Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death
Page 117
day what had happened. A German Channel convoy had stumbled on the invasion
force. ‘Thus,’ dictated Goebbels in his diary, ‘we had the first report that something
was afoot out there in the murk and fog as early as 4:28 A.M.’ A German submarine
chaser had rammed one landing craft, a second German warship had opened first on
the British motor torpedo-boats. After an exchange of fire at point-blank range which
left eleven German dead and ten missing, the British raid developed into a debâcle.
The enemy lost one destroyer, thirty-three landing craft, 106 planes, and 4,350 men
(including 1,179 dead). London claimed that the raid was merely an ‘exercise with
live ammunition.’ Goebbels dismissed this: ‘Obviously the British planned to execute
a major operation here,’ he wrote. ‘At very least they tried to bring about a
Second Front … thereby complying with Stalin’s orders. There can be no doubt
about that.’ Not even Churchill, he argued, would have sacrificed all those planes,
destroyers, and troop transporters, not to mention three thousand dead and missing
men, for a mere exercise.63 ‘All of a sudden,’ he scoffed the next day, ‘the British are
declaring that everything went just the way it was planned. From the fact that it was
all over in nine hours they are now inferring that it was in fact only planned to last
nine hours.’64 He noted with glee that Churchill had ordered a strict clamp-down on
quoting the American newspaper reports on the fiasco. ‘The reality is,’ he commented,
‘that he is the prisoner of the Kremlin. He can no longer conform to the dictates of
commonsense. He has to act at the Soviet behest.’65
In glorious sunshine he left Hitler’s HQ and drove back to the airfield, past rolling
cornfields lush with the new Ukrainian harvest. If only they could transport it all
back home, he sighed. The previous day’s Völkischer Beobachter had carried a foolish
article by Erich Koch, the local dictator, boasting of the agricultural riches now
flowing to the Reich. As soon as he got back to his ministry, Goebbels warned against
propagating such false illusions.66
714 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
1 MinConf., Mar 18; Propaganda Slogan No.22, Mar 23, and note of Mar 24 (NA film
T81, roll 672, 0928ff); see Office of War Information (OWI) confidential report No.6, Jul
25, 1942 (NA file RG.226, entry 16, box 115, file 18962).
2 Propaganda Slogan No.20, Mar 13, 1942 (NA film T81, roll 672, 0905ff): Germany had
to feed 2·5m foreign workers and the occupied territories too now.
3 Diary, Apr 5, 13; MinConf., Apr 12; Propaganda slogan Mar 10 (NA film T81, roll 672,
0918ff) and BA file NS.18/43; NYT, Apr 17, Jun 22, 1942.
4 Führer decree, referred to in JG diary, Mar 28, 1942.
5 Diary, May 2, 23, 1942. Included in the 350,000 marks furnishings were 500 phonograph
records and silverware for twenty-four guests (ZStA Potsdam, Rep.50.01, RMVP,
vol.766).
6 MinConf., Apr 11; diary, Apr 14, 1942.
7 Note for JG, Jun 10, 1942 (Hoover Libr., Goebbels papers, box 2).
8 Unpubl. diary, Mar 11, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267).
9 Ibid., May 14; cf. Mar 16 and May 28, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267).
10 Diary, Apr 9, 1942.
11 MinConf., Apr 27, 1942.
12 Diary, Apr 24; 163 people died in Rostock, and the centre was 70 percent destroyed. To
JG’s annoyance the foreign ministry sent Countess (Edda) Ciano and a gaggle of Italian court
ladies to visit Rostock (Diary, May 4). Foreign ministry official Braun von Stumm coined the
phrase ‘Bædecker raids,’ saying the Germans would now attack anything awarded four stars
in the famous guide book to Britain (Ibid., May 2–4, 1942).
13 Diary, Apr 27, 1942.
14 Unpubl. diary, Jun 2 (NA film T84, roll 267); at the MinConf., May 26 he announced
the arrest of seven Jews for firebombing his anti-Soviet exhibition. Cf. MinConf., May 27,
1942.
15 Diary, May 28, 1942. According to NYT 258 Jews were shot at Lichterfelde on that day.
16 Stapo-Leitstelle Berlin to Oberfinanzpräsident, Jun 5, 1942; cit Reitlinger, Endlösung,
111; Reuth, 502.—An Apr 26, 1938 decree had required all Jews to list assets in excess of
5,000 marks to local tax offices and police HQs. Wolfgang Scheffler, Judenverfolgung im Dritten
Reich 1933–1945 (Berlin, 1960), 27ff.
17 On Tonak: see Hitler’s table talk, Apr 29, 1942 (Picker edition).
18 Diary, May 30, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267); Reuth, note 74, makes a brave attempt to
reconcile this entry with a Hitler Plan to liquidate the Jews.
