Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  The 1975 CIA Report

  South Asians are given to a fervent belief in conspiracy theories, and Bengalis may be even more susceptible. So, while there is no reason for Indian to attack Bangladesh, in 1975 when Sheikh Mujibar Rehman, the man who led East Pakistan to independence as Bangladesh, was overthrown there was talk in Delhi of intervening to restore him to the Presidency to which he had been legitimately elected. In the event, he was murdered by his captors. In November 1975, the Bangladesh Army of 87,000 troops in four divisions seemed on the verge of open mutiny due to internal tension in the military junta succeeding Rehman and the CIA believed the risk of an Indian invasion had increased “substantially”. [97] India was a strong backer of Sheikh Mujibar Rehman. The scenario specifically notes it is concerned with capabilities, not with reasons for intervention. What is interesting about the scenario is that it shows detailed knowledge of Indian contingency plans, naming five divisions and two independent brigades as the intervening force. These included 50 Parachute and 71 Mountain Independent Brigades, the 8th, 20th, and 57th Divisions, and the 4th, 9th, and 23rd Divisions.[98] Indian 6th and 54th Division would be available too. This is a reasonable orbat. In the event, India decided not to intervene, but with this background, and the Bengalis long memories and predilection for conspiracies, it is possible that Bangladesh still harbors suspicions of India.

  From the order of battle viewpoint, intriguingly the CIA mentions 44th Division (Comilla); 72nd Division (Rangpura), 55th Division (Jessore), and 65th Division (Chittagong). None exist today except for 55th. I have no idea what happened to the other divisions. Since, however, 9th Division (Savar) raised 1976 is commonly listed as Bangladesh’s first division, possibly the others were disbanded. At that time, I did not follow the Bangladesh Army. Also, in a minor inaccuracy, the orbat has Indian 10th Division at Pathankot and not at Akhnur.

  China and India’s rail links with Bangladesh

  Both for security and economic reasons, India has correctly chosen to improve rail links with Bangladesh. A 15-km link connecting the eastern Bangladesh rail system to Agartala in Tripura State will be complete in 2018, permitting trains from Delhi to Agartala to run straight through. This link will also connect Agartala with Bangladesh’s Chittagong Port, permitting cargo ships to unload at the port with rail transport to the North East Frontier Railway, and boosting Indo-Bangladesh trade in the region. Further, Bangladesh has recently agreed that all 12 rail-links with India snapped because of Partition in 1947 should be restored. This is both heartening and sad because it has taken 47-years to make this obvious step. Lack of money might have been a major issue for the delay.

  The problem surfaces in the event of war with China. As Bangladesh and China grow closer, the former may decide to declare neutrality in wartime, thus avoiding unpleasentness with either friend. But what if under Chinese pressure, Dhaka allows passage to Chinese forces? It is also worth thinking about the possibility that China, presently rebuilding and expanding Burma’s rail system, will request the latter to permit military traffic in wartime. This will greatly complicate India’s defense of the Northeast. In 2015, China mooted a high-speed link 2800-km long between Kunming-Imphal-Kolkatta via Burma and Bangladesh. For a good academic analysis of the proposal, see Atimendu Palit. [99] In 2017 China brought up the idea again, saying there were people in India ‘quivering’ (with anxiety) at the prospect, but everyone agrees it was the best thing for the four nations, and it was willing to wait ‘a bit’ for India to come around.[100]

  Now, this is so sweet of China. Who knew Beijing was so sympathetic and empathic of India’s concerns? When the British imperalists saw it to their advantage to do something, there were no consultations with the natives. Is India allowed to ask what happens after Beijing has waited ‘a bit’ and we haven’t seen the Chinese version of truth, bcause we are so fearful of China, untrusting of its truly benign intentions, and its efforts to bring their version of the 21st Century to us, all for our own good?

  Interestingly, it seems India is agreeable to link-up on its own terms. One is to refer to such a project as the Trans Asian Rail Network, and not speak the words “One Belt One Road”, which India vehemently opposes. The Agartala-Dacca-Delhi link is almost complete, and India plans to connect Moreh in Manipur State with the Burma rail system.

