Jocks in the Jungle

by Gordon Thorburn

  Another day of marching followed, with an alarm. Reconnaissance indicated the possibility of a Japanese ambush while, unknown to the Jocks, spotters in a nearby Gurkha column had come to the same conclusion. A Black Watch section faced a Gurkha unit, unseeing across a jungle track. Matters were resolved before bloodshed, with each side saying how lucky the other had been, that it had not come to blows.

  Meanwhile, there was bloodshed aplenty at Indaw. One of Wingate’s last orders had been to Fergusson and 16 Brigade. After establishing Aberdeen, they were to attack and take Indaw immediately. Exhausted and much depleted after their long march from Ledo, they found the Japanese ready for them and in great strength.

  Colonel Officer’s report: ‘Several days of arduous manoeuvring and sustained fire fights proved futile. The 16th withdrew toward its stronghold, in which it tried vainly to rest portions of its columns, turn and turnabout, while patrolling and skirmishing along the road leading north.’

  They had been the first in. Soon they would be the first out.

  War Diary: ‘73 Col arrived at Lethi, 17.00 hours. March 27, 42 Col – recce platoon and wireless sent out over Manman hills, (saw) threat to Aberdeen from Jap movements. Column dug in.

  ‘March 28, (Aberdeen) airstrip attacked by 7 enemy aircraft, strafed and bombed. A number of casualties included 2 of Col killed and 2 wounded. Bulldozers quickly filled in bomb craters. 73 Col hot on the march today with some paddy to cross. It was later discovered that 73 Col had been observed by Japs in Lethi village. Uneventful day however, and night bivouac was made near the main track one mile north of Settaw, 16.00 hours.’

  The routine had been established during training. Standard procedure was to march in single file for fifty minutes, rest for ten. Men changed positions in their sections, sections in their platoons, platoons in their company, so that nobody was at the front – or the back – continuously. Men took turns to carry the Bren gun in addition to their packs.

  ‘March 29, 42 Col stood to at 05.00 and moved off at 08.15 on the track of 73 Col. Halted for the night at 18.30.’

  They left two Nigerian columns to defend Aberdeen, while 73 Col recced the village of Settaw.

  War Diary: ‘The Burmese guide wouldn’t go in (to Settaw village) so two patrols were sent forward and contacted enemy in village. Our casualties, one man wounded; enemy casualties unknown. The fighting group occupied the village and the remainder of the Col crossed the Banmauk-Indaw road halting in a copse south of the village. The MO Capt Chesney carried out an emergency operation on the wounded man, who was able to continue on a pony.’

  This description of Chesney’s work hardly does him justice. It was a nasty stomach wound requiring a complicated and difficult operation which should have been done in a fully-equipped and staffed hospital. With no possibility of that, the MO had to perform emergency surgery in the open, for a good half an hour. After continuing on his pony the man had the dubious delight of recovering sufficiently to march as before.

  On 30 March new orders were received. Cutting the Mansi-Pinbon road was now the objective, requiring a change of direction from south to north-west.

  War Diary: ‘42 Column moved out of night harbour at 06.30 after usual stand-to, preceded by section of recce platoon having a look at 06.00 at village of Lethi. Breakfast near Nantawnauk, lunch at 12.30 to 16.30, this long midday halt being the procedure because of the heat, and to allow the wireless to be put into operation. The advanced recce section estimated they had seen 40 enemy armed with rifles moving east in extended order from the village of Khopyin. Made close harbour at 17.50, one mile to the east of Khopyin and sent out an ambush party on the track, in the charge of Lt Richmond.’

  Further forward, 73 Column on the way to the Mansi-Pinbon road was encountering steep hills and hard going.

  War Diary: ‘Bivouac by 15.00. Balance of the day spent washing clothes etc.’

  While they were thus employed, an English stray wandered in. He was a private from the Queen’s Royal Regiment, part of 16 Brigade which had marched all the way from Ledo to Indaw. The man had been lost for almost a week, brought to safety by a sympathetic local, and he provided the Jocks with a preview of what a long time in Burma could do to you.