19 Diary, Jan 25–27; JG express circular to ministries, Jan 30: ‘I have had the circulation of
Seehaus material stopped with immediate effect.’ (Reich Chancellery files, NA film T120,
roll 2474, E.255399).—The other agencies were DNB, Transozean, and Johannsen’s service
in Hamburg (ibid., Jan 30, 1942).
20 Unpubl. diary, Apr 6, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 261). David Irving, Breach of Security
(London, 1967) and Das Reich hört mit (Kiel, 1990); unpubl. diary, Sep 25, 1942 (IfZ, ED.83/
2; author’s film DI-52), recording a visit from the FA’s Ministerialdirektor Walther Seifert.
21 Unpubl. diary, May 30, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267); for Severitt’s position see the FA
phone directory in NA file, RG.3198, IRR, XE4986, and interrogations therein of Peipe and
Rebien; his predecessors were Dr Schippert and Klaus von Klitzing.
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 715
22 Unpubl. diary, May 30, 1942 (unpubl. diary, T84, roll 267).
23 MinConf., May 29; diary, May 28, 1942.
24 Diary, May 31, 1942.
25 Unpubl. diary, May 30 (NA film T84, roll 267); cf. Table talk, May 30, 1942 (Picker,
365).
26 Gutterer MS, and interview, Jun 30, 1993. In his diary, Jun 1, 1942, JG reported Hitler’s
criticism of the other ministers for not having left contact numbers—he did not mention
his own absence.
27 Diary, Jun 2 (NA film T84, roll 267); MinConf., Jun 2; on Jun 14, 1942 he pointed out
that every conceivable bomber type had been shot down, proof that Churchill had scraped
the bottom of the barrel.
28 Diary, Jun 2, 5; NYT, Jun 2, 1942 wrote of 20,000 dead.
29 Memo by William B Donovan to President Roosevelt, No.596, Jun 1942 (FDR Libr.,
PSF, boxes 165–6, ‘OSS’); and see JG, ‘Der Luft- und Nervenkrieg,’ in Das Reich, Jun 14,
1942.
30 Memo by William B Donovan to President Roosevelt, No.581, Jun 5, 1942 (FDR Libr.,
PSF, boxes 165–6, ‘OSS’); and see the PWE analysis of German home propaganda, May 13–
20, 1942, No.528, ibid.
31 Diary, Mar 27, 1942.
32 Memo by William B Donovan to President Roosevelt, No.359, Mar 27, 1942 (FDR
Libr., PSF, boxes 165–6, ‘OSS’)
33 Ditto, No.319, Mar 9, 1942 (Ibid.)
34 Ditto, No.318, Mar 7, 1942 (Ibid.)
35 OSS R&A Report No.21, ‘Current German Attitudes and the German War Effort,’ Mar
19, 1942 (USAMHI, Donovan papers, box 37a).
36 Memo by William B Donovan to President Roosevelt, No.304, Mar 3, 1942 (FDR Libr.,
PSF, boxes 165–6, ‘OSS’)
37 E.g., on Apr 19, May 3, 9: cf. ditto, No.563, May 29, 1942 (ibid.)
38 Ditto, No.563, May 29 (ibid.); MinConf., Jun 15, 1942.
; 39 MinConf. Jul 22; see also Aug 6, 8, 1942.
40 Ibid., Aug 10, 1942.
41 MinConf., Jul 3, 1942.
42 Diary, Jun 5, 1942.
43 Bormann to JG et. al., Jun 8, 1942 (NA film T175, roll 139, 7362f).
44 MinConf., Jul 14, 1942.
45 Diary, May 14, 18; unpubl. diary, May 27, 1942.
46 JG as RPL., guidelines, Feb 15, 1942 (Yivo, Occ. E20.)
47 MinConf., Jul 6, 1942.
48 Diary, Feb 24; in general, see the report by Hadamowsky and Taubert on the administration
of the east, Sep 17, 1942 (Yivo, Occ. E18).
49 Unpubl. diary, Apr 25, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 261).
50 Ibid., Feb 14; and May 2, 1942.
51 Ibid., May 22, 27, 28, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267).
52 Ibid., Jun 1, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267).
716 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
53 Diary, Jun 5, 1942.
54 MinConf., Jul 1, 1942.
55 Ibid., Jul 7, 9, 1942.
56 JG, ‘Die sogenannte russische Seele,’ Das Reich, Jul 18; circulated to all Reichsleiter and
gauleiters, Jul 14 (NA film T581, roll 16; BA file NS.26/291); and see OWI report No.6, Jul
6, 1942 (NA film RG.226, entry 16, box 115, 18962.)
57 MinConf., Jul 28, 1942.
58 Diary, Jun 5, 1942.
59 MinConf., Jul 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 1942.
60 Ibid., Jul 23, 1942.
61 Ibid., Jul 8; on Aug 3, 1942 he added, ‘In particular avoid comments that the air raids
will not decide the war.’