  Meanwhile, China keeps marching forward on its One Belt One Road. The biggest projects in Bangladesh are a $3-billion, 169-km rail line between Dhaka and Jessore, for 2021 completion, and a 6.15-km rail/road bridge across the Padma for $1.5-billion, 2019 completion. The Jessore-Dhaka link, 120-kmph, is very expensive by Chinese standards, probably because of bridges and possibly because of the need to elevate long sections of track.

  The Padma bridge will connect southwest Bangladesh to Dhaka and the central part of the country with a single- track rail-line and a 4-lane highway. Originally it was hoped to open the bridge in December 2018, with the completion of the rail project by 2022, but piling delays have shifted the bridge date to mid-2019, perhaps a rare setback for a Chinese project. Other projects include a 20-km north-south Dhaka metro line, and a broad-gauge dual-track line from the capital to Narayanganj, quadrupling traffic capacity. It has also built seven “Friendship Bridges” to bridge rivers previously traversable only by ferry. An eighth is under construction, a ninth, 1.4-km long, has been approved, and a tenth is planned. Dhaka expects China’s help with several national 4-land expressways, including an elevated one between Dhaka and Chittagong. To put it concisely, the Chinese are helping reshape Bangladesh. The Chinese ability to casually throw money at these projects seems inexhaustible, for example, the $700-million Karnaphuli 3.5-km 4-lane tunnel. This will connect the Dhaka-Chittagong-Cox’s Bazar Highway to the Asian Highway.

  5.4 Nepal

  All we need to note about Nepal and India being of the same family is that Nepal is the birthplace of Rama, an incarnation of the Hindu super-god Vishnu, and that it is a Hindu kingdom. Sita, Rama’s wife, was also born in Nepal. Because Nepal lies in

  Schematic of China proposed Kuming-Kolkatta high speed rail link[101]

  the mountains which rise to the north of the Indo-Gangetic plain, it can in modern terms be considered an autonomous state of India. Now, I am aware that some archeologists maintain Rama was born in Northwest India. Even if this is eventually proved, it is irrelevant, because the Nepalese believe he is theirs, just as we also believe he is ours. The exact GPS coordinates accurate to 1-meter of his birthplace are of no concern when we are pointing out religious, cultural, and economic kinship.

  Like most peoples of the sub-continent, the Nepalese did not have much problem with accepting the British as overlords, particularly as the British never directly controlled the kingdom as they controlled Indian kingdoms. After Independence, however, understandably, whenever the Nepalese did things not seen as in India’s interest, India exerted pressure. Which the Nepalese have increasingly resented. India’s point here is that of the traditional imperialist: you want our protection and our money, then we expect your quid in return for our quo. While this is all sensible and normal in the relations between states, perhaps a different approach was needed. When you give your protection and money to your little brother, do you in return demand his compliant behavior? No. You give because that is your duty, without conditions. You do not squeeze his throat by embargoes on arms, trade, and fuel.

  Until recently, Nepal had no choice but to comply. Then of a sudden, the Chinese built a railway to Lhasa, and then to Xigatze, and now west to Keyroing, which lies in Tibet directly to the north of Kathmandu. Next, they signed an agreement with China to for a project report to extend the line to Kathmandu-Pokahra -Lumbini, this last being the birthplace of the Buddha and on the Indian border. One report says the project is included in China’s 13th Plan, and in 2020 construction will begin on a major tunnel under the Himalayas, complete in 2022 as a first step. They built a road to Korla which can link with the Nepal roadnet, and create an inland port to facilitate trad
e. The Korla link will open in 2020, connecting Nepal with southeast China by 2030. The Kunming-Nyangtri rail line is already under construction. From the west, the Lhasa-Shigatse-Korla line will link to Nyangtri by 2020. From the east, the Kunming-Nyangtri link is under construction. Eventually the Chinese will link Korla to Kashgar, giving Nepal access to southwest China. Meanwhile, India has in operation a narrow-gauge 29-km link to Janakpur, closed in 2014 for upgrade to broad gauge, scheduled for completion March 2018.[102] Later it will extend north by 69-km, and feature 14 stations. Land leveling has already been done. India will also link Kathmandu to Delhi and Kolkata.[103] This will be via a 136-km route from Birganj-Kathmandu. Birganj is connected to Raxual on the Indian border, perhaps. Several other lines are also under consideration.

