Midnight Ride, Industrial Dawn

by Robert Martello

  Malleable Copper Contracts and Profits

  Revere finished his first assignment for resizing 15 tons of bolts on October 14, 1795, and charged the U.S. government $2,756, which it paid on March 10, 1796.81 Over the next few years he received more contracts and turned out more output than he had in his earlier endeavors. He was now positioned to provide a relatively high-tech product to a country that needed it desperately.

  As an American craftsman and manufacturer, Revere had always competed with British goods, whether silverware, ironware, or bronze bells. He produced fairly limited quantities of most of these earlier products and focused more on meeting the specialized needs of his local market than on combating the pressure exerted by England. Upon entering the malleable copper field, in which he had to produce enormous numbers of bolts and spikes, he fully realized the power of the British industrial juggernaut and confronted America’s longstanding love of cheap imported goods. American preferences produced a form of inertia driven by hundreds of years of history: English newspapers and styles drove American tastes; the British pound, shilling, and pence system shaped Americans’ conceptions of monetary value; and British textiles, iron, china, glass, and other products had long served as standards of utility and excellence. A new manufacturer such as Revere had his work cut out for him, needing to overcome a general bias in favor of all things British. Worse yet, this bias had a solid grounding in truth, because British goods did offer excellent quality at low prices.82 Revere employed a methodical strategy in his struggle to overcome British competition. He first negotiated several contracts in 1795 and 1796 with local government officials or merchants in need of bolts and spikes. As his shop mastered these manufacturing processes his reputation grew, and he used his satisfied clients as references and contacts to drum up new business. He eventually compared the quality of his goods to that of British manufactures and benefited from both a preference for local products as well as the patriotic satisfaction of buying American.

  As with his cannon contracts Revere charged a price per pound for finished products and incorporated all raw material and production costs into this price, although this rate varied depending on the complexity of the material. For example, in an August 31, 1798 letter to “the Committee building the ship at Mr. Hartt’s yard” he offered to prepare spikes, rudder bands, a chain for the rudder, bolts, and cogs for 37 cents per pound for cast copper or 41 cents a pound for malleable copper, a difference of 4 cents a pound reflecting the extra work needed for annealing the malleable copper. With the price of copper hovering around 20 cents per pound, this yielded a “labor fee” of 17 to 21 cents per pound of work, which he used for salaries, fuel costs, other expenses, and his own profit. By the time of this letter, his reputation had preceded him and he frequently responded to letters inquiring about his prices and production speed. By December of the same year, his price for copper bolts and spikes rose to 50 cents per pound and he expressed concern that he could not accept a new contract from Jacob Sheafe because he could not find enough copper to finish his current contract. Raw material shortages once again reared their ugly head, affecting his price as well as his ability to accept new work.83

  By 1799, Revere had streamlined his pricing policies. One ledger, beginning in September 1798 and ending in April 1799, contained all of Revere’s bolt, spike, and staple orders for the USS Constitution. At the end of the contract, he computed a total of 8,116 pounds of copper products sold to the Constitution, but he did not include an equivalent dollar amount. We can assume that he computed a final charge for the contract based on an overall price per pound, probably 50 cents a pound, which included labor and raw material costs as in his earlier contracts. Taking this price simplification one step further, Revere clearly ignored any differences between bolts, spikes, staples, and other products by this point, and merely combined everything into a single total weight.84

  One comprehensive ledger describes all of Revere’s expenses and income for bell, cannon, and copper work from May 1, 1799, to February 28, 1801. The majority of these activities involved the production of bolts and spikes. The debit column covers a variety of expenses, and the credit column lists payments received from different sources. Table 5.4 outlines Revere’s major expense categories.85

  Although most of Revere’s costs are listed as a payment to an individual “for copper” or “for 6 weeks work,” some of the expenses listed in the “miscellaneous” category consist of ambiguous payments to individuals that could represent additional raw material purchases or wages. Other miscellaneous expenses include purchases of bricks, wire, and sand, and numerous small withdrawals labeled only as “cash.”

  Several patterns emerge from Revere’s expense list. The constant need for copper—and iron, brass, bell metal, and tin, to lesser extents—dominated his operations and accounted for more than three-fourths of his total operating expenses. He recorded metal purchases ranging from $7 to more than $1,000. Although the majority of his metal acquisitions are simply labeled “copper,” he recorded some purchases of “old” copper, copper stills, cannon, and bells, indicating the need to recycle in order to meet demand. His supply network became more widespread than ever before as he patronized at least forty-six different metal suppliers (and probably more than fifty after the unlabeled entries are considered), as well as numerous suppliers of coal, wood, charcoal, and other goods. Even with this huge number of individuals selling him raw materials he occasionally had to shut down his operations because of copper shortages, so we can imagine the consequences had his legendary networking skills proven less effective.

