The Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Page 21
750,000 Palestinians were expelled and made refugees by Zionist paramilitaries, and subsequently Israeli forces 1947–49.
The SSNP attempted with all its means to prevent the loss of Palestine. Its efforts were often resisted more by local governments than by Zionist forces. The traditional political and religious leadership in southern Syria refused to allow the SSNP access to arms, and repeatedly refused offers by the SSNP to enroll its members in the military forces fighting Zionist groups. Despite their meager resources, SSNP members fought against the Jewish forces in Haifa, Acre, Galilee, and the environs of Jerusalem and suffered many casualties. They also participated in military operations along the Lebanese and Syrian fronts. The lack of arms and ammunition was compounded by the refusal of the Arab Supreme Command to supply SSNP members and units with arms from their depots for purely political reasons. SSNP units throughout Syria marshalled what resources they had to help shelter, feed, and care for the waves of refugees evicted from Palestine in one of the largest operations of ethnic cleansing of the 20th century. Saadeh placed the responsibility of the Palestinian tragedy squarely on the heads of the reactionary politicians who controlled the Syrian governments, resources, and institutions for their incompetence, bickering, internecine fighting, and refusal to join in a unified Syrian effort to serve the national cause.19
Following the loss of Palestine, the SSNP spared no effort in alerting the Syrians to the dangers of Zionist settlements. It recognized that the establishment of the Jewish State in 1948 was only the beginning of a policy of expansionism that endangered the entire Syrian homeland. The Party also resisted and censored all attempts at normalization of relations with the Jewish State or political alliances between sectarian Lebanese separatist groups and the Jewish state.20
REBUILDING THE SSNP
The ideological fabric of the Party had been weakened by neglect of the study of its principles and philosophy, and foreign concepts were growing in its midst. The literature of the SSNP was without direction and prominent intellectuals in leadership positions were popularizing concepts in party publications divergent from the philosophy of Social Nationalism.
The neglect of ideological formation of Party cadres required a broad ideological education program that Saadeh undertook in the series of weekly lectures delivered in the Cultural Forum of the SSNP between January 7 and April 4, 1948. The Cultural Forum had been founded in the 1930s, and in some preliminary discussions with college students Saadeh had promised to revive it. While the original cultural forum was a restricted activity usually involving mostly SSNP intellectuals, the series of weekly lectures was opened to the public and garnered a wide interest in Beirut. Intellectuals from various political streams attended the lectures. While only 75 people attended the first lecture, by the third lecture the number routinely exceeded 500 attendees. Saadeh assigned trustee George Abdel Massih who had mastered an Arabic shorthand method to take notes and an edited transcript of the first five lectures was published in Saadeh’s lifetime. The transcripts of the subsequent lectures appeared posthumously. For several decades, the transcripts of these lectures became the standard text for the popularization of the ideology of the SSNP and are one of the most influential ideological factors in the survival and growth of the Party. Generations of SSNP members learned the ideology of their Party from this book. These didactic lectures are a tour de force in their eloquence and erudition. They represent a detailed study of the basic and reform principles of the SSNP, and the philosophy of Social Nationalism contained therein.
Saadeh gave great attention to the formation of Party intellectuals. He conducted a series of closed seminars and workshops with select groups of SSNP writers, poets, and intellectuals dealing with various philosophical concepts and views varying from esthetics to ethics. These were held in the context of the Cultural Forum on Saturdays in parallel with his public lectures delivered on Sundays. The SSNP issued a special publication al-Nizam aI-Jadid (The New Order) dedicated to publishing studies dealing with the philosophical tenets of Social Nationalism, the history and heritage of Syria, and the poetry and literature of the Syrian renaissance.
OUTREACH ACTIVITIES
Reviving the organizational structure of the SSNP was a more difficult task mostly because of the lack of resources and trained manpower. The years of decentralization of the administration of the Party had led to a weakening of the structure of the SSNP and a good deal of its members had either joined other groups, retired from political work, or sat idle awaiting direction. Saadeh undertook a tour of the branches of the SSNP in the various parts of Syria. In the early part of 1948, Saadeh visited several areas in the Lebanon including Freykeh (January), Tripoli and Qalamoun (January), Jal-el-Dib (February), Burj al-Barajeneh (February), and Aley (March). He also undertook a short trip to Damascus in March. The need to expand the popular base of the SSNP and consequently its political power, drove Saadeh to undertake two major grass-root outreach initiatives in the latter part of 1948. While expanding the popular base of the Party was the responsibility of the various departments of the SSNP, Saadeh’s personal endeavors had always had a multiplier effect. His charisma and appeal always drew large crowds to SSNP gatherings. The tours allowed Saadeh to evaluate the status of his organization, gauge the trends in the popular sector, and meet local politicians, notables, and powerbrokers.
