Early Buddhist Meditation

by Keren Arbel

  Gombrich’s hypothesis might be correct but his conclusion misses an important point: both the Susīma Sutta and the Kīṭāgiri Sutta do not mention the possibility of becoming liberated without the four jhānas;104 rather, they only mention the possibility of becoming an arahant without the formless liberations.105 In other words, the Susīma Sutta, in the Pāli version, does not envision paññā-vimutti arahants as attaining liberation without the jhānas, namely, without proficiency in meditative attainments.106

  Another sutta that has been interpreted as demonstrating the notion that one can be liberated without the jhānas is AN III.355–6.107 This sutta has been seen as a text that adheres to the view that there are two valid paths to liberation: with the jhānas and without them.108 AN III.355–6 describes two types of groups: ‘those undertaking [the learning] of the Dhamma’ (dhamma-yoga) and those ‘who attained the jhānas’ (jhāyin). The jhāyins are depicted as ‘those who having touched with the body, abide in the deathless element’;109 in contrast, the dhammayoga bhikkhus are depicted as ‘those who see, having penetrated with wisdom the deep way of the goal’.110 It is important to note that even though AN III.355–6 uses the phrase kāyena phūsitvā viharanti with reference to the jhāyins, the ‘thing’ in which the jhāyins abide and have contact with the body is not the formless (āruppā) liberations (as stated with regard to ubhatobhāgavimutta arahants); rather, it is with the ‘deathless element’ (amataṃ dhātuṃ), namely, nibbāna. This is significant also because the attainment of the ‘deathless’ (amata) is associated specifically with the practice of satipaṭṭhāna rather than the attainment of the formless states.111

  Having said that, I believe that Gombrich’s suggestion that AN III.355–6 is a later addition to the Sutta Piṭaka is reasonable. The main reason for Gombrich’s conclusion is the fact that AN III.355–6 has no Chinese parallel.112 Although in most cases suggesting that a sutta is a later addition is the easiest solution to a problem, in this case, there are a few other factors that support this hypothesis and make this text somewhat extraneous to the Nikāyas. First, a search in the Nikāyas for the terms dhamma-yoga and its variations resulted in only one occurrence: AN III.355–6 – the sutta discussed earlier.113 Further, the term yoga in the Pāli Nikāyas usually has a negative connotation, contrary to its use in later Buddhist texts. In the Nikāyas, the term yoga appears in two main negative contexts. First, it designates the four ‘bonds’: (1) the bond of sensuality (kāmayogo), (2) the bond of existence (bhavayogo), (3) the bond of view (diṭṭhiyogo) and (4) the bond of ignorance (avijjāyogo).114 Second, in numerous instances nibbāna is referred to as ‘peace from bondage’ (yoga-kkhema).115 Given all the preceding, it seems that Gombrich’s suggestion that this sutta is a later addition is credible. This sutta actually presents a new development in the conception of the path, the idea that there are two valid paths to liberation: one which mainly constitutes learning of the Dhamma, and one which constitutes the intensive practice of meditation. Regarding the narrow interpretation of paññā-vimutti that is reflected in the distinction between the dhammayogins and the jhāyin, Gombrich has further concluded that it required ‘a whole turnover of monastic personnel… a matter of at least two to three generations’.116 Following that, it seems justified to argue that the idea of sukkha-vipassaka arahants developed after the origination of the early Buddhist schools and reflects later perceptions of the path to liberation as influenced by historical changes in the conditions of the Buddhist saṅgha in Sri Lanka.

  The distinction between the ‘meditators’ and the ‘Dhamma-preachers’ is significant. Probably as early as the first century BCE, this distinction became predominant in the Theravāda tradition. As Walpola Rahula observes in his book History of Buddhism in Ceylon, by the first century BCE the Sri Lankan saṅgha had come to understand its calling as one of scriptural study rather than practice. Walpola explains that in the first century BCE there were radical changes in the life of the bhikkhus due to invasions and famine. After the famine, a conference was held at a monastery called Maṇḍalārāma in Kallagāma Janapada, and a new question was raised: what is the basis of the Sāsana – learning or practice?117 While the Paṃsukūlikas (‘those who wear only rag robes’) advocated that practice is the basis of the Sāsana; in contrast, the Dhammakathikas (‘preacher of the Dhamma’) held that learning was the basis. According to Rahula, the ‘Paṃsukūlikas were silenced and the Dhammakathikas were victorious’.118 Rahula cites from the Anguttara Nikāya commentary, which states that ‘even if there be a hundred or a thousand bhikkhus practising vipassanā, there will be no realization of the Noble path if there is no learning’.119 This new conceptual formulation and interpretation of the Buddhist path inspired the development of two vocations in the Theravāda tradition: the gantha-dhura (‘the burden of studying the texts’) and vipassanā-dhura (‘the burden of [practicing] insight [meditation])’.120 The former denotes the learning of the Dhamma, while the latter refers to the meditators (i.e., the practitioners of meditation as taught in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta).121 Rahula explains that

