Jocks in the Jungle

by Gordon Thorburn

  These aircraft were from the new RAF squadron based at Arcan, operating for the first time with Special Force.

  ‘Fighting groups of 42 and 73 Cols moved to milestone 25 preparatory to attack Japanese dumps at Singan. At 10.30 hrs Mitchells bombed the area and the fighting groups attacked the dumps. Singan was occupied at 15.00 hours. 42 Col commander Major Rose DSO was wounded in this action.’

  Major Rose and two of his officers had recced the place the previous day. It was to be their first use of close air support, directing fighter and bomber aircraft by wireless from the ground. Wingate and the Americans had been evangelical promoters of this technique. Some of the old buffers at GHQ were not convinced, believing that aircrew could not be accurate enough to avoid hitting their own men.

  On their way in to Singan, the Black Watch bumped a Jap patrol, or rather, a Jap patrol bumped them as they were having a breather at the time. All the enemy soldiers ran off back to the dump, so surprise was lost and the operation had to be brought forward. The Americans responded brilliantly. Mitchell bombers blew the place up, Mustang fighters strafed and, when the Jocks walked in, the Japs had withdrawn away from the exploding munitions. Rose sent out patrols to find them and went with one himself.

  David Rose: ‘We were walking through the jungle in extended order, expecting opposition in open forest, when we, and me in particular, came under fire. We looked in the undergrowth to see where it was coming from, when I suddenly realised it was coming from above. The Japs had climbed up into the trees and tied themselves in. I took cover behind a tree as I was shot through the water bottle, and another bullet ricocheted off my rifle, and as I dodged the other way I was shot through my right side, in the ribs.

  ‘My men put up a fusillade and saw to the Japs, who were not specialist snipers, just troops, tied up there. That was their tactic, the first time we’d seen it. They would know we were coming and set out to surprise, which they certainly achieved. That they had no means of escape didn’t seem to bother them. If we shot them they were still a menace, because we couldn’t know if they were dead.’

  Jim McNeilly: ‘We were as good as them by that time. We were up to and past their training, but they were there to die. The highest honour was to die for the Emperor. It was the seventh stage of heavenly grace or something. So they’d dig themselves into a hole and they’d get two or three of us before we knew they were there. Or they’d be up a tree, tied in, and rather die than give in to us.

  ‘It was hard to fight against them. As I said we were a match to them, in some things. I don’t really know how to describe them. Just fanatics. Fanatics, at all costs. We knew what we should do, but we didn’t tie ourselves to a tree and expect to be shot in the tree. We weren’t as daft as that. We’d save our own lives and save our own lads’ lives but them, well, they were fanatics.’

  Here is an extract from a Japanese report on a defeat suffered at the hands of the Americans in New Guinea. It illustrates McNeilly’s point:

  ‘It has been very much regretted that wounded men have been left behind. In the future we will give further attention to arrangements for rescuing the wounded. However, if the wounded cannot be rescued, they must be ready to commit suicide at the proper time – that is, after all means to continue the fight have been exhausted.

  ‘In case the wounded are retiring to the rear, always let them carry their small arms and equipment. Their ammunition should be left with comrades at the front. It is regrettable that there have been numerous instances of wounded men abandoning their weapons on the battlefield. Also, there have been instances of men leaving the front line without permission immediately after suffering wounds. This is prohibited.’

  Black Watch War Diary: ‘After the successful raid on Singan, large amounts of papers and documents were found, also ammunition, weapons and food.’

  The contemporary opinion of the Japanese as an entirely different kind of human being extended to views on their diet. Here is an American memorandum issued mid-war:

  ‘Japanese Army rations have been found to be entirely edible, and ordinarily may be utilized by U.S. forces as supplementary rations when captured. If at all possible, such rations should be examined by a medical officer before being used.

  ‘Observers (including high-ranking combat officers) recommend that U.S. troop leaders be informed about the more common Japanese foods before going into battle, so that our troops may utilize captured enemy rations if they are needed. Under other conditions, an enterprising mess sergeant may often break the monotony of his unit’s diet, and add to it an unusual touch, by employing some of the less common Japanese foods. He can also use the ever-present rice as a staple when it is captured in quantity.’

