspondence with N. C. Phillips, 27 January 1956.

  12. Lucas, Diary.

  13. Ibid. 2 January and also on 4th: “Unless we can get what we want the operation becomes such a desperate undertaking that it should not in my opinion be undertaken.”

  14. Ibid. 10 January. Bracketed passages added as afterthoughts to the previous day’s entry.

  15. Ibid.

  16. Ibid.

  Chapter 9. The Soldier’s Art, pp. 142–58.

  1. Blumenson, Mark Clark, p. 154.

  2. Ibid. p. 160.

  3. The definitive account is Blumenson; Bloody River: The Real Tragedy of the Rapido. See also Salerno to Cassino, pp. 328–47. Brigadier Howard Kippenberger’s 5th New Zealand Brigade took over the front from the 36th Division later. His account of the battle from information given to him by the survivors is in the Kippenberger Papers, in particular Kippenberger to Fred Majdalany, n.d. (March 1956?).

  For Clark’s reactions, Blumenson, Mark Clark, pp. 167–9.

  4. The Harmon Papers, Military History Institute, letter from Harmon to Lucas February 12.

  5. Peter Verney, Anzio 1944: an Unexpected Fury (Batsford, London, 1978) p. 180. We have relied on Verney’s excellent account for this narrative of the battle.

  6. Blumenson, p. 424. Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 360–65.

  7. J. R. Wood Papers, MHI, Carlisle Barracks. Interviews with W. E. Narus 1973–4. “Clark never let allies see him upset even though he was ‘biting his Goddamned lip!’” e.g. Clark made some general comments in his diary on Sir Andrew Cunningham’s performance:

  Evidence accumulates that Admiral Cunningham and his navy are in no way cooperating with me. He does not come direct to me but insinuates to everyone that he has been hoaxed into the position which makes it necessary for him to maintain my forces in the Anzio bridgehead. He not only does not cooperate in the supply set-up but with his naval gun fire he imposes so many restrictions and makes it so difficult that it is easier, in most cases, to do without his naval gun fire support than to accept the restrictions he imposes. He continually screams about enemy gun fire in the harbour, knowing full well that there is nothing that can be done on this situation that is not already done.

  Cunningham has set an arbitrary limit of 2,500 tons per day which not only is insufficient to maintain my forces but thereby precludes the essential build-up for my counter-offensive. [Clark wanted 2,700 tons.]

  Chapter 10. Fear, Hope and Failure, pp. 159–75.

  1. Hapgood and Richardson, p. 20, “later …” a Roman princess would tell Clark that “he was only the second barbarian to conquer Rome from the south”. In her eyes Belisarius was a barbarian.

  2. Information about the German disposition is from the narratives prepared by the Enemy Documents Section of the Cabinet Office in support of Molony.

  3. Hapgood and Richardson, pp. 38–9.

  4. The diary of von Senger und Etterlin was the source for his book, Neither Fear nor Hope. A copy of it is at the MHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

  5. F. Majdalany, Cassino: Portrait of a Battle, p. 89.

  Chapter 11. The Torch is Thrown, pp. 176–90.

  1. Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 383.

  2. A note in Freyberg’s log reads as follows: “11.30 a.m. 11 Feb. Gruenther asked Freyberg if GOC wanted Americans to go forward when he attacked. GOC said he did not think they could. Gruenther said they had started on their attack this morning and were fully hopeful but if it was a question of betting he would be forced to bet against them.”

  3. Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 298.

  4. Majdalany, pp. 117–18. Both Majdalany and the New Zealander Phillips served in the British 78th Infantry Division.

  5. Hapgood and Richardson, pp. 238, 240. HQ Fifth Army avoided admitting that this was so, even when they were asked to comment on reports that shells were falling on the place, saying that “erratic bursts” were responsible. In fact the zones of guns were too large to avoid hitting the place when targets close to the walls were engaged.

  6. Hapgood and Richardson, passim.

  7. Blumenson, Mark Clark, pp. 185–6.

  8. And say to this day.

  9. C. J. C. Molony, History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V. (HMSO, London, 1973), p. 713. A total of 143 Fortresses, 70 Mitchells and 40 Marauders actually set out for the mission.

  10. Neville C. Phillips, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939–1945: Italy, Vol. 1. The Sangro to Cassino (Wellington, 1957), pp. 26–30.

  Chapter 12. A Hateful Tapestry in the Sky, pp. 191–202.

  Note on research:

  Operation AVENGER and the bombing of the Monastery.

