Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  An aside: in war, it can never be forecast where fortune will visit. In 1948, Pakistan artillery blew up the Beri Patan bridge, cutting the Jammu-Poonch road as planned. But, as the Pakistan historian relates, India created a bypass in 24-hours, so nothing was gained. Had the 7-battalion attack been launched (6 infantry, 1 armored), it would have run into two Indian defending brigades. Perhaps the momentum of the attack would have carried it through. But perhaps not. Good planning always allocates extra troops to ensure an attack is successful. It cannot under any conditions be assumed that an attack will succeed. But this means troops in reserve, and as seen in earlier sections of the book, neither India nor Pakistan have anything in reserve. Therefore “just enough” troops cannot deliver decisive results. India, with 10x Pakistan’s GDP and 6x the population, can easily provide for several divisions. But India has never planned on winning against Pakistan or China. It has planned only for not losing. And should anything go wrong for us, we will lose.

  Back to the analysis, we now know that we should watch for two new mechanized battalions and two new tank regiments to form an armored brigade for 25th Division. Knowing the brigade laydown for the division, not discussed in the book, we can identify the brigade to be converted. All these permutations and combinations are raced through without putting anything on paper, setting up mental watch points. You also set up mental watch points for how Pakistan might react. My current instantaneous conclusion is that Pakistan will not react to at least Indian 10th RAPID, as it has itself undertaken a substantial buildup of armor in the Sialkot-Pathankot area. How it will react to the proposed new RAPID in Northern Command requires several branchings. For instance, will it add an armored brigade to either 19th Division or 23rd Division, or will it rely on boosting anti-tank strength and rely on its X Corps independent brigade to watch the area? So, you keep running along branches of branches, and you should – in this case – be able to do it in about 3-minutes.

  17.2 Evaluating intelligence

  Pakistan’s “305 Artillery Division”

  Please be clear I have no information except published material, now called Open Source Information, available to everyone. I begin by explaining the geopolitical significance of the confrontation. Now, in intelligence practice, the collectors are not supposed to analyze. The collector is supposed to have a bias for the information s/he obtains. But the analyst has her own bias, she will incline toward fitting, or not fitting, the information received from the collector into her bias framework. The two functions should not be separated, though I freely acknowledge most analysts may not be as flexible as required when new information is received and who may not have the decades of experience needed to combine the two well. As an example, I’ve twice come across “305 Artillery Division” at Muzaffarabad, Pakistan Kashmir. As an analyst I know to be cautious because 305 is 9:1 likely to be a brigade rather than a division. Pakistan tends to keep its division numbers in sequence. For example, it has filled the entire series 1-23, bar 13.

  India too has avoided 13 for a division, but when I asked Mandeep Singh Bajwa if this is because of superstition, he said it was not. The Indian Army has had 13 before, for example, for an artillery brigade, and as a cavalry regiment (13th DCO Lancers which went to Pakistan in 1947). Thirteen as an unlucky number has no significance to non-Christian cultures; Judas was the thirteenth man at the Last Supper where he betrayed Jesus), and that has not stopped the US from using 13, for example, XIII Corps and 13th Airborne Division and 13th Armored Division. Nor did that stop the British for giving a 13th Infantry Brigade to 39th Division during World War II. I also have a data point for 12 Artillery Division at Gujranwala. I hesitate to accept it because Pakistan already has a 12 Division, at Muree. A Pakistan 12th Artillery Division would be a break in their numbering system. This doesn’t mean they don’t have it, just that it’s unlikely. I was told years ago II Corps’ Artillery Division is the 2nd, which leaves the prospect that the 12th Artillery Division was a misprint for the 2nd. Thus, a 305th Artillery Division would be out of sequence. [While writing this, I found a Wikipedia list by ISPR Pakistan of their major-generals. ISPR places 2nd Artillery Division at Gujranwala. While I’ve seen many similar listings, this is the first that is credible enough to justify removing it on my orbat from Multan. Which leaves the question of what artillery division is at Multan; and solves the puzzle of duplication of 12 Division. Clearly, that is a misprint.] Meanwhile, you should look for the next Pakistan division to be numbered 20, 24 or in the 30s. It has 33, 35, and 37 Division, and has used 34 for the CPEC security divisiob. 36 and 39 were used for the dummy divisions in East Pakistan; the odds are Pakistan will not use them again for many reasons too tedious too detail. 31 is possible since it is an odd number joining three other odds, but with 34 now in the sequence, the next division could be 32 or 38.

  The PLA “division” that reinforced Doklam

  Nitin Gokhle, who had access to Indian military officials and others, says during the Doklam stand-off, China moved in a division including 150 tanks and guns. Let’s use this as an example of how intelligence is evaluated.

  Was there a Chinese division sent to the area? Since by the summer the Chinese Army was completing its big shift to brigades, there may be no division to send from the Chengdu-Kunming side. Four divisions were available in Sinkiang, at low readiness, and it’s not easy to bring a division from that side to the confrontation. Incidentally, this will soon be remedied. The Chinese, busy as beavers, are constructing new rail lines to improve connectivity between Xinjiang and central/southeast China. Could they have sent a division equivalent? Most certainly. Prasun Sen Gupta, who follows Chinese military technology closely, notes that China needs time to acclimatize troops to Tibet. There was a brigade exercising in Tibet at about that time, but after combing multiple sources it becomes apparent it likely is the resident 54th Brigade, supported by 308th Artillery Regiment, both assigned to Tibet around 1950. Probably no reinforcements were sent to Tibet.

