The Camden Expedition of 1864

by Michael J Forsyth

  Captain Henry was arguably the busiest man in the Union army during its repose in Camden. After the arrival of the train from Pine Bluff on the 20th, Henry had supervised the inventory, unloading, and preparations for the return trip. The train would obtain additional supplies from the depot at Pine Bluff and make an immediate turn back to Camden. Henry believed this would provide the army with just enough stores to make the trip to Louisiana for a rendezvous with Banks. To the 150 wagons from Pine Bluff, Henry added an additional 61 bringing the total to 211 to make the trek to Pine Bluff. Before the train left Camden it had to have an adequate guard to prevent another disaster such as that of Poison Spring. While Henry worked on the administrative details, Steele called together his division commanders to wargame a course of action that would ensure the safe passage of the train.7

  Steele assigned the mission of train security to Frederick Salomon. Rather than providing for a reinforced regiment to guard the train, Steele wanted a brigade tasked to protect this one. In compliance with this guidance Salomon gave the mission to his 2nd Brigade commanded by the reliable Colonel William McLean. While this was an excellent selection, McLean on the 22nd of April was on the sick list unable to exercise command of the brigade. As a result, command of the 2nd Brigade devolved on the competent Lieutenant Colonel Francis Drake of the 36th Iowa Infantry who had turned in such a steady performance at Elkins’ Ferry earlier in the expedition. Evidence of Steele’s concern for the safety of the train is shown by his requirement that Drake personally report to the commanding general for further instructions.8

  Upon reporting at headquarters, Drake found himself whisked into Steele’s presence. Steele proceeded to issue some very specific instructions in a grave and serious manner. From Steele’s tone Drake gathered how critical the mission was to not just the commanding general, but to the army as whole. Steele first introduced Drake to the guide he had assigned to help Drake find his way by the easiest route. Next, he described the conditions of the terrain along the road, specifically amplifying the Moro Bottom. The bottom was a nearly impassable swamp with only a narrow road traversing it. Steele believed this could serve as a possible ambush site for the Confederates due to its restricted nature. He told Drake that under no circumstances should he attempt to cross the swamp in late evening. In addition to Drake’s own force, Steele stated that he was attaching the 1st Iowa Cavalry for the trip to Pine Bluff. From there this regiment would return to Iowa for a veterans’ furlough owed it for reenlisting for the duration of the war. While Steele needed every soldier he could spare just now, he inexplicably decided to grant the 1st Iowa its leave. He seems to have feared breaching their contract more than the enemy. The commander concluded his meeting with Drake by telling the young lieutenant colonel that the train was ready for movement as soon as Drake could assemble his brigade.9

  Drake’s column contained several regiments of combat hardened veterans who had given a good account of themselves in many western battles. The guard included the 36th Iowa Infantry, 43rd Indiana Infantry, 77th Ohio Infantry, 1st Iowa Cavalry, detachments from the 1st Indiana Cavalry, 5th and 7th Missouri Cavalry, and Battery E, 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Drake’s command numbered some 1,200 infantry, 760 cavalry, and four guns for a total of about 2,000 soldiers. While this appears an impressive array, it would prove inadequate to protect the 200–plus wagons. When the train moved out it would stretch two to three miles down the road, far too long a frontage for Drake’s brigade. Nevertheless, Drake rolled out of Camden in the early morning hours of April 23 bound for Pine Bluff.10

  Drake arose early on the 23rd intent on stepping off at 5:00 A.M. As he moved through the assembled mass, he noted with pride the professionalism of the soldiers as they checked their equipment in preparation to move. Continuing down the column, he also ran into a sight that dismayed him as several hundred hangers-on were milling around at the rear of the train expecting to join the trek when the wagons lurched forward. The motley assemblage included an estimated 75 additional wagons belonging to the ever-present sutlers, cotton speculators, refugees, southern unionists, and 300 runaway slaves. Their presence unsettled Drake, as they would multiply the challenge of defending the train due to the disruptive effect the crowd would create. Although Drake objected to this development, he was powerless to prevent them from following the column. At best he could order them to keep their distance from the main body.11

