The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century
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56. Viktor Shakhmatov, “The EAEU: A Core Element of the Greater Eurasian Partnership,” Valdai, March 14, 2019, http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/eaeu-a-core-element-of-the-greater-eurasian/.
57. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Development Strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization until 2025,” 2015, http://eng.sectsco.org/load/200162/.
58. Nargis Kassenova, “China’s Belt and Road at Five” (panel presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, October 1, 2018), https://www.csis.org/events/chinas-belt-and-road-five-0.
Chapter Five. The Bridgehead: Central and Eastern Europe
1. James Kynge, Arthur Beesley, and Andrew Byrne, “EU Sets Collision Course with China over ‘Silk Road’ Rail Project,” Financial Times, February 19, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/003bad14-f52f-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608. Total cost estimates for the two sections have ranged between $2.8 billion and $3.8 billion.
2. Ryan Hearth and Andrew Gray, “Beware Chinese Trojan Horses in the Balkans, EU Warns,” Politico, July 27, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/johannes-hahn-beware-chinese-trojan-horses-in-the-balkans-eu-warns-enlargement-politico-podcast/.
3. Sigmar Gabriel, “Speech by Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel at the Munich Security Conference” (speech given at the Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 17, 2018), Federal Foreign Office of Germany, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/rede-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz/1602662.
4. See Phillipe Le Corre, “On China’s Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia” (testimony to the U.S. Congress, Washington, DC, May 9, 2019), Carnegie Endowment, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/09/on-china-s-expanding-influence-in-europe-and-eurasia-pub-79094; Le Corre, “China’s Rise as a Geoeconomic Influencer: Four European Case Studies,” Carnegie Endowment, October 15, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/15/china-s-rise-as-geoeconomic-influencer-four-european-case-studies-pub-77462.
5. Michel Rose, “China’s New ‘Silk Road’ Cannot Be One-Way, France’s Macron Says,” Reuters, January 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-france-idUSKBN1EX0FU.
6. George Parker, James Kynge, and Lucy Hornby, “May Resists Pressure to Endorse China’s ‘New Silk Road’ Project,” Financial Times, January 31, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/3e79ae14-0681-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.
7. Dana Heide, Till Hoppe, Stephan Scheuer, and Klaus Stratmann, “EU Ambassadors Band Together against Silk Road,” Handelsblatt Today, April 17, 2018, https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/politics/china-first-eu-ambassadors-band-together-against-silk-road/23581860.html?ticket=ST-2635619-iQxmRQU2eGxAwjKCAbTo-ap2.
8. David Barboza, Marc Santora, and Alexandra Stevenson, “China Seeks Influence in Europe, One Business Deal at a Time,” New York Times, August 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/business/china-influence-europe-czech-republic.html.
9. Jason Horowitz and Liz Alderman, “Chastised by E.U., a Resentful Greece Embraces China’s Cash and Interests,” New York Times, August 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/europe/greece-china-piraeus-alexis-tsipras.html.
10. MTI, “Orbán: If EU Doesn’t Pay, Hungary Will Turn to China,” Budapest Business Journal, January 11, 2018, https://bbj.hu/economy/orban-if-eu-doesnt-pay-hungary-will-turn-to-china_143836.
11. Le Corre, “China’s Rise as a Geoeconomic Influencer”; Thilo Hanemann, Mikko Huotari, and Agatha Kratz, China FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group, 2019), https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2018.
12. “Hungarian PM Viktor Orban’s Friend Seals €2.3bn Railway Contract with Chinese Firms,” BNE Intellinews, April 29, 2019, https://www.intellinews.com/hungarian-pm-viktor-orban-s-friend-seals-2-3bn-railway-contract-with-chinese-firms-160334/.
13. Michael Peel, James Kynge, and Lucy Hornby, “China’s Balkan Investment Pledges Stoke EU Concern,” Financial Times, July 1, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/6c646a3e-7d29-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d.
14. Barbara Surk, “As China Moves In, Serbia Reaps Benefits, with Strings Attached,” New York Times, September 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/09/world/europe/china-serbia-european-union.html.
15. Momir Samardžić, Roads to Europe: Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue (1878–1881) (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2010), 59, https://www.academia.edu/2759935/Roads_to_Europe._Serbian_Politics_and_the_Railway_Issue_1878-1881.
