Beaten Down By Blood
Page 6
Mills bombs were a staple weapon. Weighing 1.25 pounds, the Mills bomb was a grenade with a serrated exterior which broke into many fragments when detonated. A soldier would pull the safety pin and throw it as if bowling a cricket ball. Effective to a range of 30 yards, by 1917 the bomb was filled with high explosive and could be used on a rifle discharger — as a rifle grenade — to achieve a greater range. Because of his looser clothing, the Australian soldier could carry six Mills bombs at a time and these were used extensively at Mont St Quentin-Péronne as troops bombed their way up the trenches to reach their start lines, or pushed their way forward with bombs and bayonets. Approximately 70 million of these grenades were thrown by the Allies during the war.
The rifle grenade had a range of between 60 and 200 yards. Usually it consisted of a Mills bomb in a special cup fitted to the muzzle of a rifle, or a smaller grenade mounted on a rod and inserted into a rifle barrel, then fired with a blank cartridge. If a number of rifle grenades were fired together, they could form a useful barrage and they could also be powerful in defence. Between 27 August and 2 September over 20,000 rifle grenades were issued to the 2nd Australian Division alone and the men used them extensively on the Mont St Quentin ridge.
The .303-inch Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifle was standard issue and an indispensable infantry weapon. It fired most effectively to a range of 300 yards, but was capable of hitting its target at a much greater distance. The rate of fire depended on the speed with which an individual could operate the bolt and squeeze the trigger — the record was 37 hits in one minute.
The light mortar was an infantry weapon which, although cumbersome, proved useful during the attacks on Mont St Quentin and Péronne, its batteries advancing with the infantry under the direction of the battalion commanders. One eight-gun battery was attached to each brigade and its weapon was the 3-inch Stokes mortar, capable of firing six 11-pound bombs a minute to a range of 400 yards. Each gun crew comprised three gun numbers and three ammunition carriers. Two guns accompanied each battalion into battle. While it was difficult to move the guns forward and into position, they successfully engaged and dispersed Germans poised for counter-attacks on the morning of 31 August, silenced anti-tank guns and engaged snipers and machine-gun posts. However, the batteries experienced great difficulty in maintaining ammunition supply as there were insufficient men to act as carriers and some of the mules used to transport the ammunition were killed. The gunners pushed on regardless and rendered valuable, if limited, service to the infantry. While numerous targets were engaged, there were times during the battle when no targets were within range and the mortars ‘were not called upon to fire’.12
From March 1918, four machine-gun companies formed a machine-gun battalion, numbered according to the division to which it was attached. Each company was equipped with 16 Vickers heavy machine-guns, giving a total of 64 for each battalion. These guns had a rate of fire of 450–500 rounds per minute with a normal combat range of 2000 yards. A four-gun section from each machine-gun company advanced with the attacking battalions during the Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne. The Australians also captured large numbers of German machine-guns and on many occasions used them against the defenders, although commanders recommended that more men be trained in their use.