  Despite the fitness-inducing rigours of training, the midday heat was a severe problem. Men soon discovered that the antimosquito cream had the effect of blocking pores and stopping perspiration. They preferred to drip with sweat than to bake inside their own skins, so mosquito cream was abandoned.

  Medical report: ‘At the commencement of operations, oil of citronella in a greasy base was issued to the Force as an antimosquito cream. The discomfort produced by this obsolete repellent, and the manner in which it failed to repel culicines (gnats and mosquitos), resulted in its falling into disrepute. Consequently little faith was placed in its non-greasy counterpart when its supply became possible, and no organised parades were held to ensure its proper and regular use. Greater trust was placed in Dimethyl phthallate and this liquid was generally used in a more conscientious fashion. Unfortunately, supplies of this chemical were limited and could not be supplied in the necessary quantities.’

  Later in the day, still 30 March, more new orders arrived by wireless: ‘Do not go to Mansi-Pinbon road. Go back to the Banmauk-Indaw road and cut and block it at milestone 20.’

  David Rose: ‘When Wingate was killed, we were rather in limbo for a while. Mostly we just marched, and did our officers’ business on the radio with India in the evening, with Bishop my adjutant. We only had the K rations, no fresh food, and we didn’t live off the jungle because there was nothing to live off. It wasn’t that kind of jungle where I was. It was open teak forest.’

  Bill Lark: ‘A soldier lives from day to day. You do what you do, and take everything as it comes. The best place to march was by a chaung. You had your ordinary army water bottle and you also had a chuggle, like a tarpaulin hot-water bottle, and the material swelled up when wet so it didn’t leak, and you got your water from tributaries if you could, not from the main stream. And below there the mules drank, and below that the men washed. You had to put a tablet in the water, to purify it. Although it was running clear you couldn’t trust it.’

  Bill Lark was more conscientious than some, apparently.

  Extract from medical report: ‘Every man was in possession of an individual water-sterilising outfit at the commencement of operations, but as the majority of these were of Indian-make the tablets therein had deliquesced. Demands were soon received on the majority of QQs for replacements. 16 Indian Depot Medical Stores however could not supply anything like the number of replacements required, and those they did supply were of exceedingly poor quality and really unserviceable.

  ‘The attention given to water sterilisation was indifferent and various factors contributed to this. Not the least important of these was the lack of faith resulting from the use of the Indian-manufactured water-sterilising tablets, which on analysis proved to have little, or no, free chlorine. Again troops arriving at a water point with empty water bottles after a long and strenuous march were not prepared to wait half an hour for the water sterilising tablets to take effect, nor would the operational situation always allow of this. Moreover, the proper siting of water-points in regard to bathing was not always observed.

  ‘A plentiful supply of English water sterilising tablets was not always available, and rather than send in nothing at all, resort was made to the use of water sterilising powder. As this was packed in 7-pound tins, it proved itself worse than useless, first because of the difficulty in carriage and secondly because constant opening and contact with the air reduced the available free chlorine content.’

  War Diary: ‘March 31, 42 Column headed out towards Khopyin at 06.45, turned south and proceeded over a hill path which was steep and slippery in parts. The mule loads had to be manhandled up 600 yards of bad track. Reached the watershed at 10.00. Explosions were heard from the valley. Lunch was partaken of while awaiting the return of 13 Platoon
. The ambush party had been left on the track with the additional job of leading in the fighting platoon. 13 Platoon returned stating that they had encountered the enemy at Let yet and had been fired on with grenade dischargers inaccurately. Enemy received five casualties at least; 13 Platoon nil. 42 Col broke harbour at 16.00 after booby-trapping the track. Night harbour was reached at 18.30 one mile east of the village of Kanpawlut where there were many signs of recent Jap occupation – cook houses, hill slope cleared of trees. Several thousand Japs had been billeted in the area and had departed two weeks before to the north west.’

  The first supply drop was due for 73 Column, which had been in for five days.

  War Diary: ‘73 Col still found it hard going on the hilly tracks today, and at points the mules had to be unloaded and loads manhandled. Once again an early bivouac was made at 16.00 hours. First SD two hours late because of the heavy rain, one plane failed to find the dropping area; remaining planes dropped across the flare path (rather than along it) consequently the majority of the parachutes dropped in the jungle. One plane for 111 Brig dropped on us by mistake. Villagers very helpfully provided dry wood.’