  Our study is based on N. C. Phillips’ volume of the Official History of the 2nd New Zealand Corps (1957), and on Martin Blumenson’s Salerno to Cassino (1967) in the series published by the Office of the Chief of Military History in Washington, examination of the Fifth Army, 2nd Corp
s, 34th and 36th Divisional records in Washington, the New Zealand Archives in Wellington and the narratives written by the British historians responsible for Enemy Documents working in the Cabinet Office, London.

  Phillips’ files record his efforts to discover the truth. He was, unfortunately, doubly handicapped. Disgruntled as Freyberg may have been by Calculated Risk, which laid the blame for the destruction of the Monastery at his door, he was reluctant to provide Phillips with ammunition for controversy. Also, Phillips was unable to travel to the US to examine the American documents for himself. He wrote on June 22, 1954, and also to Harding for confirmation of Clark’s story in Calculated Risk. The Americans replied on July 7 saying: “Our historian has failed to find any such Fifth Army transcripts. The information is based on Clark’s diary which is still in his possession.” On September 22 they wrote again saying that a memorandum on which Clark appeared to have based his information in Calculated Risk had been found written by Gruenther and dated February 12. It was still classified. However they sent extracts from it which were to be included in Blumenson’s account (1967) and were incorporated into Phillips’, although in some important respects Gruenther’s disagreed with the New Zealand evidence. In reply to a letter from Phillips F.-M. Lord Harding said that he did not disagree with Clark’s account in Calculated Risk, but had no evidence to support his opinion. Phillips’ account of the events of the 14th, when the final decision to bomb on the 15th was apparently made, relies on a “weather forecast” and is based on Freyberg’s memory. Freyberg told him that Gruenther stated that the bombing had to be on the 15th because the weather was expected to deteriorate and FISCHFANG would require all aircraft to be used at Anzio on subsequent days. “It was then or never,” and so Freyberg had no choice. This version of events served to explain the unreadiness of the 4th Indian Division to exploit the bombing and has entered into some, but not all, accounts. In fact, Blumenson does not mention it, nor does he suggest that the bombing was advanced a whole day or even a few hours from the afternoon to the morning. Blumenson is correct for the bombing was never intended to be on the 16th. Furthermore, the weather forecasts did not predict wet weather on subsequent days, and, in fact, the 16th was fine and the heavy bombers were not used at Anzio. However, the bombing was advanced from the afternoon to the morning which was a casual act by the air force and went unreported by Fifth Army staff until the last moment.

  The American account relies heavily on Gruenther’s memorandum, but it was a red herring. It was purportedly written on the 12th, yet Gruenther intimates that the first that he had heard of the bombing plan was when Freyberg phoned to ask for the mission on the evening of the 12th. This is wrong, because Freyberg discussed the matter with Clark on the 9th. Freyberg’s requisition on the 11th for tactical support was turned down by Fifth Army on the morning of the 12th, which caused Freyberg to ask Harding to have the decision reversed on the afternoon of the 12th, and Gruenther had been engaged the rest of the afternoon and evening discussing the matter with Harding and Clark. Clark’s account confirms this. Gruenther is also wrong about the Bomb Safety Line (BSL) and the initial postponement of the mission from the 13th to the 14th. He says that he warned Freyberg that the Americans would have to be withdrawn behind the BSL on the evening of the 12th, and that was when Freyberg phoned back later to say that the withdrawal could not be arranged and that the mission was postponed until the 14th. Clearly he has confused the events of the 12th and 13th. The mission was not cancelled until 10 a.m. on the 13th and then at the behest of the 2nd Corps. He makes no mention of the introduction of the heavy bombers, since his account concerns only the 12th. The purpose of his memorandum, though, is clear. It is to maintain a causal link between the original “softening” mission of fighter-bombers as requested by Freyberg, and the ultimate destructive attack in the interest of Clark. Freyberg is, thereby, set up as the originator of the attack by the heavy bombers and Gruenther omits all the events in the interim, including his own cancellation of the fighter-bomber mission.

  Misled by Gruenther, Blumenson observes that there is no explanation for the introduction of heavy bombers when only fighter-bombers were requested, and suggests that the airmen were responsible. Ira Eaker may have flown over the Monastery in a light aircraft on the 13th and reported signs of German occupation. Yet that seems unlikely, since the 13th was a day of snow storms and there was no flying. Eaker says that he made the flight on the 15th, which would have been too late to influence the matter — a convenient alibi. Probably he flew on the 14th, but only after the decision had been made, with his reluctant agreement. No doubt he hoped to see some confirmation that the Monastery was occupied and he did. He agreed to the mission only because he was under pressure from Arnold to use his aircraft to blast a way into the Liri valley.

