Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  One more approximation is needed before making a table. Assume that two attack helicopters equal one fighter in the matter of ground support. Then an Indian division gets only half the air support of a Chinese division, which gets a fourth of the support of a US division. We need more artillery.

  US

  China

  India

  96

  24

  12

  A note on Robert S. McNamara

  McNamara had a gift for systems analysis. He could look at an organization as one giant system and identify the role each sub-system played. So, for example, when he became US Secretary Defense, one of things he noticed was the US had far more reserve divisions than it could equip with modern weapons. Before 1960 thus did not matter so much because the US Army had equipped 93 large divisions and there was plenty of surplus equipment. With the passage of time, however, new weapons were needed. For example, in 1960 the Sherman M-4 main battle tank was obsolete, and its replacement, the M-47/48 Patton was obsolescent. The M-60, which can also be termed as Super Patton, was the tank of the day. So, there was no point in keeping reserve divisions that were not at least equipped with the M-47/48. Approximately 45,000 Shermans were built, 20,000 Patton M-47/48, and 16,000 M-60, many of which were exported. McNamara cut the 37 National Guard and Army Reserve divisions to eight with 100% equipment and 80% manpower. [377] A more detailed, but still comfortably readable account is by Worsnop. [378] This move caused severe angst on a political level, but for me, the concern lay elsewhere. The Soviets could field 200 divisions after mobilization; with the McNamara reduction, it became 24 for the US versus the previous 53, or less than half. The correct solution, I believed, was to buy new equipment for the reserves. At any rate, within the parameters McNamara set, he was right in his decision.

  Where McNamara went off course was in assuming everything about war could be reduced to decimal point precision and dollars and cents. That was one cause of the Vietnam fiasco. The main cause was the assumption that since nuclear war was ruled out, the US could win victories using limited war, and of course you cannot. I discuss this in a book slated for end 2019. All the millions of pages written about the Vietnam failure are pointless because they don’t approach it from the core issue. One of McNamara’s most annoying decisions, which bothers me to this day, was to build only 41 Polaris missile submarines, instead of 45 needed for a full five squadrons. This was dissymmetrical and inelegant, something I cannot stand. His reasoning was that at 45 boats the Soviets would react, wiping out the US advantage, at 41 they would react in a way that left the US ahead. But how could McNamara have known this? You can be as “scientific” and “analytical” as you like, but you cannot assume to know with such precision what any opaque adversary is thinking.

  The reason for this anecdote is to emphasize that the crude air support model built above should not be taken to imply exactness on any level. It is a back of the envelope solely to point out that because the Indian Army is starved for firepower, the easiest way to provide it is with more artillery. In Vietnam, the US never lost a company-sized or larger battle. There were two reasons: every outpost was covered by artillery and, wather permitting, could call for unlimited airpower.

  In 1959-62 our Forward Policy in the north could have worked had the outposts, ranging from sections to platoon-plus size, had artillery cover. Rezang La is an example. The post’s firepower consisted of two 3” mortars. The Chinese not just outnumbered C/13 Kumaon six to one, they had four artillery pieces and some recoilless rifles. They blasted one stone sangar after another. Sangars were no more than stone walls built with available rocks. This worked well on the North West Frontier because the insurgents had only rifles. The sangars stood no chance against 57mm and 75mm RCLs. There was only one 25-pounder battery of 8 guns at Chushul, but an intervening mountain made firing from Chushul impossible. At Tawang, it was the same problem: 7th Brigade should have had a regiment of 24-pounders, it had nothing. The most fatuous pronouncement made by a general in 1962 was by the corps commander responsible for the Tawang axis. “Determined infantry does not need artillery.” To say he was living in the 19th Century is to understate the magnitude of his ignorance because it was well known then, and earlier, that the side without artillery was at a massive disadvantage. Indeed, if the gentleman had known his Indian history, he might have recalled Babur vs. Ibrahim Lodhi at Panipat 1526. Babur was outnumbered 1:4. But he had artillery and knew how to use it. The usual figure of Babur having 12-13,000 soldiers is wrong. He entered India with that many, but at Panipat, according to his records, there were 25,000.[379] This is because while today it is the fashion to blame the Muslims for invading India, at every step they had help from Indians. Rajputs were the sword arm of the Mughal Empire. Hindu kings like Shivaji freely used Muslim troops. When Aurangzeb, whose sworn vassal Shivaji and his father were, got fed up with the Maratha’s depredations, the Emperor sent a Rajput army to capture him. Aurangzeb could not hurt Shivaji in any way because the Rajput general in charge gave Shivaji his word he would not be harmed. Today its all Hindus versus Muslims, but until the British Crown took over India, a distinction based on religion were not made.