  There were several columns in the area. A supply pilot spotting any sign of troops below was likely to believe that they were his designated target, he in his high-speed machine having no idea of the difference a few miles on the ground could make.

  Fred Patterson: ‘We were in columns but there were occasions when we would go off on platoon operations. It might be a week before we met up again. We wouldn’t know what the others had been doing in our absence. Our war wasn’t like the war in Europe; every section, platoon and column had its own war.’

  Lentaigne, now in charge, surveyed the situation. His own brigade, the 111th, had ended up on both sides of the Irrawaddy and was in the process of consolidating and heading for the Pinlebu-Pinbon road, which they were to cut, it being a main artery of communications for the Japanese. The enemy was not using air and wireless comms to anything like the British extent and so relied heavily on road and rail.

  The Black Watch were marching to their new objective; the rest of 14 Brigade was to get south of Indaw and set up blocks there, also guard the approaches to White City stronghold. Other units had had various successes, blowing bridges and blocking railways and roads, cutting off Japanese supplies, and 16 Brigade was making its weary way back to Aberdeen. Nearer home, the 14th Indian Army was trying to deal with a 100,000-strong Japanese invasion heading for Imphal. In the view of many at GHQ, the Chindit brigades would have been better employed in that fight than blowing up railways.

  War Diary: ‘April 1, 73 Col spent the day distributing rations and cutting down parachutes caught in the trees. April 2, 73 Col had a very tiring journey today. Marched towards (village of) Le-u by track. April 3, 73 Col established road block at milestone 19 on the Banmauk-Indaw road. 42 Col had SD. April 5, 5 Pl of 73 Col moved out to milestone 17½ to cover SD which was to take place that night.’

  The supply drop began around 21.00 and all seemed in order.

  Jim McNeilly: ‘We’d set out on the road to assist Fergie at Indaw. That’s where we were going, in our column (73), to hit the Japs at Indaw. But we’d to change and come back, and that’s when our platoon went to the supply drop. My section had the flamethrower.’

  This machine, officially the ‘No. 2 Portable Flamethrower’, was known as the ‘lifebuoy’ because that was the shape of the fuel tank. It was deeply mistrusted by the men. It was indeed portable, weighing about the same as the packs they were carrying, but unreliable in use, and there was a pumping and squirting procedure to go through before it could be operated. Also, having four gallons of petrol on your back gave you very few close friends under fire.

  Jim McNeilly: ‘Nobody wanted to carry it. I was the NCO so I didn’t carry it. For one thing, it made you a target. If the Japs saw you with it, they’d go for you right away. But that night we used it, the once, and it was once only. They were lethal weapons but for all they did, it was really not worth it, and we dumped the flamethrower after that and used the fuel for cooking.

  ‘We’d had a tip-off that a small convoy was coming our way, so G. G. Green sent us to set up an ambush, to catch them in the valley. We waited, and three trucks came along, all full of Japs. We blew the first one up with grenades. The second one couldn’t move so we took out as many Japs as we could but they fought before they disappeared, and then we had the truck for ourselves, which we used for a few days on the road until we moved off again. The third one reversed right out of it, high speed backwards in the dark round quite a sharp bend.’

  War Diary: ‘The supply drop was not interrupted.’

  True, but there were casualties – two killed, two wounded – although the Japanese had many more.

  War Diary: ‘April 6, day spent in issuing rations, burying the dead and treating the wounded. Recce sent towards Indaw. No trace of the enemy found. 42 Col joined road block. April 7, captured Jap truck used to transport 73 Col’s wounded to a landing strip for evacuation.’

  David Rose: ‘We used to clear a strip for the American planes called L5, which was a light aircraft that could take a couple of wounded away from pretty well anywhere.’

