Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  One problem with making studies is that data is hard to come by, and alarmists rule. For example, one study says an Indo-Pakistan war with 100 15-KT explosions would lead to a global loss of 10% of sunlight for 10-years, because of 5-million tons of smoke from burning cities, with global temperatures dropping 1.5 C and severe cold, disruption of agriculture leading to 1-billion famine deaths.[316] That results from just 1.5-megatons worth of explosions. By “alarmists” I do not mean people who are manipulating or putting out false data. They are, instead, chaining multiple worst-case scenarios. The Krakatoa (Indonesia) volcano explosion of 1883 is estimated at 200-megatons, throwing 45-cubic km of ejecta into the atmosphere.[317] Tambora 1815 exploded with a force of 33-gigatons,[318] putting 100-million tons of sulfur aerosols into the atmosphere. Six years previously another volcano had put 50-million tons.[319] In 1253, Rinjani, Indonesia put more than 250-million-tons into the atmosphere with 175-cubic kilometers of ejecta, lowering temperatures by 2 C. Admittedly 2018 is not 1815, when the total world population may have been around 1-billion versus ~7.5-billion today, and almost the entire world was agricultural and rural. Tambora caused 200,000+ deaths directly and indirectly.[320] That might equate to 1.5-million deaths today as the effect of an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange. Nonetheless, if recovery planning is not done, at least in India the toll could be far higher. An unrelated calculation gives 1-million tons of smoke will be generated by the combustion of 40,000 hectares (400-km2) of thick forest.[321] It seems hard to believe that 200,000-hectares on fire (2000-km2) could cause global winter for 10-years.

  Missiles landing on IAF bases can be reduced to a nuisance by quick-repair. About a 6-hour standard is possible with very-rapid hardening materials it could be reduced.[322] We can imagine a future system, also for use on roads, where a liquid polymer is pumped into a hole and then smoothed with a roller, taking less than 6-hours. This obviously requires well-drilled engineer squadrons at hand, even though highly trained personnel are not required. But a missile landing on a key road/rail bridge or an HQ or an ammo/POL dump can create severe problems. Readers wanting to learn more about rapid runway repair should read this dating from 1990.[323] The paper discusses nine techniques and finds that

  “The final results showed that the best RRR systems are asphalt blocks, fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) mats, and FRP foldable mats. These repair techniques possess the desirable advantages in an RRR system. They are fast, simple, and cost-effective, and extensive training is not required.”

  12. Roads and Railways

  12.1 Roads

  12.2 Rail

  12.3 Interlude: Battlefield Reserves

  12.1 Roads

  The British theory for India’s northern border was NOT to develop roads because roads would permit adversaries an easy advance into India. There is a certain logic to this, but conversely, no roads make it difficult for India to get reinforcements to the border. We followed this British policy, and the result was that when in 1959 we embarked on our Forward Policy stance against China because our road building was so excruciatingly slow, we do not reinforce before the outbreak of war in the fall of 1962. There’s a reason we had only a single brigade at Tawang, for example. We could not supply more, and we certainly could not supply even that brigade forward of Tawang. A brigade with an artillery regiment and an engineer squadron in those days would have required 100-tons a day in active defense, more for an attack.

  Now consider the road between Misamari railhead and Tawang.[324] From Misamari to Tezpur the road provided fair passage for 1-ton trucks. Once in the mountains, the hastily cut 1-ton road to Bomdila was difficult to traverse even in fair weather. It had not settled and was unsurfaced. The broken stone roadbed was murder on tires and transmissions. From Bomdila to Tawang the road became an unmetalled jeep track; in bad weather, even jeeps could get bogged down. The 345-km journey from the railhead took 3 days or more, depending on weather. From Tawang to the Namkachu Chu was a 6-day porter hike. Indeed, porters can deliver 100-tons/day – if you have large numbers.