  Consider for a moment the US’s 1/7th Cavalry at the 1965 battle of Landing Zone X-Ray.[380] The battalion was 300 men short, or essentially at 60% strength. It ran into a fight with three PAVN and 1 Viet Cong battalions. In the space of 53-hours, 12 105mm howitzers fired eighteen thousand rounds to stop the enemy from overrunning the battalion. Its perimeter was so small than the battalion OC’s command post was 90-meters from his companies who were deployed for all-round defense. At one point, one of the companies had the support of nine MMGs each with 6000 rounds of ammunition, 3-times the daily line – on a 70-meter front. Additional to this, the battalion’s parent division had a battalion of 48 Ariel Rocket Artillery helicopters to support. When at one point it looked as if the very determined and very brave communist troops were going to break into the perimeter, the artillery started firing just 35-meters ahead of own troops. A general call was put out for air support, and US fighters, including A-1 Skyraiders which carried enormous payloads low and slow (it was a propeller plane built like a tank – just as the jet A-10 is) were stacked up at 330-meter intervals all the way to 11,000-meters waiting their turn to pitch in. This battle took place 3-years after the 1962 War. It shows how seriously the Americans take war, and how lightly we take it, to this day, when we don’t have even 10-days ammunition. By the way, the MMG’s ran out of ammunition in one day, but of course, it was replenished by the division’s helicopters that kept flying in supplies and flying out casualties despite being under continuous fire. Night flying was impossible at that time.

  Given the huge distances our northern forces must cover – today 14-divisions for 4,000-km, that’s ~278-km/division, even with the eight additional divisions proposed here, each division will hold 180-km. And this is not the plains, which permit easy lateral movement. There are only two solutions. (a) Preempt China; and (b) protect the border with available paramilitary force backed with artillery and keep the regulars for counterattack/counter offensive. Thus, the paramilitary, stiffened by helicopter delivered regular battalions as a reserve, will have to be protected by artillery. Just one battery every 40-kms means 100-batteries, or 33 regiments, or 25 if we shift to the 4 batteries per regiment organization. Why is only a 20-km radius being used? Aren’t the hypothetical 155mm guns we are hypothetically getting capable of 40-km range? Indeed, yes. But you don’t want to make a habit of firing at extended ranges because you’ll wear your barrels down that much faster[381]. Remember that the number of charges determine range. Charge 8 will give you maximum range and create that much more pressure inside the barrel. Read this[382] 189-page document to get an approximate idea of how an artillery battery operates. Read Appendix 3 for common mistakes and malpractices. After this, you will appreciate how complicated war is.

  Boosting battalion firepower

  We’ve already sugge
sted that tank battalions and IFV companies be allocated a fourth company, permitting a 25% increase in combat power by adding perhaps 15% more troops. As also increasing artillery batteries to 8 guns versus six today. Equally, mountain infantry battalions need augmentation. The plains infantry battalions can be excluded, because eventually, they will all become mechanized, greatly increasing their firepower and mobility. I make it a habit, at least once a year, to read histories of the 1962 War. Again and again one replays battles assuming the infantry had artillery cover. Again and again, one is reminded that “platoons” were often 25 or fewer men, and “companies” often 80 or less. Often this was a consequence of another unwritten army law: the closer to the front, the more understrength the unit. Sometimes it was because platoons were detached from companies and sections from platoons for setting up new posts. The irrationality of it all, particularly the refusal to provide artillery, create mutually supporting infantry positions, the shortage of essential supplies and ammunition, and barrier material for fortifications, is infuriating. The Army’s excuse is that it told the GOI the situation was unworkable. GOI’s excuse is that the roads did not exist, and air/helicopter lift was limited. But you know what? Any Army leadership that accepts its government’s orders when those orders are impossible to implement should be court-martialed and punished. And why could not GOI have the Army lay low until it was ready to fight? The roads were non-existent because of GOI negligence. You cannot fail to do your job, and then blame the failure on providence or inevitability.