  The aircraft was the Stinson Sentinel L5, which needed 375ft to take off, and much the same to land, at less than 50mph, although pilots complained about the brakes. Made of steel tubing covered in fabric, it could take a lot of punishment and was easily fixed in the field. The ambulance version in fact could take only one stretcher case; a second wounded man could go in the co-pilot’s/observer’s seat, behind the pilot, if the plane was flown solo. According to an American report, the L5’s predecessor, the L1, was also used.

  ‘It was not known at the commencement (of Chindit operations in 1944) how evacuation was to be achieved. It was hoped that light planes would be available for use in conveying casualties from the vicinity of columns to already existing airbases. Failing this, the only method possible was for casualties to be carried with the columns when they would of necessity have to be left to the care of friendly villagers, or with sufficient food and water until they became well enough to proceed on their way alone and able to look after themselves.

  ‘With the change in plan of operations, it was soon seen that evacuation by air would be possible, and in actual fact it became so and remained the sole method of evacuation throughout the whole pre-monsoon period. Wherever possible, columns constructed light plane strips in the vicinity in which they were operating and casualties were evacuated by light plane to the nearest Dakota strip.

  ‘These light planes were of two types, L-1 and L-5. The former could carry four casualties (two lying and two sitting or one lying and three sitting). The L-5 on the other hand could evacuate only one sitting patient. Moreover, as the length of strip required by the L-5 was greater than that required by the L-1, the former was rarely used.’

  This report does not match experience on the ground, as recalled by the Black Watch at any rate, nor the aircraft manufacturer’s specifications. Also, it is known that only 125 of the L1 were converted for ambulance use in the entire war, including a dozen float-plane variants, whereas a great many more of the L5 were used for this purpose. The report is also wrong to state that the L1 needed less landing ground than the L5 and that the L5’s patient was sitting. He could be, but he could also be on a stretcher, loaded through a specially fitted door at the back of the aircraft.

  The ‘L’ stood for liaison, the term replacing ‘O’ for observation. The L-1 was originally designated O-49, and was the military version of the civilian Stinson Model 74 designed in the 1930s. It was really an in-between type, the USAAF having used heavier and larger observation aircraft before changing to the lighter ‘grasshopper’ types represented by the L5 and the Piper Cub (known as L4).

  Pilots liked the L5 in the jungle because it could provide a very rapid rate of descent, which made it perfectly suited for getting into short fields, some of them pretty rough – o
r ‘unimproved forward airstrips’ as they were technically known. It was nicknamed the ‘Flying Jeep’ for its versatility.

  The American report continues:

  ‘Dakota strips were for the most part situated in the strongholds and were being used nightly by incoming supply planes of (USAAF) Troop Carrier Command bringing supplies and equipment into the strongholds. These were available for the evacuation of casualties on the return trip.

  ‘This, then, was the method used, and proved highly successful right up to the onset of the monsoon. No fighter opposition was ever experienced and evacuation was carried out continuously and without interruption.

  ‘The conveying of casualties from columns to light plane strips was usually carried out with the help of the local inhabitants or by personnel of the columns acting as stretcher bearers. They were invariably escorted by an armed guard.’

  Whether fighter opposition was experienced or not, in these unarmed little aeroplanes there was always the risk of meeting hostiles, and there cannot be admiration enough for the American pilots who worked on demand, often in appalling weather.

  Many miles away from the wounded and their air-ambulance drivers, the generals were setting forth the destiny of the Chindits. Instructions from Stilwell dated 4 and 10 April, and from Slim dated 12 April, state that the LRPGs’ first responsibility was to support Stilwell’s advance on Mogaung and Myitkyina. General Slim designated Indaw as the most southerly point for LRPG operations, which were to be dedicated to disrupting those Jap lines of communication leading to Stilwell’s objectives. Second, the LRPGs were to assist the 14th Army by disrupting enemy communications east of the Chindwin River.

  Black Watch War Diary: ‘April 8, Easter morning, both Columns held a church service and a communion. 42 Col had a successful SD. Soft skins (non-combat troops such as the muleteers, RAF personnel and so on) went to safe harbour where they will stay during projected attack on the Jap dumps of arms at Singan. April 9, 73 Col blew up and burned several wooden bridges near the road block. 73 Col then moved to safe harbour near 42 Col. April 10, SD taken, four planes, three good, one poor.’