  The American account reflects Gruenther’s and Clark’s impressions of the fighting. It does not explain that the 2nd Corps only relinquished command on the heights early on the 15th, and hence does not have to explain that was the reason for the confusion there. Far from mentioning the loss of ground by the 2nd Corps, it states that the Indians actually withdrew behind the BSL on the night of the 14th/15th and that the Germans followed them up; the rest of the fighting on the heights being devoted to recovering the lost ground (Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 416). This is completely erroneous and may reflect the confusion in the US HQs concerned. However, it also successfully avoids the need to explain the loss of the 2nd Corps’ positions, to comment on Ryder’s report on the morning of the 13th that he still held them, or to connect the loss with Clark’s refusal to use the New Zealand Division as soon as it was available to him.

  When was the ground lost? The Fifth Army documents make it clear that the 34th Division never claimed to have taken Point 593 or Albaneta. The 36th Division was brought up for both purposes in the fatal, final days of the battle, between February 10 and 13. It did not hold either for more than a few hours at most. The German account confirms this. On the night of the 11th/12th they were outflanked by Baade’s Operation MICHAEL and gave up the whole front-line position that Ryder thought was still held on the 13th.

  This leads us to Clark’s critical error and the historians’ treatment of it, of not reinforcing the exhausted 2nd Corps earlier. It partly ducks the issue and partly blames Alexander for the delay. The former was done by ignoring the results of it on the heights, as we have seen above, and omitting to explain how the plan had to be changed from a leapfrog operation to a relief and a deliberate attack, and placing blame for delays on the Indians. The suggestion that Alexander wanted to reserve the New Zealand Corps for the breakthrough transfers the blame for what actually happened to him. Yet on January 30 Clark, at Anzio, received a signal from Gruenther:

  NZ Corps will continue momentum of attacks now being carried out by French and 2nd Corps. Attack cannot take place before 8 February. [The first day of the 4th Indian Division’s presence at Cassino.]

  Clark’s reply was:

  Your 915 not understood. How can Spadger Corps [sic] of two divisions carry on the impetus of four? Does Alexander understand the possible necessity of using some of this force if present attacks are unsuccessful? (Note 2 below.)

  It was difficult for Alexander to deal with a man who did not understand that the best course was to maintain the momentum of an attack and not wait until it came to a halt through exhaustion before committing fresh troops. By the time Clark had indulged in his usual piecemeal tactics there was nothing that Alexander could do but restrict his aim to obtaining a limited bridgehead, and taking his time over it.

  Behind the idea that the timing of the entry of the New Zealand Corps was never in question is the notion in the American account that it came over from Eighth Army just in time to relieve the 2nd Corps, according to plan. The options open to Clark are not then in question. Clark is represented as being in Alexander’s hands; the reverse being the case.

  The episode at Cassino demonstrates the problems that the official his
torians and their unofficial successors face in recounting a coalition campaign in a national history. Our contribution, like those of Majdalany and Hapgood and Richardson in particular, has been to attempt to gather material from all the national archives of the armies concerned and to explain the contradictions between the official accounts. Clark’s Calculated Risk is a valuable contribution, provided that it is borne in mind that it contains a general’s apologia. Unfortunately for the historical record, Freyberg for the best of motives declined to counter by telling his own story. (A little inconsistently, he confided more to F. Majdalany in two interviews than the total of the information he gave to Phillips, but not enough to enable Majdalany to arrive at the correct answer.)

  Hapgood and Richardson identify the key questions — Who ordered the bombing? Why were the heavy bombers brought in? Why was their attack made on the wrong day? — but cannot answer them satisfactorily. They rely on Gruenther’s memorandum and have not compared the differing US and NZ accounts. However, they do point to the important clue of the BSL, without actually explaining its meaning, and they note the German use of the ground around the Monastery. Their Monte Cassino was not published in time to affect our research but did lead Graham to examine the notes he took in 1970 from the American archives when he was writing his Cassino. There he found the evidence that allowed the piece in the puzzle labelled “BSL” by Hapgood and Richardson to be inserted.

  Ground is evidence as important as a typed letter, an operation plan or a message torn from a signal pad. In 1970, Nicholas Straker and Dominick Graham spent several days walking the ground of the Cassino battlefields with modern and contemporary maps in their hands. It appeared to them that some modern authors had misappreciated the ground and that even the participants in the battle, in particular officers at divisional and higher headquarters, were misinformed. That is not at all surprising, since few of them had seen the ground behind the Monastery, which is very broken and not easily read from maps. After seeing the ground Graham became sceptical about unit reports of their locations and achievements, which in some cases could be reconciled neither with the map nor the ground.