  A most useful thing the Army could do – and with today’s video/computing capabilities it is easily done, is to create visualizations of the 1962 battles so that the people can understand what it is like for a company to be pushed to Rezangla, or a brigade to the Namkachu, and forced to fight that battle under the geographical conditions the men faced. The Army can educate the politicians, the press, and the people, because honestly, no one who has not either walked the terrain or has access to topographic maps and knows how to read them, can understand the realities. I was once shown an army topo map of Sela mountain. It staggered the mind because never had I appreciated how big that mountain is, how puny our positions must have been, and how many trails they were for a determined enemy to outflank. Look at a topo map of Rezangla: the 1946 US Army 1:250,000 series available on line is adequate. You’re looking at a pass 2.5-kilometers wide and 1.8-km deep in terms of aerial distance, and a rifle company which should not have to protect more than a maximum 900-meters.[383] How could the Chinese be stopped without artillery, medium-machine guns, heavy mortars, and fortifications? At Rezangla, the distance between two platoons was 1500-meters[384] and from the second to the third platoon 1000-meters. Perhaps it was a mistake not to keep the platoons tighter, say 200-meters between each. Of course, the Chinese would have infiltrated past, but they did that anyway.

  Rezang La[385]

  In any case, since I have no detailed knowledge of the situation, there is no point to making a comment on the deployment. Matters were not helped by the Chinese holding the high ground. It has been suggested that India would have done better by manning the next range, denying it to Chinese

  observation. Perhaps, but no matter how to play it, a company cannot for long hold out against two battalions without fire support. And the already tenuous supply line would have been stretched further. The block at Rezeng La was intended to protect Chushul’s flank. In such cases, the company could have acted as a delaying unit. For that, Mandeep Singh Bajwa has made the point that delaying positions must be created in advance. Lacking engineers, mines – only a few were available - and barrier material, C/13 Kumaon could not develop proper positions along its own main line of resistance, leave alone build delaying positions. Essentially, in the absence of artillery, the company should not have been tasked to defend that position. Possibly it should have been deployed on the Taska La road. The brigade did what it could to stock the position, with 500 rounds for each of the two 3” mortars, which were fired in less than 4-hours, and 600 0.303 rifle rounds per man. Suppose for a moment that C Company had automatic rifles, a weapons platoon of three 60-mm mortars and three RCL, and each rifle section had had an MMG, timber for bunkers, and mines to cover gaps, adequate barbed wire, and backup communications to the single land line and single radio for the company – the Chinese cut the land line, and the radio was damaged. The outcome might have been different.

  The mountains absorb infantry like a thirsty sponge absorbs water. No one can possibly man a 4000-km frontier with less than 100 divisions. If you are not going to provide a hundred divisions, at least give the available troops the best possible tools. One tool is to enhance the capability of the infantry battalion. Here is one suggestion

  Platoon: add weapons section of 2 MMG and 2 anti-tankanti-bunker assault weapons, 13 men

  Company: add weapons platoon, 22 men with 3 x 60mm mortars (18 men), Micro UAV team (2)

  Battalion: weapons company: HQ 8, 8 x 81mm mortar = 83 men, 8 x 0.50-cal HMG = 50 men; add UAV section of 4 UAVs, 14 men

  This will increase battalion strength to about 1250 men, but triple MMGs, replace 51mm mortars with 60mm for some serious additional firepower, double Carl Gustafs, double HMGs, and increase 81mm by 33%.