  The cavalry detachment led the advance as the sun rose, followed by the 36th Iowa, 43rd Indiana, the wagons, and the 77th Ohio as the rear guard. The 1st Iowa Cavalry would depart later in the day on foot catching up the column before it camped for the night. Drake found the going rough as the column swung into the Camden-Pine Bluff Road. The heavy rains of recent weeks had washed away sections of the road bringing the train to a halt periodically. This forced Drake to make hasty repairs to keep the column rolling. He decided to make use of the camp followers as a makeshift pioneer corps to shore up the roadbed. Consisting of about 75 contraband slaves, the small corps worked diligently, yet the damage to the road made progress agonizingly slow. This resulted in Drake making only twelve miles on the 23rd. With nightfall closing in late in the evening, Drake decided to encamp for the night and make an early start in the morning. During the night he would send the pioneers forward to corduroy portions of the washed out road and construct makeshift bridges over the many small streams to facilitate mobility the next day. As the soldiers prepared their bivouac, Drake took great care to post security around the campsite. Patrols fanned out in all directions up to five miles from the camp to provide early warning of any Confederate cavalry patrols that lurked in the area. He sent one to the junction of the Princeton and Camden-Pine Bluff roads to scout this critical point for Rebel activity.12 Drake had certainly taken Steele’s instructions to heart making an energetic effort to carry out his duty and protect the army’s lifeline.

  The pioneers moved out long before dawn with a cavalry escort and two guns from Charles Peetz’ battery to cover their work efforts. The negro workers quickly repaired all washouts encountered enabling the empty wagons to make 18 miles on the 24th. The pickets and the main body still had no indication of any Rebels in the immediate vicinity—with the exception of finding an abandoned cavalry camp—and Drake was confident that he could get the train through to Pine Bluff in the next couple of days. Late evening on the 24th, Drake and company came to the head of the Moro Bottom. Remembering Steele’s admonition to not attempt a crossing with night closing in, he stopped the column for a second night short of the swamp. Once again he sent patrols out in a wide pattern to prevent any possibility that the Confederates could surprise his encampment. Again, Drake had the pioneers work through the night to enable the passage through the bottom the next morning. The lieutenant colonel also took the precaution of sending a Lieutenant Schrum of Frederick Salomon’s staff forward to Pine Bluff. The intent of this mission was to alert Powell Clayton of Drake’s location and situation, and to have a mobile column ready to come to his assistance should the train run into problems. At early dawn the column would move out pushing through the swamp quickly so that the train would not be in an exposed position for an inordinate amount of time.13

  Before dawn of the 25th the Union column was well on its way through the Moro Bottom with an advance guard and Peetz’ guns providing security. The ad hoc pioneer corps had once again turned in a spectacular performance in improving the road. Thus far, the bluecoats had seen no Rebels, but this would change abruptly as the long train wound through the pine forest. Lurking ahead at a forgotten corner known as Marks’ Mills were 4,000 tough Confederate cavalrymen waiting to pounce on a juicy target. General Shelby effected a junction with Fagan’s Division as it crossed the Ouachita early on the 24th and immediately conferred with his superior. Fagan had formulated a plan for grappling with the Federal train after receiving Shelby’s dispatch the day previous. Fagan knew that in order to destroy the wagon train he first had to stop it. To do this he decided to ma
ke a forced march along the Chambersville Road, which paralleled the Camden-Pine Bluff Road. He hoped that by hard riding the Rebel cavalry would cut the Federal route and halt the train somewhere near Marks’ Mills. Then Fagan would coil around the train with assault units to hack up the defending train guard. Fagan believed the great length of the train would make it difficult for the Federals to defend. If the Yankees massed their infantry it would expose sections of the train to destruction. On the other hand, if they attempted to cover the whole length, the Union force would be thin, making the column vulnerable to a breakthrough at many points.14 Everything portended another disaster for Federal arms and Fagan knew it.