16. Samardžić, 104.
17. Samardžić, 102.
18. Dragana Gnjatoviæ, “Foreign Long Term Government Loans of Serbia 1862–1914” (SEEMHN Papers 11, National Bank of Serbia, Belgrade, 2009).
19. Author interview, March 4, 2019.
20. Inke Piegsa-Quischotte, “Memories of the Orient Express,” Travel Thru History, accessed April 1, 2019, http://www.travelthruhistory.com/html/exotic47.html.
21. Simon Calder, “Murder of the Orient Express,” Independent, August 22, 2009, https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/murder-of-the-orient-express-1775809.html.
22. Radomir Ralev, “Hungary Hopes Belgrade-Budapest Rail Project to Be Completed in 2023,” See News, June 11, 2018, https://seenews.com/news/hungary-hopes-belgrade-budapest-rail-project-to-be-completed-in-2023-615874; Aleksandar Vasovic, “Belgrade-Budapest Railway Part of Chinese ‘Express Lane’ to Europe,” Reuters, December 17, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/europe-china-east-idUSL6N0U11ZN20141217.
23. One estimate puts the average speed of Serbia’s modern passenger trains at forty-four kilometers an hour, barely changed since the 1880s, when the first trains traveled just under forty kilometers an hour. See Federico Sicurella, “40 km an Hour: The Slow Modernization of the Serbian Railways,” OBC Transeuropa, October 28, 2013, https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Serbia/40-km-an-hour.-The-slow-modernization-of-the-Serbian-railways-142933.
24. Bent Flyvbjerg, “What You Should Know about Megaprojects, and Why: An Overview,” Project Management Journal 45, no. 2 (April–May 2014): 6–19, https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1409/1409.0003.pdf.
25. Jamil Anderlini, “High-Speed China Changes Rail Landscape,” Financial Times, March 16, 2010, https://www.ft.com/content/a04d14cc-310b-11df-b057-00144feabdc0.
26. James McGregor, China’s Drive for “Indigenous Innovation”: A Web of Industrial Policies (Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2010), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/100728chinareport_0_0.pdf.
27. DW staff, “China Masters German Train Technology, Will Cut Costs,” Deutsche Welle, April 28, 2006, https://www.dw.com/en/china-masters-german-train-technology-will-cut-costs/a-1982476.
28. McGregor, China’s Drive for “Indigenous Innovation.”
29. Wendy Wu, “China Says Its Bullet Train Technology Was Stolen, Days after US Trade Probe Move,” South China Morning Post, August 17, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2107096/china-says-its-bullet-train-technology-was-stolen-days-after-us.
30. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, “The Economics and Politics of High-Speed Rail: Lessons from Experiences,” AAG Review of Books 4, no. 1 (2016): 17–18, DOI: 10.1080/2325548X.2016.1117342.
31. Ignacio Barrón, Javier Campos, Philippe Gagnepain, Chris Nash, Andreu Ulied, and Roger Vickerman, Economic Analysis of High Speed Rail in Europe, ed. Ginés de Rus (Bilbao: Fundación BBVA, 2009), https://www.fbbva.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/dat/inf_web_economic_analysis.pdf.
32. Baruch Feigenbaum, “High-Speed Rail in Europe and Asia: Lessons for the United States” (Policy Study 418, Reason Foundation, Los Angeles, CA, May 2013), https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/high_speed_rail_lessons.pdf.
33. Nick Miller, “‘Why Are They Giving Us the Money?’ Behind China’s Plans to ‘Rescue’ a Decrepit Rail Link,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 20, 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/why-are-they-giving-us-the-money-behind-china-s-plans-to-rescue-a-decrepit-rail-link-20180606-p4zjwk.html.
34. Mu Xuequa
n, “China-Europe Land-Sea Fast Transport Route Opens,” Xinhuanet, February 7, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/08/c_136039012.htm.
35. Jens Bastian, The Potential for Growth through Chinese Infrastructure Investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the “Balkan Silk Road” (Athens and London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 2017), https://www.ebrd.com/documents/policy/the-balkan-silk-road.pdf.