  Table 5.4. Furnace Expenditures, 1799–1801

  Revere’s income is listed in a credit column that is far less comprehensive than the expenses ledger due to abbreviations and missing pages. Fortunately, he computed subtotals of his income at several points, and these subtotals cover the missing entries. He received $26,450.17 in cash payments throughout this period. Although some of the 61 recorded payments are as small as $2, they averaged more than $430 thanks to 12 large payments of $500 or more, 7 of which exceeded $1,000. Payments from Stephen Higginson and Amasa Davis account for the four largest ones, all for Revere’s work on government contracts that each incorporated a range of goods. Most of the payments merely record the name of the payee instead of the item sold, but Revere did make sure to note that five payments corresponded to bell purchases, a product that continued to stand out from all others. His product line continued to increase as he sold his clients copper nails, sheathing nails, flat point nails, braces, pintles, dove tails, composition cleats, braces, eye bolts, chambers for pumps, cast rollers, and chains in addition to bolts and spikes. If his prior experiences serve as a guide, Revere could reproduce nearly any item after the proper study and practice. This period of product expansion and experimentation exposed him to the technology surrounding sheathing copper and probably gave him the idea to attempt to produce that commodity in the years to come.

  Revere’s gross revenues from May 1, 1799, to February 28, 1801, exceeded his expenses by $5,042.67, yielding an approximation of his profit. Of course, this figure cannot be treated with any confidence or precision, because it depends upon Revere’s subtotals and assumes that the beginning and ending of the debit and credit lists correspond to the same transactions. Since many of his clients took years to pay him, and we know his sales volume increased steadily throughout this period, we might expect that his eventual profit for this period could be higher when clients paid some of the larger bills from the end of this production run. This ledger also fails to include hidden expenses, such as Revere’s depreciation on tools and machinery or any rent he paid for his property, calculations beyond the consideration of eighteenth-century businessmen. With these disclaimers in mind, if the “profit” is compared to gross revenues, every $1 of sales yielded 19 cents income for Revere. This income, while not hurling him into the uppermost social or economic class, enabled him to continue amassing capital for his final endeavor, which
eventually led America into a new copper age.

  Adaptation and Networking

  In the extremely fluid economic climate of post-Revolutionary America, flexibility, adaptation, and innovation paved the way for great success. The 1790s saw a revival of commerce, and America’s growing market economy created large demands for a wide range of products at a time when few domestic producers could compete with British goods. Britain’s dominance of most manufacturing fields was an established fact, rarely questioned and in some cases even praised for its impact upon America. But the hazards, costs, and delays of international transport often rendered British goods vulnerable in American markets. An enterprising American manufacturer hoping to compete with these foreign products merely needed the initiative to enter the ring, enough capital to launch a manufactory, a command of the technological and business processes required to establish a production system capable of meeting local needs at accepted prices, and a network able to bring in enough raw materials to keep the fires burning. These requirements set the bar fairly high: most artisans lacked the necessary capital and business acumen, and most merchants lacked technical expertise. Paul Revere could do it all.

  By the end of the 1790s, Revere exploited America’s favorable economic conditions by helping to fill its seemingly unquenchable demand for malleable copper products. His position as a manufactory owner and supervisor enabled him to use his talents in a way that separated him decisively from the different laborers in his shop. The majority of his responsibilities fell into two categories: technical adaptation and networking.

  Revere personally pioneered all technical processes employed in his shop. His adaptability is more evident at this point than at any other time in his life. Between 1792 and 1796, he learned to cast bells and cannon, produce “malleable” copper via annealing and cold working, and fabricate a variety of fasteners such as bolts and spikes, all without any formal instruction or benefit from the emigration of knowledgeable experts—the traditional form of technology transfer. Revere demonstrated his intellect and creativity through his exceptional ability to learn new trades by borrowing from ones he had already mastered. In many ways he embodied the ideal of an adaptive American society struggling to emerge from Britain’s imposing shadow.

  Revere also derived significant benefits from his formidable networking skills. During his artisan days he used his contacts to drum up silver orders from the members of many organizations, and his networking ability also helped him spread the alarm during his Midnight Ride. In the 1790s networking enabled his workshop to thrive when so many other manufacturing endeavors failed, because he could generate work for his shop and overcome raw material shortages better than most. His location near the docks of a major port city and his numerous colleagues in the public and private sectors helped him identify lucrative projects and offer his services at the right time, often before the work formally materialized. Of course, discovering the work was only half the job. No longer a newcomer to the metallurgical world, Revere had a growing reputation that accurately described his capabilities. He had become a respected manufacturer and he had earned that respect.

  Revere’s many successes illustrate how a choice subset of post-Revolutionary artisans improved their circumstances, becoming managers and owners of growing manufactories in a time when most other master craftsmen continued working in small shops or as skilled laborers in the employ of others. Profits from a number of endeavors, starting with silverworking and iron founding and soon incorporating bell and cannon casting, provided fixed and liquid capital that empowered Revere to continue trying new applications such as malleable copper work. His furnace, tools, workforce, and property, as well as intangible assets such as experience, supply networks, and reputation, allowed him to experiment in new fields without excessive risk or delay. And steady income from already-mastered occupations gave him the freedom he needed to survive the startup of each new operation. During this early federal period, the high entrance requirements for new technological endeavors discouraged the bulk of the population, but certain members of the middle class still took a chance. However, in his later endeavors Revere needed help to overcome higher startup costs associated with larger and more complex manufacturing processes.