  Six days means 12-days round trip. A strong, well-fed porter getting 1-kg/day food can carry 30-kg at those altitudes. That means aside from his sleeping bag etc., he delivers a net load of 18-kg. That requires 5,500 porters arriving at the Namka Chu every day, and 66,000 porters in all. No need to work out how 66,000 porters based on Tawang are themselves to be supported with only a fair-weather jeep road. So, this is obviously an exaggeration because the Indian Army did have some mule companies available.[325] Pakistan Army mules carry 72-kg loads at altitude and walk 26-km/day.[326] The problem? The cute critters need at least 8-kg/day of food. So, the net load for a six-day round trip would be 30-kg. That’s 19,000 mules, which puts paid to that idea. So how does the Army manage? Simple. It tried to stockpile supplies delivered by mule, air drop, and helicopter.

  The C-119 used by the IAF could probably para drop 6-tons, and the Mi-4 lift 1-ton. There were, however, just a few helicopters. Perhaps the IAF might have been able to spare 2-3 for Tawang sector. Russian engines had low Time Between Overhaul. Assume a Mi-4 was available for 300-hours a year. Those 2-3 were needed to resupply everyone in the sector, including Assam Rifles Border Roads. 2 Bell 47s might have been available for liaison, communications, and emergency casualty evacuation. A problem for the C-119 in this sector was that drop zones were small, and the aircraft flew too fast, even at minimum speed, for accuracy. So, your C-119 might drop 6-tons at a go, and fly perhaps 100 sorties a year – again, it must serve everyone, but you’d need a lot of porters on standby to retrieve supplies dumped wrong.

  I don’t want to belabor the point or numb readers with multiple tables, so let’s keep this brief. The buildup of 7th Brigade forward of Tawang was very hurried. Shiv Kunal Verma[327] notes that one way or another, Tawang itself was kept supplied and a stockpile created. But at the Namka Chu there was little by way of supplies and ammunition. Given the tenuous supply lines and the difficulty of replenishment, the Brigade would have needed 1000-tons stockpiled just for 10-days fighting in the defense. I have no figures on how many tons were stockpiled. The Army did manage 450 rounds for a heavy mortar battery, about 40-tons, and sufficient for 20-minutes for eight tubes. Unfortunately, Verma says, communications went down when the Chinese attacked due to their cutting wires, so it was unclear if the battery entered the action. Civilians need to be informed that serious communication mishaps are routine in combat. Today army units use multiple radios and wire nets, if links get cut, traffic is immediately rerouted. The Army had very severe problems with radios in the 1962 War, and their usefulness is compromised in deep mountain terrain. Today the transmissions use troposcatter, as this allows telephones to function without land lines. In those days a company had one wire link with its higher HQ. Further, forward observers to direct fires need reliable radios. To build roads, mule tracks, fortifications, and stock with the limited resources of the time and so on would likely have required 2-3 years. We had the time, but no one took the possibility of war seriously, and attacking forward of Tawang was beyond imagination. When field commanders advised senior officers at Corps and Army the very concept was madness, no one listened, because they had no idea of what the ground looked like.

  Today, it’s different. There are useable roads forward of Tawang, and numerous Mi-17 helicopters, which can comfortably carry up to 3-tons at that height. Conversely, however, today we need to support three divisions forward. Certainly, there are stockpiles. Yet There is no alternative to a broad-gauge rail line, because corps troops, paramilitary, and Border Roads also need support. Until then, a single word applies: tenuous. The Chinese have 3-ton roads for their brigades and 8-ton roads for their corps. Not to speak of the lateral east-west rail-lines they are building across the front. This is discussed further on.