  A mountain division really needs 12 infantry battalions; whether that means 3 brigades of 4 battalions or 4 brigades of 3 battalions is something professionals can decide. The division also needs an RSTA battalion and a light armor battalion with 8 x 8 fighting vehicles, consisting of 3 companies of tanks with 105mm guns and an IFV company.

  15. The false prophets of a ‘rational’ nuclear weapons policy

  15.1 Western nuclear doctrine is irrelevant to India

  15.2 A brief note on making threat analysis

  15.3 India’s doctrine of No Doctrine

  15.1 Western nuclear doctrine is irrelevant to India

  We can now examine some generalizations about how nuclear weapons affect the 2-front war scenario. Two words: they don’t. TNW are irrelevant, and we need to firmly tell western scholars to stop their nonsense about the India-Pakistan situation is the greatest danger the world faces. People must earn a living, academics too. Saying the above gets researchers money. That’s fine. My gripe is I never get money, while others are making money pushing false theses.

  The western framework on nuclear weapons is not applicable to South Asia.

  Indeed, it may not be applicable to the west, either. We just gave the example of the US 1945 to mid-1950s where it had a nuclear monopoly, was engaged in a global struggle with communism, but despite threats, never used these weapons. India as a nation that finds it very difficult to target civilians. So much so that a plausible scenario can be made that should Pakistan use a limited number nuclear weapons against India, India may well not retaliate, but leave it the other nuclear-armed states to deal with Pakistan.

  Western analysis of India-Pakistan nuclear equations falls prey to the Mirror Image Fallacy. This operates on the assumption that I would do things a certain way, so will my adversary, or top use a more elegant construct, “Fundamentally, it is a radical denial of the otherness of others.”

  Logicians have their own technical vocabulary for the process of constructing a mirror-image: plural syllogisms. A syllogism is “a deductive scheme of a formal argument consisting of a major and a minor premise and a conclusion (as in "every virtue is laudable; kindness is a virtue; therefore, kindness is laudable").” Fair enough, but “mirror imaging” is a simple term to learn and use, why go into the process of creating a more complex one, because you are what you speak. The answer is that saying “You use plural syllogisms to create a mirror image” is more impressive. You have achieved ascendency in the argument by using “mirror imaging,” showing you are educated. But once said, “mirror imaging” is easily understood and assimilated into the debating opponent’s vocabulary. To gain a higher ascendency, use the second formulation because it is unlikely your opponent is trained in formal logic and a
rgumentation. S/he will have to either quickly back off or admit s/he doesn’t understand what you mean. Either way, you have ascendency. Taking a couple of courses in formal logic and argumentation will not only provide you with sharp, incisive tools for analysis, but you will also impress the heck out of those listening and gain you more credibility. I cannot deal with abstractions due to learning disabilities. But that’s no reason you shouldn’t learn. Obviously, you must also master the technical vocabulary of the subject. This requires learning hundreds and thousands of acronyms. Tip to sound learned: memorize the difference between acronyms and initialism. IGNOU is an acronym; it is pronounced as a word formed from a contraction of Indira Gandhi National Open University. But IAF or CBI are initialisms because you must speak the initials separately: Indian Air Force, Central Bureau of Investigations. You can also turn initials into words to show you are part of the “in crowd.” For example, for the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, you can say “Fibby,” for Motor Vehicles Administration, MVA, you say “Muvah.” But be careful where you use these. If you are with FBI people, please refrain because they will know you are a pretender. Use it to impress non-FBI people. Another impresser: with military persons, don’t just say “attack.” An attack is a 4-step process. From an Assembly Area you move to Assault Line, then into the Attack, and last, into the Deep Attack. For example: “When the Pakistanis attacked Poonch, their first echelon managed penetration, but suffered so heavily it could not shift to the Deep Attack, and there was no second echelon to exploit.” In the US case, you would use Movement to Contact, Attack, Exploitation, Pursuit. As is the case for Pakistan, the Indian Army is not good at Exploitation and Pursuit because it wants to establish firm defensive positions before making the next attack. Understandable, but in the time momentum is lost, the enemy reinforces, and you’re left with a few kilometers gain.