Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018
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Instead of helping us against rising China, the US wants India to help it. It’s the deaf and blind leading the lame and the insane. The point of this extended diversion is to warn, again, that relying on the US to handle China is a very bad idea. We can rely only on ourselves.
A caveat: you should not get the idea that at any time soon the Chinese Navy can defeat the US Navy. What the Chinese are doing every year, however, is raising the cost of a US intervention to protect American interests. It is possible that the cost-benefit ratio is already unfavorable in the South China Sea, which China demarcates as the Nine Dash Line. Another aside: The Nine Dash Line is not a recent Chinese invention. It was discussed a hundred years ago by the nationalist Chinese who wanted to revive China’s glory days and formally sketched in 1947.[406] Nationalism has its own imperatives. The Island Chain concept came from the US in the days the rise of the Japanese Navy happened. To be clear, China is not saying it wants to dominate here or the East and North China Sea. (This last includes what is sometimes called China’s fourth sea, the Bohai Sea plus Korea Bay). Together these waters are enclosed by the 1st Island Chain. What China is saying is the South China Sea is its territorial water, and everyone else can sail here only with Chinese permission. Beijing’s ambitions for the East China Sea are seen in its declaration of an air defense intercept zone which again requires Chinese permission for aerial transit. The US and allies have refused to accept this. The 1st Island Chain is defined in three ways (a) From Japan to Borneo; from the Kuriles to Borneo, and the Aleutians to Borneo. In my opinion, including Japan, Russian and American Near Seas. naval doctrine requires first strikes within the 1st Chain to eliminate US bases and keep the 7th Fleet out of Chinese waters. In case the idea of first strikes horrifies anyone, please do note that when the US entirely controlled the 1st Island Chain, it too required first strikes if necessary to maintain control of the China/Yellow Seas if necessary to defend its interests. We could discuss the 2nd Island Chain, from Yokohama through Guam to Australia, and the 3rd Island Chain, which encloses the Pacific west of Hawaii, but this takes us too off course. India is aiming for control only of the Ocean, for the rest, it wants only freedom of passage.
How are “unacceptable losses” to be defined? I am unclear if the US has made a precise definition because this is a situation-dependent political matter. Losing three carrier task forces would seem to be a starting discussion point. That would leave the US with seven and still quite capable of sweeping the Chinese Navy from the 1st Island Chain, but a capability for China to sink three might lead the US Navy to think twice about getting into a war with China within the 1st Chain. The US is hardly going to be sitting helpless east of the 1st Island Chain. It is working on several weapons to attack Chinese surface warships 300-600 km away; moreover, its carriers remain invulnerable despite the hoopla about China’s “carrier killer” hypersonic missile. The US already can “create” a virtual carrier group well away from the actual carrier group, which will sail using zero emissions. There will be a bunch of hypersonic missiles making holes in the water. And the US is very close to the deployment of 100-KW lasers and is working on 1-MW lasers. It already selectively deploys 10-KW lasers.
Nonetheless, just the fact that the US will not be automatically able to enter the 1st Island, and will have to fight to get inside, is itself damaging to US prestige. Since most of naval power projection requires maneuvering in ways to convince the adversary he faces annihilation should the trigger be pulled, automatically changes the framework of the debate because it creates an up-to-500 km buffer from the Chinese coast.
Long range outlook: Could the US turn isolationist?