  Back to 7th Brigade, the east-west traverse was so rough because of several river valleys that cut deeply into the mountains that 2-days traverse was required. Whoever heard of a brigade front requiring two d
ays passage? In the plains today, that is akin to using a single brigade to protect 400-km. Indian porters were apt to expeditiously desert, the going was too hard, and of course, once the shooting started, they didn’t want to get killed. Two-thirds of the paradropped supplies fell into deep valleys. The men had inadequate food; they were on hard rations even in peace. They had no protection against the weather. They were exhausted from simply trying to exist, and then they had to try and retrieve supplies from the mountainsides and valley. And ideas on how to haul a 55-gallon drum of fuel up 4000-feet were short. Oh yes: they had no entrenching tools or saws to build fortified positions. The Chinese had gasoline powered saws and jeered when Indians tried to use bayonets to cut wood. Must have raised Indian morale no end. Since the Indians had no artillery, the Chinese kept fires blazing all night long for warmth, while the Indians froze. The men had 60-rounds per rifle versus the 180-rounds/day required. They had so few grenades that returning patrols had to hand over their grenades to the next patrol. In close quarter fighting, grenades are critical. And of course, our boys had bolt-action rifles with 10-round magazines; the Chinese had their equivalent of the AK-47 automatic fire, 30-round magazines. Sixty-rounds last about 15-minutes. After which you either run or stand and die. ,By contrast three years later in 1965, the basic issue for US soldiers was 300-rounds M-16, and when in combat as many rounds as wanted were available.

  If I may be a permitted a rant. First, “last man, last round” is illogical. If the last man is gone, there’s no way to fire the last round. ‘Last round, last man’: get it right, folks. Second, this order must have a purpose, for example, ‘you are to hold the bridge at all costs until all remaining troops have crossed.’ So, you are sacrificing some to save many. You cannot be out of ideas, and demand everyone holds till they die. The solution is to fall back. People who issue such orders should be required to join the last man drama. It is immoral to order men to sacrifice themselves because of your stupidity. On a military level, it violates the principle of conserving your force. What good are your men dead for no purpose? The stupidity of the politicians created this war, but it’s the military men who issued these orders. The obvious example is the Namkachu battle. By what logic did GOC IV Corps, once he realized before the fighting began that the matter was hopeless, tell the brigade commander it was his battle, and leave? If it was hopeless, his duty was to order a withdrawal. What he did was to desert in the face of the enemy, a capital crime in wartime, particularly as he was the top commander. So, you might ask: why did the OC 7th Brigade not give the order? Because no soldier wants to be a coward. The brigade OC could not give that order lest he is accused of cowardice. OC 7th Brigade tried twice to tell his division commander the situation, as from his vantage he could see the Chinese building up on Thag La. He was told not to flap. Did the division commander go forward to see for himself? Obviously not. Twice directly ordered to hold, the brigade commander saw no way out except compliance. Had the 4-battalion brigade and the battalion at Poshang La been withdrawn to Tawang, perhaps things might have been different. Our senior commanders must be strenuously taught to avoid these pointless, counterproductive false heroics at the cost of their men. I would hope today if such a pointless order were given it would not be obeyed, at least I hope so, because the soldiers are educated and savvy. Possibly not, though.

  Back in the good old days, i.e., 1962, an Indian division used 200-tons of supplies a day and a Chinese division used 50. Today it is reasonable to expect a Chinese brigade to use 200-tons a day. On our side, a 155mm shell is about 43-kg, so division artillery of 72 guns at 100 rounds each alone will use 300-tons/day. Six hundred tons a day is probably reasonable for the modern division. These figures are averages. In the attack, ammunition/POL consumptions surge. In the defense, it goes down. But not always, because if you are defending a box under heavy attack, then while your POL consumption may be low, your artillery expenditure can go up. A corps really needs a railhead, preferably no more than 100-km distant, because hauling supplies via truck, particularly in the mountains is inefficient, tiresome, and troublesome. For example, take IV Corps at Tezpur. The road to Tawang is 348-km. Corps plus three divisions may need 2500-tons/day. In theory, 310 8-ton trucks a day going up and the same number coming down should be a simple matter to handle.