  [O]ut of the two vocations, gantha-dhura was regarded as more important than vipassanā-dhura. Examples found in the Commentaries show that almost all able and intelligent monks applied themselves to gantha-dhura while elderly monks of weak intellect and feeble physique, particularly those who entered the Order in their old age, devoted themselves to vipassanā-dhura.122

  These observations about the nature of spiritual praxis in the early Theravāda community are supported by Reginald Ray in his book Buddhist Saints in India. Ray points out that, in the context of Theravāda monasticism, the practice of meditation was less common. According to Ray, the emphasis was on sīla as fulfilment of the vinaya; in contrast, prajñā was defined as knowledge based on learning. Ray further adds that the Theravāda tradition placed considerably less emphasis on samādhi. He concludes:

  [A]lthough many classical texts – both Buddha-word and commentaries – recommend meditation as a necessary component of the Buddhist path, in monastic tradition, meditation has often remained a primarily theoretical ideal.123

  Martin Stuart-Fox also maintains that

  Long before the time of Buddhaghosa, the Buddhist saṅgha had become predominantly a worldly organization, concerned above all with its own preservation, with maintaining its popular appeal and princely patronage. By that time the meditative tradition may well have been reduced to little more than an eccentric group of recluses.124

  It follows from the preceding studies that, early on in the history of the Theravāda tradition, when most monastics were already living in settled monasteries, the practice of meditation (i.e., the intensive practice of satipaṭṭhāna) was rare among monastics (and presumably also lay) saṅgha members; this was especially true when the practice of meditation came to be regarded as less important for the preservation of the Dhamma (In the twentieth century, the practice of vipassanā enjoyed a revival within the Theravāda tradition). Until that time, we can even speculate that the practice of meditation was the domain of only few monastics, namely, those who joined the order in their old age, and those few who made the effort to leave busy monasteries for a secluded place to practice meditation intensively; this was at the expense of being scorned for engaging in an inferior activity.125 Sarbacker has offered an interesting observation concerning the historical developments that brought about the preference of scholasticism over meditation practice:

  If we consider the shifting of the śramaṇa traditions from peripheral cults in nature to a central religious tradition or cult, it makes sense that there would be a natural inclination to move towards a scholastic based system of authority, replacing virtuoso practice with scholasticism and ritual. It naturally follows that we would have the development of highly scholastic interpretations of the meditation systems. Particularly represented by attempts to reconcile varied interpretations of such practices and their role in soteriology.126

  Since the practice of medit
ation became early on quite rare among monastics in the Theravāda tradition, it ensures that most of the attainments described in the suttas, including the jhānas, the formless liberations, the attainment of cessation and nibbāna, became no more than a theoretical possibility for most monks, nuns and Buddhist scholastics; rather, meditation practice was mainly a matter for intellectual speculations and analysis. This in turn explains, or so I would suggest, that the Theravāda proclivity to intellectual learning and analysis became a predominant mode of interpretation. This same Theravāda proclivity to intellectual learning and analysis was also directed with respect to terms and doctrinal ideas that were clearly associated in the Nikāyas with the practice of meditation and the attainment of specialized forms of awareness. We have seen that this mode of interpretation was definitely at play when the Pāli commentators interpreted what we might characterize as ‘yogic insight’ (paññā) and consequently their interpretation of the term paññā-vimutti.

