Early Buddhist Meditation
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27 E.g., DN III.132, SN V.308.
28 MN I.246–7.
29 E.g., SN I.48.
30 MN I 165–6.
31 SN V.308: Seyyathā’pi bhikkhave, gaṅgā nadī pācīnanintā pācīnapoṇā pācīnapabbhārā, evameva kho bhikkhave bhikkhu cattāro jhāne bhāvento cattāro jhāne bahulīkaronto nibbānaninno hoti nibbānapoṇo nibbānapabbhāro. Note that the Nikāyas do not offer any evidence that the Buddha taught (or practiced) the complete set of the four jhānas before he was awakened. In chapter two, I show that the jhānas, in the format of a fourfold model, are uniquely Buddhist – even though the term itself was adopted from the Indian ‘pool’ of contemplative terms.
32 An interesting reference in this regard is SN IV.298–302. Here, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, most probably a Jain teacher and the naked ascetic Kassapa, do not know the experience of the four jhānas. They are presented as the unique teaching and domain of the Buddhist path.
33 SN I.48: sambādhe vata okāsaṃ avindi bhūrimedhaso. Yo jhānambujjhā buddho patilīna nisabho munīti. See AN II.245, which states that the four jhānas are called the Tathāgata’s posture.
34 My MA dissertation explores this unusual attainment. Following Schmithausen, I suggest that saññāvedayitanirodha is fundamentally different from the formless attainments and is analogous by nature to the state of the arahant after death. I demonstrate that this peculiar and unique attainment could only be achieved when the meditator has contemplated, understood and abandoned even the refined ‘formless states of mind’. I also suggest that even though the arūpa samāpattis are not necessary for liberation, they enable the meditator to realize that even in these subtle and sublime realms, where beings are undefined and formless, the law of kamma still operates and there are still fruits and results of good and evil deeds (DN II 327). In other words, the experience of the different realms of existence, which the arūpa realms are part of, deepens the attainment of insight into the Buddha’s teaching. It broadens one’s understanding concerning the cycle of deaths and rebirths, dukkha and impermanence. The arahant who attains the jhānas, the arūpa samāpattis and the ‘attainment of cessation’ gains insight into the whole spectrum of phenomena, that is, the material (oḷārika), the mind-made (manomaya kāya) and the formless realms made by ideation (saññāmaya). I also suggest that for complete and full liberation (sammāsambodhi) (AN IV 447–8), one has to understand all possible experiences in existence; that is, one must not only understand experiences in the kāmaloka, rūpaloka and arūpaloka, but also have attained the state of saññāvedayitanirodha where the ‘end of the world’ has been achieved. As suggested by Schmithausen, in this state, one is beyond saṃsāric existence while still alive, meaning one ‘experiences’ the state of an arahant after death while still embodied. I have further suggested that attaining this state is important for the attainment of complete and full Buddhahood. Only by attaining this state we can answer questions such as how can the Buddha profess the knowledge of the nature of ‘nibbāna without a remainder’ without attaining a state? What simulates it? Although the attainment of the arūpa samāpattis and the ‘attainment of cessation’ is not necessary for the purification of mind and for the eradication of desire, aversion and ignorance, attaining these states allows the awakened one to be able to teach the Dhamma in its fullest. See Arbel 2004, 70–2.
35 Note that in MN II 265, the Buddha explains to Ānanda that the sphere of neitherperception-nor-non-perception is the ‘best [object of] clinging’ and hence, will be an obstacle to nibbāna. The Buddha explains that only if a person will not find delight in this state, then his consciousness will not have anything to hold on to and this person will attain nibbāna (MN II265). In other words, even in this state some form of mental reactivity occurs, which can produce clinging. This is why Sāriputta includes the arūpa samāpattis as attainments in which one should train in non-clinging to any type of experience or attainment.
36 It needs to be noted that ubhatobhāgavimutti arahants (arahants who are ‘liberated in both ways’) attain both the four jhānas and the four arūpa samāpattis. However, as it will become evident, paññā-vimutti arahants, although they do not attain the formless attainment, do indeed attain the four jhānas.
37 Bronkhorst 1993, 88. For a full discussion, see Bronkhorst 1993, 30–67. Although Bronkhorst argues that it is more likely that Buddhism adopted parts of Jaina meditation that resemble the four arūpa jhānas and saññāvedayitanirodha (Bronkhorst 1993, 78), this practice cannot be found in this form in Jain texts or in other Indian religious traditions. Gombrich argues that since both arahants who are called ‘liberated in both ways’ (ubhatobhāgavimutti) and ‘bodily witness’ (kāyasakkhī) – who are not fully liberated – reach the formless attainment, the attainment of the formless states does not liberate at all and ‘seems to have no function’. See Gombrich 2002, 103.