The tour in Lebanon was achieved through short trips to various locations including the Kura district in the north (September 19), the Shouf district (September 30 and October 3), and the Jezzine district in the south (October 10). The tour in the hinterland was prolonged and spanned the entire month of November 1948. Saadeh began his trip in Damascus on November 3rd. Saadeh stayed in the Syrian capital through November 12th. Between the 14th and 16th of the month he was in Homs, in Hama on the 17th, and then he headed to Aleppo where he stayed from the 19th to the 26th of November. His Aleppo stay was interrupted by a return trip to Hama on November 24th for a lecture. From Aleppo, Saadeh headed to the coast and between November 26th and December 5th visited the cities of Latakia, Tarsus, Banias and Safita. This was reminiscent of his visit in 1936 with its memorable displays of horsemanship and festivities.
POLEMICS AND ASCENDENCY
Saadeh conceived of the SSNP as a defiant agent of change willing and ready to take on the reactionary bastions in Syria, dismantle their intellectual frameworks, and expose their nefarious influences on Syria’s future. The prolonged suspension of the SSNP newspaper al-Jil al-Jadid (The New Generation) by the Lebanese government led Saadeh to seek alternate venues to deliver his messages to the people. Tours and speeches played a role, but the written medium of periodicals was a necessary component of the outreach. The publisher of Kul Shai’ (All News), a young journalist named Mohammed Baalbaki, had engaged Saadeh in a discussion of national issues that ultimately led Baalbaki to join the SSNP. In the interim, Baalbaki welcomed Saadeh’s Op-Ed pieces on the front pages of his periodical. Saadeh covered a range of issues on the pages of Kul Shai’ with a unifying theme of dismantling the theoretical constructs of reactionary groups and their political ideas. The articles appeared on a weekly schedule between mid-January to mid-April 1949 and ceased when al-Jil al-Jadid resumed publication. Baalbaki had engaged Saadeh in a discussion of Pan-Arabism to which Baalbaki originally adhered, so it was natural for the opening article to be dedicated to that topic.
Saadeh had maintained throughout his career that an elucidation of national identity was the necessary pre-requisite to sound political activity and that national renaissance should be based on a robust understanding of the elements of nationhood and nationalism. The most prominent topics of these editorials were the issues of national identity and the debunking of religious Pan-Arabism and religious based Lebanese isolationism. Saadeh tackled the bankruptcy of Pan-Arabism and trampled the feeble attempts of its proponents to defend it. He tackled the tenets of Pan-Arabism and its sectarian religious undertones, and its corrupt usurpation of leadership in Syria and
its responsibility for the loss of Palestine.21 He also confronted the separatist Lebanese movement and its equally sectarian underpinnings stoking the fires of religious discord and past grievances to secure political gains.22 He countered the claims of the two sectarian trends by illustrating how the aim of the SSNP would secure the formation of a realistic Arab front in lieu of the confused plans of the Pan-Arabists.23 He also discussed how the SSNP political program was the salvation of the Lebanese 24 from the curse of religious discord.25 He also tackled the fad of “reform movements” appearing on the scene, a reference to the emerging sectarian “Progressive Socialist Party” of Kamal Junblatt among the Druzes.26 To clearly delineate the distinction between the Syrian nationalism of the SSNP and the political schemes of the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri as-Said and the Jordanian Prince Abdullah, Saadeh expounded on the motives and the machinations behind the two seemingly concordant political schemes.27
The SSNP was winning the war of ideas and ideologies, and making inroads into the constituencies of traditional Christian and Muslim politicians and eroding their base of support. This progress was translated in the local elections in Lebanon in 1949 where SSNP candidates made substantial gains.28
Saadeh during a tour in the Syrian hinterland reviewing SSNP members.
THE ZAIM COUP
On the night of March 30, 1949, contingents from the Syrian army cordoned off Damascus and blocked all major thoroughfares into and out of the city. Military convoys converged on main government headquarters while smaller forces apprehended leading government officials including the president Shukri al-Quwatly, the prime minister and several ministers and high-ranking officials. The coup encountered no resistance and by sunrise on March 31, 1949, Husni az-Zaim was in control of the capital and nominally the country. Syrians were treated to a spectacle that was to repeat itself numerous times over the next two decades as Zaim inaugurated the trend of government take-over by the armed forces. The token ‘Communique no. 1’ that would become the prototype for future similar announcements, and the flurry that followed, informed the citizenry of the change in leadership, called for calm, threatened that seditions or resistance acts would be dealt with harshly, and promised reforms to better the lot of the citizens.
