Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  Regardless of how the company is currently arranged, it is to be rearranged into three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. The weapons platoon will have a 60mm mortar section with three tubes, an HMG section of three 0.5-caliber weapons, and three automatic grenade launchers, with about 40 men. The platoon will have three rifle sections of nine, and a weapons section of the same strength. The weapons section will have two MMG teams of two men each, and two medium ATGW teams of two men each, plus a section leader. Supporting forces such as engineers and reconnaissance sub-units can be attached, for a basic strength of 145, and an augmented strength of 200. This TOE is focused on providing as much firepower as is practicable for a rifle company behind fixed defenses. By the way, the US Army field manual for rifle platoons runs 600 pages[374] which is a bit much by any standard. The extra subunits will come from reservists. These reserve units will have weekly musters and a 28-day annual call up. While the militia companies will have reservists, they will recruit young men 18-25 years in age. The Local Defense companies are locality based and can recruit women in any role if they want to volunteer.

  US Army Bradley or Stryker Platoon

  The M249 is a light machine gun; the weapons squad has 2 MMGs. The total is 39 men in four IFV or Stryker. The US Marine rifle squad has 3 4-man teams, a squad leader, and is about to get a 14th man who will operate a UAV. This 14th man used to be an assistant squad leader before the USMC was forced to economize on manpower. I’d mentioned it doesn’t long to lose a whole lot of tanks. It also doesn’t take long to lose most of your platoon. These are the realities of the battlefield.

  Readers may complain this is too much detail. Be assured. In military matters there is no such thing as too much detail.

  The R&S battalions will consist of 8x8 wheeled vehicles: tank destroyers, infantry fighting vehicles, and 120mm mortar carriers. The battalion will have six companies. Each company will consist of five platoons: 3 platoons of 3 tank destroyers each, an infantry platoon with four IFV, and a heavy mortar platoon of 3 tubes. These companies will perform the standard Reconnaissance and Support roles. One way of deploying them will be three companies assigned to support forward deployed battalions, and the Bn HQ plus 3 companies as a reserve.

  There are many ways to arrange border defense, the following is only one. Visualize a 4 x 4 checkerboard with a black square at the center. The squares might be 2- km2, giving a battalion a front of 8-km. The squares will have various degrees of obstacles such as minefield, anti-armor ditches, fortifications such as blockhouses and dragons teeth/steel stakes, and dummy positions. The black squares will be held by companies or platoons, aided by militia as possible. The usual procedures to conduct patrols and ambushes will be used. When a square can no longer stand, it will retreat to an appropriate adjacent or diagonal square. The object is to maintain a continuous line, not necessarily a straight line. A square is to be hled for 6-hours before retreating, if the square cannot hold, to an adjacent square. The idea is to preserve strength for the next defense, causing the enemy attrition at every step. Since all positions are arranged for 360-degree defense, if a stronghold has contact with one on its left and on its right, it does not matter if the enemy staves in a stronghold. Depending on the defensive depth available in from of National Highway 44 and the Pathankot-Jammu rail line, the defenses might be one to four-squares deep. The best counterattack will be by the corps as an entirety, and the divisions should remain concentrated for maximum striking power. This is easy enough as the checker-square defense eliminates the need for regular brigades to hold ground.

  This said readers should know the building of fortified lines and manning them is far from easy. It is particularly a problem for India because permanent fortifications eat up productive farm land. Jammu District has a population density of 500-person/km2, Samba and Kathua have 300-person/km2. Major engineer resources are required to rapidly dig trenches, interconnect trenches, and mine approaches. While militia can dig trenches, with the right equipment, professionals must do mining. Moving in and positioning pre-stocked concrete and steel obstacles also require heavy equipment. Tight arrangements must be made for sheltering civilians, and once-a-year evacuation exercises must be conducted. Building thorn bush and tree barriers take up land, though it helps restore degraded areas. All this is hardly cheap. Equipping the militia is inexpensive, as it will be armed with assault and sniper rifles, LMGs, and portable anti-tank weapons discarded by the Army or acquired second-hand on the world market. But reequipping the BSF will involve substantial money.