  Revere marketed himself to the government during a period of Federalist dominance, marked by international tension and fiscal uncertainty. What the government lacked in competence and experience it made up for with ambition. Indeed, its ambition was probably aided by the inability of most officeholders to recognize the funding limitations of the young bureaucracy. Revere corrected some of the government’s deficiencies by confidently proposing new products or methods in letters to military purchasing agents or treasury officials. He did this with the same two goals that drove his entire career from his earliest days of patriotic artisanship. On one hand, he unapologetically served his own interests, zealously learning new trades in hopes of making a profit and augmenting his reputation and social standing. However, he also drove himself so hard because he wanted to help his country increase its manufacturing potential and technical expertise. Patriotism is often hard to prove: ironically, if Revere ever professed his patriotism in too direct a manner one might question his real motives. However, he went out of his way to offer free advice and other assistance in correspondence with key governmental figures such as Byers, Knox, and Coxe, and he offered the government extra services such as the procurement of raw materials for the national armory at Springfield without requesting a finder’s fee. His interactions with government officials employed a more respectful tone than his letters to private clients, and in spite of frequent delays and errors he never considered ending the collaboration. Revere’s desire to serve his community also reinforced his choice of products during this period: bells, cannon, and fasteners all represented both cutting-edge technology previously limited to Britain and high-profile items that helped local communities or the government function smoothly. Revere’s pride in his work mirrors his love of his country, and he finally accepted that his most valuable contributions lay in manufacturing instead of office holding.

  National economic growth, turbulent domestic and international politics, public service, and the drive to improve his societal standing propelled Revere into his final endeavor. Changing times produced new demands, which called for new products. An advantageous location, his growing reputation, and a vast stockpile of experience helped open the door to the greatest challenge of his life, rolling copper. And for this he would need government support beyond the founding fathers’ wildest dreams.

  CHAPTER SIX

  Paul Revere’s Last Ride

  The Road to Rolling Copper (1798–1801)

  On New Year’s Eve of 1798, Revere wrote an introductory letter to Benjamin Stoddert, America’s first secretary of the navy:

  Sir, I understand you have advised the Committee for building the Frigate in Boston, not to send abroad for any thing they can git manufactured in this Country; these sentiments have induced me to trouble you with this letter. I can manufactor old or New Copper into Bolts, Spikes, Staples, Nails &c &c or any thing that is wanted in Ship building; that is cast the Copper into Pigs, draw the pigs into Barrs under the Forge hammer, and then manufactor the Barrs into Bolts, Spikes, Nails, &c &c. I supplyed the Constitution with Dovetails, Staples, Nails &c &c. The Frigate Building here has upwards of 5000 lb. of Bolts, & Spikes, allready in her, of my manufactor, & I have supplyed Jacob Sheafe Esq., Naval Agent at Portsmouth with 600 lb. of Spikes for the Frigate building there.—My greatest difficulty is to git old Copper. Could I git a sufficient supply of Copper I would undertake to roll sheet Copper for Sheathing Ships.1

  Revere’s contacts had once again provided a valuable tip: Stoddert wanted to build a strong navy from domestically produced components and actively sought manufacturers who could produce bolts, spikes, and sheeting from malleable copper. Increased military spending fit perfectly into Revere’s plans. He had spent the prior three years perfecting his a
bility to work copper into a malleable state and then draw it into various shapes such as bolts and spikes. The long list of products in his letter to Stoddert reveals his growing technical mastery of large-quantity output for a fairly wide array of products. Revere’s letter also displays his confident eagerness to learn to roll copper as long as Stoddert helped him find enough raw materials, the biggest stumbling block at this stage of his business. In spite of the seemingly perfect match between Stoddert’s needs and Revere’s skills, Stoddert ignored this letter after a consultation with Colonel Joshua Humphreys suggested that Revere’s claims were ludicrous. Humphreys was America’s foremost turn-of-the-century naval architect and also served as the Navy Department’s chief technical advisor, appointed as America’s first “naval constructor” in 1794. His knowledge about both the science of ship design as well as the technical details underlying different ship components made him eminently qualified to assess the nation’s technological limitations.2 Humphreys assured Stoddert that no American could produce malleable copper. Humphreys was wrong.

  Revere had been producing and experimenting with malleable copper since 1795 and after learning to construct and modify various copper fasteners he investigated the possibility of making sheathing copper for ships’ hulls. The road to rolling copper consists of two intertwining narrative pathways: Revere’s technological progress and the government’s evolving goals and capabilities. These threads converged when he finally made contact with Stoddert, and they remained connected until his retirement. Revere’s technical accomplishments continued the self-education that characterized his foundry endeavors, particularly his drive toward standardization. Revere’s copper-rolling education differed from all his previous studies, because he now hoped to learn an elusive British process that Americans had yet to master. As the first American practitioner of a new process, Revere moved up the technology transfer ladder described in Chapter Four, climbing from the internal diffusion phase to become the initiator of a pilot plant. Revere did not travel to Britain or record any conversations with British workers, instead relying on other methods closer at hand and more familiar by this point in his career.