Somme
Page 46
The situation remained chaotic for some time until finally a staff officer, Major Gwyn Gwyn-Jones, came forward to investigate and, after taking personal control, led the various disparate groups forward to finally secure Flers.
Meanwhile, a tragic breakdown in communications led to disaster for the survivors of the 21st King’s Royal Rifle Corps, who were in the fields to the right of the village looking towards Gird Trench. Although it had been intended they should remain there and consolidate their positions, a fatal confusion in the definition of the objectives in their latest orders meant that a further attack was ordered. Their colonel, the Earl of Faversham, led them forward to destruction.
The scanty remains of the two battalions drew intense machine-gun and cannon fire and many fell amidst the growing corn. The Colonel knelt down and as he peered through his binoculars he fell back, killed. Signallers Baker and Gunson were wounded at the same time: the former a nasty wound in the neck. He was made comfortable in a shell hole, which was deepened a little to protect him. A liaison aeroplane appeared above and the Queen’s colonel suggested that a message be attempted. The battalion sign was laid out and the shutter used. The message was acknowledged by the airman on his klaxon horn, though all did not hear the acknowledgement owing to the din. A shell dropped where the regimental sergeant major, police sergeant, pioneer sergeant and corporal lay. Two were wounded and two were killed. Immediately afterwards the signal officer, ‘Tockie’ Turner, was hit in the stomach and was writhing in agony. The intelligence officer was then killed, and the adjutant, Captain Honey, was hit in the eye. Jerry had held his intense fire whilst the men ascended a slight slope and then had mown them down. It was impossible to hold any positions thereabouts and the depleted ranks fell back down to the bottom of the slope amid a knee high hail of machine-gun bullets.61
Lance Corporal Gerald Dennis, 21st Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 124th Brigade, 41st Division
The attack on Flers may have been a success but the men of the 41st Division had suffered severe losses in the course of the long day. Alongside them, the 14th Division faced what looked like a dangerous extra complication of straightening out the German ‘pocket’ pressing into the British lines just to the east of Delville Wood. A preliminary operation was ordered to commence at 0515, but in the event the Germans abandoned it without much of a fight. When the main advance came the division would have much more hard fighting before it was able to successfully conform to the general advance made by the XV Corps.
The XIV Corps (Guards, 6th and 56th Divisions) on the right of the Fourth Army was attacking the German front stretching from Ginchy to Combles. The Guards and the 6th Division were to move forward, while the 56th Division moved out to form a defensive right flank to the whole advance. They were allotted fifteen tanks, nine for the Guards Division and three each for the 6th and 56th Divisions.
It was here on the XIV Corps front that the assault tactics broke down in total disarray. After the Royal Artillery had carefully left the 100-yard gaps required for the tanks in its artillery barrage, the infantry found to their horror that the tanks either failed to get forward or lost their way as they set off into No Man’s Land. The results were predictably disastrous. Without a creeping barrage to flay across the German trenches and the shell holes where German machine-gun teams were, the infantry were exposed to deadly fire from all sides. Although the Guards made fair progress, they suffered badly from flanking fire originating in the centre of the line. Here, the unfortunate 6th Division was faced with the German Sydow Höhe Redoubt known to the British, who seemed to have lacked much imagination in these matters, as the Quadrilateral. The preliminary bombardment also seems to have been badly directed and lamentably failed to destroy the trenches. When they were also left without a proper creeping bombardment the British infantry stood naked before their enemies.
The tanks achieved nothing in the chaos and confusion that seems to have enwrapped them. Everything started to go wrong the night before as they moved up. Of the three original tanks one, C-20, commanded by Second Lieutenant George Macpherson broke down while moving forward and had to be left behind. Shortly after, C-19, commanded by Captain Archie Holford-Walker suffered a broken axle on the tail unit. As Holford-Walker was unfortunately not aware that the tank could still be steered without the tail unit (which, indeed, was later discarded from use) he felt obliged to stop for repairs, which effectively excluded him from any part in the battle. This left only one tank to carry forward the hopes of the 6th Division next morning: C-22, commanded by Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques.
The progress of this tank has frequently been analysed without much firm agreement emerging as to what actually happened. It has been claimed that Henriques inadvertently opened fire on soldiers of the 9th Norfolks while behind the British lines and then compounded this by moving forward too early, thus arousing German suspicions with the result that they dropped a brief but damaging artillery barrage on the British troops waiting for zero hour. Whatever occurred,62 it was still not Zero Hour when C-22 began moving across No Man’s Land heading towards the Quadrilateral. The Germans seem to have been effectively stupefied by its strange appearance and somehow failed to open fire as C-22 slowly rumbled across to their lines. As Henriques and his crew crossed the German trench his gunners opened up a vicious fire on both sides. Coming to their senses the Germans opened a heavy small arms fire, which included armour piercing rifle ammunition normally used to penetrate the metal shields used by British snipers.
