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The Thirty-Year Genocide

Page 2

by Benny Morris

Nizip

  Nizip

  Nizip

  Latin(?): Nisibis

  Sometimes mistaken

  for

  Nusaybin

  Ordou

  Ordu

  Ordu

  Osmaniye

  Osmaniye

  Osmaniye

  Osmanjik

  Osmancık

  Osmancık

  Osmanli

  Osmanlı

  Osmanlı

  Pergamon, Pergama

  Bergama

  Bergama

  Grk.: Pergamon

  Phocia

  Foça

  Foça

  Fogia

  Pozanti

  Pozantı

  Pozantı

  Grk.: Pendhosis

  Bozantı

  (Continued)

  YWJ

  Place Names

  Ottoman

  Armenian, Arabic,

  En glish common

  name

  Greek, Syriac, Latin,

  name WWI

  (simplified)

  Turkish name

  or Kurdish name

  Variations

  Rakka

  Rakka

  Rakka

  Rasulayn

  Re’sülayn

  Rasülayin

  Arab.: Rās al-’Ayn

  Rize

  Rize

  Rize

  Rodosto

  Tekirdağ

  Tekirdağ

  Grk.:

  Rodosçuk

  Rhaedestus,

  Biysanthe

  Samsun, Samsoun,

  Samsun

  Samsun

  Grk.: Amisos

  Sampsoun

  Sassoun

  Sasun

  Sason

  Arm.: Sasun

  Sasson, Sasoun

  Scutari

  Üsküdar

  Üsküdar

  Grk.: Skoutarion

  Sharkeuy(?)

  Şarköy

  Şarköy

  Sinope

  Sinob

  Sinop

  Grk.: Sinope

  Sis

  Sis

  Sis

  Sivas

  Sivas

  Sivas

  Latin: Sebastia

  Sebastea, Sebasteia,

  Sebaste

  Smyrna

  Izmir

  Izmir

  Grk.: Smyrna

  Talas

  Talas

  Talas

  Grk.: Dalassa

  Talori

  Talori

  Talori

  Tarsus

  Tarsus

  Tarsus

  Grk.: Tarsos

  Tirebolu / Tripoli

  Tirebolu

  Tirebolu

  Grk.: Tripoli

  Tokat

  Tokat

  Tokat

  Grk.: Evdokia

  Trebizond

  Trabzon

  Trabzon

  Grk.: Trapezunt /

  Trapezous

  Urfa, Edessa

  Urfa

  Şanlıurfa

  Grk.: Edessa

  Kurd.: Riha

  Van

  Van

  Van

  Kurd.: Wan

  Viranshehir

  Viranşehir

  Viranşehir

  Yalova

  Yalova

  Yalova

  Grk.: Pylae

  Yenikeuy

  Yeniköy

  Yeniköy

  Yozgat

  Yozgat

  Yozgat

  Zeitoun

  Zeytun

  Süleymanlı

  Arab.: Zaytūn

  Zeytoun

  Arm.: Zeytun

  Zonguldak

  Zonguldak

  Zonguldak

  Introduction

  We embarked on this proj ect in quest of the truth about what happened to

  the Ottoman Armenians during World War I. Most Western scholarship on

  the subject has concluded that the Ottoman Empire, exploiting the fog and

  exigencies of war, carried out a genocidal campaign that resulted in a million

  or so Armenian dead. Turkish and pro- Turkish scholars have argued that

  Turkey, embattled by the British and Rus sian empires, was assailed from

  within by treacherous Armenians and simply defended itself. On this view,

  thousands of Armenians died amid deportation from troublesome combat

  zones, while the Turks suffered significant casualties at Armenian hands.

  Turning to the available con temporary documentation, we set out to dis-

  cover for ourselves what had actually happened, and why.

  We found the proofs of Turkey’s 1915–1916 anti- Armenian genocide to

  be incontrovertible. The reports by Leslie Davis, the U.S. war time consul in

  Harput, in central Turkey, offer a good illustration. Davis was no “Armenian-

  lover”; in December 1915 he questioned Armenians’ moral fiber, writing,

  “ Mothers have given their daughters to the lowest and vilest Turks to save

  their own lives . . . lying and trickery and an inordinate love of money are

  besetting sins of almost all. . . . Absolute truthfulness is almost unknown

  among the members of this race. . . . From every point of view the race is

  one that cannot be admired.”1 But he did not let his prejudices cloud his

  eyesight. During the deportations Davis sent home dozens of reports de-

  scribing the Turkish atrocities, which he summarized in a conclusive memo-

  randum in early 1918. In these reports he recalled observations such as that

  of September 24, 1915, when he toured the area southeast of Harput,

  Introduction

  around Lake Gölcük (Hazar Gölü), accompanied by the American mis-

  sionary Dr. Henry Atkinson:

  We saw [dead bodies] all along the road. They . . . had been partially

  eaten by dogs. . . . There were several hundred bodies scattered over the

  plain . . . [mostly] of women and children. . . . Some of the bodies . . .

  had been burned . . . [by] Kurds . . . in order to find any gold which the

  people may have swallowed. . . . In most of [the lakeside] valleys there

  were dead bodies. . . . In one [valley] . . . there were more than fifteen

  hundred. . . . The stench . . . was . . . great . . . I explored [this valley]

  more carefully a month later. . . . [An old Kurd] . . . told us that the gen-

  darmes had brought a party of about two thousand Armenians . . . and

  had made the Kurds from the neighboring villages come and kill

  them. . . . He acted very indignant . . . as he said the smell of their dead

  bodies was very disagreeable.