  Nepal is set on a ~1400-km east-west line running through districts with 66% of nation’s population, mainly in the lower lying Terrai region. The main line is about 850-km, perhaps about 200-km are six connections with India, and a 50-km connection to the Pokhara-Kathmandu line (already committed to by China). Several hundred kilometers of tunnels are included. Indian Railways finished the feasibility study in 2012[104]. While media reports are not entirely clear, it appears that the Chinese are not keen on getting involved, because this line is not part of their OBOR-Nepal plan, while the Keyrong-Kathmandu-Pokhara-Lumbini line north-south (roughly) line is. China has not refused outright but has pleaded this will be a complex and expensive project, and more study is required beyond the feasibility study already done by Nepal Railways and the Indian Railways consultancy division. I could not spare the 10-hours estimated research to understand the east-west line, as it was not part of my original analysis.

  There is a reason India is not building railways in Nepal: simple economics. Either GOI gives Nepal a grant, which we cannot afford, or it must be commercially viable. In this game the Chinese are tops because they think in terms of strategic investment and have money. They are unconcerned with commercial returns because of larger goals. After the railroad is built, in time the traffic will increase, and the line become profitable. The Chinese will put in the squeeze when Nepal is inextricably dependent on them. It will be like a Chinese version of a Roach Motel: the roaches check in, but none leave. Meanwhile, they will be sugar and spice and all that is nice, leaving the Nepalese to draw the obvious comparison between bullying India and kind, selfless, helpful China.

  The next item to watch is the supply of military equipment, particularly helicopters, which Nepal’s military and civil defense badly need. Their current fleet is a hodge-podge which must be very hard to maintain. It has approximately 4 types of light transport and six of helicopters, for 29 machines (including those on order). China is training Nepal’s border police force, has given $145-million in earthquake aid and roads, a report says that at any time 100 Nepali officials are junketing around China, language classes for Nepali tour grounds, a police training academy, joint military exercise anti-terror/hostage rescue, selling the advantage of OBOR to Nepal, 55% increase in Chinee tourists in 2016 alone, putting pressure on Nepal after China’s preferred candidate for PM was defeated. And this is all in 2016-17. Most interesting, a Transit Treaty allowing Nepal to import goods from third countries without Chinese taxes. This will break India’s hold over Nepal’s trade, currently India’s strongest pressure. A Free Trade Agreement is under negotiation.

  5.5 China and Sri Lanka

  As is wholly understandable, Sri Lanka has from the start been friendly to China as a way of counterbalancing India. Colombo fears that India might annex Sri Lanka date back to 1947, before independence, based on India’s “annexation” of Kashmir, and it entered an alliance giving UK the responsibility for the external defense of the country. In 1962, for example, Sri Lanka refused to condemn China for its attack on India. In 1971, Pakistan airlifted troops to Sri Lanka to help suppress a Communist uprising. When India banned Pakistan overflights, Sri Lanka permitted Pakistan to refuel at Colombo, which allowed Pakistan to support its operations in East Pakistan more easily. This decision was multi-faceted, one was that Sri Lanka did not want its Tamil rebels to use Bangladesh as an excuse for their own nation. India supported the Tamil uprising in the 1970s and early 1980s, further feeding the island nations deepest fears about is hegemonic neighbor. Though India changed course and helped Sri Lanka stop the rebels in 1987-90, the government wanted India out as the earliest possible opportunity. The rise of China and it’s never-emptying cornucopia of aid led Sri Lanka to accept large infrastructure investments and to permit Chinese warships to dock in the country. In 2014, after a Chinese nuclear attack boat visited, India pressured Sri Lanka’s new government to stop submarine visits.[105] Rumors said New Delhi had interfered in the election to overthrow the previous pro-China government in favor of one more amenable to Indian concerns.[106] While undoubtedly India was involved in the election campaign, it is not easy to influence election outcomes.

