The Camden Expedition of 1864

by Michael J Forsyth

  Cabell had fought frantically at one point launching an impetuous charge with his outgunned cavalry that morning to hold the ridge overwatching the Camden-Pine Bluff Road. Feeding his men into the fight as they came onto the ridge, he simultaneously sent couriers dashing back down the Warren Road to encourage Dockery to come up more quickly. One account states that the reason for Dockery’s delay was his insistence that his brigade halt to forage its animals since they had not had the opportunity to do so the previous night. “Neither orders nor cannon shots seemed to disturb the equanimity which he [Dockery] always carried with him in battle,” one observer noted. In addition to Dockery’s intransigence, nature intervened again in this campaign as a downpour drenched the battlefield. This further slowed Dockery’s movement to the attack position. In the meantime, Cabell made judicious use of fire support to pin the blue infantry down and silence the 10–pound rifles of Charles Peetz’ battery. Placing Hughey’s Battery on the left flank, the guns were able to bring a devastating fire on the Union soldiers near the road and suppress Peetz’ guns.22 Just when Fagan and Cabell felt their ability to hold had culminated, Dockery swung into line on Cabell’s left and the van of Shelby’s Division threatened the unsuspecting Drake’s own left flank.

  Dockery’s Brigade approached the rear of Cabell’s line and then filed off the road to the left. Using the ridge to screen his deployment, Dockery moved around to form on Cabell’s dangling left flank. When he had organized his line, Dockery moved forward on foot in consonance with Cabell. The combination of the two brigades allowed the Confederates to overlap Drake’s right by more than a regimental frontage. This stabilized the Confederate line while conversely placing Drake in a perilous situation.

  Shelby’s Brigade had about ten miles to move that morning to reach the vicinity of Marks’ Mills. The sound of heavy firing greeted Jo Shelby as his men trotted down the Camden-Pine Bluff Road. This assured Shelby that the prey had not passed his position, but also filled him with fear that Fagan, with the other half of the Rebel force, might get overwhelmed. Shelby put spurs to his horse and encouraged his men to pick up the pace of their march in order to save Fagan from disaster.23

  The firing grew louder as Shelby drew closer to the field of action. When about one mile from the head of the Federal train, he formed his division for a mounted charge. Shelby deployed Crawford’s Brigade—commanded by Colonel John C. Wright—on the right side of the road and his own brigade, under Colonel David Shanks, on the left. Two regiments—the 5th and 12th Missouri—would constitute a reserve that would follow Wright’s force north of the road. Finally, Shelby called Captain Richard Collins’ Battery to come forward. He wanted two guns to occupy a point in the center of the line on the road to fire two blank charges. The shots would signal to Cabell that Shelby had arrived and would represent the moment for a simultaneous charge by both divisions.24

  Collins signaled for his cannoneers to pull the lanyards and two clear shots echoed across the landscape. At the signal, Shelby initiated his charge and Cabell, hearing the report of the cannon, threw his line forward. Together they crushed all resistance around the train. Dockery’s Brigade passed around the flank of the 43rd Indiana crashing right into the wagons parked on the side of the road. From here, Dockery wheeled to the right to roll up the Union infantry. Cabell’s charge ran headlong into the teeth of Federal resistance, but threatened on both flanks, the Union forces melted away. Cabell’s dismounted men “drove him … through the train, capturing two pieces of artillery.” Hughey’s Confederate battery had done excellent work cutting down the artillery horses of Peetz’ battery immobilizing the guns. As Cabell’s wild troopers bore down on them the Federal infantry supports abandoned the battery. This panicked Peetz’ gunners who deserted their guns in a disorderly retreat. While Cabell and Dockery placed irresistible pressure on Drake’s defense, it was Shelby’s charge that thoroughly unhinged the Federal line precipitating a rout. The 36th Iowa attempted to refuse its left flank to meet Shelby’s onslaught, but the strength and speed of the attack was simply too much for the Federals. As General Fagan moved through the wreckage of the fight he encountered a wounded Francis Drake and promptly demanded the surrender of the remaining defenders.25