In the mobile warfare of the Hundred Days, machine-guns provided a useful form of ‘near-artillery’ which, if used effectively, could substitute for heavier guns.13 Machine-gun barrages were also known to demoralise the enemy. However, at Mont St Quentin-Péronne, no machine-gun barrages were put down and the conditions and terrain meant that some sections could be effective while others made very little impact on the battlefield. Overall, Lieutenant Colonel James Durrant, the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General for the 2nd Australian Division, considered that machine-guns did not assist the infantry as much as expected. They were not able to engage strongpoints which were preventing rifle sections from advancing, and the low trajectory of their bullets made it unsafe to fire at short range over the heads of the infantry. It was only when engaging targets at long range that they were able to provide much greater support.14
The Maxim heavy machine-gun captured by Private George Cartwright, 33rd Battalion, on 31 August 1918. (REL/AWM 00981.001)
A Lewis gun issued to the 27th Battalion in March 1916. It took part in every unit engagement until 3 October 1918. (REL/AWM 02766)
The penultimate infantry weapon, however, was the Lewis gun, a ‘light’ machine-gun which the BEF had used on the Western Front since 1915. Weighing 28 pounds, it was capable of firing about 550 rounds per minute and was most effective to a range of about 800 yards, although it could fire much further than this. By the end of the war, 50,000 Lewis guns had been produced in Britain and America and each Australian battalion had 30 of these guns by 1918, compared to eight per battalion at the beginning of the Somme campaign in 1916. Monash believed that the Lewis gun was the key to infantry success in battle. Indeed, on 31 August, the backbone of the 33rd Battalion’s initial attack along the Bouchavesnes ridge was its 30 Lewis guns and Mills bombs, as there were no Vickers machine-guns or mortars available and artillery support was thin.15
A Lewis gun could be carried and fired by one man, but was usually operated by a gun team of four men. It gave the infantry a great deal more flexibility in mobile warfare, as the gun could be emplaced for defence or used in action, fired from the shoulder or the hip. On 3 September the 26th Battalion was well settled on the Mont St Quentin ridge with 22 Lewis guns and 16 Vickers heavy machine-guns defending its position. Not surprisingly the battalion believed that it could repel any attempted German assault.16 British historian Paul Harris argues that when the infantry effectively combined the Mills bomb and the .303 Lee Enfield rifle with the light mortar, the bayonet, the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun, it could create ‘a potent synergy’, releasing the men from ‘a slavish reliance on artillery’ and allowing them to use their initiative. These weapons could be used skilfully at company and platoon level, the whole manoeuvre pivoting on the Lewis gun section of the platoon which, with the rifle grenadiers, made up the covering fire team. The men could then use the ground intelligently to move close enough to the Germans for their assault team to launch an attack using bombs, bayonets and rifles.17 Paddy Griffith asserts that ‘this combination was expected to flush out even the most stubborn enemy machine-gun position’ and was often used very effectively.18 Australian sources repeatedly stress the importance of the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun, particularly on the Mont St Quentin and Bouchavesnes ridges.
James Durrant provides one example of how such firepower, used with clever tactics, overcame the opposition at Mont St Quentin. Once the troops had decided on a plan of attack to knock out a German machine-gun post, the rifle grenades would open fire. Rifle grenades had the double advantage of containing high explosive as well as firing at a high trajectory capable of penetrating covered positions. Usually the defenders would bolt under this accurate and destructive fire, to be mown down by the Lewis guns carefully placed to catch them in the open. The advance could then resume. On 1 September 1918 the 44th Battalion used precisely this tactic in its capture of the strong post of Quarry Farm on the Bouchavesnes ridge.
The constant repetition of this tactical manoeuvre using infantry firepower at platoon level not only caused casualties but had a demoralising effect on the Germans. The Australians perfected this tactic and it became ‘the usual basis of the plan of infantry attack against the defended localities’ and was particularly effective for close fighting. Its success depended on the skill and accuracy of both the Lewis gun and the rifle grenade sections of the platoon and, consequently, the men were highly trained and gained experience by practising their craft when out of the line. This also illustrates how important the platoon had become as a tactical unit by 1918.19
Intelligent use of ground was also a key ingredient in the success of a tactic such as this, and indeed could compensate for lack of firepower in any action. Gro
und was the prime influence on every battlefield and it was a tribute to the skill of the Australians in 1918 that they could use ground effectively, even without adequate reconnaissance. They were meticulously trained in the art of fieldcraft and this would prove invaluable at Mont St Quentin-Péronne.20 Only infantry could hold the ground which had been won, making it the dominant arm in any attack, even in 1918.
Technological developments throughout the war meant that artillery firepower was much more accurate in 1918. Guns could be ranged on their targets without a shot being fired; batteries could be silent until zero hour. What this meant, as Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have pointed out, was the reappearance of surprise as a battle tactic.21 Monash regarded surprise as ‘one of the most potent weapons in the armoury of the tactician’ and, on 31 August and 1 September, the element of surprise rattled the Germans completely on Mont St Quentin and in Péronne.22 Private Daniel Petersen of the 19th Battalion stressed that it was surprise that outwitted the Germans and the ‘daring, bluff and determination’ of the men, as well as their initiative, that ‘fixed the result’.23 It is probably true to say that the 5th Brigade’s capture of Mont St Quentin on 31 August was largely due to the element of surprise and the clever use of noise, another tactic of bluff widely used in battle to disguise small numbers.
