Beaten Down By Blood

by Michele Bomford

  The Alexander Regiment was the garrison on the Mont on 29 August. On 30 August, the 3rd Division met units of the Augusta Regiment and the 21st Division from the Frankfurt area on the Bouchavesnes ridge. When the Australians launched their surprise attack at dawn on 31 August, the Alexander Regiment was in the process of relieving the 21st Division in the front line in front of Mont St Quentin. The relief had experienced all sorts of difficulties and delays and consequently no continuous line of defence had been established — fortuitously for the 5th Brigade, but unfortunately for the Germans who could only try to repel the assault with scattered groups of men. The 21st Division had been in the line since 13 August, borne the brunt of the Australian advance to the Somme, and lost 1200 men taken prisoner. By 1 September, both its morale and its numbers had plummeted.

  On Mont St Quentin, the 94th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Division, a good defensive formation, was preparing to take over garrison duties and had barely established its headquarters when the Australians attacked on the morning of 31 August. The 38th Division, from Thuringia, was used extensively in defence in 1918 and had remained in the line for extraordinary periods of time, in this case from 10 August to 22 September, reflecting just how few reserves were available to the Germans. The division was involved extensively in the fighting from 31 August to 2 September. On joining the battle, the strength of the 96th Infantry Regiment was probably no more than that of a battalion — around 650 men — with the other two regiments equally weak.

  The Jaeger Regiments of the Alpine Corps, one of Germany’s best remaining formations, were moved from the east bank of the Somme south of Péronne to the Moislains-Aizecourt-Bussu sector by 2 September to defend the vital high ground there and seal off a breakthrough by the Fourth Army. Again the division was reduced to brigade strength — fewer than 3500 infantry combatants — it was demoralised, it suffered heavily in the ensuing fighting and lost 700 prisoners in August/September. The 5th Bavarian Division, defending the Somme line around St Christ, had been used in the most active areas of the British front and was still rated a first class formation in late 1918 terms.

  Péronne itself and the outpost zone were defended by two much weaker divisions, the Germans believing the town to be invincible. From the Rhine provinces, the 185th Division was trained in open warfare but not used in this capacity. It was in the line from 18 August to 5 September, lost heavily and was ‘full of revolutionary fairy tales’, a consequence of the influence of Bolshevism on some of the German formations.36 Indeed, Ludendorff was concerned about the effect that ‘the constant retreats and the disintegrating influences from home’ would have on morale.37 Charles Bean asserts that the machine-gunners attached to the 1/65th Infantry Regiment of the 185th Division — the garrison in Péronne — deserted their posts on 1 September. The commandant, Captain Schwerdtfeger, and his staff fled to Flamicourt, from where they were ordered back into Péronne on 2 September only to be captured by the Australians.38 The 14th Bavarian Division was a shattered formation reduced to about 1000 men, but its storm troop company was still capable of making a stand against the Australians.

  A German sniper’s shield found at La Maisonette by Stephen Bomford, May 2010, photo by the author.

  A German Mauser rifle found by Stephen Bomford in Berlin Wood on the Bouchavesnes ridge, May 2010, photo by the author.

  The popular legend of the battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne pits depleted Australian brigades against an enemy which was far stronger numerically, making their victory even more heroic. There has been much speculation over how many Germans faced the attackers, but William Denny’s assertion that 3000 Germans were deployed on 31 August on and around Mont St Quentin itself was perhaps not too much of an exaggeration considering the 5th Brigade met all three battalions of the Alexander, two regiments of the 38th Division and odds and ends from other formations. Based on these figures, the Australians were outnumbered three to one.39

  As German casualties started to mount and a weakening of morale saw men surrender in their droves, the battle ratio was reduced. Nevertheless, by the evening of 1 September, the Australians in Péronne were certainly outnumbered and their position precarious. By 2 September, in what remained a stubborn defence, the Germans deployed pioneers, drivers and even cooks to the front line.