38 Bronkhorst 1993, 91.
39 For a full discussion see Wynne 2007, 26–37.
40 Wynne 2007, 31, 37, 111.
41 Wynne 2007, 111.
42 Wynne 2007, 107.
43 Vetter 1988, xxiv.
44 Vetter argues that the meditation model in which one goes through the four rūpa jhānas, the four arūpa samāpattis and finally saññāvedayitanirodha was not taught by the Buddha, at least not in the early phase of his teaching career (Vetter 1988, xxi–xxii).
45 Vetter 1988, xxi–xxii. For further discussion on arūpa samāpattis see Vetter 1988, 63–71.
46 Stuart 2008, 24–5. Stuart further posits that entering the ‘attainment of cessation’ after the practice of the four dhyānas, was quite possibly one of the earliest Buddhist models of liberation (Stuart 2008, 24–5).
47 See, for example, Sarbacker, who distinguishes between the ‘cathexis’ (which he associates with both the jhānas and the arūpa samāpattis) and the nirodha aspect of ‘catharsis’. According to Sarbacker, the latter is meant to reduce the field of awareness and focus on one object of attention, which he characterizes as a process of conditioning. The former on the other hand, is characterized by the releasing of objects and the de-conditioning of habitual process of awareness (Sarbacker 2005, 43–4). The argument of this study is that some constructed attainments, that is, the four jhānas, aid the process of de-conditioning unwholesome tendencies and misconceived perceptions; in contrast, other constructed attainments do not.
48 MN III.252, SN V.9 and SN V.196
49 See, for example, Katz 1982, 69.
50 Griffiths 1999, 19.
51 Gimello 1978, 187.
52 Gimello 1978, 184.
53 Schmithausen 1981, 219.
54 Schmithausen 1981, 214.
55 Schmithausen 1981, 219, 221–2.
56 Schmithausen 1981, 214, 219.
57 Vetter 1988, xxiv. It is interesting to mention Vetter’s argument that after the Buddha’s awakening, when he continuously taught the five ascetics, he in fact initiated them into the stages of jhāna meditation. Vetter 1988, xxix.
58 Vetter 1988, xxxv.
59 Sarbacker 2005, 33–4.
60 E.g., Vism VIII.227.
61 E.g., Vism I.6. Cousins observes that the terms samatha-bhāvanā and vipassanā-bhāvanā, ‘have come to refer specifically to the presence or absence of the jhānas’ (Cousins 1974, 116).
62 Sue Hamilton points out that ‘Buddhaghosa’s writings in particular have been so influential as to have become the determinant of the orthodox Theravāda position on virtually every point of religious concern’ (Hamilton 1996, 170).
63 See, for example, Snyder and Rasmussen 2009, 3.
64 See Erik Braun’s observation that ‘Ledi was one of the first teachers in the modern era to offer this approach of pure insight practice as a viable – even preferred – option. What is more, he was the first to do so on a widespread basis in popular writing (Braun 2013, 139).
65 Pa-Auk Sayadaw 2001, 58; Snyder and Rasmussen 2009, 134–5.
66 A good example of the commentarial perspective
of this issue is MA I.108–9.
67 Braun 2013, 138. See also Pa-Auk Sayadaw 2003, 89–90. Sayadaw points out that ānāpāna-sati is used for developing the jhānas before practicing vipassanā.
68 Jinavamsa 2003, 19. This type of concentration is not mentioned in the Nikāyas and is described only several times by Buddhaghosa (e.g., Vism IV.32–3). U Nyanuttara Agga Mahā Pṇḍita wrote a rejoinder to a criticism published against Mahāsi Sayadaw’s system of meditation. According to Sayadaw, U Nyanuttara Agga Mahā Pṇḍita states that sukha-vipassaka has no lokiya-jhāna when he practices vipassanā, but he does come to possess ‘lokuttara jhāna’ at the attainment of the path (Jinavamsa 2003, 22). For a discussion on the terms lokiya-jhāna and lokuttara jhāna see chapter one.
69 Buddhadāsa and Thepwisutthimethi 1989, 36.
70 Matara 1993, 36.
71 Cousins has pointed out that actually the term samatha is also used as a synonym for nibbāna (Sn 732, S III 133, M I 235 D III 54). Cousins 1984, 56.