Peter Pedersen argues that one of the critical factors for operational success at Mont St Quentin-Péronne was the smooth working of battle procedure, which can only unfold properly in practice if commanders and troops at all levels are experienced, disciplined and well-trained and units are working cohesively. Battle procedure is concurrent activity to reduce the time required to prepare troops for battle and involves reconnaissance, planning, orders and the resting, feeding, supplying and deployment of troops. Its purpose is to bring troops into action fully prepared and fully supported in the shortest possible time. A warning order gives notice of future action and all levels of the chain of command then start to work towards its implementation. While this is taking place, the higher commander finalises his planning and orders for battle, so that they only have to be distributed to the troops who can be briefed just before the attack is launched.24
Ideally, Monash liked plenty of time for orders to be received and digested; however, in a quick attack such as Mont St Quentin-Péronne, battle procedure necessarily had to be compressed and often rushed. At 8.00 am on 31 August Monash issued his instructions for the deployment of the 14th Brigade. By 9.30 am Hobbs had relayed a warning order to the brigade commander, James Stewart, who then prepared his brigade to cross the Somme River to be ready to attack on time. This involved organising a conference with his battalion commanders before racing off to a prearranged conference with Hobbs and visiting the headquarters of other brigades involved in the attack. Meanwhile, the battalion commanders had organised to meet with their company commanders, had reconnoitred the ground and river crossings and had set the battalions themselves in motion. At various points the men were rested and fed as circumstances permitted. By the time they crossed the Somme, their battle procedure was complete — a relatively smooth process conducted under difficult conditions in a short space of time.5
All eyes to the officer
Charges of indiscipline plagued the AIF throughout the war. Theoretically, its disciplinary structure was no different to the rest of the BEF, except that the Australian government would never allow the death penalty for desertion, believing that this could not be imposed on a volunteer force and that to do so would adversely affect recruitment. Douglas Haig and some Australian commanders, including Monash, believed this was a mistake, and provided insufficient deterrence to the men. Certainly by late 1918 the rates of absenteeism and desertion were much higher in the AIF than in other formations.
Peter Stanley points out that discipline worked very differently in practice. The formal disciplinary structure was often ignored; there were ‘unspoken rules’ and punishments for misdemeanours varied from battalion to battalion. Discipline in the AIF ‘owed more to negotiation and personality than to rule and regulation’, the qualities of leadership most important as men could ‘be led but not driven’. Officers had a different relationship with their men, for whom discipline meant doing what was asked of them rather than saluting an officer. The AIF’s concept of discipline allowed both initiative and individuality, fostering the image of the ‘larrikin digger’ — that ‘high-spirited defiance of authority’ that would come to characterise the Australians.25
Monash himself believed that punishment per se was not the answer to discipline problems and that loyalty to and upholding the honour of the battalion, confidence in officers and mates and in equipment and training were much more potent forces. Commanders should tell the troops that they had done well and not be stingy with honours and awards. The aim was ‘to create a community spirit which was intolerant of misbehaviour’. Privileges should be extended, but punishments incurred if these were abused. Such a policy appealed to men’s intelligence in recognising that this was in the best interests of all.26
Discipline in the field was a different matter again. Charles Bean felt that a crucial attribute of the AIF and a reason for its success was its practical discipline as distinct from the ‘appearance’ of discipline. The men could not have applied tactics or firepower as effectively as they did had they not been highly disciplined. They were keen to gain the objective and understood the methods for doing so as much as their leaders — a result of experience and training. They were promoted within their battalions, commanding men they knew, under the command of men who had recommended them. In battle, Australian troops displayed skilled teamwork, mutual support and good military technique. Staff work was generally superb. The men stood firm in time of crisis, their judgement unimpaired by confusion or disorganisation during battle, and this set them apart from other troops.27 It was also one reason for their success at Mont St Quentin-Péronne.