  Black Watch War Diary: ‘Fifteen Jap dead at the dump. The remainder of the garrison made their escape through the jungle. Casualties three killed, two wounded. Major Rose was operated on by Capt Longwell and the bullet removed from his side. Both fighting groups returned to harbour at 17.30hrs leaving the Commando pl to demolish the bridge over the Mesa river.’

  During the night, David Rose awoke feeling on top form after his operation, and decided to take a walk around the sentries in his bare feet and underwear.

  ‘They asked after my wound, of course, and I told them I was fine, just fine, ready for anything. As I walked on I heard one Jock mutter “The Major’s rather drunk” or, shall we say, words to that effect. I realised I was on a morphine high and went back to bed.’

  War Diary: ‘April 12, day of make and mend, 13th, day of rest. In the late morning a 42 Col patrol brought in a Burmese and an Indian who were believed to be working for the Japs. Good local supplies in this area, rice, chickens, potatoes and tomatoes, sufficient for two days, bought by 73 Col for two parachutes.

  ‘April 15, SD this morning was intended for the Beds and Herts. The drop was widespread and the pick-up difficult. Burman villagers assisted in the collection of scattered packages. A church service was held today.

  ‘One patrol under Capt Swannell departed to endeavour to locate several Burman traitors in one of the small villages near Singan. The information was obtained from one Mohnsaw, a Burman from the Banmauk area who had turned from Jap informer to ours on our arrival. The wanted men were believed to be implicated in the killing of a British officer in the Khopyin area some weeks before. They were tried by Major Condon, the Burrif officer, and were found guilty of this charge and others including dacoity (robbery with violence committed by a gang), and were sentenced to be shot at 18.00 hours. They were led away and despatched by a Sten gun firing party. Lt Austin was evacuated with a hernia. Cpl Brannen and Pte O’Brien were also evacuated – report on compassionate grounds. The Indian arrested was taken away and evacuated; the Burman was released. The SD for 42 Col at 03.00 failed to materialise and a signal was despatched for another attempt the following night.’

  More bridges were blown up. Supply drops sometimes went right; sometimes went wrong. The Jocks marched almost every day, always on the lookout for possibilities of raids and damage to be done. Lots of contact with the locals kept them informed of enemy movements. This was the routine. Major Rose was on a pony, his bullet removed. All was bearable for soldiers, all except not having any definite objective with clear orders about how to reach it.

  War Diary: ‘April 16, 73 Col still combing the area for parachute containers while 42 Col had a successful drop. A party of villagers arrived at the harbour with presents of food for them. Another villager arrived with one of the mules which had strayed.

  ‘April 18, a patrol of 73 Col brought in four Burman villagers. One was the headman of the village Thitladaw, accused of sending information to the enemy. The headman possessed a great deal of Jap money.’

  In fact, it came out that the villagers were on the British side. They had been sending messages to notify the Japs at Indaw of movements by British troops, which accounted for the money, but it was entirely false information volunteered by the villagers. Next day, the Burmans were sent ab
out their friendly business.

  The Japanese had flooded Burma with paper money, rupee notes, but the local people didn’t want paper. Paper is no good in the jungle. It gets eaten by bugs, or dissolves in the rain, or rots away. If your small wealth was in paper, it could disappear, so the locals liked the rupee coins.

  Bill Lark: ‘Every man had ten rupee coins, which were like half-crowns, and when a man was hurt he could use these to buy some safety and care. In such a case we generally all gave the man an extra rupee of our own. And then we sent the Burrifs into the village. They would take their army gear off and sling a dhoti round their middles and go into the villages to get information for us. And they would say, there’s a man up the track, look after him, hide him from the Japs. He’s got some money and when we come back we’ll give you more money, and real money, not this paper rubbish. And there would be a silk parachute as well, for the women to make dresses. The Japs dealt in paper and rape. We dealt in silk and coinage.’