  One might sum this up by saying that finding a rationale for awakening without meditative attainments was a way for the tradition to deal with the reality in which most monastics did not practice meditation. According to Sarbacker, the vision of awakening and the practice leading to it probably changed over time when the Buddhist tradition became more integrated into society and more inclined to theoretical and intellectual learning. The need to reach out to a larger society inspired the development of systems of authority that were gradually based on firmer ground than charismatic virtuosity.127 In other words, the Theravāda tradition established its authority and hierarchy within the saṅgha on scholasticism rather than on proficiency in meditation. Fortunately, the tradition preserved those suttas that affirm the significance of the practice of satipaṭṭhāna and the attainment of the jhānas. We might also hypothesize that within the monastic saṅgha that preserved the teachings, there were always ‘jhāyins’ or ‘vipassanā-dhuras’ who were influential enough to uphold the teachings that emphasize the intensive practice of meditation and the attainment of the jhānas as a necessity for liberation. Yet, the highly scholastic interpretation of meditation practices in the Theravāda tradition and the shift in emphasis from meditative attainments and ‘yogic insight’ to conceptual learning and wisdom had a potent influence on traditional Theravada’s understanding of the nature of the jhānas, their role and significance in the spiritual path, and their relationship to other path-factors.

  Notes

  1 MN I.494: tena hi tvaṃ vaccha, dve dhamme uttariṃ bhāvehi, samathañca vipassana-ñca. Ime kho te vaccha dve dhammā uttariṃ bhāvitā, samatho ca vipassanāca. Anekadhātupaṭivedhāya saṃvattissanti.

  2 SN IV.360: katamo ca bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmī maggo: samatho ca vipassanā ca. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmī maggo.

  3 Sarbacker 2005, 33–4. See also Gimello 1978, 185.

  4 In chapter 2, I argued that even though the term jhāna might have been adopted from the Indian ‘pool’ of contemplative terms, as far as we know, the fourfold jhāna model is uniquely Buddhist.

  5 For example, this is claimed in DA II.511 and SA II.127.

  6 Alexander Wynne offers an excellent study of the arūpa samāpattis in his book, The Origin of Buddhist Meditation.

  7 See, for example, Snyder and Rasmussen 2009, 99, and also Buddhadāsa and Thepwisutthimethi 1989, 63.

  8 See, for example, Vism. X.1ff. See also Gunaratana 1999, 80–1.

  9 E.g., Vism III.106. See also comments by Shwe Zan Aung in his introduction to the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha (Shwe Zan 1995, 56).

  10 See, for example, Achaan Naeb Mahaniranonda, a Thai meditation master, who explains that the object of the jhānas is conventional reality, such as the kaṣina, while the object of vipassanā is ultimate reality in the four foundation of satipaṭṭhāna (Mahaniranonda 1988, 43).

  11 See also Cousins 1974, 125; King 1992, 48. Note, however, that Wynne has suggested that the last ‘formless attainment’, the sphere of ‘neither-perception-nor-non-perception’, is a state without an object (Wynne 2007, 39). See also Gunaratana 1999, 79.

  12 King 1992, 41.

  13 E.g., DN II.69 and SN IV 263–8.

  14 Sarbacker 2005, 44. He describes this process as ‘cathexis’, a process of training the mind to do something specific and bringing the mind to specific object.

  15 Sarbacker 2005, 44.

  16 E.g., MN I 160; I 175; I 205; I 209; III 45; III 28; AN IV 431; IV 438; IV 447; V 209. They also appear together as the ‘nine successive abidings’ (anupubbavihāra) and the ‘nine successive cessations’ (anupubbanirodha): DN III 266.

  17 It is beyond the scope of this study to pursue the issue of saññāvedayitanirodha. It is also not relevant for the arguments in this study. For a detailed discussion on this special attainment, I refer to my MA dissertation (Arbel 2004).

  18 DN II 111–2: Aṭṭha kho ime ānanda vimokkho. Katame aṭṭha? Rūpī rūpāni passati. Ayaṃ paṭhamo vimokkho. ajjhattaṃ arūpasaññī bahiddhā rūpāni passati. Ayaṃ dutiyo vimokkho. Subhanteva adhimutto hoti. Ayaṃ tatiyo vimokkho. Sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamā nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā ’ananto ākāso’ti ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. Ayaṃ catuttho vimokkho. Sabbaso ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ samatikkamma ’anantaṃ viññāṇanti’ viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. Ayaṃ pañcamo vimokkho. Sabbaso viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ samatikkamma ’natthi kiñcī’ti ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. Ayaṃ chaṭṭho vimokkho. Sabbaso ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samatikkamma nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. Ayaṃ sattamo vimokkho. Sabbaso nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ samatikkamma saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ upasampajja viharati. Ayaṃ aṭṭhamo vimokkho. Ime kho ānanda aṭṭha vimokkhā. See also DN II 70–1; DN III 261; DN III 288; AN IV 306; AN IV 349; MN II 13; MN III 222. The tradition identified the first three with the four jhānas. See, for example, Nyanatiloka 1980, 225.