Lieutenant Joe Maxwell, 18th Battalion. (AWM POO171.001)
There are numerous examples of this ‘no frills’ discipline during this battle. On 31 August, officers steadied the men of the 20th Battalion following their initial frenzied attack on Mont St Quentin. Lieutenant Daniel Anthon blew a whistle and from that moment ‘there was not an eye turned to Fritzy. It was simply all eyes to the officer’ and the men advanced in good order.28 Similarly, on 1 September, the ‘strict obedience to all orders’ by men of the 55th Battalion saw them reach the first objective with few casualties. The companies crossed the barrage area ‘in perfect formation. It was a sight worth seeing and was a sure proof of the discipline of the men.’29 The success of the 25th Battalion’s tactics which led to the capture of German machine-gun posts on 2 September owed much to its perfect discipline.30
‘Pineapple bombs’ found at La Maisonette by Stephen Bomford, May 2010, photo by the author.
Lieutenant Joseph Maxwell of the 18th Battalion was both hero and villain. Behind the lines, Maxwell and his mates were always in trouble. He was involved in a brawl in London in 1917, but his worst misdemeanour occurred on 27 January 1919, when he and some friends visited Tortoni’s Restaurant in Le Havre in ‘a state of intoxication’. Joe was responsible for ‘the most disgraceful fracas’, in which chairs were thrown, glasses smashed and the police called. The authorities delayed his demobilisation, but his mates were court-martialled for this and another offence in which he had no part.31 Preferential treatment? But then Joe Maxwell was the second most decorated soldier in the AIF, having won the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) in 1917, the MC in March 1918, a bar to the MC at Amiens in August and the VC for an attack on the Beaurevoir Line on 3 October 1918. On going into the line, he was transformed from a larrikin to a focused, astute officer renowned for his bravery and courage, an example of practical discipline where it mattered — in the field.
The gallant German gunner
A division in the German army had an establishment of 12,500 troops from 1917. It was divided into three regiments, and each regiment
into three battalions which were further divided into four companies each. In August 1918 the Supreme Army Command declared that battalions with a combat strength of fewer than 650 men would be reduced to three companies, a measure which was implemented in most divisions on the Western Front in the final months of the war.32
Nine German divisions faced the Australian Corps from 31 August to 2 September. They were ordered to hold an outpost zone and a main defensive position which, as their ‘winter line’, they intended to hold permanently — at all costs. A great deal of semi-permanent work had been completed in Péronne in preparation for the winter and Ludendorff did not intend a further withdrawal until early in 1919. All of these divisions were severely depleted in numbers and but a shadow of what they had been in March 1918, but they were far from completely fought out. Indeed, according to Paul Harris, the German armies were certainly not in a state of disintegration in August 1918 and the men themselves did not believe they were beaten.33 As Tim Travers comments, while morale was weak in some units and parts of the line were not held by strong troops, the Germans offered stiff resistance and fought hard at critical points, particularly where the units comprised hand-picked troops.34
The line of the Somme and the Drocourt-Quéant switch further north were considered critical points and some of the best remaining German divisions had been ordered to defend them. In front of the Australian Corps, the Prussian 2nd Guard Division (Alexander, Franz and Augusta Regiments) — commanded by General von Friedeburg and one of the few assault formations still available to the Germans — was brought into the line on 27 August. Charles Bean writes that, on 30 July, the Alexander 1st Battalion numbered 618, the 2nd 688 and the 3rd 713, while companies of the Augusta were 140 strong. The Franz Regiment consisted of two weak battalions.35 Thus the entire division was effectively operating at brigade strength. There were very few original guardsmen left, the division having suffered heavily on the Marne in July. Since then, it had been trained in rearguard action and, like most divisions, had a number of very young men in its ranks with its battalions probably reduced to three companies each. Nonetheless, it retained its formidable reputation and was brought in to strengthen the line — thinly interspersed with weaker divisions — on the Bouchavesnes and Mont St Quentin ridges.