  Drake was pleased to see how Norris succeeded in pushing Cabell back believing he would soon continue his movement unabated to Pine Bluff. Just at the moment it appeared that Drake’s men had won the day, Dockery’s Brigade deployed on Cabell’s left. Drake reacted by placing the 36th Iowa on the left of the 43rd Indiana to lengthen his line while directing Captain Peetz to the center of the line holding his fire “until they were in close range.” When the Rebels came in range the battery opened with great effect and the infantry “poured in a deadly volley of musketry…. The contest raged with unabated fury,” until Shelby appeared in Drake’s rear. The 77th Ohio had still not made it to the scene and the two infantry regiments, Peetz, and the few cavalry troopers braced for Shelby’s charge. Drake ordered five companies of the 36th Iowa to bend back to the left to meet Shelby, but as already discussed, this measure was wholly inadequate. Soon after giving this order Drake received a severe wound to his leg. A subordinate noticed blood spilling from Drake’s boot and asked him “[A]re you severely wounded?” Drake replied positively and continued issuing orders before he passed out from loss of blood. Leaderless, the Federal units disintegrated with fugitives fleeing in all directions.26 When Drake revived Fagan was standing over him requesting his surrender. Drake remained quite groggy as he attempted to comprehend what had happened. One thing he knew for certain was that he exercised very little control over anything. To Fagan, Drake replied that he no longer held command and that the Confederates would have to refer to someone else to force a capitulation. Fagan politely acknowledged Drake’s predicament and called for his surgeon while Shelby and Cabell scooped up the fugitives.27

  The 77th Ohio Infantry and 1st Iowa Cavalry represented the only organized Federal units in the vicinity of Marks’ Mills. The 77th Ohio had not moved forward with as much energy as Drake had requested due to a mix up in orders. When they did reach the field they threatened to upset the Rebel triumph. Captain Andrew McCormick commanded the 77th Ohio along with a section of Peetz’ Battery E, 2nd Missouri attached to his rear guard. As he approached the field McCormick noticed that Cabell’s Division was in disarray as a result of their victory and an opportunity for a counterattack presented itself. McCormick quickly formed the regiment in line of battle using the road as his axis of advance and with the two guns centered on the regiment. Once the regiment was formed, McCormick fixed bayonets and charged up the Camden-Pine Bluff Road landing a blow squarely on Cabell’s flank sending the division reeling. The assault fell predominantly on Colonel James C. Monroe’s 1st Arkansas Cavalry, who struggled to change front to face the enemy attack from an unexpected quarter. The momentary success of the 77th dissolved as Shelby’s troopers bore down on the Ohioans. McCormick’s men held solid for a few minutes until they received a surprise of their own. Major J. H. Harrell’s Arkansas Battalion had been on rear security when his pickets caught sight of the newly arrived Federals. Grasping the situation, Harrell took the initiative to form his unit and swing it around to the rear of the 77th. When Harrell’s men announced their presence with a shrill yell, the Ohioans lost heart and surrendered ignominiously. A dispute soon erupted between Dockery and Cabell’s men over who should have the credit for taking Peetz’ guns, but the engagement was largely at an end.28

  The veteran troopers of the 1st Iowa had marched along in anticipation of their first furlough since enlisting three years earlier. As a part of their reenlistment contract, all veterans who signed up for another hitch would receive a 30–day veterans’ furlough. These cavalrymen proceeded to Pine Bluff on foot because their horses were in no condition to make the trip to Pine Bluff and the army needed all its animals for transport. They left Camden on the 23rd and were to catch up with Drake’s column before nightfall. The 1st failed to reach Drake
in large part because of their being unaccustomed to making hard marches. Nevertheless, by morning of the 25th the veteran soldiers were closing in on the rear of Drake’s column when they heard the unmistakable sounds of battle. As they approached the Moro Swamp “a most demoralized crowd of cotton speculators, sutlers, refugees, teamsters, etc., mounted on mules and horses dashed past.” Close on their heels were elements of Confederate cavalry pursuing the defeated fugitives from Marks’ Mills. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Caldwell immediately placed his troopers, 520 battle experienced men, in line of battle to meet the onrush of Rebels.29