Since everything cannot be covered in a single book, I’ll make this point briefly. Yes, the US could turn isolationist. This may seem to be a possibility so unlikely that discussing it is wasting time. What folks need to understand is that the US, from 1776 to 1940 was isolationist as a matter of policy. It did not want to get involved in the Old World’s quarrels. The manipulations required to get it to intervene in World War I are a long story by themselves. There was considerable manipulation required for World War II. Had the British not cancelled their alliance with Japan, largely at the US’s behest, there was a good chance that instead of attacking Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would have pursued their invasion of Siberia more seriously. In which case, America First sentiment might well have won. Since 1940, of course, the US has become involved in every nook and cranny of the world. That it is hugely overextended is obvious, particularly as Americans have become less and less inclined to fight wars. Fortunately for those that want the US to be involved everywhere, the US has become involved in endless with a tiny army and avoided mass casualties. But sooner or later it will occur to Americans that they are dissipating their strength in meaningless and never-ending wars if that means taking casualties. This realization will be speeded by the rise of China, making US interventions abroad much costlier. Americans have no interest anymore in sacrificing to maintain their position as Number One. They are fat (literally), and if not particularly happy for at least half the country, are zonked out on cheap beer, legal and illegal drugs, cheap porn, and reality TV to the point they have lost interest in much of the world. Do not be fooled by the American Establishment: it no longer drives the aspirations of the American people. That does not mean the Establishment will disappear overnight. It will take decades. A stage could be reached, however, that the US is willing for the Chinese to take care of the next crisis. The Chinese, already involved militarily or economically all over the world except North America, will gladly take over the role of Global Policeman.
The above is just a warning to the Indian establishment. There is no surety that the US will bail us out in the future, especially starting around 2035.
16.4 The Japanese and Australian Navies
In any analysis of the naval equation between the Indo-US and Chinese navies, consideration must be given to Japan. There is no Indo-Japan defense treaty, but there is one between Japan-US. If India and China are facing off in the Indian Ocean pursuant to a war on the subcontinent, and the US elects to help us, it is possible that the US will ask Japan for help. Under the current Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, Japan can assist the US only if the threat is to Japan. The Prime Minister may bring up the matter of amendment in early 2018. Two-thirds of both houses of Parliament must agree, followed by a simple majority of the public referendum. Because the conflict is far away in the Indian Ocean, it is likely that Japan will not be able to respond. Conversely, however, the proposed changes to the Japanese Constitution, the definition of defense of Japan is to be considerably widened, and likely Japan will be able to respond. Even if the constitutional amendment is not passed, the US (a) can tell Tokyo that the China-India conflict at sea threatens the security of both US and Japan shipping lanes, particularly oil/gas tanker traffic, and ask Japan to join with the US to protect the sea lanes. (b) can request Japan to accelerate patrolling/surveillance in the China Seas. Either way, China will have to divert naval resources to counter the increased Japan deployment.
As of 2015, it was reported that the Japan Navy was permitted to help defend US warships anywhere.[407] Earlier it was restricted to operations within Japanese territory, which in an emergency could extend to 1000-nm. Though the Diet has passed two bills expanding the meaning of “self-defense,” the constitution also must be changed. The Japanese people adore ambiguity in speech and words, the more obscure the subject, and the longer it takes to understand, the happier they are. [408] If I may be permitted to expand and modify Gay Claiborne’s explanation of the graphic representation of how different cultures think, [409] Asian thinking is a spiral where you traverse a circular path moving ever inward; Arabic thought is parallel lines, successively set forward; and western thought is a straight inclined line taking us from Point A to Point Z, i.e., linear. I can offer you no understanding of how the Japanese people look at Article 9, but a report from US Library of Congress, especiall
y Sections XI and XII give an idea of the ambiguity and complexity of how the article is to be interpreted. I mention this because of the current popularity in India of the idea of the quadrilateral, Australia-India-Japan-US. To a person like myself who thrives on hard data, the quadrilateral notion is as insubstantial as one of Salome seductive veils, and less enticing. As a Punjabi, Editor has no use for theory; his sole concern is who will help us when the shooting starts. Sitting cross-legged on a lily-pad in the ocean pondering on the beauty and meaning of words is unproductive when an anti-ship missile is bearing down on you.
