Midnight Ride, Industrial Dawn
Page 28
Paul Revere’s last ride cannot be properly understood without also following the development of the early federal government, still young and inexperienced in 1800 yet embroiled in intense ideological and diplomatic struggles.
In addition to serving as the single largest customer for American businesses, the government cared about the source of its products. A strong market mentality developed in large port towns by the 1790s and private buyers sought the highest quality at the lowest price, which almost always led them to British goods. Certain individuals within the federal government, particularly Benjamin Stoddert, realized they had to think of the future and prepare for a time when volatile international relations might lead to blockades, the cessation of foreign imports, or war. A well-equipped, domestically supplied navy would guard the young nation against these scenarios. Concerns for national security dovetailed with a growing public discourse on the benefits of a domestic manufacturing industry. Influential leaders such as Alexander Hamilton and Tench Coxe crafted careful arguments, government policies, and public shows of support for high-profile manufacturing endeavors in order to help America overcome its significant technological deficiencies. Revere had finally positioned himself in the right place at the right time, and his technological skills could now meet a national need while reaping financial and social rewards. But first he had to attract the federal government’s attention, something easier said than done.
The Early Federal Government and Benjamin Stoddert’s Navy
The federal government played an increasing role in Revere’s business in the 1790s, first as a client for his cannon and later as the purchaser of innumerable bolts and spikes. Government contracting became a major part of his identity as it provided him with income, technical challenges, and the chance to serve his society. Government negotiations soon became even more challenging than the technical aspects of the trade, and Revere’s vaunted networking skills offered him little guidance in this new arena. Fortunately for him, the government’s reaction to changing international alliances and events provided large long-term contracts that balanced the frustrating delays and errors of the inexperienced bureaucracy. All of these impacts, good and bad, had their roots in the early years of the republic.
The government’s deficit of administrative experience owed much to America’s colonial status during much of the eighteenth century. Local and colonial governments operated on small, informal scales far from the center of empire, and few colonists had the opportunity to participate in colonial bureaucracies such as the customs service. Some Americans received administrative or managerial education in the army or in larger businesses with many employees, but even this preparation hardly met the needs of postwar America.3 As much as Paul Revere wished for a more proactive and accomplished government able to commit to large military contracts, he and his contemporaries had ample experience with the negative aspects of central government in the years leading up to the Revolution.
Following the war, Patriot leaders hesitated in establishing a strong centralized source of authority so soon after throwing off the ruling hand of Great Britain. In 1783, following the successful negotiation of a peace treaty with Great Britain, America finally received official recognition of its independence. But independence had few immediate political ramifications because the Articles of Confederation had been ratified in 1781 and the Congress of the Confederation, continuing the membership and mission of the Second Continental Congress, had directed the war effort and served as a federal government since then. The Articles of Confederation created a weak federal bureaucracy to oversee governmental functions, but it was severely understaffed and overworked from the beginning. Without the power to tax or regulate commerce the Congress of the Confederation often took a back seat to the individual states. A group of Federalist statesmen, including George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, championed a new system to collect greater power in the hands of a national government. Passionate political leaders and much of the general population debated the merits and dangers of this new system in state after state during the ratification debates of the 1780s. The proposed Constitution gave the federal government the authority to borrow and coin money, tax, and regulate commerce. To avoid the jurisdictional turf wars and confusing overlaps that plagued the government under the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution prevented states from usurping federal prerogatives such as issuing money or levying tariffs. With the election of George Washington in 1789 the new government finally came to life, and an eager nation awaited signs of the tone it would set, the actions it would take, and the world it would produce.
Three defining characteristics colored all government actions at the turn of the century. First and foremost, the federal government was completely inexperienced: every aspect of it was new and its employees and officeholders had little or no administrative experience.4 Each decision represented not only the solution to a short-term need, but also a potentially vital precedent that could shape future policies in unforeseen ways. As a result, lawmakers often focused upon the theoretical underpinnings of the Constitution rather than the practical details of daily policy execution, rendering detailed transactions haphazard at best. Revere eventually learned that many government officials knew little about the products they asked him to produce, and even less about the funding mechanisms that ensured he received his fees. Second, the small government had a limited budget and modest goals. The ongoing constitutional debate concerning strict versus loose construction forced all officials to carefully justify and defend their actions, discouraging broad or decisive action. The government’s concerns over budgets and strict construction caused all of Revere’s contracts to undergo extensive review after he provided his products but before he received his fee, and plunged all operations into chaos every time any officeholder retired or lost an election. Third, the government was intensely partisan, and many newspapers cast the very future of the nation into doubt each time an opposition party threatened to win a majority. Although the partisan nature of government helped Revere win some contracts in the 1790s, it played a larger role after 1800, when the Jeffersonian party of Democratic-Republicans actively opposed his Federalist ideology.