  However, the numbers do not tell the whole story. Intelligence reports asserted that the German units were thrown into the line in a piecemeal fashion without any organisation whatsoever and elements of these divisions were moved around depending on the circumstances at the time, without any overall plan or cohesion. It was virtually impossible to establish an order of battle and the best infantry were thinly spread across a wide front in an effort to bolster the line.40 Jack Sheldon comments that the German regimental histories ‘tell a tale of confused fighting, tangled remnants of regiments and battalions moved around here, there and yon to counter the latest threat, but being pushed back constantly.’41 There were no counter-attacks against the Australians on 1 and 2 September and the Germans had no real chance of withstanding a determined assault by skilled and well-trained troops who employed firepower and tactics effectively.

  In their bombardments of the Australian troops, however, the Germans used every calibre of shell and inflicted considerable casualties. These shells had colourful names, from the very heavy ‘iron foundry’ to the ‘woolly bear’, a shrapnel shell which burst with a cloud-like explosion, and the ‘whizz-bang’, a high velocity shell usually fired from a 77-mm field gun with such speed that its intended recipients had no warning. In addition, the German defensive arsenal included trench mortars, the most common of which were the minenwerfer or ‘minnie’ and the ‘pineapple’ bomb, a grenade grooved into sections to ensure a fragmented burst and fired from a light trench mortar. The Germans generally used their trench mortars much more effectively than the Allies. One of the most commonly used weapons was the ‘potato masher’ or German stick grenade, thrown by specially trained soldiers.

  All of these weapons paled into insignificance, however, beside the Maxim machine-gun. The Germans produced over 100,000 of these heavy machine-guns during the war. They were capable of firing 600 rounds per minute, but this rate of fire was rare and between 300–450 rounds was more usual. One man could operate the gun, but a gun team of four to six men was the norm. By 1918, a machine-gun company, each with 12 heavy guns, was attached to every infantry battalion, so the two were closely linked in battle. Given their importance to the Germans, machine-gun companies may have remained at full strength throughout the war, the machine-gunners meticulously trained at special training schools. Their establishment was two officers and 95 NCOs and other ranks.

  In addition, the German army contained special machine-gun detachments — highly competent units which could be deployed at decisive points. On 1 September a company of the 67th Machine Gun Sharpshooting Detachment, under the command of Major Kastenholz, was firing from the ramparts of Péronne while, on 2 September, a number of its gunners were in the line against the 7th Brigade. The detachment was attached to the 243rd Division — a creditable but numerically weak formation from Württemberg — but was under the tactical administration of the 2nd Guard Division for the battle of Mont St Quentin. According to Fourth Army intelligence, it comprised three companies, each of six platoons of two sections each. Company strength was three officers, 113 other ranks and 12 heavy machine-guns.42

  German prisoners captured by 3rd Division, photographed near Curlu, 1 September 1918. (AWM EO3141)

  A feature of the Australian experience across the battlefield was the strength and accuracy of the machine-gun fire and the number of machine-guns the Germans deployed. Calculations would suggest that the defenders did indeed have at least twice as many heavy machine-guns as the Australians and, on Mont St Quentin, the attackers were told by wounded men returning to the rear not to spare the German machine-gunners, who would give them no quarter. In Péronne, machine-gunners on the ramparts played havoc with the 53rd Battalion
in the amphitheatre on 1 September, as they did in their ‘easy job’ against the 56th the following day.43

  In March 1930, Joe Maxwell published a short piece in Reveille describing the German machine-gunners opposing the Australians at Mont St Quentin. He sardonically depicted the task of his battalion on 31 August as ‘a simple job – merely following the other three battalions and collecting souvenirs overlooked by them.’ However, it was not long before the men came under fire from a German machine-gun. They used a rifle grenade to silence it ‘and two fellows hopped over to capture it’, only to be confronted by a German, with his right leg blown off, determined to hold the position. This German just would not die; he was hit three times until finally one of Maxwell’s men ‘fired a revolver at point blank range, and the bullet entered the shoulder of the German, who fell backwards. But he rose and grabbed a stick bomb and pulled the string.’ The bomb exploded a few seconds later, killing both himself and a digger who was now on top of him, and smashing the gun. Maxwell recalled, sincerely, that ‘next morning when things were again quiet we buried our dead, and with all due reverence and respect a place was found among them for our “friend”, the gallant German gunner.’44