  The Daily Mail August 4, 2017, has Chinese-released pictures; it suggests that the idea was to intimidate India. If so, the performance may be equated to a mime playing to an audience of a million penguins in Antarctica. The Chinese are said to be very subtle, so much, so their subtlety passes over Indian heads. If China wants our attention, it must start bashing us with metaphorical shovels. Subtlety-shuttlety is not our thing, because we are simple folks. Loads of artillery firing pre-arranged patterns designed to look good on TV is not going to impress the Indian Army – if anyone even noticed. [419] [420] [421] One possibility for the estimate of 150 tanks lies with the 54th Brigade, which is Mechanized. If it has not yet been converted to a combine arms brigade, iIt has a battalion of T-96s, and the remaining four battalions have a combination of tracked and wheeled IFVs and APCs. The IFVs feature guns and are light tanks. Moreover, gun-mortars also look like light tanks. So a mechanized brigade can look as if it has 150 tanks.

  We already know 54th was originally a division of 18th Army headquartered at Lhasa, later disbanded when China was confident it had subdued Tibet. Its sister divisions, 52nd and 53rd, were reduced to regiments, and 54th was eliminated. From Andrew KC we learn the recent history of 54th Brigade.[422] It was reactivated as a regiment August 1, 1990, with three motorized (truck) and one APC battalions. In 1996 it added a 100mm mortar company and two 25mm air defense companies, I assume under a new artillery battalion HQ. Its mission as the Tibet Military Districts Rapid Deployment Unit is readiness to deploy at 48-hours’ notice, with support from 308th Artillery Regiment – which fought along the Tawang axis in 1962. In 2014, it was spotted with the 120mm SP mortar Type 05A. The mechanized battalions have T-92 IFV (light mechanized, 25mm cannon, 6 x 6, 3 crew + 9), and T-89I APCs (tracked, 12.7mm HMG, 2+12). The SP gun/mortar using the same chassis as the T-92 light IFV. At some point, a T-96 tank battalion was added This tank is the equivalent of the T-72. If 54th is now a Combined Arms Brigade, it will have perhaps 104 tanks and 112 AFV/IPCs. On the information avail
able, I would place no more than the 6th Border Regiment and 54th Brigade at the confrontation. I do not think China inducted any additional formations to Tibet – it did not intend a mini-war, and it knows we are not about to start one.

  That said, India has already raised two armored brigades for the area; likely the same ones that are part of XVII Corps. One brigade has been sent to Jammu area. XVII Corps is supposed to get an artillery division. The Chinese see war primarily as a political act; and on the political level, they are so sure India wont attack despite its huge margin of superiority, that it hasn’t yet reacted by inducting fresh troops into Tibet/Xinjiang. Nonetheless, however sure they may be, it seems they are making a mistake by not (a) moving a regular brigade or regiment opposite us in Ladakh in view of our buildup of four brigades in recent years, and (b) inducting at least a fourth regular brigade into Tibet. 54th Brigade is their reserve for Tibet, and for Lhasa internal security, it is too risky to change its station to Yadong. A new brigade is needed there.

  So, likely you are disappointed that after all that effort, all I conclude is that there is 1 regiment and a mechanized brigade in the area, that a new border regiment must be brought in to replace 6th at Yadong, and we should also watch for one new brigade that may or may not be seen soon. Lengthy as this explanation is, it’s a highly condensed version of the reasoning/analysis process. But again, if you follow these matters year in and year out, the analysis takes three minutes. [While finishing this book, @rajfourtyseven kindly told me that according to a mutual source, whom we both regard as impeccable, 55th Brigade has moved into Lhasa, and presumably becomes the new theatre reserve.]

  17.3 Misleading by mirror-imaging

  As a case study to make the point, I will take a report from the prestigious Stimson Center in Washington DC, “Military Budgets in India and Pakistan: Trajectories, Priorities, and Risks”.[423] The report

  “examines trends in defense spending in India and Pakistan, explores the strategic implications of those trends and outlines the consequences for regional stability. The panel discussion was convened by Michael Krepon and moderated by Sameer Lalwani, with Shuja Nawaz, Nilanthi Samaranayake, and Shane Mason serving as discussants.”

  The names of the other discussants may be unfamiliar to the general Indian reader, but please be assured that Lalwani and Nawaz are respected academic heavyweights in this business. Still, these are serious scholars doing serious work, and if they are adding 2 and 1 and getting an answer of 5, it isn’t their fault. They are starting from a western point of view. Understandable, because they’re in Washington and American donors fund the Center. But if you are planning to go into intelligence analysis, you must operate by putting yourself in place of India and Pakistan. That’s hard to do except for a very few scholars like Steven Cohen of Brookings, or me who has studied both sides for 48-years. I will always stand up for India, but that doesn’t mean I don’t understand and present fairly Pakistani imperatives.