Due to its large size and close ties to the recent Revolution, the army stood in a class by itself, encapsulating all the administrative challenges facing early America. Although Congress demobilized the Continental army after the war, the government reorganized and strengthened the War Department in 1791. The new standing army reached a size of 12,000 men by 1798 in response to fears of a French invasion, a shocking development for a nation that had previously equated large military forces with imperial oppression. Financing and supply problems plagued the War Department from the start, leaving behind a depressing legacy of mismanagement, waste, supply line breakdowns, and undelegated authority. A damning 1791 report singled out the quartermaster’s department and private contractors for particular criticism. Alexander Hamilton described the prevailing situation in a colorful 1799 letter to the secretary of war: “the management of your Agents, as to the affair of supplies, is ridiculously bad. Besides the extreme delay, which attends every operation, articles go forward in the most incomplete manner.”5 The government’s chronic inefficiency had many sources. The Constitution did not specify whether the War or Treasury Department should purchase and pay for supplies, and the two departments frequently resolved this stalemate by not paying at all. The comptroller of the treasury had to approve all federal funding claims personally, and even small errors in the application process led to rejection and delay. Revere ran afoul of these pitfalls repeatedly in his manufacturing career and his papers contain many letters reminding different branches of the federal government that he had been waiting months or longer for his payment. Revere’s experience was far from unique: military contractor James O’ Hara, for example, had still not been paid for his 1796 contract in 1801.6
Unlike the American army, which dealt primarily with internal issues
such as protecting the frontier until the War of 1812, America created its navy in order to address ever-changing international relations with various European powers. Although the Department of the Navy was only two years old when it contacted Revere in 1800, its origins stretch back to the creation of the new federal government and the mercantile and diplomatic policies of the early republic. Naval history presents an unusual paradox. For some European powers, America’s navy represented their primary interaction with the government of this new nation, and its successes or failures often embodied America’s overseas reputation. The early navy became a vital component of national diplomacy and defense, and its existence and operations engendered continual high-profile attention as well as partisan debate at all levels of government and throughout most American cities and towns. At the same time, a single individual could fully supervise the small navy, making it personal and flexible on good days but inefficient and overworked in hard times. This combination of visibility and compactness explains many of the factors that influenced Revere’s copper-rolling contracts and says much about the navy’s first chief executive.
The establishment and growth of the Department of the Navy would not have been possible without the financial prosperity and expansion of trade fostered by the Federalists, particularly Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton’s policies bore fruit by the mid-1790s, when America enjoyed restored public credit, stable national currency, huge quantities of investment capital, and a thriving merchant marine. America’s growing merchant fleet went hand in hand with improved coastal fortifications, the creation of a navy, and an often pro-British foreign policy, culminating in John Jay’s controversial treaty with England in 1794. In addition to removing British forts and troops that constrained America’s westward expansion, Jay’s Treaty (also known as the Treaty of London) allowed American merchants to continue their profitable activities but alienated powerful interests by granting “most favored nation” trade status to Britain and failing to compensate slave owners for captured slaves. This treaty effectively cooled the rising tensions that threatened imminent war between America and Britain at a time when America was militarily and economically unprepared. In the years of peace following this treaty, American exports increased in value from $33 million in 1794 to $94 million in 1801.7
Although many Americans, and particularly Democratic-Republicans, protested the unfairness of Jay’s generous treaty with Britain, France did more than protest. Viewing it as a tacit alliance with Britain, France declared war on American commerce in 1796 and 1797, and French privateers and warships began capturing merchant ships, particularly in the vicinity of the West Indies. By 1799, America had lost approximately $20 million of mercantile property to French attacks and shipping insurance increased from 6 to 25 percent. When French officials insisted upon a large bribe in order to meet with John Adams’s diplomats (later known as the scandalous XYZ Affair), America revoked its earlier treaty with France and retaliated with its own privateers and navy. Thus began an undeclared naval war with France in 1798, often called the Quasi-War. This “war” was unique in American history because of America’s lack of clear wartime goals: America did not seek victory or French defeat, the government prohibited privateering against French merchants, and the navy initially avoided French warships except under special circumstances. America only wished to protect its overseas commerce without provoking a larger conflict. The young nation received an early lesson regarding the price of independence; Americans now had to protect their own interests without the backing of Britain’s imperial might.8