  The Iowans held a decided advantage in that they held the far side of the Moro Creek bridge, which the attacking Rebels had to cross to come to grips with the Union soldiers. The Rebels from Shelby’s command attempted to carry the bridge, but a concentrated volley prevented them from crossing. The Rebels did take some prisoners from the Union skirmish line including one Lieutenant Silas R. Nugen. The Confederates immediately interrogated the lieutenant in an attempt to determine the size and disposition of the Federal force at the bridge. In answer to their questions, Nugen stated that the 1st Iowa represented “the advance of General Steele’s army.” This revelation diluted the Rebels’ enthusiasm for making another assault. Nugen’s misinformation probably saved the 1st Iowa from a southern prison and happily ensured they would take their leave, albeit at a later date, for the Confederates called off their assault. Caldwell now countermarched back to Camden. Taking up successively strong positions as they reversed course, the 1st Iowa made it back to Camden without further incident. Charles Lothrop, regimental surgeon, remarked that the dismounted cavalrymen moved an astonishing fifty miles that day, an impressive march for men who normally had their mobility provided by horses.30

  When the 1st Iowa encamped exhausted opposite Camden it was the first intimation Steele had of the disaster at Marks’ Mills. The extent of the defeat exceeded the debacle of Poison Spring in terms of transportation and personnel and it cast a dark cloud over the high command and soldiers of the Union army. The Confederates brought approximately 4,000 soldiers to Marks’ Mills of which about 2,500 were engaged when detachments for horseholders and flank guards are factored in. Of these, Fagan lost only 41 killed, 108 wounded, and 144 missing for a total of 293 casualties. The Federals, on the other hand, lost an estimated 1,500 men of approximately 1,800 engaged, most of whom were captured including the seriously wounded Francis Drake. In addition, Drake’s train guard lost all its artillery and 240 wagons in a three-hour fight.31

  As the Confederates inventoried the spoils, they took great delight in pillaging the contents of the sutlers’ wagons. These contained sumptuous delicacies the Rebels had not seen for some time. Shelby’s men made a “great haul” of Union greenbacks from the army paymaster and cotton speculators. The gray troopers were angered to find a great deal of personal belongings of families that lay along the Camden-Pine Bluff Road. These included furniture, bedding, jewelry, and family heirlooms. Many of the “women all along the road for miles back came on horseback to identify their belongings.”32 Together with Poison Spring, Marks’ Mills represented a catastrophe for the Union army west of the Mississippi, one that would cause abandonment of the Camden Expedition.

  Once again rumors of Confederate atrocities arose in official reports and memoirs as they had after Poison Spring. Francis Drake stated in his report that “a large number of negroes and Arkansas refugees … were inhumanly butchered by the enemy, and among them my own negro servant.” Confederate Major John Edwards, an aide to Shelby, confirmed that, “the battlefield was sickening to behold. No orders, threats, or commands could restrain the men from vengeance on the negroes.…”33 Such vindictiveness only added insult to the injury inflicted on Union arms. Worse than insult, the defeat at Marks’ Mills had a demoralizing effect on the army.

  Andrew Sperry recorded with disgust the fact that the outgoing Union mail became a casualty of Marks’ Mills. The Federal soldiers at Camden had pored over their letters to loved ones in the days before the train pulled out. Now the Rebels “had a good time in reading over the words of love and hope, or the expressions of our opinions as to the situation.” The stragglers from Marks’ Mills trickled in over the next couple of days telling stories reminiscent of Poison Spring. Soldiers congregated around campfires discussing the latest disaster and the relative intelligence of their senior commanders.34 One can imagine the caustic discussions that raced through regiments that evening. While the troops debated, Steele requested a report from his chief quartermaster to assess the possibility of sustaining a continuation of the expedition.

  Captain Henry submitted a distressing estimate of the current situation and an assessment that the army could not stay in its present position or advance without an immediate infusion of forage and supplies. Henry stated that the army had lost the entire wagon train of 211 vehicles in the engagement at Marks’ Mills. Further, the army had lost over 2,000 animals since the commencement of the campaign and those that remained were in poor condition. Henry counted 9,000 horses and mules in the transportation pool and estimated that he could secure forage for only 1,000 due to the “present impoverished condition in this part of the state.” He concluded the report with a polite admonition that the commanding general must “give this question of supplying forage your immediate and earnest attention.”35 The crisis of the expedition had arrived and Steele knew it required an immediate decision to extract the army from pending disaster.