  The importance of artillery and heavy machine-guns, while making the capture of the Bouchavesnes ridge, Mont St Quentin and Péronne very difficult for the Australians, masked a deeper problem for the Germans. General von der Marwitz, commander of the Second Army opposed to the Australians, was concerned in late August 1918 that the weakened German infantry divisions were relying on artillery and machine-guns to do their work for them and were not using their rifles. He ordered that any man who came out of the line without his rifle would be severely dealt with under military law.45

  The number of prisoners taken by the Fourth Army would further suggest that even the best German divisions had their breaking point. From 27 August to 3 September the 2nd Guard Division lost 1450 men captured by the Australians, while the much weaker Prussian 232nd Division, in the line around Bouchavesnes and heavily influenced by Bolshevism, lost 1500 men taken prisoner by III Corps and the 3rd Division.46 This also indicates that, following the fighting of 31 August, the Germans had lost any offensive capability and the best they could do was to try to hold on to their defensive positions.

  By the end of August 1918 the Australians were riding on a string of successes in the field and were being ‘fed on victory’ as they inexorably pushed forward. Every unit wanted to contribute to the grand offensive and play its part and consequently morale was high. By contrast, the Germans had been forced to withdraw, step by step, relying on their rearguards to slow the advancing Allies. They hoped to make a stand on the line of the Somme. On the front shared by the British Fourth Army and the German Second Army, Mont St Quentin-Péronne posed the ultimate challenge.

  CHAPTER 4:

  NOT A GHOST OF A CHANCE – 28-31 AUGUST 1918

  A daring plan

  The capture of Mont St Quentin was reminiscent of some of the surprise tactics of Stonewall Jackson, which depended on accurate calculations of time and space and punctual execution of orders by all concerned.

  John Monash, 6 September 19181

  The story begins on 28 August 1918, when Monash formulated his risky and daring plan for the capture of Mont St Quentin and Péronne. His intention was to seize ‘the dominating hill of Mont St Quentin’ which was ‘the key position of the whole line’. By securing this, he would prevent the Germans establishing a strong defensive position on the line of the Somme and ‘thereby render probable [their] immediate further enforced retreat to the Hindenburg Line.’ It was vital that the position be taken ‘without delay’ so that the Germans ‘should not be allowed a single hour longer than necessary to establish [themselves] upon that hill.’2

  Monash’s only problem was that Haig had instructed Rawlinson on 25 August that the Fourth Army was to ‘mark time’ while the First Army pursued the main offensive to the north. He found a loophole in these instructions and seized it with Rawlinson’s blessing:

  The offensive policy will be continued on the Australian Corps front by means of aggressive patrols. Close touch will be kept with the enemy in this way and advantage will be taken of any opportunity to seize the enemy’s positions and to advance our line.3

  Monash would take his opportunity and push it ruthlessly and relentlessly. For him, ‘in war opportunity waits for no man’ and ‘it is from the greatest dangers that the greatest glory is to be won.’4

  The attack, 31 August 1918.

  The original plan to ‘bounce’ the Somme.

  With the 2nd and 5th Divisions approaching the Somme bend, Monash’s original concept was to ‘bounce’ the river in a direct assault from the west. The key elements of the plan were threefold: the 7th Brigade of the 2nd Division would cross the river south of Péronne and push towards the high ground near Doingt; units of the 5th Division would establish a bridgehead at Brie and push beyond and the 5th Brigade of the 2nd Division would cross at Halle and Ommiécourt to attack Mont St Quentin straight on using a pincer movement. Success in these attacks would render the German position in Péronne untenable and threaten the Somme line to the south.