  China used cheap financing for big infrastructure projects to gain a foothold in Sri Lanka, which has accepted $15-billion in the period 2005-2017.[107] To put this sum in perspective, it amounts to $700 per capita, making it equivalent to almost $1 trillion for India ($928-billion, to be more precise). India’s response has been grumpy, and as with Chinese investment in Pakistan and Bangladesh, misses the point. When China, to reduce its China debt, handed over the Chinese built port of Hambantota on a 99-year lease for $1.1-billion, a typical Indian comment was that Sri Lanka would now learn the cost of taking Chinese money.[108] The point India is missing is there is simply no way countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Nepal can attract massive infrastructure investment from any commercial or international agency. Sri Lanka offered the port first to India, which rejected it as commercially unviable. China will invest further large amounts of money in commercial ventures which will use subsidized money. These investments will create jobs. For example, a Chinese company is to invest $1-billion in commercial buildings in Colombo, to be built on reclaimed land. The overall project will create 83,000 jobs, the equivalent of 5-million jobs in India. China will construct industrial estates at Hambantota ports, meeting its need for cheap labor as Chinese wages keep rising. So far Sri Lanka has said: no submarines. But after China gains control of a big enough chunk of the Sri Lanka economy, those submarines and more will arrive. Moreover, as Chinese influence in the country grows, so will Indian clandestine activity. India will see it as purely defensive. China will then step up its assurances to Colombo that it will protect Sri Lanka against India. It will not matter if the Sri Lankans worry about China’s expanding footprint. They will have no choice. It does not matter to China if it must take a commercial loss on its investments. It will be akin to foreign aid used to support China’s global ambitions. The US spent about 4.5% of its 1948 GDP on the Marshall Plan. Please look at the enormous benefit that accrued to the US. And of course, much of the money went to boost US exports. The same applies to China, which monopolizes even labor used by sending its own workers.

  Can the Indian intelligentsia to wake up and understand how China is using its money, aid, trade, and military power to buy/protect influence all over the world? Even just 1% a year of GDP spent on these geostrategic/geopolitical investments means $130-billion/year at this time, and double that in 12-15 years. According to a Brookings Institute 2017 report,[109] China limited the amount of corporate capital investment overseas to ~$200-billion/year. This would seem to exclude $80-90 billion/year worth of government investment. These are very large figures for 3rd World nations, who otherwise find it difficult to get money.

  5.6 China and Myanmar

  In Myanmar, China does not have the field to itself in contrast to most other Asian nations. Japan has decided to compete and is investing $200-billion 2016-2021 in Asia.[110] Singapore is also a heavy investor. China’s GDP is $13-trillion versus Japan’s $5-trillion. In Japan’s case, yen depreciation has pulled it down from $6.2-trillion in 2012. Nonetheless, given Japan is a highly
developed country with a per capita of $48,000 it probably should have a higher percentage of GDP for overseas investment than China, because the opportunities for domestic investment should be less. The problem is that Japan is a proper capitalist state, so it cannot beyond a point afford to lose money on overseas investments. China is better off in that respect. Moreover, by the time Chinese GDP doubles to $26-trillion in – say 2030 (6% annual growth), Japan may be up only to $6.5-billion (2% annual growth). Japan cannot then compete with China in investments made for geo-strategical gains. Japan has a quality edge, but China will catch up. In 20-years, China has invested $14-billion.[111] To date, possibly the most important project is an oil pipeline from Myanmar to Kunming, Yunnan, bypassing the Malacca choke-point.[112] The 771-km line carries 22-million-tons/year of crude. A parallel gas line carries 12-billion-meters3.

  Myanmar has canceled a $3.5-billion dam project financed by China because environmental protests have led it to downgrade Big Hydro.[113] India will be courting false hope if it thinks this represents a setback to Chinese economic expansion in Myanmar. This project is already being renegotiated, with one alternative being several smaller dams.[114] We’re already noted Pakistan canceled the $14-billion Daimer project because it did not want to give the Chinese the share they wanted, and much the same is true of Nepal’s cancellation. The three countries are so impoverished, however, they will eventually take Chinese money, either for other projects, or after renegotiating terms for the dams.