  The old man also described a “system” whereby Armenians were

  massacred. They were, he said,

  allowed to camp for a day or two in the valleys. . . . The gendarmes

  summoned the [local] Kurds . . . and ordered them to kill [the Arme-

  nians]. . . . An agreement was then made by which the Kurds were to

  pay the gendarmes a certain fixed sum— a few hundred pounds, or more,

  depending on circumstances— and were to have for themselves what ever

  they found on the bodies . . . in excess of that sum.

  Davis learned “that the people were forced to take off their clothes before they were killed, as the Mahommedans consider the clothes taken from a dead body

  to be defiled.” Most of the dead had “bayonet wounds. . . . Few had been shot,

  as bullets were too precious. . . . Nearly all of the women lay flat on their backs and showed signs of barbarous mutilation.”2

  One of these lakeside massacres was witnessed by three Eu ro pe ans on Sep-

  tember 17, a week before Davis�
��s first trek. They saw Kurds on the hills

  above the lake shoot up a large Armenian convoy and then, bearing axes,

  Introduction

  attack the “defenseless flock” like “ferocious animals.” Kurdish women ran

  down the hillside to “strip the bodies.”3

  What happened at Lake Gölcük in August– September 1915 was emblematic

  of the Armenian Genocide. But we discovered that the Armenian Genocide

  of 1915–1916 was only part of the story, a story that began de cades before

  and extended for years afterward. The story is both deeper and wider than

  the Armenian Genocide. It is deeper in the sense that the events of 1915–1916

  were part of a protracted history of vio lence; one has to look at Turkish be-

  hav ior before and after World War I in order to understand what happened

  during the war years. And it is wider in the sense that one also has to look at

  how Turkey dealt with its other Christian minorities, Greeks and vari ous

  Assyrian (or Syriac or Syrian) communities.4 This larger story extends from

  the prewar years under Sultan Abdülhamid II through the war time dominance

  of the Committee of Union and Pro gress (CUP) and the immediate postwar

  rise of the Turkish Nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. We found that,

  under each government, Muslim Turks— including the po liti cal leaders and

  everyday citizens— came to see Asia Minor’s Christian communities as a

  danger to their state’s survival and resolved to be rid of this danger. In line

  with changing po liti cal, military, and demographic circumstances, the

  successive regimes dealt with Christian communities somewhat differently,

  though to the same end. In the course of three campaigns beginning in

  1894, the Turks turned variously to tools of steady oppression, mass murder,

  attrition, expulsion, and forced conversion. By 1924 they had cleansed Asia

  Minor of its four million– odd Christians.

  This book is structured in accordance with the staggered nature of the

  Turkish campaign. There are chapters on the pre-1894 background; the mas-

  sacres of 1894–1896; the Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916; and the destruc-

  tion of the Greeks, Assyrians, and remaining Armenians in 1919–1924. The

  coverage of 1915–1916 is relatively modest in light of recent, perceptive,

  and comprehensive scholarship on the Armenian Genocide by Raymond

  Kevorkian, Donald Bloxham, Taner Akçam, Ronald Grigor Suny, and others.5

  By contrast, historians have devoted little attention to what happened in 1894–

  1896 and 1919–1924, and almost none to what befell Turkey’s Greeks and

  Assyrians during this thirty- year period. We tackle these subjects in great detail.

  Introduction

  If other historians have not treated the entire thirty- year scope of oppres-

  sion and carnage as one continuous saga, they arguably have good reasons.

  For one thing, the period spans three very diff er ent regimes: that of the last

  autocratic sultan, until 1909; of the CUP, or Young Turks, who ruled during

  the Great War after promising equality and supranational constitutionalism;

  and of Mustafa Kemal, the war hero and founder of modern Turkey during

  1919–1924. For another, each regime had diff er ent aims and constituencies.

  The CUP and Ataturk each accused their pre de ces sors of unnecessary cru-

  elty toward non- Muslims. Indeed, Ataturk is famously credited with labeling

  the mass murder of Armenians during World War I a “shameful act.”

  The traditional interpretation thus identifies three separate policies carried

  out according to distinctive logics tailored to their par tic u lar circumstances.

  The massacres of the 1890s are usually understood as Abdülhamid’s effort

  to cow disruptive Christians into submission. The 1915–1916 genocide is de-

  picted as a momentary war- induced aberration. And the ethnic cleansing

  during 1919–1924, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, is por-

  trayed as part of a chaotic, multisided bloodletting triggered by foreign inva-

  sions and the reactive Turkish war of national liberation.

