The Syrian Social Nationalist Party

by Salim Mujais

  67 On September 1, he writes four letters to the following individuals: Letter to Buenos Aires SSNP director, August 16, 1946, ibid., pp. 172-74; Letter to Najib Israwi in Brazil, September 1, 1946, ibid., pp. 191-5; Letter to William Bahliss, September 1, 1946, ibid., pp. 196-7; Letter to Rafiq Halabi in Gold Coast Africa, September 1, 1946, ibid., pp. 198-202.

  68 Letter to Maaruf Saab, September 21, 1946, ibid., pp. 244-5.

  69 Letter to Antoun Dahi, September 29, 1946, ibid., pp. 249-50

  70 Letter to Buenos Aires SSNP director, October 26, 1946, ibid., pp. 256-60.

  71 Letter to Juliette, February 22, 1947. Rasa’il ila Dia’, pp. 217-218.

  Saadeh Returns From Exile

  Saadeh’s reception on his arrival in Beirut was spectacular. Never in the history of the city or the region had a political figure received such a display of enthusiasm and loyalty. Saadeh was met by the largest number of welcoming crowds ever assembled in the modern history of Syria. Syrians thronged from various parts of the country to greet their returning leader. It was a display of political power that emboldened his devotees and worried his adversaries. In his speech on his day of arrival, Saadeh addressed two narratives, both different from the prior formulations of the SSNP. The first narrative related to the current status of the Syrian states arising in the wake of the British-French struggle in the Near East. The second narrative addressed the SSNP’s vision of the future.1 As he stepped to the podium and ushered for silence, comrades in attendance were eager to hear his voice. He had been preceded by Fayez Sayegh, the Director of Culture and Propaganda, and a celebrated orator whose speech was particularly impassioned on that day. Saadeh opened his speech by expressing his joy of having returned after 9 years of exile to join his comrades that “represent a nation that has refused to accept the grave of history as its lot in life.” He praised his comrades for fifteen years of organized struggle after which “we stand today as a live, free and victorious nation” having overcome the efforts of foreign powers to keep the nation divided between sects and creeds. “Today our flags wave in the sun with no foreign flags beside them, and if our flags stand-alone unhampered and unfettered by foreign flags, it is due to your ideology, your faith, your work and your unified struggle.” Then he directly broached the topic of independence that was no doubt on the minds of the Lebanese politicians who had dispatched several informants to record the speech and report back. “We are today in a state of independence that is not the ultimate goal of what we aim for in life, but is a step of many that this nation undertakes, one of many, and the credit for its achievement is to a large part due to your organized work and struggle.”

  Saadeh on his arrival in Beirut on March 2, 1947 received by multitudes of SSNP members and supporters.

  THE BATTLE FOR FREEDOM

  Astounded by the size of the popular reception that they witnessed firsthand, and likely alarmed by the public position announced by Saadeh that confirmed the failure of Thabit and Achqar in their mission, the Lebanese President and Prime Minister moved swiftly to counteract the political momentum Saadeh had garnered. The government issued a subpoena for Saadeh to appear in front of a magistrate to clarify what the government initially called “ambiguous statements,” but what government-allied newspapers labelled “treasonous statements.” The Lebanese government’s intent from the subpoena was clearly nefarious. Saadeh could have been arrested, expelled from the country, or worse. The assault of the government on human rights was unabating. Having famously lost the battle against Saadeh’s right to return to his homeland, it was now waging a battle against his freedom of expression. The pretext that the authorities used to issue the subpoena was that Saadeh in his homecoming speech declared that the existence of the State of Lebanon as null. This was obviously a misinterpretation of the speech. In his speech, Saadeh defined for his welcoming followers the real conditions of Syria, including Lebanon, the real nature of the political arrangements dividing the nation into several independent states, and he reaffirmed the determination of the SSNP to continue its struggle along the same principles on which it was founded.

  Saadeh on his arrival in Beirut on March 2, 1947 surrounded by the leaders of the SSNP. To Saadeh’s right is Nehmeh Thabit, president of the High Council of the Party.