  The attack began auspiciously on 29 August with the 7th Brigade sweeping all before it to capture the vital high ground of La Maisonette, overlooking Péronne and the village of Biaches, to reach the western bank of the river, with the 5th Division on its right. However, here the attack stalled as the Germans occupied deep trenches on the forward slopes overlooking the east bank and had sited posts to rake any approaches with machine-gun fire. Patrols were able to cross the Somme Canal, but could not penetrate the 500 yards of marsh beyond. The Germans had ‘methodically and systematically blown to pieces’ the bridges at St Christ, Brie, Eterpigny and Péronne.5 Similarly, the 5th Brigade had no success opposite Halle or at Ommiécourt, which was still held by the Germans, as was Cléry on the opposite bank.

  The attempt to ‘bounce’ the Somme and turn the position from the south, while the quickest and most direct plan of attack, was a gamble, and it had not paid off. Writing in 1919, Monash maintained that ‘there was only one tactical method by which such an obstacle could be forced by a frontal operation’ and that was to bring up dominating artillery support to shoot the infantry across — support that Monash knew on 29 August that he did not have. He also recognised that to move the guns across the river would be ‘quite impossible’. The ‘bounce’ could only have succeeded if the Germans had failed to ‘put up any sort of fight to prevent it’.6

  Monash feared heavy casualties for little gain if he continued to push against an impenetrable barrier. Instead he demonstrated flexibility, quick thinking and ‘tactical ingenuity’ in changing the axis of the attack to turn the position from the north with a flanking movement.7 He now switched from the ‘bounce’ to what became a series of quick attacks in order to fulfil his intention, which remained firm. At 5.30 pm on 29 August, as engineers worked frantically to repair existing bridges or improvise ‘other bridges from material on the spot’, Monash outlined Fourth Army policy to deflect ‘the advance of the Australian Corps from an easterly to a north-easterly direction’ to a conference of his commanders.8 Divisional boundaries were altered and the 2nd and 5th divisions sideslipped to the left, leaving the British 32nd Division holding an extended front and assuming a more passive role on the right of the Australian divisions.

  On 29 August Rawlinson had also approved the alteration of corps boundaries north of the Somme, allowing the 3rd Australian Division to play a greater role both in attack and support. This gave Monash far more freedom of action, ‘elbow room’ and control of the territory he needed, including the Somme crossings. The task of the 3rd Division on 29/30 August was to capture the ‘heap of ruins, almost piles of dust’ that was the village of Cléry, thus securing the Ommiécourt bridgehead, and then advance along the Bouchavesnes ridge to the north-east.9 Charles Bean saw this as crucial, with all successive action depending on its progres
s.10 It was essential that this ridge be captured simultaneously with the Mont St Quentin ridge if the whole operation was to succeed and Péronne was to fall, as the two were mutually supporting.

  In the operations for 30 August, the 2nd Division would determine the rate of advance all along the front, the 5th Brigade crossing the river at Halle and Ommiécourt to take Berlin Wood and Mont St Quentin in an attack commencing at 5.00 am. Depending on this action, the 7th Brigade would capture Doingt and swing east clear of Péronne, the 15th Brigade then passing through the 7th. When neither brigade could cross the river at its allotted points, the axis of the attack was switched yet again, this time involving a freewheeling manoeuvre which would see three battalions of the 5th Brigade cross at Feuillères and fight their way through Cléry to their assembly positions for an attack on Mont St Quentin and Feuillaucourt on the morning of 31 August. Brigadier General Edward Martin had reset his objectives and redeployed his battalions for the amended operation. The advance through Cléry was probably Monash’s least preferred option for the attack on the Mont, but with the cancellation of the quick attack on the morning of 30 August he had no alternative. Cléry, therefore, became the pivot for future operations.