36. Piraeus Port Authority, “Official Visit of China’s Minister of Transport at the Port of Piraeus,” October 16, 2018, http://www.olp.gr/en/press-releases/item/4159-official-visit-of-china-s-minister-of-transport-at-the-port-of-piraeus; Bian Jing, “China Transportation Infrastructure Three-Year Plan Released: Overall Investment around RMB 4.7 Trillion” (Chinese), Reuters, May 11, 2016, https://cn.reuters.com/article/cn-infrastructure-plan-idCNKCS0Y302B; Helena Smith, “Xi Jinping Comes to Greeks Bearings Gifts,” Guardian, November 11, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/12/xi-jinping-comes-to-greeks-bearings-gifts.
37. World Port Source, “Port of Piraeus,” accessed April 1, 2019, http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/review/GRC_Port_of_Piraeus_1041.php.
38. Nektaria Stamouli, “What’s Derailing Greece’s Plan to Sell State Assets? Its Own Government,” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-greek-government-is-both-for-and-against-its-own-privatization-plan-1475428917.
39. David Blair, “Greek PM Faces Revolt from His Own Left-Wing over Bail-Out Crisis,” Telegraph, June 5, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11652502/Greek-PM-faces-revolt-from-his-own-Left-wing-over-bail-out-crisis.html; Kerin Hope, “Greece Sells Controlling Stake in Piraeus Port,” Financial Times, April 8, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/895aac42-fd98-11e5-b5f5-070dca6d0a0d.
40. George Georgiopoulos, “China’s COSCO Acquires 51 Pct Stake in Greece’s Piraeus Port,” Reuters, August 10, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/greece-privatisation-port/chinas-cosco-acquires-51-pct-stake-in-greeces-piraeus-port-idUSL8N1AR252.
41. Ports Europe, “Piraeus Port Reported Back to Normal after Strike Action,” June 4, 2018, https://www.portseurope.com/piraeus-port-reported-back-to-normal-after-strike-action/.
42. Piraeus Port Authority S.A., “Annual Financial Report for the Year Ended December 31, 2017,” February 13, 2018, https://www.worldreginfo.com/wdoc.aspx?file=Piraeus_Port/1/13F11B98-07E2-4580-871C-F03720179186/394262_rfa_2017_en_grs470003013.pdf.
43. Simon Marks, “Greece Faces €200M Fine for Failing to Stop Chinese Fraud Network,” Politico, January 14, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-faces-e200m-fine-for-failing-to-stop-chinese-fraud-network/.
44. Ilias Belos, “Cosco’s Piraeus Plan Approved, in Part,” Ekathimerini, October 13, 2019, http://www.ekathimerini.com/245471/article/ekathimerini/business/coscos-piraeus-plan-approved-in-part.
45. Angelos Bentis, Caroline Carulas, Christ Mihalaris, and George Papoutsas, China’s Image in Greece: 2008–2018, ed. Plamen Tonchev (Athens: Institute of International Economic Relations, October 2018), http://idos.gr/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/China-Image-in-Greece_9-10-2018.pdf.
46. GTP Editing Team, “Piraeus Port Development Plan Runs into New Hurdle,” GTP Headlines, March 5, 2019, https://news.gtp.gr/2019/03/05/piraeus-port-development-plan-runs-new-hurdle/.
47. Jonathan Hillman, “A Chinese World Order,” Washington Post, July 23, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/07/23/china-world-order/?utm_term=.d780fdcbdafb.
48. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “The Sofia Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries,” July 9, 2018, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1577455.shtml.
49. “Chinese Premier Praises EU, Says Free Trade Must Be Upheld,” Associated Press, July 7, 2018, https://apnews.com/d641da055d7248e39d34ae49615c822b.
50. Thornsten Benner, Jan Gaspers, Mareike Ohlberg, Lucrezia Poggetti, and Kristin Shi-Kupfer, “Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe,” Global Public Policy Institute, February 5, 2018, https://www.gppi.net/2018/02/05/authoritarian-advance-responding-to-chinas-growing-political-influence-in-europe.
51. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, “Quick Facts,” accessed February 2, 2020, https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html.
52. Nikki Sun, “China Development Bank Commits $250bn to Belt and Road,” Nikkei Asian Review, January 15, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Economy/China-Development-Bank-commits-250bn-to-Belt-and-Road.
53. Peel, Kynge, and Hornby, “China’s Balkan Investment Pledges Stoke EU Concern.”
54. Beta, “Salaries in Serbia among Lowest in Europe,” N1, May 21, 2018, http://rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a389833/Serbian-salaries-among-lowest-in-Europe.html.