  As Fagan met with Shelby, he identified the objective point as Marks’ Mills and sent him tearing down the road when the meeting broke. Fagan attached a guide to Shelby’s staff to help him find the area of Marks’ Mills with a minimum of navigational difficulty. The man, a private in Dockery’s Brigade, proved a judicious choice, for William Marks was the son of the gentleman who owned the mills. Shelby was the right man to lead the van of Fagan’s command because he drove his men relentlessly on the 24th. Setting a personal example, Shelby pushed the head of the column an astonishing 45 miles easily outdistancing the Federals as they approached Moro Bottom. Shelby decided to bivouac about eight miles short of Marks’ Mills in order to rest his men after their grueling day in the saddle. At dusk Fagan—in camp a few miles behind Shelby—sent patrols throughout the surrounding countryside to pinpoint the location of the Federal column hoping they had not passed Marks’ Mills. Much to Fagan’s satisfaction, the Union train had not made it to the mills. During the night one of Fagan’s scouts came in and informed the general that the Federals had halted on the evening of the 24th short of the Moro Bottom. This meant that they would have to cross it in the morning giving Fagan time to push his cavalry in front of the bluecoats. He determined to break camp for Marks’ Mills at daybreak in order to set an ambush for the Union column as they emerged from the bottom.15

  Fagan scarcely snatched any sleep on the 24th as he spent the night planning the attack of the next day. The scheme of maneuver called for Shelby and Cabell to launch simultaneous attacks on the head and flanks of the Union column. Shelby would move to a point between Mount Elba and Marks’ Mills on the Camden-Pine Bluff Road. Upon reaching the road the division would make a left and ride in a southwesterly direction until encountering the train. Here, Shelby would act as the anvil and stop the train from proceeding any further down the road. Cabell’s Division would at the same time move north on the Warren Road directly toward the mills. Just short of Marks’ Mills, Cabell would dismount his division and deploy it in line of battle. When the head of the Union train ran into Shelby, Cabell would deliver the hammer blow crashing into the open flank from the south.16 Fagan hoped the Confederates would achieve complete surprise and hence, thorough destruction of the train. The drawback to the plan was that it required precise timing to ensure the widely separated gray columns converged at the appropriate moment. If one of the divisions delayed in its movement, the Union infantry with the train could overwhelm one of the Rebel cavalry divisions before the other could arrive to help. Fagan, however, had under his command some of the best subordinate cavalry leaders in the west and this went a long way toward minimizing the risk of precise coordination.

  Engagement at Marks’ Mills. General James Fagan discovered a train of 240 wagons on April 23 bound for Pine Bluff in an attempt to obtain food for the half-starving Union army at Camden. Fagan quickly marshaled his forces for a Poison Spring-style ambush on the train. The Union force guarding the train under Lt. Col. Francis Drake, numbering 1600, was overwhelmed as the head and flanks of the train came under heavy contact by Rebel cavalry. After a five hour struggle the wounded Drake surrendered to Fagan. The loss of the train forced Steele to abandon the Camden Expedition.

  At dawn, according to plan, the Rebel troopers were in the saddle moving to their respective attack positions. When Shelby reached the Camden-Pine Bluff Road he sent the bulk of his force down toward Marks’ Mills. He also detached a small force in the opposite direction toward Mt. Elba at the crossing of the Saline River to keep an eye on the road to Pine Bluff. Shelby worried that the Federals under Powell Clayton might come down from Pine Bluff to meet the train and threaten the rear of his column. Additionally, he wanted to seal off the crossing so fugitives from the ambush could not make it to Pine Bluff. Meanwhile, Cabell moved up the Warren Road to get in position for his assault. Cabell’s movement went much slower as Dockery’s troopers lagged behind creating a gap in the division. Cabell intended to place his own brigade on the right and Dockery on the left parallel to the road. The slow arrival of Dockery however, endangered Cabell to an attack on his own exposed left flank. To protect against this possibility, Cabell sent his own 7th Arkansas to guard his left until Dockery came up. As the brigade made its dispositions, Fagan, who had accompanied Cabell, peered over the ground catching sight of the train for the first time. Cabell stated that “the train was moving rapidly” as it jolted to the northeast toward Pine Bluff. The generals must have salivated at the sight of so many wagons moving in the open across their front. Just then shots rang out to the left as Federal patrols flanking the train made initial contact with Cabell’s exposed flank.17