  Jammu-Pathankot

  One advantage today’s militia recruits have is that they are far more technology savvy than was the case a generation ago. Having back-up cellular service will enable men to use their own cell phones to communicate. Encrypted cell phones will be required for everyone from platoon commander and up, but likely in a few years encrypted transmissions will become the commercial norm. Men that are used to operating farm and construction machinery require little training for operating and maintaining heavy equipment. The government could subsidize the purchase of more powerful tractors and provision of bulldozer blades and do the same for civilian construction companies which needed earthmoving equipment, and road construction including excavators, loaders, dump trucks and the like. Aside from trenching, which requires infantry trenchers working at 1-km/hour, the greatest engineer need is to build fighting positions for infantry and armored vehicles. Because tree trunks are very useful for covering trenches and for quick building of abatis, India will have to import and stockpile trunks from overseas – and please don’t forget to cover them on wooden plinths, and to treat them against wet and insects! Cannot abatis be constructed from steel beams? They are better used to strengthen fighting positions. The wood abatis reinforced with sand bags is good for absorbing enemy fire. With the rapid spread of literacy, teaching men to maintain company and battalion weapons will be simpler. Weapons given to the militia must be selected for robustness and minimum maintenance, even at the cost of quality.

  Border Defense Divisions (Proposed)

  Sector

  Fortress Divisions

  Kutch, Barmer, Jaisalmer

  3 [BSF]

  Jodhpur, Suratgarh, Ganganager, Fazilka

  4 [BSF]

  Ferozepur, Amritsar, Gudaspur

  3 [BSF]

  Kahuta, Samba, Jammu

  2 [BSF]

  Akhnur, Naoshera, Poonch

  3 [BSF]

  Uri-Tithwal- Gurais

  2 [BSF]

  Sonamarg-Kargil

  3 [BSF]

  Sub-Sector West and North

  1 [ITBP]

  3rd Division sector

  1 [ITBP]

  Himachal-Uttarakhand

  2 [ITBP]

  Nepal Border

  3 [SSB]

  Sikkim

  1 [SSB]

  Bhutan

  3 [SSB]

  Western, Central, Eastern Arunachal

  4 [AR]

  Burma

  2 [BSF]

  Bangladesh

  3 [BSF]

  This totals 40 divisions. At a very approximate estimate, the excess operating/maintenance costs over normal border forces budget might equal 6-8 divisions, but reequipping the border forces with first-class weapons, signals networks, armored vehicles and the like could easily cost the same as 15-18 divisions. At which point we must consider whether adding that many reserve divisions may not be a better idea.

  TO Fortress Division (about 20,000 troops when

  mobilized)

  HQ

  6-8 BSF Battalions (or another border force) (1 8x8 motorized, others 4 x 4 motorized)

  1 TA Battalion

  1 Border Force artillery battalion (3 batteries x 8 guns)

  1 Militia AAA battalion (6 batteries x 6 guns, quad

  12.7mm or higher caliber

  20 Militia battalions (or as needed) (400 troops each)

  1 Logistic Support Battalion

  1 Road Maintenance
Battalion (militia)

  14.8 Enhancing firepower of existing formations

  Manpower without firepower is not helpful. The Chinese like to pack as much firepower into infantry units as they can. Our units are, of course, much better equipped than they were in 1962. For example, the infantry section of ten soldiers has an 84mm rocket launcher, an under-barrel grenade launcher, and a Light Machine Gun, in some divisions there are two, plus the riflemen. Nonetheless, this is insufficient in the mountains. A platoon also needs a weapons section with three medium machine guns, giving 36 for a battalion versus the usual 8. A company needs a weapons platoon with three 60mm mortars and three anti-tank missile launchers. The battalion cannot make do with six 81mm mortars. It should have a minimum of eight; in the plains mechanized and tank units require 6 x 120mm mortars, for plains infantry, eight are needed. And a battalion should have eight heavy machine guns, versus the four it now has.[375] This likely to require battalions of at least 1000 men.

  Our tank regiments need more reserves. Currently, for 44 tanks there are 14 reserves. That means in a typical offensive, by the end of the second day your regimental strength starts falling. Usually, a plains infantry division is given one tank regiment, which means each of three brigades gets a squadron of 14. Today this is insufficient. While all plains formations should be fully mechanized, while getting to that state, a Delta Squadron needs adding to each regiment, making 58 tanks. This permits the division HQ to have a reserve squadron, which can be sent to a brigade that needs it the most, giving 28 tanks. Tank regiments need tracked logistic support vehicles. The regimental reconnaissance troop needs 11 tracked vehicles, not 8 wheeled ones. Reconnaissance is a critical function.