  Frederick Steele decided to convene a council of his officers to solicit their opinions as to the possibility of continuing the campaign. Steele wasted no time in assembling his commanders, calling them together late on the evening of the 25th just hours after the engagement at Marks’ Mills. One by one the generals arrived at headquarters and waited for the commanding general to enter. John Thayer, Frederick Salomon, Eugene Carr, and Samuel Rice were quietly discussing the army’s predicament when Steele entered the room. Steele started the council by providing a synopsis of events over the past week and by reading Henry’s analysis of the quartermaster situation. Next, Steele provided the latest intelligence to the generals.36

  Steele had sent out numerous patrols and scouts to assess the disposition of Price’s army and to confirm or deny the veracity of rumors racing through Camden about the arrival of reinforcements. Many of the local citizens had openly taunted the Union soldiers with statements about how inbound Confederate infantry divisions would soon turn the tables on the Federals and send them running or capture them outright. Several of the parties had succeeded in taking a number of prisoners from various Confederate outfits. From interrogation the Confederates revealed the fact that they belonged to at least three separate infantry divisions. Estimates placed Rebel strength at around 6,000 mounted men and between 8 and 10,000 infantry.37 The Federal army by comparison had now less than 10,000 men of all arms, a severed line of communication, and currently only one line of retreat. The Rebels had them hemmed in on three sides in the fortifications surrounding Camden and the only way to continue south meant a climactic battle with a larger, fresh Confederate army. Further, the Rebels had high morale as a result of their stunning victories in both Louisiana and Arkansas and they were anxious to come to grips with Steele’s emaciated force in Camden. Prospects for Union success, indeed, did not favor prolonging the campaign or continuing to the Red River.

  Steele stated that he believed that the changed situation required an immediate retrograde movement to save the army. Steele understood that he did not have authorization to abandon the expedition, but he believed the circumstances dictated that he must preserve the army rather than continue on a forlorn hope. The Federal commander must have known that tremendous criticism would come his way from such a decision inside and outside of the army. This may have been why Steele wanted the opinions of his officers in a public forum. If they all agreed that continuing south was hopeless, Steele could then deflect some of the expected barbs. Therefore, in addition to req
uesting a public statement, Steele had each man submit his thoughts in writing for the record. His generals did not let him down and provided full support in an admirable show of loyalty.

  Fred Salomon started by expressing in positive terms that the VII Corps “must fall back to the line of the Arkansas, and that the movement should commence at once.” He added, “[T]o go out and fight the enemy would only cripple us, and if supplies are exhausted we have no means to get more.” The conversation now moved to Eugene Carr, the feisty cavalry commander. Up front he concurred with Steele and offered that “Kirby Smith has evidently no further fear of General Banks.” Therefore, he was now concentrating on Steele in order to “pass to our rear and cut us off.” In essence, Salomon and Carr believed that Smith intended nothing less than the destruction of the VII Corps. Further, he had the Federal army in a box that he would soon enough close the lid on if the Unionists did not move quickly. Thayer stated that he favored “falling back … at least by tomorrow night” lest the Rebels encircle the army and force its capitulation.38

  The only dissenting opinion came from Samuel Rice, Salomon’s First Brigade commander. Rice had a reputation of being perhaps the most combative general in the army. Rather than commencing a retreat, Rice wanted to move to the east to Hampton destroying the bridges over the Ouachita and taking up a strong position to draw the Rebels into a disadvantageous battle. Rice seems to have believed that the Union army could still rebuild its strength and break through to the Red River. However, he said that should this prove impractical the army should then “go toward the Arkansas.”39

  Steele did not take long to deliberate for he delivered a verdict before the meeting broke. He wrote in his report:

  If we had been supplied at Camden I could have held the place against Kirby Smith’s entire force, but on learning that my communications were effectually [sic] interrupted, and that the line of the Arkansas was threatened by so large a force of the enemy, I decided to fall back at once.40