Type
Number
Note
SS Soryo
9+4
4,200-tons submerged, AIP, 2009 or later
SS Oyashio
9
4,000-tons submerged, all 2000 or later
CVL Izumo
2
27,000-tons, full deck
CVL Hyuga
2
19,000-tons, full deck
LHD Osumi
3
14,000-tons, half deck, 8 helio, 2 LCAC
DDG
6 + 2 Type 27DD + 2
9,500-10,000 tons, Aegis
DD
18
~6,000-tons, 2 DDGs, all SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 x SH-60J
FF
10
~5,000-tons, 8 x SSM, Sea Sparrow, ASROC, 1 x SH-60J
(a) The Japanese call their light carriers “helicopter destroyers”
(b) 48 new escort ships 2013-2023
(c) In 2014 planned to buy Wasp class LHD from US, possible airwing 20 F-35 + 10+ helio/MV-22, 40,000-tons, no further details
(d) LHD Osumi to be upgraded for MV-22 Osprey
One of these days I must look into why the Japanese Soryu submarines are so large. Meanwhile, read the article by Kyle Mizokami to learn more about the class.[410]
The Japanese navy is fifth in size in the world. Corvettes have been excluded from the tally. Primarily the navy is focused on ASW, in support of which it flies the second-largest MR/ASW aircraft fleet in the world, after the US, with ~90 P-3 Orions, replacing with indigenous aircraft. It has begun to concern itself with ballistic missile defense. In addition to six Aegis destroyers, it has two building and two more planned. Presently, two ready ships are needed for missile defense of Japan; additional ships will go toward boosting BMD for US warships and surely most likely for Japanese task forces.[411] Also, two Aegis Ashore bases are to be build. The US Navy deploys five Aegis ships in Japan. The new ships will be delivered in 2020 and 2021 and belong to the 27DD Class. Two more may be procured. Maritime strike capability has been increased by locating two F-15 squadrons to Okinawa. 4 E-2D AEW&C and 17 MV-22 Osprey are on order. 40 F-35Bs are proposed The E-2Ds will either replace some of the existing 13 E-2Cs or add new capabilities. Japan has 4 x E767 for air defense operations; the E-2 is optimized for overwater missions.
The Japanese Army is about 150,000 personnel, with nine divisions the size of reinforced brigades, and six brigades the size of reinforced battalions groups: 1st-4th, 6th-10th Divisions; 5th, 11th-15th Brigades. The navy has an amphibious rapid deployment brigade with two infantry regiments (battalions) for the defense of remote islands, based at Nagasaki. Unfortunately, my Japan expert Larry J. Smith has not been in touch for many years, and I am not sufficiently updated.
The air force has about 3000 combat aircraft: the F-2, an F-16 analog, F-15s, and F-4s. F-35s are entering service to replace the F-4s.[412]
Australia Navy
Type
Current
Future Fleet
SS
6 x Collins
12 x Barracuda class 2023-
DDG
1+2 Hobart
3 Hobart Air Warfare 2018-
FFG
8 Anzac
9 successor class ASW
OPV
13 Armidale 300-tons
12 successors class 2020 onward, 90-meter, 1900-ton
LHD
2 Canberra class
Replaced 2030-40
The Australians are about the only ones taking the Chinese naval expansion seriously. They are doubling their submarine fleet with advanced – and very – expensive – submarines. They have in service, on order, or planned 15 P-8s plus 9 MQ-4C Triton long-range ocean surveillance UAVs and will be the first, after the US, to fly the Posideon/Triton combination. Triton has 360-degree surveillance over a radius of 2000-nm, 80% availabibility, and 24+ hour patrols. It carries weapons, and aside from surveillance it performs EW and C4IR. It is a sophisticated and very expensive system: Germany had ordered four for $2.5-billion[413]
The 90-meter OPV contract has been awarded, [414] $300-million per ship. Some reports say 80- or 85-meter. Possible armament 1 x 57mm, landing space for 1 helicopter (no hanger), and so far no mention of missiles. Presumably, this is by choice as the ship is big enough for 8 Harpoon and Sea Sparrow, or a smaller SSM.