  I will take just one point from the study, which says that India spends 4% of its defense budget on N-weapons and Pakistan spends 10%. First, how is the estimates derived? I’m willing to wager that even India and Pakistan don’t know the actual spending, simply because no one has bothered to put together under one head spending made under different heads. Second, what does the figure mean? Is it too much? Too little? Just right? Though the Stimson paper makes a commendably valiant effort to make a comparison, and acknowledges that much is hidden, the figures 4% and 10% indicate a false precision. Someone will quote Stimson, and the figure will become gospel through multiple repetitions without noting the caveats.

  Based on the output of the spending, in the form of nuclear warfare units, the figures are much too high for both sides. For example, an Agni-2 missile of 2000-3000 km range costs about $6-million. But the US estimated in 2017 perhaps 10 were deployed. Assuming a life of ten years (arbitrary) and one firing a year, India is spending just $6-million a year on this weapon system. Here is US estimate of India’s N-capable missiles: Agni II = <10, Agni III = <10, Agni I = <75. K-15 = 12, Bhramos = ? India uses Bhramos as a conventional weapon that should not be counted here. Similarly, the Mirage 2000, said to be equipped for nuclear weapons, is used for conventional operations. (SPD 2016) (PAEC budget 2016 and 2017) (Suparco 2017-18 Rs 3.5-billion, 3.3 for remote sensing sat, 0.2 for comsat) (30 June 2017 PNR 105 to USD). The force as exists, and the R&D that is done, make it unlikely in the extreme that India is spending more than 2% of its defense budget on N-weapons. You’ll have to take my word for it, because the calculation is complex.

  In 1980, Sridhar Rao of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi and myself did a book-sized estimate for Chinese military spending and concluded it was around $5-billion/year, about the same as India and way below western estimates. What happened? Well, Sridhar was on a fellowship at Princeton that year. When he brought up the conclusion, it is not as if the learned scholars of that august institution laughed at him. They simply said the figure was wrong, without reading a page, because the CIA estimate was much higher. What happened in India? We submitted the book for clearance to GOI and were refused. But why? Two entities move in mysterious ways: God and GOI. Neither deigns to give reasons to mere peasants like Sreedhar and me. While I would love to do a study on Pakistan’s actual defense expenditure and the N-force expenditures, I have no idea who will fund it. Our estimate was so much lower because we did it in Indian rupees, not dollars. This was fair because India and China had approximately the same per capita, did not have a free market economy, had very little motorization, and used conscripts paid very little. This point seems obvious, doesn’t it? It wasn’t to the Princeton scholars. Which validates my long-held theory, that there is an inverse relationship between a person’s academic standing and IQ. But enough of this very satisfying name calling, Back to non-serious stuff.

  The paper creates a metric defense spending per capita and says that Pakistan is falling behind here (p. 36). Statistically, this is a content-free metric. It means nothing. Then: “It is still too soon to say whether Pakistan’s military decisionmakers, faced with increasingly difficult budget choices, will continue to sustain significant investments in nuclear capabilities at the expense of conventional capabilities in the future” (p. 38). How has Pakistan been trading off conventional capabilities in favor of nuclear capabilities? At several points this analysis shows that Pakistan has been increasing its conventional capabilities to the point that, in terms of brigades, it has reached parity with India; it has been steadily modernizing its air force and navy, the latter to the point that the modernization gap has never been narrower. And what are these difficult budget choices? Pakistan is spending less in terms of GDP on defense than it has ever before. “The United States covered 21 percent of Pakistan’s defense spending between 2002-2015. There is ample reason to believe that Washington will no longer continue this practice. U.S. contributions now only account for 11 percent of Pakistan’s defense budget.” (p. 38). The US has NOT been covering part of Pakistan’s defense budget, it has been repaying Pakistan for CI operations conducted on the US’s behalf. Yes, as noted earlier, US has supplied some systems like the F-16. But Pakistan has paid for every aircraft, not the US. “Consequently, India engaged in robust modernization programs in the 1980s, and is attempting to do the same at present.” (p. 37). India engaged in “robust” modernization – whatever that means in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It fell behind in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s to such an extent that not since 1962 has so much of its conventional arsenal been obsolete. It is always understood that a weapon has a finite life and needs replacement. Replacing obsolete weapons is not “robust modernization,” it is simply replacement.

  First, you cannot compare India and Pakistan for the same reason you can’t compare Canadian defense spending to the US. The US has a GDP 12x greater than Canada’s, and the US spends a greater percentage of GDP on defense. The paper is starting with an irrelevant comparison. The author is not t
o blame, because as a westerner he is concerned about US national security interests. He is mirror imaging, because he operates, naturally enough, in a western frame work. India does not help by refusing to explain in depth what are its viewpoints. We are such superior thinkers that if thick-headed westerners don’t understand us by instinct, it is below us to educate menials. It also does not help that when we do explain, we use western frameworks of strategic study to show we are part of the western club. And it surely does not help that our thinking is so confused and ill-analyzed by ourselves, that it seldom stands up to detailed scrutiny.