Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  not mean you build the road to make sure it gets flooded and washed away. Anyway, the until eleven years later. There’s no sense in asking why this happened because trying to figure out how the Great Indian Mind works will drive anyone to the loony-bin. The Border Roads engineers say well, speed was of the essence. So it was, dummkopfs, but that does road was re-laid on extra high-priority for 2014 completion, except it slipped to 2017. Now editor is told it won’t be fully ready until 2022.

  The article with the photo above talks of a landslide on the road to Tawang, but the “representational image” indicates it could be anywhere in the mountains.

  A board of enquiry found that half the money for the road was stolen. To cut 1-km of road required removal of 15,000-m3 of mountainside, which is mainly rock. It is permissible to speculate if the road was laid in the river bed or at below flood level because that would be far cheaper, allowing siphoning off the money. But naturally, the GOI has not seen fit to inform the taxpayers what really happened. Perhaps the Central Auditor General made an inquiry. Was anyone shot for (a) this major boondoggle; and (b) theft? Obviously not. If you start shooting people for incompetence in India, you will end up executing everyone right to the very top.

  Oh yes, did I mention some of the bridges too are misaligned? Maybe the folks in charge got the local sheep to do the road survey, allowing the humans to siphon money.

  In other news designed to bring joy to every Indian heart, during the winter of 2017-18 the Chinese began building a 36-km road from their positions opposite to Daulet Beg Oldi to positions where it can connect with the Pakistan base of Dansam, HQ of 323rd Brigade which controls the Pakistan side of the Siachin Glacier. It may be complete by Summer 2018. [332]The possibility this could happen was a major reason for India’s preemptive seizure of the Siachin in 1984. The last time I looked at a map of the Shagksman Tract, as the area of North Kashmir Pakistan gave to China in 1963, it was apparent a jeep track could be built from DBO to Dansam. This, of course, was before we all realized the Chinese can build proper roads and even railroads anywhere they darn please, doesn’t matter if its 5000-meters or 6000-meters in the high Himalayan. @rajfortyseven, a retired Indian Army Chinese linguist and photo-interpreter, caught this road a few weeks ago using low-resolution Google pictures. It would seem to be related to the Doklam crisis all the way to the East, because the road will allow Pakistan and China to exert more pressure on India.

  By comparison, by 2016 China had built 85,000-km of roads in Tibet and embarked on 44 more projects.[333] By 2020, it should have 110,000-km.[334] The journey from Lhasa to Nyangtri, in 2016, took 8-hours. The were in the process of improving the road, including the world’s highest tunnel at 4700-meters, to cut the distance to 3-4 hours. The tunnel has two separate bores, about 5700-meters long.

  12.2 Rail

  The Chinese are serious people; Indians are jokers. Look at the situation regarding our 14 strategic rail lines, finally approved in principle in 2016, fifty-four years after the China war.[335] The following four northern lines are to be taken up first. One engineer advises the Bilaspur-Leh line could cost $14-billion[336] (Rs 70=US$1). With the usual delays its anyone’s guess what the eventual cost will be. The Misamari-Tawang line is currently estimated to cost $26-million/km (Rs 70=US$1);[337] again, noone knows what the eventual cost will be. These costs assume the government will provide funds in timely fashion. That is hard assured.

  378km Missamari-Tenga- Tawang

  498km Bilaspur-Manali-Leh

  227km Pasighat -Tezu-Rupai

  249km North Lakhimpur-Bame-Silapathar

  Let us look at the Jammu-Srinagar-Baramulla rail line, just for comparison.

  Leg 0: Jammu-Udhampur (53-km) 1984-2005.

  Leg 1: Udhampur-Katra (25-km) 2014.

  Leg 2: Katra-Banihal (148-km) likely 2023 versus scheduled 2000.

  Leg3: Banihal-Baramulla (112-km) 2009 (this stretch is in the Valley).