  The Union column roused before daybreak on the 25th and as the sun rose the men fell in on the road to begin shuffling through the narrow path in Moro Bottom. Drake arranged the 43rd Indiana in the lead, followed by the 36th Iowa who moved beside the train on the right flank, while the 77th Ohio remained in camp until the train cleared in order to fall in as the rear guard. The 1st Iowa Cavalry still had not overtaken the train, but Drake expected them to join the column sometime that day. During the night the work party had done excellent service in corduroying the road through the swamp. Even so, the going proved difficult as “many wagons mired down and the mules floundering in seemingly bottomless slush holes.” As the train struggled through the swamp, a courier from one of Drake’s many patrols reported in with disturbing news. The patrol, it seems, had encountered elements of Rebel cavalry lurking on the Warren Road, but the courier did not believe it a serious threat.18

  Nevertheless, Drake became somewhat apprehensive that the Rebels could make an attempt on the train as it cleared the swamp. He may have felt more at ease had Lieutenant Schrum made it through to Pine Bluff the previous evening. Schrum, however, barely proceeded beyond sight of the night’s bivouac. As he trudged through the swamp on the 24th the ambulance he rode in became hopelessly mired in the muck. Schrum’s arrival at Pine Bluff could have helped immensely the next day at Marks’ Mills because Powell Clayton had taken the initiative to form a “flying column” in the event that the train needed assistance. He had even gone to the trouble to position the column forward to Mt. Elba to render quick support.19 Altogether, Clayton’s effort was intuitive and prudent, but without information on location or situation he could do little to help Drake.

  As Federal infantrymen from the 43rd Indiana cleared the swamp they found unmistakable signs of heavy Rebel activity in the vicinity of Marks’ Mills and sent a follow-up report to Drake. Now thoroughly aroused to the danger ahead, Drake decided to move to the front to have a look for himself. As Drake moved forward he found his stranded messenger, Lieutenant Schrum, and ordered him to take command of the train and move it to an appropriate point of safety while the infantry cleared the front of Rebels. Continuing on, Drake came across Major Wesley Norris of the 43rd Indiana conferring with a cavalry officer that he did not recognize. After further investigation, Drake found that a Major Spellman with 150 troopers of the 7th Missouri Cavalry had been in the area conducting a reconnaissance from Pine Bluff when his detachment bumped into the 43rd skirmishing with Cabell’s Rebels. Spellman had immediately attached himself to Norris’ regiment to fight the Confederates. Drake welcomed the reinforcements and then turned to Major Norris who reported that the Confederates in large force occupied a r
idge on the south side of the road. This ridge dominated the road and would have to be cleared before the column could proceed. Drake ordered Norris to shake out a battle line and attempt to sweep the ridge. Norris was somewhat skeptical of his ability to carry the ridge because he believed the Rebels were in much greater strength than did Drake. Without arguing, however, Norris saluted and turned to execute the order.20

  Norris’ skirmishers had advanced one hundred yards when a volley sent them tumbling back: they had run into Cabell’s 7th Arkansas Regiment. Drake finally realized that he had a serious fight on his hands and sent for the 36th Iowa and 77th Ohio to hasten to the front. As the 36th double-quick marched forward, Drake fed them into line on the left of the 43rd Indiana along with two guns from Peetz’ battery. The struggle between Cabell’s lone brigade and Drake’s stiffening line continued for about an hour and a half with the Federal infantry slowly building to a point where it appeared they would overwhelm Cabell.21 Fagan’s dependence on precise timing was now threatening to upend the entire attack unless Dockery and Shelby could reach the scene.