  As a historical matter, German panzer divisions were designed for 4 battalions of 90 tanks each. By 1943-44 due to heavy losses and insufficient replacement, motorized divisions which should have had 180 tanks had a TO of 44; panzer divisions about 106; and SS Panzer divisions about 180. One of Germany’s best tank generals, Hermann Balck, was not upset about this. He believed that loading up divisions with more equipment than an average officer could command was a waste of resources.

  Companies had four companies each of 22 tanks, with four platoons of five each and an HQ section of two. The rationale was that tanks were the core of an armored division; the mechanized infantry and artillery were supporting arms. Fewer tanks created a bigger overhead. So, when Hitler, planning his invasion of the Soviet Union, ordered the ten German armored divisions split into twenty, making believe he had 20 armored divisions, he had no net increment of strength. Indeed, by doubling the overhead, the division base, he weakened the army. If Balck and Manstein had to choose between more tanks or more infantry, they would chose more infantry. Why? Because the infantry had to hold the ground seized by tanks, after December 1941, the Germans were very short of infantry

  A note on the lower organization of tank units

  The basic tactical tank unit is two tanks, the leader, and the wingman. India uses a troop of three tanks, meaning one loss still leaves the basic unit intact. Generally, western armies use four tanks or two pairs; the loss of two still permits one basic fighting unit. The five-tank platoon, which the Germans and later the US used, was deployed by the US as two + three, and while probably complicated to use, was a strong sub-unit on its own. Armies have used may different variations, the British in World War 2 at one point had squadrons of 18 tanks, with five troops and an HQ troop of three each. Today they also use squadrons of 18 but with four troops of 4 each and HQ troop of 2. My personal preference is for 4 tanks, but it has been explained to me that the Indian Army is well used to troops of three, and it is not considered worth the learning curve to shift to four tanks. Till recently, India’s regiments had an HQ troop of three but then shifted to two, with the second-in-command riding an APC which gave more room for the regimental command staff. Again, personally, I object to this as denying the 2 i/c his chance for glory, and it becomes harder for him to take over if the CO is put out of action. Our tank divisions have only 268 tanks, six regiments of 44 each, which seems a shame. Our regiments and mechanized battalions have only three squadrons or three companies; this also is a waste of overhead. In World War II, the US believed the ideal was a balance of armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery, one battalion of each in three combat commands. Now, like the Germans, the US uses battalions of 2 tank and two mechanized companies each, some of these combined arms battalions retain their armor lineage, some their infantry lineage.

  Usually, artillery battalions/regiments have 18 guns in three batteries, and each battery can be divided into troops. Here too, however, there is an enormous waste of overhead. During the height of the Cold War, the US started using 8-gun batteries. We had the same arrangement until after the 1962 War. The British in NATO gave their armored brigades four 8-gun batteries, for 32 guns. Since all were 155mm, it was unnecessary to maintain a division general support regiment. In World War II, the Red Army relied heavily on massed artillery. Artillery is the battlefield killer, causing up to 80% of casualties. The Red Army would line up guns/howitzers at a density of 100 per kilometer, which sounds extraordinary until one realizes that divisions would attack frontages of 1000-1500 meters. So, a hundred guns are what you would give a division plus a share of army (corps) artillery. The US’s best preference was an artillery battalion per infantry battalion, by pulling in corps and army artillery.