  So, essentially the project began in 1984 and will complete in 2023. A mere 41-years, an eyeblink in Indian Eternal Time. At that, in 2002 the project was declared a national project, meaning it had to be completed regardless of cost. The Army needs the line extended from Srinagar to Kargil and Leh. The Manali-Leh line will likely come out 600-1000 km, depending on the route and gradients. It would seem simpler to go the shorter route and use multiple engines, but of course, the gradient is not the only consideration, the curve radius is also critical.

  Of course, no money has been sanctioned. Only some money for identifying potential trackway has been sanctioned. Of the approximately $60-million required for the four lines about $12-million was cleared in 2016-17. Time to completion? “A few years.” We Indians are believed to be superior in mathematics. Can GOI explain what this newly invented number, another proof of our mathematical genius, “few” stands for?

  So, back to the railroad situation. We may not like the idea of linking Kunming with Kolkata via a high-speed link. But we need rail links to advance the economy of the Northeast. We need to link to Bangladesh to shorten the distance from Delhi to the Northeast, and to Burma for purposes of trade and to counter the growing Chinese influence in the region. There is nothing to stop China from running trains to Burma as it likes. Yes, we can bar China from crossing Indian territory to move between Burma and Bangladesh. Which will make absolutely no difference, because all that is required for Burma and Bangladesh to replace the Chinese engines and continue their journey. If India was to bar Chinese freight cars, off-loading and reloading takes care of that, and leave Bangladesh and Bhutan fuming because of the added time delays and costs. And here is the real killer: China is our biggest trade partner, putting obstacles in China’s way only increases our costs and hinders our exports and imports. Since the links will be built by us anyway, perhaps we should accept the inevitable and let the Chinese build their high-speed rail line.

  Doubtless closer physical ties with China creates many security problems. All states bordering Myanmar have multiple insurgent groups. The rail links help Chinese in creating problems for us. Since – as we keep saying – the links will be built anyway, why not take a positive view: China can reinforce opposite the easternmost border states more easily, but so can we reinforce our positions more easily. If China uses the rail links to help it subvert the northeast, surely it makes it easier for India to return the favor. Are there any dissident and potential insurgent groups in Kunming and Yunnan? The Editor has no idea. But we won’t know until we go there, will we? At least we can keep a closer eye on military movements in those Chinese provinces. China is building rail lines in Vietnam and Thailand. The Vietnamese and Chinese are hardly best friends forever. We may rest assured, however, the Vietnamese and Thai will use the opportunity to step their surveillance in China’s Southeast. We can cooperate with both countries in this matter.

  The real problem is not the rail links. It is that the growing Chinese presence in the region opens the possibility that China could force Bangladesh to stay neutral in a crisis or war, and it could force Myanmar to allow passage of Chinese troop and/or supply trains. Then, to take the case of Bangladesh, the narrow Siliguri corridor problem remains. China’s growing influence in Burma opens another potentially dangerous border. None of this will happen tomorrow. But China is in no rush. We must also look far down the road, to 2050 AD.

  There is occasionally casual talk about trading or buying land with Bangladesh or Nepal to widen the corridor.[338], [339] But with the expulsion of Hindus from Bangladesh, there is little opportunity to trade areas based on religion. It is hard to imagine Indian citizens will agree to become part of Muslim Bangladesh which could well become a theocratic state in 20-30 years. Nor is it easy to imagine that Bangladeshis, having gotten their own country, will blithely agree to become Indians.

  The only realistic solution is to enhance the defense of the Siliguri corridor and to prepare for a new corps to cover Tripura, Manipur, and Nagaland. We’re friends today. Can anyone guarantee we’ll be
friends tomorrow?

  Using Google maps, the air distance from Doklam to Bangladesh ~90-km, ground distance likely 130-km or so. From Nepal border to Bangladesh border is about 23-km air distance; land distance about 30-km+ In both cases assume China captures bridges intact – unlikely to happen. The Ministry if Finance will ask: is there no end to demands from the armed forces? Had the Ministry consistently allocated 3.5% of GDP for defense over the last 30-years, only small increases of perhaps 0.5% would be needed.