  The other Black Watch contingent, with the Cams, were having much the same kind of experiences – bad terrain to cross, very hard work, and occasional action.

  Fred Patterson (after a day hacking a way up and over a bamboo covered hill): ‘Back at road level, we split up, each platoon with a different task, blowing up a bridge or scouting a place for an ambush. I was walking down the road at night with our platoon commander Lieutenant Simpson, when he stopped me with his arm across my chest. “Don’t move,” he said. “There’s a wire tight across my neck.” We ducked under and never did find out if it was a Japanese booby-trap or one of ours.’

  The ambush they set up on 19 April was a complete surprise to the Japs who were singing while marching along. It soon developed into a fierce firefight:

  ‘Lieutenant Simpson was killed. He went down to the road for some reason and a wounded Jap shot him in the stomach. To say our platoon was shattered is an understatement.’

  Patterson’s much respected officer had been promoted a few days before. Captain Alexander Simpson, 24, was from Edinburgh but was actually Yorks and Lancs, seconded to the Cameronians for the Chindit campaign.

  Black Watch War Diary: ‘April 20, 73 Col left harbour at 06.00 following the Mesa river by track for one hour then deviated south-east through the valley of the Boncha-ung chaung. Reached the river Mesa again at Manpha. Lunch then fast march in the afternoon. Major Fanshawe went to try and find a crossing place. A recce party of 42 Col was encountered today at Thitladaw. Pte Baine missing from bivouacs.

  ‘April 21, 42 Col moved to Peinnebin. Moved off at 04.00 as a stiff climb over the hills lay ahead of them. The march was uneventful and rather pleasant amongst the hills in the cool of the early morning.

  ‘April 21, information received re 73 Col’s projected route to the effect that water was scarce. This combined with the necessity of crossing the Mesa river, railway and then the Banmauk-Indaw road in a short interval of time meant a somewhat difficult and arduous day today. Therefore reveille was called at 02.00 hours and after some difficulty in forming up on the track, due to the intense darkness, the Col moved off at 03.30 carrying full chuggles, every second one to be used for watering the mules. Slow going in the darkness and dawn broke as the Col was approaching the river bank. A quarter of a mile beyond the river a Jap supply train could be heard. The river crossing was accomplished in the early morning light covered by the support weapons. Col reformed and moved across the road at about 07.00 and one mile past the road crossing the Col halted for breakfast, one cup of water being allowed each man. The Col moved again and marched on a compass bearing due south across the country. As a result of a recce water was found in Manthe chaung; bivouac was made here therefore at 17.00. At this harbour a signal was received that no Cols were to cross the Mesa river.’

  Bill Lark: ‘We didn’t know where we were going. Nobody told us. We broke camp every morning, marched all day, and camped again. When we were told to stop, we stopped. When we were told to move on, we moved on. All I knew was that we were passing trees. Miles and miles and miles of trees, we passed.

  ‘We were to live off the stuff we carried, and when we ran out there’d be another supply drop. For a man to survive and work, K rations weren’t enough in the long term. They didn’t fill you when you were using so much of yourself on a jungle march. They were all right if you got some other food, something fresh, but if that was all you had then you would eventually turn into a skeleton, as we all did after months in the jungle.’

  Medical report: ‘Another cause of diarrhoeas (as well as bad water, poor sanitation etc.) although of more mild type, was prolonged use of the K ration. After consuming this ration for a week or two, stools became loose, watery and light yellow in colour. Fortunately, only on very few occasions did it prove incapacitating and generally cleared up with adequate doses of chalk and opium.’

  Bill Lark: ‘When it came to calls of nature we were not allowed to leave anything on the top. We had a small digging tool, and we used a leaf for wiping our behinds. There was one leaf you had to be very wary of. It looked a very attractive leaf for the purpose, large and thin with a nice, soft, hairy surface. This was another thing you found out for yourself. Nobody who had found out would ever tell you, but if you used this particular leaf you got a very hot bottom for the rest of the day. Being taken short on the march wasn’t really an option, but if it was desperate you had to say “There’s a Jap in the column,” and be careful which leaf you picked.’