  But from the documentation now available, it is clear that treating the three

  periods separately obfuscates the real ity of what the Turks intended and what

  tran spired. Nor does it make sense to view what happened to each of the victim

  communities— Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians—in isolation. To be sure,

  the Turkish proj ect evolved over time. What appeared to Abdülhamid and his

  entourage as a vague and disembodied idea in the 1890s crystallized under

  the Young Turks into a full- fledged genocidal program, with the last nails ham-

  mered into the coffin during Kemal’s National Strug gle. Each regime con-

  fronted a diff er ent cluster of dangers, acted under diff er ent constraints, and imagined a diff er ent future. Ultimately, however, all three engaged in a giant and continuous crime against humanity.

  The Armenians were the main victims of Turkish atrocity, in terms of the

  numbers slaughtered in 1894–1896 and 1915–1916. Certainly, the Turks ap-

  pear to have hated them the most. This is cogently illustrated by events in

  Smyrna (Izmir) in September 1922. There, conquering Turkish troops

  murdered thousands of Armenian inhabitants before dealing with the town’s

  Greeks, even though the retreating Greeks had just (unsystematically)

  Introduction

  massacred hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of Turks on the outskirts of the

  city. Still, tens of thousands of Greeks would be murdered during the fol-

  lowing days. Smyrna would prove to be merely one chapter in the destruction

  and expulsion of Anatolia’s vast Greek minority, which had begun before the

  Great War, in the first months of 1914.

  As we hope to show, the annihilation of the Christian communities was not

  the product of a single cause. At play were fears of foreign machinations and

  interference, Turkish nationalism, ethnic rivalries, economic envy, and a desire

  to maintain po liti cal and social dominance. Perpetrators sought power, wealth,

  and sexual gratification. A combination of these motivations was manifest in

  each period and location. In the course of our research we have also concluded

  that these forces were joined by another overarching ele ment: Islam. As an

  ethos and an ideology, Islam played a cardinal role throughout the pro cess,

  in each of its stages.

  We are not arguing here that Islam is a single dogma, worse than other

  religious dogmas. Islam has vari ous streams, and individual Muslims feel dif-

  ferently about questions of practice, scriptural interpretation, and moral be-

  hav ior. Inherent in Islam are humanistic and moderate traditions, and, as we

  emphasize in our conclusion, Christians lived in relative security under

  Ottoman rule for centuries. Indeed, their standing was prob ably more secure

  than that of Jews or Muslims under Christian governments during the same

  centuries.

  Yet there is compelling evidence showing that Islam was an impor tant driver

  in the events and pro cesses described in this book. Ottoman authorities in-

  voked jihad to mobilize the Muslim masses to massacre and plunder. Perpe-

  trators cited jihad and Muslim law more generally to explain and justify their

 
; actions, even to argue that these actions were obligatory. Moreover, Muslim

  religious leaders and seminarians were prominent figures in the massacres.

  Indeed, even during Kemal’s ostensibly secularist National Strug gle, officials,

  himself included, frequently referred to Islam as the basis of their actions.

  These same officials described the massacres of thousands of Christians, and

  the expulsions of hundreds of thousands more, as jihad. Islam was the glue

  that bound together perpetrating Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Chechens, and

  Arabs and was the common marker of identity separating them from their

  Christian victims. In 1894–1896, 1915–1918, and 1919–1924, conversion

  Introduction

  to Islam was often the only path to survival for Christians who remained in

  the empire.

  The Sources

  This study focuses on what happened in Asia Minor and Constantinople, with

  more limited treatment of events in eastern Thrace (specifically, the vilayet of

  Edirne) and in the northwestern corner of Persia. We refrain almost completely

  from covering events in the Caucasus, despite the fact that this remote moun-

  tainous region was periodically engulfed in warfare among Turks, Rus sians,

  Azeris, Armenians, Georgians, and other groups, with accompanying

  large- scale massacres by all who participated. What happened in the Caucasus

  requires a study of its own, partly because these events were not synchronic

  with those in Asia Minor, and partly because the relevant archival material is

  often inaccessible or written in languages with which we are unfamiliar.

  Focusing on Asia Minor and Constantinople, one also encounters serious

  archival prob lems. To some degree, these affected our research and writing

  and so need to be described and explained.

  The Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, had large, or ga nized bureaucra-

  cies churning out massive amounts of state papers, which eventually made

  their way to a number of archives. The most impor tant are the Ottoman Ar-

  chives of the Office of the Prime Minister (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri) and

  the archive of the General Staff Military History and Strategy (Genelkurmay

  Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt) Institute in Ankara. The military archive is in

  effect closed to researchers. And the prime ministry’s archives, as well as

  smaller provincial archives, have under gone several bouts of purging, starting

  with the weeding out of rec ords by exiting CUP officials at the end of World

  War I. Since then, Turkish officials have further sanitized the archives so that

 

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