  For that, you need a nice, paved all-weather two-lane highway with shoulders. You need shoulders because vehicles must stop for any number of reasons, and you don’t want to block a whole lane. Does such a road exist? Unfortunately, not. Most of the road is one-lane, and particularly the 181-km stretch from Bomdila to Tawang is a mess. The embankments are not stabilized, a day of solid rain is going to create landslides. The road itself is rutted and broken. It isn’t just the supply columns using the road. Like it or not, essential civilian traffic must continue bringing up petrol, essential commodities, ambulances, vehicles to keep telecom repaired, police. The border forces generate traffic too. The Border Roads and Army engineers need the road too, to keep it fixed. The heavier the traffic, the more the surface deteriorates. Moreover, movement after dark is a bad idea because of mist and the sharp curves. There is, at last, an alternate road under construction, except it is stalled for environmental clearances. Also at last, there is a “road” to Tawang from Bhutan, another alternate route. The importance of this is that in IV Corps, 21st Division in its war stations in Bhutan protects the left flank of 5th Division at Tawang. The corps reserve is 71st Division. This will permit some lateral movement between the two divisions; else they were fairly much isolated on their own. There is a plan for two tunnels under the formidable Sela Pass. Though touted as cutting an hour off the journey to Tawang, the real significance is that traffic will not have to climb up to the 4170-metter pass, which is prone to heavy snowfall blockages.

  Here are some pictures of the road to Tawang.[328] Fifty-five years have elapsed since 1962. In 2000-2012 India constructed a high priority road from Darbuk in Leh to India’s forward base at Daulet Beg Oldi near the Chinese border. Then it discovered that the road was prone to be washed away by the Shyok River.[329] Dare one ask why since India has been active in the region since the mid-1950s, did it take twelve years to realize the alignment was wrong? Did the Shyok River dry up for 12-years? So 160-km of the road was realigned and is expected to be operational in 2018. I avoid discussion of the road itself because the miracle is there is a road, however miserable, in the first place.

  Look at the road. Nice width. Nicely levelled. But why are the using hand compactors? Why is the pavement so thin? Does the road have at least a 3-step base? If it’s only 2, its going to start cracking in winter and in the rains. Asphalt will quickly get holes. Holes will become potholes, damaging the second layer as well and wrecking havoc on vehicle suspensions. Where’s the retaining wall, at least 8-meters high? Without it, you’re going to have great whacking landslides. There is no drainage on the cliff side. Given Arunachal’s torrential rain, the run-off is going to start eating the edge in the very first year. Is the entire road sloped toward the cliff? If not, is the road humped with proper drainage on the inside? Else water will start pooling on the inside which is not good. Given the hostile climate, have adequate resouurces been provided for twice-yearly inspection/maintenance? Read the design guide for Colorado (mountainous, heavy snowfall) roads.[330] It does not matter if, like myself, you are a layperson. You can still get some idea of what road construction entails.

  Now look at the photos of the Siliguri-Tawang road, climbing to Bomdila. When the tunnel is built, the journey will be easier and less prone to snow and r rain disruption. It does remind of the famous 36-bends on the Darbuk-Daulet Beg Oldi roads – that was built for mules, I have no idea what it looks like now. But let’s be honest: is this road going to support a 3-division corps in action? The second picture shows the condition of the road surface the SUV is traversing – 55-years after 1962. Imagine driving an 8-ton load truck in winter, on the bends in the first picture. The photos are from Wikipedia wh
ich says they may be copyright. The third picture is the Leh-Manali Road. Incidentally, the traffic is now so heavy there are odd-even days because the alleged 2-lane is, in many parts, effectively 1-lane.

  A brief note on the Darbuk – Daulet Beg Oldi Road

  In 2000, India finally got down to building this vital road as a high priority, 38-years after the 1962 War.

  The construction of the road in or near the riverbed meant it was damaged every summer as melting snow from the upper reaches flooded the Shyok river. During summer months from June to October, the road remained closed for up to 94 days due to rise in the water level, generally at km 99 to 105.50, 106.6, 112, 121.50, 124.32, 130.00, 138.8, and km 148 to 162.[331]

  Indeed, the road was essentially useable only in the late Fall to early Spring when the Shyok River was frozen. The road was built along or even in the riverbed, along the old mule track, for speed. By 2011 it was obvious this would not work. You can already tell the tremendous speed at which this road was being built that it took 11-years to figure out 168-km of 210-km built so far of the 255-km total needed to be rebuilt. For some reason, that the road was flooded for six months of the year didn’t seem to bother anyone