  19 Wynne claims that Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta were historical figures, although they do not appear outside early Buddhist literature. He bases his claim on the fact that, besides the early biographies of the Buddha, the two appear in a number of early Buddhist texts (Wynne 2007, 9). Although some scholars such as La Vallée Poussin and more recently Zafiropulo view this account as authentic, some have claimed that the training under the two men is a fabrication (such as Bareau, Bronkhorst and Tilmann. See Wynne 2007, 9–12. However, according to Wynne, Bareau’s argument, which is mainly based on the absence of the training of the Bodhisatta under the two teachers in the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya, is not solid enough.

  20 MN I 164.

  21 MN I 165.

  22 See, for example, AN V.60–4 where the Buddha specifically refers to the ‘sphere of nothingness’ and the ‘sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception’. In this sutta, before the Buddha mentions these attainments, he describes the kaṣina practice and the ‘eight stations of mastery’ (aṭṭhimāni abhibhāyatanāni), which seems close to the first of ‘the eight liberations’ (aṭṭha vimokkha). Although there is no clear reference concerning the connection between these two arūpa attainments and the kaṣina practice, they seem to be connected. Interestingly, the four jhānas do not appear in this sutta at all (although the translator, F.L. Woodward adds in brackets, after the description of the first ‘station of mastery’, that this is how one enters into the ‘musing’, which seem to mean the first jhāna). See Anguttara Nikāya. F.L. Woodward (trans.), The Book of the Gradual Saying, vol. 5. (London: The Pāli Text Society, 2003), 42.

  23 Wynne 2007, 111.

  24 Ibid., 43–4.

  25 MN I 166: ‘This Dhamma does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to awakening, to Nibbāna, but only to reappearance in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.’ The same was said by the Bodhisatta with regard to the teaching and attainment of Āḷāra Kālāma (MN I 165).

  26 It is
important to note that references to the jhānas as a way to be reborn in higher cosmological realms are very rare; in contrast, the four arūpa samāpattis appear repeatedly as bases for rebirth. Furthermore, the jhānas do not appear in the Nikāyas as having a specific corresponding cosmological realm and are not listed as a ‘stations of consciousness’. For example, MN III.147 and MN I.289 both describe different attainments that lead to rebirth in different deva worlds. Yet, the jhānas do not appear in these suttas as a way to certain rebirth; they are also not identified as specific realms of existence. In the Sankhārupapatti Sutta, the Buddha enumerates the different ‘places’ one can re-appear after death; while the four formless attainments do appear as a place of rebirth (MN III.103; DN III.253), the jhānas do not. One of the rare associations in which the jhānas are associated with rebirth in a specific realm is AN II.126–8. This exceptional occurrence concerns jhānas that do lead to ‘communication with the devas’ and rebirth in their world, as the sutta phrases it; I would suggest that this type of jhāna is the same type of jhāna Ānanda describes in the Gopakamoggallāna Sutta as ‘unworthy jhānas’. In this sutta, Ānanda explains that there is a type of jhāna (discussed in chapter 2) that ‘the Blessed One did not praise’ (so bhagavā sabbaṃ jhānaṃ na vaṇṇesi) (MN III.13–14). It would seem plausible to suggest that a jhāna that leads to communication with divine beings is a type of jhāna that the Buddha did not praise or teach. Perhaps this sutta is referring to a common spiritual goal of other ascetics and contemplatives in early Indian traditions that used the term jhāna to describe spiritual attainments. These two occurrences of the term jhāna both appear in unfavourable contexts. It is plausible to suggest that both are examples of the term jhāna (dhyāna) as describing the quality of vision (dhī) that characterized the Vedic ṛṣis. The notion of ‘special vision’ (dhī) is the foundation of greater part of Indian religious theory and practice. It is reasonable to surmise, then, that the term jhāna was used quite rarely in the Nikāyas as a term referring to practices that aim at certain visions and better rebirth. Yet, we should bear in mind that this type of jhāna is inferior to the fourfold jhāna model that the Buddha did praise. For a discussion of dhī, see Gonda 1963, 18.