  The core issue is simple: unless we agree to become a Chinese vassal, we cannot defend ourselves on less than 4% of GDP spent on defense. If vassalage is chosen, personally I have no problem because I don’t live in India. It could even be economically beneficial for us. So, it hurts our pride. So what? We’ve spent a thousand years living with shattered pride. No need to protect our borders, China will do that for us. They’ll spend hundreds of billions building our infrastructure and investing in our economy. Maybe their money will create 100-million jobs in 15-years.

  The Siliguri Corridor: a closer look

  Not unusually, relying on the media to get facts right is an unprofitable business. For the aspiring or young analyst: always check for yourself if possible. It is true that the narrowest point of the Corridor is about 23-km between Bangladesh and Nepal borders, say between Banshgoan, West Bengal and Bhatgoan, Bihar, in a straight line, which is not an exact measurement of a road between the two towns. But this is irrelevant to a discussion of the Siliguri Corridor because the line is west-east. In other words, China would have to move through Nepal to Bangladesh to cut the Corridor. Yes, this is possible in the future if Nepal becomes dependent on China to the point it cannot refuse a request for transit. That hasn’t happened yet, and if the Chinese move through Nepal we will move into Nepal to block them. (That 2-division corps for the Nepal border would make all the difference). More realistically, think 90-kilometers from the Chinese border at the India-Bhutan-China trijunction to the Bangladesh border.

  Now, if the Army says even 90-km is too risky, it is not my job to convince it otherwise. When offering solutions, I must consider what the people who do the actual work want, as opposed to those like myself who offer free advice. Nonetheless, here is a legitimate question. Several critical targets inside India are 90-km or less from Pakistan, starting from Ganganager all the way to the Neelum Valley in northwest Kashmir. Does the Indian Army worry about the narrowness of the depth? It does, but it remains confident it can handle the matter. So why the paranoia about China, which last won a war 55-years ago, against a very weak adversary – that was us. Just because the Chinese talk big, of a sudden their talk is translated into an invincible, irresistible force? Next, is China mad that it will attack India from Yadong, given the narrowing Chumbi Valley is outflanked by an Indian division on each side, and with the entire valley at its lower end bracketed by Indian artillery? Last, why is it assumed we would be on the defensive if China attacks? Or are planning to sit their passively? Why won’t we attack at other points?

  We will not because our current and suggested additional eight division force structure is insufficient to give us the confidence needed to attack. And fortunately, the solution is simple. An armored division in the Corridor will block any deep Chinese offensive. Increasing XVII Mountain Strike Corps to three divisions plus an armored brigade, will give the Army its counterpunch. At which point Ministry of Finance says now you want another two divisions? Do you even know how much an armored division and making XVII Corps into a true strike force will cost? Thought MoF would never ask! The armored division will cost a minimum of $7-billion. Giving the strike corps a third division including an aviation brigade will cost at least $8-billion, say $15-billion in all. And that doesn’t count the needed infrastructure, which includes a rail-line from Gangtok to at least Nathula, and the proposed line to Tawang. If MoF says “we don’t have the money”, I have already given the solution: become a Beijing vassal.

  Readers should not stress themselves trying to decipher every item, because this is only a representation based on approximations of what things cost. They can cost more, and unlikely to cost less. Spares for more than five years will increase the cost. Attrition units are included, for example, 16 tanks per regiment for each of six regiments. RFVs are Reconnaissance Fighting Vehicles; they cost more than IFVs because they require sensors. Tracked APCs serve as load carriers, ambulances, recovery vehicles, signals, mortar carriers, forward observers, etc. The helicopters include two squadrons of 12 each plus 3 for maintenance and attrition, with a light reconnaissance/attack squadron, and a general-purpose squadron. For modern warfare, there really should be four squadrons: two attack, one light utility for liaison, communications, and medevac, and one for troop and cargo lift, or some combination of the four. A US heavy combat aviation brigade has 114 or so, 48 AH-64, 50 UH-60, 4 EH-60, and 12 CH-47,[340] but as this will cost $5-billion by itself, we can’t get there until our GDP passes $10-trillion, assuming 5-6% of GDP for defense.