  Saadeh addressed a letter to the director of the Sureté Générale denying the false accusations of enmity towards the Lebanese state, and asked the director to convey to his superior’s Saadeh’s complete respect of the will of the people, affirming that his views towards the Lebanese state remained consistent with prior statements and declarations.2

  As Saadeh refused to appear before the magistrate, the government changed the subpoena to an arrest warrant and the minister of interior declared that Saadeh was wanted dead or alive. By making his alleged unacceptance of the existence of an independent Lebanese state the reason for the arrest warrant, the Lebanese government was aiming to put a wedge between the SSNP and the Lebanese population. Saadeh countered this tactic by addressing several public statements to the Lebanese people clarifying the dedication of the Party to the independence of Lebanon, but never failing to maintain that Lebanon remains a part of the Syrian nation. Furthermore, at the risk of his personal safety, he granted from his hideaway several interviews to journalists (who could easily have been Government informants) to utilize the interest of the public in the dramatic aspects of the affair as an opportunity to expound his political views.3 Saadeh took his case to the people and on March 6 issued a public statement refuting the claims of his adversaries that he was an enemy of the state of Lebanon.4

  The Lebanese government initiated a well-orchestrated campaign to subvert his efforts at assuming leadership of his party, initiating required re-organization, and participating effectively in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Various separatist political groups in Lebanon came to the aid of the government such as the Lebanese Phalanges and the francophone press in Beirut. The SSNP counter-campaign on the pages of its newspaper Sada an-Nahda garnered some initial success and succeeded in silencing some political foes, but as this counter campaign was gaining strength, the government closed down the paper. Saadeh was energized by the loyalty and enthusiasm of his supporters, but he rapidly noted that the magnitude of the support displayed on the day of his arrival was not manifest in the actual organization of the party. His headquarters in the mountain was secured by armed escort and guards, but this curtailed his freedom of movement and outreach. He could move only with an armed escort.5

  Antoun Saadeh with armed guards 1947.

  Saadeh continued his rebuttal of the accusations by the government by issuing another public statement addressed to the Lebanese people on March 28, 1947.6 In this new statement, Saadeh reiterated his position vis-à-vis the existence of the Lebanese state and his adherence to the principle of the will of the people being supreme in deciding the fate of its political forms of government. He then launched an attack against the prevailing conditions in Lebanon detailing the injustices that were pervasive in the Lebanese government and in society at large. His plan to elicit enough public protest to reduce the pressure on the SSNP had very modest success. Thabit and his associates criticized Saadeh for leading them and the Party into this unnecessary enmity with the Lebanese government. They attempted to dissuade Saadeh from the course of action he had undertaken and to convince him to surrender to the authorities. They sabotaged the central administration of the Party by absenteeism, delays, contrariness, contention, and cantankerousness. They spread vicious rumors about Saadeh within the ranks and attempted to undermine his authority and leadership. Simultaneously, they aggrandized their militancy and questioned maliciously Saadeh’s wartime struggle.7

  The attempts of the Thabit camp to amend the constitution and reduce Saadeh’s control over the affairs of the SSNP continued. Thabit lobbied for support in this scheme with the members of the Higher Council. Careful not to alienate his constituency and cause a major breach in the SSNP, Saadeh called for
a meeting of the Higher Council at which he confronted Thabit and addressed the issue. He made the case that a return to the original goal of the SSNP and adherence to its unified national strategy represented the desires of the broader constituency, and that the trust that the constituency had in Saadeh’s leadership was not consonant with the request of modifying the constitution. Saadeh’s arguments and charisma won the day and Thabit’s support in the higher council disintegrated. After the meeting, Saadeh dissolved the Higher Council and the political bureau and appointed a new team.8

  In April, he moved his headquarters from the Shouf region to his hometown of Dhour Shweir. The erratic living conditions enforced by the government campaign against him and the preoccupation with the Lebanese elections and the ongoing dispute with the Thabit regime, prevented Saadeh from undertaking any effective administrative or political reforms in the Party. Matters of personal security were primordial. The only guardian of his freedom was the armed protection provided by SSNP membership.9