72 Note, that in MN I.33, AN V.131 and Iti. 32, the word vipassanā occurs in the same context as one of the qualities a monk possesses. Interestingly, the Nettipakaraṇa states that the Blessed One taught samatha for those with sharp aptitude (tattha bhagavā tikkhindriyassa samathaṃ upadisati), samatha and vipassanā for those with medium aptitude (majjhindriyassa bhagavā samathavipassanaṃ upadisati) and vipassanā for those with weak aptitude (mudindriyassa bhagavā vipassanaṃ upadisati). Nettipakaraṇa 101.
73 MN I.294 and AN III.21 (samatha and vipassanā assist right view); MN I.494, MN III.289 (yoked evenly together); DN I.76 (vipassanāñāṇaṃ after the fourth jhāna); DN III.213; AN I.100, AN II.92–4, AN II. 247, AN III.373; SN IV.195, SN IV.295 (when attaining cessation), SN IV.360 (the path to the unconditioned), SN V.52, AN V.99. AN II.157 depicts different ways to attain Arahantship. In this sutta, Ānanda declares that the first way is when a monk develops insight preceded by peace (samathapubbaṅgamaṃ vipassanaṃ bhāveti); the second way is when a monk develops peace preceded by insight (vipassanāpubbaṅgamaṃ samathaṃ bhāveti); the third way is when a monk yokes peace and insight together as a pair (samathavipassanaṃ yuganaddhaṃ bhāveti); the fourth way is when a monk is gripped by the excitement of the Dhamma (dhammuddhaccaviggahītaṃ mānaṃ hoti). In the last case, the mind attains singlepointedness and abides in concentration. Cousins reiterates the commentary of the Paṭisambhidāmagga on this last point. The Paṭisambhidāmagga explains that while paying attention to the aggregates, elements, bases and so on as impermanence and so forth, ten dhammas arise. This list became of central importance later on, as the ten defilements of insight. Cousins further elaborates, and states that ‘states similar to those of Bodhi are reached, but become the cause of excitement. This obstructs the clarity and onward development of insight. The commentary interprets this fourth way as that of the pure insight follower (sukha-vipassaka)’ [PaṭisA584] (Cousins 1984, 61). Note, however, that the list at A II 157 is given by Ānanda and not the Buddha (or his arahants disciples). Also, there is no reference at the end of the sutta to the Buddha’s consent to this list. Furthermore, it is also not evident that samatha refers to the jhānas while vipassanā does not.
74 The Theravāda commentarial tradition is quite obviously the product of a different generation than that of the Nikāyas. Some of the explanations and interpretations given in the Aṭṭhakathā and Ṭika are idiosyncratic and use terms that do not occur in the Nikāyas at all.
75 See Thanissaro Bhikkhu, who wrote that ‘vipassanā is not a meditation technique. It’s a quality of mind – the ability to see events clearly in the present moment.’ Thanissaro 1997.
76 Cousins 1974, 116. See also Vism XVIII.5. Cousins also observes that the omission of the jhānas from the path to awakening is well established in the Aṭṭhakathā literature (Cousins 1994–6, 48 and 50). Katz also maintains that ‘in this context, then, the ubhatobhāgavimutta is distinguished from the paññā-vimutti by virtue of his mastery of the jhāna, although the aim of their method is identical’(Katz 1982, 80).
77 SA II.127. See also the example used in the statement by Shwe Zan Aung in his introduction to the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha: ‘For it must be borne in mind that jhāna is not absolutely necessary for Arahantship, as, e.g., in the case of Arahants termed “dryvisioned” (sukha-vipassakā) Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha’ (Shwe Zan 1995, 55). Griffiths also asserts that ‘the category of paññāvimutto, one who is liberated by means of wisdom, seems to envisage the possibility of the attainment of nibbāna without complete mastery over the enstatic practices’ (Griffiths 1999, 153–4, n.47).
78 See DA II.511, MA III.188 and PugA 191, which enumerate five types of paññāvimutta: one who attains insight without the jhānas and four types who attain insight on the basis of anyone of the four jhānas. See also Atthasālinī 1976, 307 and Sv II.512. In his article on the Kīṭāgiri Sutta, Piya Tan brings in several references of this view in contemporary Theravāda; for example, he refers to Mahasi Sayadaw, Satipatthana Vipassana, 3rd ed., 2005, 283 ff. Thai Abhidhamma teacher Sujin Boriharnwanaket speaks of ‘two kinds of ariya-savaka, namely, the sukkhavipassaka and the cetovimutti’ (Piya Tan 2005, 10 no. 59).