  Item

  $million

  Units

  Total

  Tanks

  6

  360

  2160

  IFVs

  3

  250

  750

  RFV

  4

  60

  240

  SP 155mm

  6

  80

  480

  Air Defense Gun/SAM

  10

  48

  480

  APC

  2

  300

  600

  Helicopters

  20

  30

  600

  Vehicles

  0.3

  2500

  750

  Engineers

  250

  1

  250

  Signals

  250

  1

  250

  Electronic

  100

  1

  100

  Personal equipment

  0.01

  15000

  150

  Miscellaneous

  500

  1

  500

  7310

  A five-battalion independent armored brigade group would cost about half that for three tank regiments, two mechanized battalions, and two SP artillery regiments. We could, of course, use XVII Corps’ two independent armored brigades for the purpose. That would leave XVII Corps without an offensive punch when it reaches the Tibet plateau, where Chine combined arms brigades will be waiting.

  Item

  $million

  Units

  Total

  AH-64 heavy attack helio

  40

  55

  2200

  Light attack/recon helio

  20

  35

  700

  CH-47F medium lift (10-tons)

  60

  30

  1800

  Troop carrier

  30

  90

  2700

  Miscellaneous types

  25

  15

  275

  7675

  Mountain Strike Corps Aviation Brigade

  Again, this is purely representational. There are multiple ways of defining the Table of Equipment for such a brigade. These are unit prices, with 25% extra for maintenance/attrition, and not a substitute for the 24 helicopters per division that are also required. The above gives two regiments each of 21 heavy attack helicopters and 14 light attack/recon; a heavy lift battalion of 24; and two assault battalions of 36 each, with each helicopter capable of lifting a rifle section. The miscellaneous category includes 4 each for command and control, liaison, and maintenance support helicopters.

  Useful to note: the Siliguri Corridor could equally be composed of one armored, one airmobile, and one air air assault brigade. The US tried this with its 1st Cavalry Division after the Vietnam War. It didn’t work beca
use the threat was the Warsaw Pact’s heavy divisions, so 1st Cavaly became a straightforward armored division. The above combination is particularly useful to get behind the Chinese line of advance in the mountains, then use the armored brigade to smash the spearheads that make it into the plains. Just a thought.

  China has warned us against building a railroad to Tawang because, it says, this would complicate the border issue.[341] Two things. China should not worry. This being a high-priority project, it will take us decades to complete. The Chinese concern about border issues is puzzling, because there is no border issue. There is nothing to discuss. Arunachal Pradesh south of the McMahon Line belongs to India, and that includes Tawang. Why is India engaged in endless discussions with China on this point? China’s idea of a settlement is “we keep the Aksai Chin, which we have, and we let you keep Arunachal, which you have”. It is odd indeed that India has not stated the obvious. An intruder cannot come and occupy a room of your house, and insist you give him that room while he lets you keep the rest. The discussion, if any, is the modalities for China withdrawing from the Aksai Chin, not how China can be rewarded for its aggression. But that is India. We have been terrified of China since 1962, and we remain terrified.

  Normally, a decision on a country’s force levels is made by defining strategic objectives, then estimating adversary capabilities. If our strategic objective regarding China is defensive, probably the existing 14 divisions are adequate in a 1-front situation. We’d want to focus on increasing/modernizing firepower and mobility, and we’d have to get off our large, expanding, fat butts and urgently construct the needed communication infrastructure. Readers should not mistake existing achievements as sufficient, for example, rebuilding closed advanced landing grounds as proper air bases. In the ALG case, we decided that since it was to be total Hugs and Kisses with the Chinese, these facilities could be closed. In the Northeast, at least, with the much-increased population and need to accelerate the economic development/nation integration of the isolated states, the rebuilding also serves a civilian purpose as the new bases are dual-purpose. Aside from the obvious improvement in providing supplies in peacetime, they are critical for rapid reinforcement in case of mobilization, and for logistic support in the event of war. They also serve another purpose: forward and recovery bases for IAF fighters. This is all good. That does not, however, mean we can afford to lollygag on critical roads and rail lines, and modernizing/upgrading existing ones such as the Misamari-Tawang road.