  In a third communique addressed to the Lebanese people on May 19, the eve of the elections, Saadeh exhorted the Lebanese electorate to support true reform by ensuring SSNP representation in parliament with the SSNP candidates. He reiterated his commitment to the independence and prosperity of Lebanon and repeated that the SSNP principles are the best recourse to solving what ails Lebanon.10

  PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

  The Lebanese parliamentary elections were to take place on May 25, and the Syrian elections on June 8. The SSNP chose initially not to engage directly and observed the unfolding of the chaotic campaigns of the various candidates, focused as they were on personal and religious interests. It declared that it was willing to participate in a coalition for the opposition based on its reform principles. This initiative did not garner any tangible support, so the SSNP decided to put up its own independent candidates.11 Ten candidates were slated in the five electoral districts of Lebanon. Members of the opposition as well as candidates affiliated with the government who were not selected on the government slates, approached the SSNP with a proposal for a coalition. This was purely a coalition of convenience and for the limited purpose of the election. Nevertheless, the SSNP leadership reasoned that it might open the door for a political compromise with the government since the brother of the president was a leading proponent of such a coalition. Saadeh hoped that such negotiations may pave the way to a resolution of the campaign of intimidation and harassment the SSNP was subject to.12

  The 1947 election has gone down in history as the most fraudulent election ever held in Lebanon.13 Intimidation, coercion, stuffing of ballots boxes, and falsification of results were so flagrant that even government ministers came out criticizing the practice. In some jurisdictions, there were more ballots than voters to ensure the election of favored candidates. The losers clamored for an insurrection and acts of disobedience and appealed to the SSNP to join in that effort. The SSNP was uniquely targeted by the fraudulent actions. It chose, however, not to join in with the opposition in an unprincipled insurrection. The efforts of the opposition soon petered out and control of the government remained in the clutches of the oligarchy. On May 30, five days after the election, Saadeh issued a communique characterizing the election as a tragicomedy, detailing the infractions committed, and questioning the validity and legality of the elected parliament. He criticized the general absence of civic responsibility and unprincipled alliances. He chided the citizens of Lebanon for allowing the rampant disregard of civic liberties exercised by the government as it persecuted the SSNP, aimed to arrest its leader, and suspended the operation of its newspaper. He warned, however, against the calls to civil disobedience by the opposition whose corrupt plans and aims were no better than those of the government.14

  The manufactured success of the ruling oligarchs meant that the resulting government did not need to come to a political agreement with the SSNP, and its campaign against the Party and its leader could continue. Indeed, raids against SSNP strongholds intensified. The campaign aimed at maintaining pressure on Saadeh and disrupting his effective leadership of the Party did curtail his efforts at re-organizing the ranks of the SSNP. If the defiant fugitive garnered any sympathy from the public, it could not be turned into any tangible political momentum.

  THE “GREATER SYRIA” SCHEME

  Soon after the end of the elections, Saadeh travelled secretly to Jordan to meet with King Abdallah and his representatives to review a potential alliance and examine the degrees of concordance between the King’s “Greater Syria” project and the aim of the SSNP. The King had sent emissaries to meet with Saadeh in his hideout in Lebanon and proposed an alliance.15 During Saadeh’s absence, the SSNP had publicly opposed the Greater Syria project on political grounds and in accord with its political alliances with Lebanese politicians who were opposed to the scheme. News of the visit leaked to the press, and it does not seem to have led to any concrete plans or understanding as neither the SSNP nor the King manifested any actions or declarations that would suggest otherwise. Accusations that the SSNP was allied with King Abdallah would be raised by opponents of both and they represent no more than partisan rhetoric. Indeed, during the SNPs direst hour in July 1949, Jordan did not come to its aid nor did it provide any succor even nominally.