  ‘Using so much of yourself’ on the march equated roughly to 5,000 calories a day output, about twice what a young man of average height and weight might use in normal activities. Without special high-calorie foods, most men would find it quite difficult to get that amount inside them.

  Jim McNeilly was not so critical as Bill Lark: ‘They were good, the K rations, but better if you could get something else as well. My section had been with the Gurkhas so there was more knowledge about that. We got bananas, and there was a tree root they called boombay, which you cut up and boiled and it was just like a tattie. It was as good as a tattie. You could eat bamboo shoots as well, although we didn’t.’

  McNeilly’s boombay was not really a tree root, but the energy-storage tubers of a climbing vine, the wild yam, sometimes called Chinese yam, which grows wild in wet tropical regions but is also cultivated. It was probably either Dioscorea bulbifera, called the ‘air potato’ for its fruits but which has tubers like small potatoes, or D. pentaphylla, the five-leaf yam. Both offered food high in starch to the knowledgeable natives of those parts.

  Let the US Army Quartermaster Foundation have the final word on the subject of K rations.

  ‘Although the accumulation of research and experience has since produced amplifications of this definition, the original concept stated by The Quartermaster General in 1940 covered the major characteristics of the C ration (predecessor of K). In a letter to Maj. W. R. McReynolds, 10 June 1940, Quartermaster General E. B. Gregory stated:

  There are certain fundamental principles that must be met by a ration of this type:

  It should contain not less than 4,000 calories and preferably contain 4,500 as it has been found that this much food is required for the average soldier under field conditions.

  It must be divisible into at least two, and preferably three, meals.

  It must be as light as possible and still contain the necessary food value and bulk.

  It must be suitable for use over a period of three or four days or longer, and therefore must be as palatable as possible, well balanced and not highly seasoned.

  It must be suitable for production in large numbers and at a reasonable cost. This statement of objectives provides the guiding clue in the development of the C ration. The ration went through many changes since its formal inception as Field Ration C but basically its progression continued to be guided by the original concept of a full and satisfying ration for one man for one day and one that he could carry on his person.

  ‘Like other unpopular i
tems, misuse was a contributing factor to the waning popularity of the K ration. Although designed to be used for a period of two or three days only, the ration occasionally subsisted troops for weeks on end. There were times when this application was unavoidable; there were also occasions when the K was employed because it was easiest to issue. Continued use reduced the acceptability and diminished the value of the ration.’

  War Diary: ‘April 22, stand-to for 73 Col, Manthe chaung, 05.00. Each section sent out parties to collect bamboo shoots as the mules were short of fodder.’

  Bill Lark: ‘At night we fed the mules, and we used to cut young bamboo and pile it as high as we could reach or throw, like building a bonfire, and in the morning when we came out it had disappeared. We carried a certain amount of feed, and a great deal of rock salt, but the mules’ main diet was what we chopped down. We also had oxen with us. We put a load on them, a fairly light load, and occasionally we’d kill one of them, and everybody got a bit of meat off it. The officers had the steak of course and we were eating the scraggy bits, but we all got some.’

  War Diary: ‘April 22, 42 Col moved again at 02.30 after four hours rest, marching south-east by track. The railway was crossed by the level crossing a little south of the bridge at 04.30 but between rail and road, about 300 yards along, was an enemy machine-gun post which opened fire. The leading patrol had walked through unmolested. They turned and attacked the enemy post while the path was cleared by the recce patrol. Engaged enemy firing positions in bamboo thickets for time sufficient to withdraw the mules. The Col withdrew across the railway leaving rear guard under command of Lt Richmond. Lt Anderson and his patrol were left as ambush on the track and to cover Richmond’s patrol retiring. The Col reformed and marched back to the safe harbour which was reached by 08.00. During the encounter, casualties were two killed and one wounded. Enemy casualties not known but the local villagers said the Japs buried nine men the following day.