The Australian Army[415] consists of a division HQ, 3 active brigades (3 battalions each), an aviation brigade, and a combat support brigade. Reserves have a division HQ and six brigades.
The Australian Air Force has 78 F-18 and a surprisingly large number of F-35s, 10 + 90 on order. It also has 8 C-17s, 12 F-18 EW aircraft, 5 G550 EW on order, and 6 E-7 AEWCs (Boeing 737-700 airframe).
17. Intelligence: its collection, its evaluation and misevaluation
17.1 Collecting intelligence
17.2 Evaluating intelligence
17.3 Misleading by false mirror-imaging
17.4 Overinsuring based on incomplete or false intelligence
In this chapter, by means of case studies, I will show how intelligence is collected and evaluated or mis-evaluated. This is not a book about theory, thus the practical examples. I’ve included US examples that I am familiar with because there is relatively little material available on India,
17.1 Collection
How is information collected?
A question I am asked: how you get your information on India and Pakistan. The answer is in the pre-internet era, which is while I was in India, the information had to be ferreted using a variety of methods. This was not spying. Spies acquire information for someone who generally, but not always, pays them. Some spies work for ideological reasons, not financial. I collected data only for myself. And I never read or had possession of any official document. Leaving India in 1989, for many years I was deprived of all sources of information. Then came the internet and the golden age of what is grandiloquently called Open Source Intelligence. More accurately, it is just plain old-fashioned research. At one stage I had approximately 40 correspondents all over the world, most of whom worked for free, on an information-exchange basis. Some had to be paid, admittedly modest sums. In the early 2000s, due to divorce I had to declare bankruptcy and lost my Pakistan correspondents who would send me data from newspapers and other sources. GOI had become much more relaxed about Indian defense information, and there was a big explosion of blogs and social media. For several years Mandeep Bajwa, who is extraordinarily well informed, was a major help, but recently has ceased communication. Rohit Vats, who has an unmatched ability to search for data on the internet, has been a big help on Pakistan. Blogger friends help. Incidentally, of the four new divisions raised 2007-now, I have only three of the twelve brigades. The Director Military Intelligence will smirkingly say: “that’s just the way we want it, to keep nosy civilians out of our business.” That’s fine but having seen on occasion the product collected by other agencies, I can assure DMO that everyone except myself already knows.
Take for example an article in the Punjab Tribune[416] 2017 on raising of four new mechanized battalions It confirms these are first new mechanized battalions in several years. You can infer the MIR battalion is 27. It shows 20 Guards was recently raised, and the next two battalions will be 22 and 23. Naturally you wonder what happened to 21 Guards; fortunately, the article saves further work by reminding 21 is with the Rashtriya Rifles. Where m
ight those four battalions be? We know from other reports that the 7th and 10th Infantry Divisions are now RAPID, so that takes care of the four. You also know from Army gossip that the Grenadiers may be the next mechanized regiment, so you set a mental note to watch out for actual information or anomalies indicating this may be the case. The news of 7th RAPID comes from Sparsh Amin, an enthusiast with sharp eyes. He saw a photograph of a BMP in 7th Division markings. The news of 10th RAPID comes from the Tribune.[417] It also gives other valuable clues. (i) It adds another level of confirmation to what you heard earlier that the RAPIDs have an R&S battalion, a mechanized unit; (ii) more importantly, confirms rumors the Army needs to put an armored brigade at Naushera, which is decent tank country even though it is in the low hills. Before Pakistan attacked Akhnur in 1965 and in 1971 to sever the Indian line of communications between Jammu and Kashmir, the concern was Pakistan might stage an armored attack in the Naushera/Jhangar area. This was because Pakistan’s Operation Venus, to be launched in 1948 just before the ceasefire, was aimed south of the town, to be conducted by two brigades of Pakistan 7th Division, 14th Para and 3rd Armored Brigade and almost all the artillery Pakistan could gather.[418] The division will be 25th if existing plans remain the same. Often, they change.