With the increasing complexity of naval affairs, Congress took the controversial step of establishing a separate Department of the Navy. Prior to 1798, the secretary of war supervised all naval operations. James McHenry served as the secretary of war in the late 1790s, and friends and foes alike described him as a bureaucratically inept administrator. His lack of talent aided the birth of a separate Navy Department, since many of his allies hoped he might perform better if his responsibilities diminished. The creation of this new department stirred arguments between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans over the ideal size and strength of a national navy. Federalists supported a strong navy that could defend American shipping interests and generate international respect, while Democratic-Republicans believed the distance between America and Europe rendered a large navy unnecessary and prohibitively expensive. As with most issues during this volatile period, the debate over the navy highlighted diverging ideological views of America’s future: a nation with a prominent navy anticipated international interactions and conflicts, while a nation without one expected neutrality and isolation. Amid all the conflict and rhetoric, 1798 also marked the appointment of America’s first secretary of the navy, Benjamin Stoddert.9
Benjamin Stoddert was the only cabinet member President John Adams did not inherit from Washington’s administration, and was by some accounts the president’s most trusted advisor. Born in Maryland in 1751, Stoddert belonged to a prominent landholding family and trained as a merchant in his youth, serving as a major in the Pennsylvania militia during the Revolutionary War. He soon received an appointment to the Board of War, which provided him with invaluable administrative experience and political connections. He established and managed a successful shipping firm in Georgetown after the war until he received his appointment as secretary of the navy in June 1798. A Federalist to the core, Stoddert immediately used his cabinet office to promote his vision of America as a powerful, self-sufficient, and commerce-driven nation. Throughout the turbulent years of the early republic, Stoddert’s intelligence, leadership, and drive stand out against a horde of less experienced government employees. According to Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott, “Mr. Stoddert is a man of great sagacity, and conducts the business of department with success and energy: he means to be popular; he has more of the confidence of the president than any officer of the government.” Stoddert’s clerk Charles Goldsborough added his own praise at the end of Stoddert’s term, saying, “A more fortunate selection could not well have been made. To the most ardent patriotism he united an inflexible integrity, a discriminating mind, great capacity for business, and the most persevering industry.”10
Upon taking office Stoddert inherited a single four-week-old vessel, several appointed captains whose only experience lay in the merchant marine, two office rooms, and no administrative staff whatsoever. He quickly assembled a staff of six clerks, and better yet, he received the services of three frigates whose construction had begun years earlier. The Naval Act of 1794 provided for the armament of six ships under the Department of War in order to protect American shipping from pirates hailing from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli, known collectively as the Barbary states.11 Republicans opposed to the idea of a standing navy forced the insertion of a clause stating that these ships would be decommissioned if hostilities ceased, and indeed, American ambassadors signed a peace treaty with Algeria in 1795. However, George Washington lobbied in favor of continuing at least a partial armament of naval vessels, and three of the frigates survived. Christened the USS Constitution, United States, and Constellation, they were completed and seaworthy by July 1798. The term seaworthy fails to do justice to these vessels, also termed super frigates, which combined the world’s most advanced technological design with first-rate materials only available in America. Brilliantly designed by naval architect Joshua Humphreys, these ships were longer, faster, heavier, more durable, and more efficient than any existing ships of their class. They could outfight anything their own size, and outrun anything bigger.12
Stoddert faced a shortage of skilled manpower for all aspects of naval operations and personally performed nearly all diplomatic, financial, technical, and logistical administrative tasks, ranging from the development of national policy to the addressing of envelopes. Stoddert’s correspondence illustrates his ability to successfully address practical and detailed questions related to timber selection, the number of cannon appropriate for ships of differ
ent sizes, the amount of nails needed during construction, and many other issues.13 Although administrative tasks occupied an enormous amount of his time, the manpower deficit gave him free rein to shape the navy as he saw fit and allowed him to handle every detail properly and consistently. Stoddert’s position compares in many ways to Revere’s, since both men had to deal with a mixture of strategic plans and practical logistics, and they thrived on the opportunity to set and implement bold objectives that exploited new opportunities. A deficiency of entrepreneurship or managerial prowess in either man would have led to disaster.
Because of a short-lived and fortuitous bipartisan emphasis upon national defense, governmental stinginess did not constrain Stoddert. Republicans lost support in the patriotic fervor following the XYZ controversy and Congress voted large appropriations to the Navy Department along with explicit permission to build another three frigates, purchase more than forty ships of all sizes, arm merchant ships, and establish a marine corps. Stoddert interpreted this mandate in the broadest possible terms and immediately developed a network of naval agents who served as important links in the navy’s administrative chain, acting as purchasing agents, recruiters, supervisors, local technical experts, and general “handymen.” One agent generally supervised each naval yard, although they also oversaw transactions between the government and the numerous merchants and private contractors who supplied the navy.14