  Now the US seems to have gone the other way, much reducing the number of guns, but introducing GPS guided rounds at $150,000 each. The argument is that logistically it is so much easier to substitute one round for fifty unguided ones, which in total cost the same. The US has spent the last 16-years fighting insurgents, and massed artillery is not required. For example, the US now has only four active duty artillery brigades. I, III and XVIII Corps and 8th Army have one each. Often there are photographs from Afghanistan that show a gun position with a single gun. It can be agreed that to destroy, for example, an enemy strongpoint, a handful of guided rounds have greater utility than firing hundreds of rounds. Still, this assumes that multi-sensor intelligence fusion is available. The Taliban have no means of countering US drones and other reconnaissance platforms. This is a high-tech war against the “fuzzy wuzzies.” For shock-and-awe, however, nothing beats the good old-fashioned barrage, something multiple rocket launch systems are particularly good at delivering. For harassing fire, you surely don’t want to use $150,000 rounds. Fifty conventional rounds would be better. When a horde of attackers is determined to overrun your position, massed fire is a thing of beauty and a joy forever. True that the US still maintains some capability in the form of reserve units, for example, 8 artillery brigades in the National Guard. Nontheless, a 3-brigade division now has only 54 tubes.

  In India’s case, every corps of three divisions needs an artillery division of 3-4 brigades. So far only the three armor strike corps have an artillery division (40th, 41st, 42nd) and XVII Mountain Strike Corps is to get one. Other corps generally have just one artillery brigade. The number of guns/MRL is the important issue; it doesn’t matter how many units there are. Each battalion in a division should have 18 guns, a total of 180. A corps of three divisions need 540 guns. Regardless, at the minimum, the 18-gun regiment should be converted to 24 guns. Adding six more guns to a regiment should require no more than 100 additional troops, perhaps 18% more for an output 33% greater. Please to note that when the 40s series of divisions fill up, the artillery divisions should go to the 60s series. In the plan suggested here, the 30s, 50s, and 70s series gaps are to be filled with new divisions (Gaps: 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38; 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 58; and 70, 73-79.

  By now you are probably smelling frumious stinks and hearing gargling noises. That is the MoF, about to explode. “You want to add 2000+ more guns to the Army? On what basis?” MoF can say that China, for example is reducing to 42 guns/MRL per 4-battalion brigade, including army artillery, or 10 guns a battalion, how can twice as many be justified for India? A so
ft answer turns away great wrath, says Proverbs 15, and this should be the Army’s soft answer: (a) Don’t we want to win decisively? (b) The US may be reducing the number of artillery guns, but it has very heavy firepower delivered from the air, about equal to 72 fighter aircraft and 48 heavy attack helicopters per division. China will end up providing at least 24 fighters per ground division equivalent. The Indian Army will get perhaps six fighters. Indeed, the Indian Air Force is absolutely resistant to providing close air support and will grudge even the six. (c) The weather in the high mountains tends toward the difficult; artillery is impervious to weather, like US mailpersons - “Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds."

  The above figures require elaboration. (a) Typically, a US Army division has 48 heavy attack helicopters, divided between a cavalry squadron and an attack battalion. Readers may find figures of 24 heavy and 30 light attack helicopters, but the lights have been phased out, and with the AH-64 Apache being removed from the eight National Guard reserve divisions for assignment to active divisions, the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior reconnaissance/light-attack helicopter is no longer in service. Very roughly, the US Air Force has 1200 combat aircraft with another 600 as trainers, maintenance reserve, etc. It can reasonably be assumed that a wing of 72 aircraft, is available to support each army division. (b) For China, assume that each of 13 armies has the equivalent of two divisions. Each army has a helicopter brigade, which has 96 helicopters. As discussed earlier, the Chinese Army now has 1000 helicopters; the goal appears 3,000.[376] Because helicopters will likely be assigned to each of the five theatres and to other units, it may be reasonable to assume a helicopter brigade will have perhaps 144 machines. Currently, I assume 24 heavy attack helicopters in each brigade and 24 light attack. Equating two lights to one heavy – another matter we could argue for several pages, each Chinese division will have eighteen. For the Chinese Air Force, in the near term, I am assuming 750 modern fighter aircraft, of which one-third will be available for support of the army, or 8 aircraft per division. (c) For the Indian Army, assume 12 attack helicopters in the corps aviation brigade (ALH or Dhruv-WSI) plus 4 from the air force, and – say two AH-64 and two Dhurv. These are averages per corps; the Army and IAF A-64s will be in squadrons, not given out two per corps. Both our attack helicopters are classified as light, but in terms of weapon payload, they are heavies. Together, assume 6 helicopters per division. For the IAF, it is difficult to envisage more than 400+ modern aircraft in the near term; divided into thirds for air defense, interdiction, and ground support. That works out to less than four per division.