In a fake nod to democracy and the will of the people, Zaim paid a visit to Fares Khoury, the head of the Syrian parliament and invited the representatives to a dialogue aimed at legitimization of the new leadership. When these proved fruitless, Zaim dissolved parliament and promised future elections at an opportune time. Written resignations by the President Quwatly and his Prime Minister were extracted in due course and facsimile copies published in the local press. Wide ranging reform legislations derived from the playbook of various political parties, including the SSNP, were enacted by edicts from the new leader. The Syrian populace was bewildered by the unaccustomed event and traditional notables who relied for their political base on loyalties and affiliations were not equipped to mount any resistance. Further, the mounting discontent with the prior civilian government and the increasingly evident corruption gave way to a euphoria expressed particularly among students and young workers who thronged to the streets, when allowed by the army, to express their support. The adulation of the mob was stirred by agents of the regime and regional functionaries intimidated by the brute power of the army declared their allegiance publicly. It appeared that Zaim was safely enthroned in power. When asked for an impromptu comment at a social gathering on April 3, Saadeh cautiously choose to focus on the ills of the overthrown regime and its suppression of freedom of expression and assembly. He warned his listeners from putting their hopes on capricious events and advised patience until the new regime clearly declares its policies.29
On April 13, 1949, the SSNP newspaper offered a cautious but positive assessment of the Zaim coup praising its reform initiatives that it declared consonant with SSNP initiatives and hinted at the role of SSNP elements in their formulation. It also expressed the hope that the new regime would allow more opportunity for expansion of the role of the SSNP than its oppressive predecessor regimes.30
The refusal of the Lebanese government to recognize the Zaim regime infuriated the latter and precipitated a crisis between the two states. Zaim started courting the opposition forces in Lebanon, among them the SSNP. Zaim's threats of interference in Lebanon alarmed the Lebanese government and increased its scrutiny of the activities of the opposition, as well as its efforts to nurture domestic and pan-Arab support. Egypt was instrumental in attempting to resolve the Zaim-Lebanon conflict through its influence on both parties. Contacts between Zaim and the SSNP also alarmed the Lebanese government and played a role in accelerating the efforts of the Lebanese government against the SSNP.
A GATHERING STORM
The ongoing revival of the SSNP, the growing popular discontent with the Lebanese government, electoral fraud, and usurpation of resources, made the rulers of Lebanon more determined to eliminate the SSNP and Saadeh from the Lebanese political scene. This they proceeded to do by harassment and tyranny. SSNP members were dismissed from government offices and pressured out of civil service posts. Party meetings and large gatherings were proscribed on flimsy excuses of maintaining order and tranquility. Party publications were intermittently banned or confiscated (the SSNP newspaper al-Jil aI-Jadid (The New Generation) was banned for one year starting April 1948), and armed police were frequently sent to forcibly disperse SSNP gatherings. This series of events culminated by the Government instigating the Phalanges party to attack the printing press of the SSNP daily paper on the evening of June 9, 1949, in an attempt to assassinate Saadeh, or at the very least create a pretext for his arrest.31 The transparency of the plan was betrayed by the Government moving swiftly to issue warrants of arrest for the victims of the incident (SSNP members and Saadeh) and no attempt at disciplining or even reprimanding the aggressor Phalanges. In effect, the Government had declared open war on the SSNP. Its members were arrested and jailed, its publications and offices confiscated, and its leader pursued. The arrests of Party members were so massive that within a few days more than 2500 were either in prison or in detention camps. Saadeh went clandestinely to Damascus to organize and lead the fight against the Lebanese government. He met with Zaim who had his own gripes with the Lebanese government and was promised support.
The Lebanese government was determined in its plan to extirpate the SSNP from the Lebanese political scene. To contain the onslaught, Saadeh sought to open a negotiation channel with the government akin to what transpired during the prior confrontation after his return in 1947. Much had changed, however, and the resolve of the government in the pursuit of its radical goal was bolstered by significant regional and international support. Nevertheless, Saadeh sent a trusted negotiator to contact the office of the Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Solh, the main force behind the government action. At the arranged meeting, the SSNP negotiator was treated to a barrage of accusations by Solh claiming that Saadeh and the SSNP were in collusion with the Zionists to topple the Lebanese government and establish a new regime allied with Israel! These were the same charges that Solh had declared publicly to explain the campaign against the SSNP. Assertions to the contrary only stoked Solh’s fake ire. He went on to suggest slyly that if SSNP leaders were to denounce Saadeh’s collusion with the Zionists, the campaign against the SSNP would wind down and prisoners would be released.
Despite early promises of support, Zaim was growing tepid on the alliance with the SSNP that he had used for his purposes to pressure the Lebanese government. The more reconciliation he achieved with Solh, the less his enthusiasm for the SSNP. By late June, it was clear that relations with Zaim had soured 32 and the SSNP leadership was being tracked and apprehended by Syrian security forces. Saadeh himself had to move to an undisclosed location. It is unclear why in the midst of these changes the SSNP continued on the path to declare an insurgency in Lebanon. It is likely that its leadership realized that a negotiated settlement with the Lebanese government
was the only path forward and sought to create facts on the ground to force such a settlement.
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1 Homecoming Speech, Complete Works, Volume 7, pp. 204-207.
2 Letter to the director of the Sureté Générale, Complete Works, Volume 11, p. 304.
3 He gave interviews to around ten newspapers in a period of two months.
4 First communique to the Lebanese people, Complete Works, Volume 7, pp.208-209.
5 Letter to Juliette, March 19, 1947. Rasa’il ila Dia’, pp. 219.
6 Second communique to the Lebanese people, Complete Works, Volume 7, pp.217-219.
7 Nehmeh Thabit, batal al-Khiyanat (Nehmeh Thabit, the traitor hero), Complete Works, Volume 7, pp.298-304.