55. Holger Hansen and Michael Nienaber, “With Eye on China, Germany Tightens Foreign Investment Rules,” Reuters, December 19, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-m-a/with-eye-on-china-germany-tightens-foreign-investment-rules-idUSKBN1OI0UP.
56. Rochelle Toplensky, “EU Blocks Planned Siemens-Alstom Rail Deal in Landmark Decision,” Financial Times, February 6, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/6e344f6a-29fd-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8.
57. Silvia Amaro, “EU Blocks Alston-Siemens Rail Merger Due to ‘Serious Competition Concerns,’ ” CNBC, February 9, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/06/eu-blocks-plan-for-alstom-siemens-rail-merger.html.
58. Tara Patel and Aoife White, “Siemens-Alstom’s Expected EU Veto Unleashes Political Storm,” Bloomberg, February 4, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-04/european-champions-may-yet-rise-from-the-siemens-alstom-rubble.
59. BDI, “Partner and Systemic Competitor: How Do We Deal with China’s State-Controlled Economy” (policy paper, BDI, Berlin, January 2019), https://english.bdi.eu/media/publications/#/publication/news/china-partner-and-systemic-competitor.
60. This estimate includes only BRI-specific documents. Chinese state media cite higher estimates, which often count MOUs on related topics, such as infrastructure, transport, and customs cooperation. Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Research for TRAN Committee: The New Silk Route—Opportunities and Challenges for EU Transport (Brussels: European Parliament, 2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/585907/IPOL_STU(2018)585907_EN.pdf.
61. Shi Jiangtao, “China, France Sign US$45 Billion of Deals including Airbus Order,” South China Morning Post, March 26, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3003384/china-france-sign-us45-billion-deals-including-airbus-order; Giselda Vagnoni and Fran-cesca Landini, “Italy Signs Deals Worth 2.5 Billion Euros with China,” Reuters, March 23, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-china-deals-factbox/italy-signs-deals-worth-2-5-billion-euros-with-china-idUSKCN1R40KN.
62. Andrew Small, “Why Europe Is Getting Tough on China: And What It Means for Washington,” Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-03/why-europe-getting-tough-china.
63. European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf.
64. European Commission, EU-China—A Strategic Outlook (Brussels: European Commission, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.
65. Valerie Hopkins, “Brussels Says EU Has ‘Underestimated’ China’s Reach in Balkans,” Financial Times, March 5, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/4ba18efa-377b-11e9-b72b-2c7f526ca5d0.
66. Jacob Poushter and Christine Huang, “Climate Change Still Seen as the Top Global Threat, but Cyberattacks a Rising Concern,” Pew Research Center, February 10, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/10/climate-change-still-seen-as-the-top-global-threat-but-cyberattacks-a-rising-c
oncern/.
67. Noah Barkin, “The U.S. Is Losing Europe in Its Battle with China,” Atlantic, June 4, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/.
68. Halford John Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal 23, no. 4 (April 1904), https://www.iwp.edu/docLib/20131016_MackinderTheGeographicalJournal.pdf.
Chapter Six. The Weak Are Powerful: Southeast Asia
1. Anna Coren, Ellana Lee, Jane Sit, and James Griffiths, “Malaysian PM Mahathir: ‘Most of the Top Echelons in the Government Are Corrupt,’ ” CNN, July 26, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/25/asia/malaysia-mahathir-mohamad-interview-intl/index.html.
2. Russell Fifield, “Southeast Asia as a Regional Concept,” Asian Journal of Social Science 11, no. 1 (1983): 1–14.
3. International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database,” October 2018, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/index.aspx.
4. International Monetary Fund; US-ASEAN Business Council, “Growth Projections,” accessed January 7, 2019, https://www.usasean.org/why-asean/growth.
5. Krishnadev Calamur, “High Traffic, High Risk in the Strait of Malacca,” Atlantic, August 21, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/strait-of-malacca-uss-john-mccain/537471/.
6. Owen Lattimore, “Yunnan, Pivot of Southeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs 21, no. 3 (1943): 476–493.
7. John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” Washington Post, July 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html.
8. Eleanor Ross, “How and Why China Is Building Islands in the South China Sea,” Newsweek, March 29, 2017, https://www.newsweek.com/china-south-china-sea-islands-build-military-territory-expand-575161.
9. Mission of Japan to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Japan’s Cooperation on ASEAN 2025 (Connectivity),” May 2016, https://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/asean2025/jpasean-ec03.html.