  THE BATTLE FOR LEADERSHIP

  In the weeks following the elections, the confrontation between Saadeh and the Thabit camp reached a crisis level. Saadeh had been patient with his old comrades choosing to dialogue with them rather than ostracize them. However, as they saw his tightening grip over the Party and their political plans in tatters, they moved from latent opposition to frank insubordination and public confrontation. In early July, Saadeh suspended Thabit, Ayyas, and Achqar from all responsibilities and activities within the party. The suspended members, save Achqar, declared their resignation and the formation of a new Lebanese party which they invited their supporters to join. Thabit issued a public statement criticizing Saadeh and blaming him of endangering the future of the SSNP and of Lebanon. Thabit’s attempt was ineffective and his new party was an abortive attempt by a desperate man. Achqar on further reflection realigned with Saadeh and declared his allegiance publicly.16

  With the defeat of Thabit and his group, the government had lost a lever of pressure on Saadeh and the SSNP. Thabit and his group had monopolized the central leadership of the SSNP and had held most of the sensitive posts in its hierarchy. Thabit had been in effective control of the SSNP as he combined his role as president of the Higher Council (which is the legislative branch of the SSNP hierarchy), with membership in the executive council and presidency of the political bureau, in effect monopolizing all relevant positions within the Party. The Thabit administration had neglected, wittingly or unwittingly, to develop a next generation of leaders and qualified Party administrators. Further, they had excluded dissenters from positions of power and alienated them to the point of defection from the organization. This dearth of experienced party cadres hampered and delayed much of Saadeh’s plans and burdened him with unnecessary chores.

  The government’s campaign against the SSNP and its leader was entering its seventh month and had resulted in a stalemate. Neither side had enough political or military power to win the standoff. Over many months, Saadeh waged a counter attack against the Government, its policies of repression and oppression, its falsification of elections, its economic and political favoritism and the unbridled growth of government sponsored capitalist power. Gaining some support among senior members of the judiciary by arguing for the constitutional right of freedom of expression and assertion of non-belligerence towards the Lebanese state, Saadeh pushed for a political compromise. The initiative was finally successful and the warrant for Saadeh’s arrest was withdrawn after the formality of a personal visit to the Attorney General on October 9, 1947.17

  PALESTINE IN PERIL

  With the “Lebanon first” policy of the Thabit administration and the disruptive confrontation with the Lebanese govern
ment that pre-occupied its ranks, the SSNP was not prepared to materially engage in the battle for Palestine. Nevertheless, the imminent and present danger of a catastrophe in southern Syria impelled it to actions despite its chronic shortage of resources and need of breathing room to rebuild its organization. Witnessing the disarray in the actions of various Palestinian and Syrian groups in combating Zionist advances, the SSNP could not afford to remain silent. Taking advantage of the tenuous truce with the Lebanese government, the SSNP called for a massive rally in Beirut on the anniversary of the Balfour declaration on November 2, 1947. This was critically important on the national front to mobilize internal forces, and equally important on the international front as significant decisions at the United Nations were due later that month.

  SSNP branches throughout Syria were invited to this demonstration and convoys from as far away as Aleppo headed to Beirut. The plan, however, unnerved the Lebanese government that always feared that such a massing of SSNP supporters could be used to challenge its authority and even overthrow it. It informed the SSNP that it had instituted a ban on public gatherings and demonstrations and the Balfour day demonstration would not be allowed to proceed.

  The government claimed that the Arab Council in Palestine had requested that efforts be directed at raising financial support for its own fighters in lieu of public demonstrations. The SSNP countered that the Arab Council was not a representative body and did not have monopoly over Palestinian issues, nor did it have qualifications to be the sole authority on all initiatives for the Palestinian cause. The Lebanese government was using the Arab Council as an excuse that suited its purpose of crippling any political activity by the SSNP. The accommodation reached barely a month before meant a cessation of overt military activity against the SSNP, but did not mean an end to efforts of intimidations and subversion. The threat of the use of force to disperse any gathering and the risk of being drawn into renewed confrontation with the Lebanese government and the further drain on time and resources led the SSNP to cancel the planned demonstration. In lieu of the demonstration, Saadeh issued a long communique in which he provided a comprehensive review of the evolution of the Palestinian question since World War I, detailed the disarray in the activities of the Syrian states and politicians, and stressed the need for organized cooperation and a unified Syrian national effort.18 He called on Syrians from various states to come together in a unified national effort. The call was not heeded and the disarray continued. The consequence was that within a month the United Nations voted for the partition of Palestine on November 30, 1947.