62 JG, ‘Auch der Versuch ist strafbar,’ Reich, Aug 2; issued as usual by radio and DNB several
days ahead. See ‘Goebbels über die Zweite Front,’ in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jul 30, and NYT,
Jul 30, 1942, p.3. In his diary on Aug 1, 1942, JG wrote, ‘Never has an article of mine
attracted such lively interest as this one. It is quoted under banner headlines on the front
pages of the entire European press.’
63 MinConf., Auf 18, 22, 1942.
64 Unpubl. diary, Aug 14–15, 1942 (BA file NL.118/125).
65 MinConf., Aug 11, 1942.
66 See ibid., Aug 19, 1942 (Moscow archives).
67 Unpubl. diary, Aug 21, 1942 (Moscow archives).
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., Aug 22, 1942.
70 MinConf., Aug 21, 1942.
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 717
46: The Road to Stalingrad
GERMANY had now been at war for three years. Her public’s brittle morale was
troubling Goebbels and he drafted an article on ‘The point of war,’ reviewing
the events since 1939 from a lofty ideological plane.1 British leaflets were becoming
more insidious, particularly one appealing, ‘Get rid of Hitler!’2 The message
seemed unthinkable, but within the four walls of No.20 Hermann-Göring Strasse
even he began to express reservations about some of Hitler’s decisions. Once he
stepped out through the padded double-doors and into his morning ministerial conference,
however, he radiated unswerving loyalty to his Führer.3
He had recently issued a circular to journalists discouraging inflated terms like
‘unique’ or ‘historic’ to describe their victories, and words like ‘warlord’ for anybody
other than Hitler.4 Morale improved as Hitler’s armies fanned out to the south
and east across the shimmering, dusty Russian steppe, and Goebbels methodically
warned the media against overweening optimism.5 They captured the oil cities of
Maykop and Kraznodar; the Russian population rose against them under the influence
of Moscow’s propaganda and, as the High Command chided Goebbels, with no visible
effect from his. Hitler repeatedly warned him to damp down any spreading
optimism.6 He ordered General Friedrich Paulus to advance with the Sixth Army on
Stalingrad, a city of two million souls dominating the Volga waterway.
The Russian summer’s heat was as savage as the late winter’s cold. The temperature
soared to near fifty degrees Celsius. On August 8 Goebbels dictated: ‘The battle
of Stalingrad has begun.’ As Marshal Timoshenko withdrew before Hitler’s tank on-
718 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
slaught, Stalin ordered him to stand and fight. Goebbels compared this harshly worded
order approvingly with Hitler’s order of December 1941. ‘You can see,’ he dictated,
warming once more to the Soviet leader, ‘that in Stalin we are dealing with a man of
calibre.’7
As Soviet resistance at Stalingrad stiffened, so did Goebbels’ instinctive reluctance
to mention the city’s name. He had not forgotten Otto Dietrich’s blunder of October
1941. From late in August onward he repeatedly embargoed all reference to the
battle. Nobody could say how long it would last. But already Stalingrad was on every
tongue, both friend and foe.8
FOR a week he vanished from Germany, visiting Venice again for the biennial film
festival.
Before leaving he wrote for Das Reich an article entitled ‘Don’t be so righteous!’, a
critique of the Germans’ pedantic sense of justice and over-objectivity. ‘We’re so
frightened of doing an injustice to somebody,’ he wrote, ‘that when in doubt we
prefer that the injustice be done to ourselves… Hating is something we Germans
still have to learn.’ Too much objectivity, he concluded, would be the death of them.
Their global mission was, he said, not to purvey culture to the world, but to ‘bring
home the grain and oil’ to Germany.9 He repeated his attack on his bugbear, overobjectivity,
in a secret address delivered to about sixty senior Berlin journalists in the
ministry’s Throne Room on September 23. He warned against harbouring any illusions
about victory. They must not under-estimate their enemy. ‘The German public
is not as hardy as the British,’ he pointed out. Britain had yet to lose a single war. ‘The
German public,’ he repeated, ‘suffers from a craving for righteousness and from a
craze for objectivity. It keeps looking for the laudable in our enemies.’ Their chronic
love-affair with Churchill was just one example.10* He dinned into this select audience
his principle of constant repetition. If he were English, he said, he would have
* The Germans cheered Mr Churchill when he drove through the ruins of Berlin in 1945,
and the city of Aachen later awarded him the Charlemagne prize.
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 719
kept repeating ever since 1939 that they were fighting Hitler, and not the Germans;
he would also have hammered home ad nauseam the eight points of the Atlantic
Charter. He warned them that their biggest problem in coming months would be the
resumption of the British air raids. Single-line references to enemy air activity in the
High Command communiqué would no longer suffice. He set up propaganda companies
with no other task than to dramatise the coming blitz and the heroism of the
people.11
IN this secret speech to Berlin’s top journalists, Goebbels was astonishingly frank
about the fate of Berlin’s Jews. Justifying the reporting restrictions imposed, he explained