79 The commentaries have distinguished the cetovimutti and the ubhatobhāgavimutti arahants from the paññā-vimutti arahants. According to the commentaries, the former follow jhāna practice, while the later follow vipassanā practice (Katz 1982, 81). However, De Silva has argued that there are times when cetovimutti does not refer to final liberation but to ‘temporary and pleasant’ (sāmāyikaṃ kantaṃ) liberation. However, when it is used in conjunction with paññā-vimutti, then it refers to inviolable or permanent liberation (akuppā cetovimutti) (De Silva 1978, 120). The terms cetovimutti and paññā-vimutti were also identified as beneficial for different kinds of obstacles. For the eradication of greed (rāga) and hatred (dosa), samatha should be practiced; in contrast, for the eradication of ignorance/delusion (moha/ā vijjā), vipassanā should be practiced. Gimello, for example, argues that samatha meditation conduces ‘to the near extinction of the affective obstacles, but it is discernment or doctrinal analysis supported by concentration which completely extinguishes them and which extinguishes also the intellectual barriers’ (Gimello 1978, 187). A passage from the Aṅguttara Nikāya is usually used for illustrating that the development of samatha leads to the development of citta, and to the abandoning of desire (rāga) which is cetovimutti, whereas the development of vipassanā leads to the development of insight (paññā) and to the abandonment of ignorance (āvijjā), which is paññā-vimutti (AN I.61). However, the distinction between the two is stated quite differently in DN III.270: ‘How is a monk well liberated in mind? The mind of a monk is liberated from greed, hatred and delusion. This is how a monk is well liberated in mind. And how is a monk well liberated by wisdom? A monk knows: “for me greed, hatred and delusion are abandoned, cut of at the root, like a palm tree stump, destroyed and incapable of arising again.”’ Here it is clear that ‘liberation of mind’ (cetovimutti) refers to the moment in which the mind is liberated from the three ‘poisons’: rāga, dosa and moha, namely, from both the affective and cognitive obstacles, while ‘liberation by wisdom’ (paññā-vimutti), refers to the reviewing moment after the mind has been liberated – when the arahant knows that the mind is free from greed, hatred and delusion.
80 E.g., SN V.74 where one has ‘well liberated’ (suvimuttaṃ) mind while still practicing the path.
81 See Arbel 2004, 71–2.
82 Note that Sāriputta is said to gain deliverance by wisdom (paññā-vimutti) since he gained awakening by listening to the Buddha’s discourse (MN I 501). Mahāmoggallāna is said to gain deliverance of mind (cetovimutti). Anuruddha was considered to be an arahant who is a meditation master (MN I 209–10). To put it more simply, Sāriputta, who gained deliverance by wisdom, is also described as having proficiency in concentration (SN III 235–8; AN I 41ff; MN III 25ff).
83 MN I 477–9. This
list appears also in DN III.253–4 where these seven types of persons are called ‘seven persons worthy of offerings’.
84 For a detailed discussion see Gombrich 2002, 96–134.
85 For a fuller discussion see Katz 1982, 83–95.
86 De Silva 1978, 134.
87 MN I 477: paññāya cassa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti.
88 It seems that the Buddha was actually an ubhatobhāgavimutti arahant. He is described as possessing special powers that are called ‘the ten powers of a Tathāgata’ (MN I 69–71). These powers emphasize, I would suggest, precisely the difference between an ubhatobhāgavimutti arahant and a paññā-vimutti arahant who does not possess any of these powers (SN II 121–4). Accordingly, only an ubhatobhāgavimutti arahant can teach the Dhamma in its fullest, just as the Tathāgata did, and ‘claim the herdsleader’s place, roars his lion’s roar in the assemblies, and sets rolling the wheel of Brahmā’ (MN I 70–1). The difference between an ubhatobhāgavimutti arahant and the Buddha is in terms of precedence; the Buddha achieved complete liberation without having an awakened teacher, while ubhatobhāgavimutti arahants had the Buddha and his teachings for guidance (Katz 1982, 79, 96). Nyanatiloka explains that ubhatobhāgavimutta ‘is the name of one class of noble disciples. He is liberated in two ways, namely, by way of all eight absorptions (jhāna, q.v.) as well as by the supermundane path (sotāpatti etc.) based on insight’ (Nyanatiloka 1980, 214). See also Ṭika to MN I.477.