All the time I had the front flaps open, for visibility was far too restricted if they were shut; but after a hail of machine-gun fire, I closed them tightly for the first time. Then the periscope got hit away; then the small prisms got broken one after another; then armour piercing bullets began to penetrate, in spite of the fact that tanks were said to be completely proof against them. Then my driver got hit; then one of my gunners; then I got splinters in the face and legs. Meanwhile the gunners claim to have killed or hit twenty or thirty of the enemy. I could see absolutely nothing. The only thing to do was to open the front flap slightly and peep through. Eventually this got hit so that it was hanging only by a thread, and the enemy could fire in at us at close range.63
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques, Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Just as Second Lieutenant Henriques and his battered crew were discovering that German infantry were not entirely helpless against tanks, the British barrage burst out at 0630. Fortunately, for C-22 at least, the barrage was not directed at the Quadrilateral as it was located within one of the tank ‘lanes’ left in the barrage. But the tank had not the firepower to deal with the Quadrilateral, indeed the garrison seemed to be on the point of overwhelming it and adding its machine guns to the existing bristling defences. As the men of the 6th Division moved forward across No Man’s Land they were met with a hail of fire.
As the infantry were now approaching and as it was impossible to guide the car, and as I now discovered the sides weren’t bulletproof, I decided that to save the tank from being captured I had better withdraw. How we got back, I shall never understand. We dodged shells from the artillery and it was just a preserving hand which saved us. It was like hell in a rough sea made of shell holes. The way we got over the ground was marvellous; every moment we were going to stick, but we didn’t. The sight of thousands of men dying and wounded was ghastly. I hate to think of it all.64
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques.Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
The slight inconsistencies in his story are not necessarily serious, but it does seem remarkable that he should retire, seemingly able to see well enough to steer from the field of battle just as the infantry most needed him. The infantry attack, it hardly need be said, was a dreadful failure. The reason for the disaster was not the failure of the tanks—they were, after all, only an adjunct to the artillery and infantry that together still ruled the battlefield. The problem lay in the deliberate
weakening of the artillery to allow for the tanks and then the inability to respond swiftly by filling the gaps when it became apparent that the tanks were letting them down.
When the infantry tried again a little later, three more tanks had been optimistically ordered forwards. One, C-12 from the XIV Corps reserve, commanded by Lieutenant Vincent, came up only to ditch at the rendezvous by Guillemont crossroads. A second tank, C-9, commanded by Second Lieutenant Murphy, had originally been assigned to the Guards Division, while the third was C-20, repaired after its breakdown the night before. Second Lieutenant George Macpherson was about to take this tank forward to its destiny when he encountered his friend, the somewhat battered and bedraggled Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques.
Just as I was reporting to the brigadier commanding the infantry, I met George, who had got his tank to go. He looked aghast at my bloodstained face, and then with a smile got into his tank and went off to follow up the slowly advancing infantry. It was the last I saw of him. I never heard how his tank fared. I only know he was a great hero off the field of battle and I am sure he must have been one on it.65
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques, Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
The situation was chaotic as the never robust battlefield communications surrendered to the disruptive attentions of German shell fire. In the event the second attack planned for 1330 was cancelled, but the tanks seem to have gone forward anyway.
Our tank commander was Second Lieutenant Macpherson, a fine and likeable young fellow, but he, like all of us, had never been in an actual battlefield or in action before. The briefing and instructions regarding objectives were quite inadequate and there was little or no cooperation between the infantry and the tanks. We reached a point which we believed was our objective and after a while as petrol was getting low, we had to return some distance, where we were joined by the other tank in our section. Both it and ourselves came up against machine-gun fire with armour piercing bullets and while we had quite a few holes I counted upwards of forty in the other tank. I regret to say however that Lieutenant Macpherson, when going back to headquarters to report, was killed by enemy shell fire.66
Gunner William Dawson, Tank C-20, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
His crew never really knew what happened to their officer; for tragically all was not as it seemed. Brigadier Osborne, who commanded the badly mauled 16th Brigade, later explained what had happened to George MacPherson.
I was ordered to space them out evenly over the area attacked and their lines of advance were marked with tapes as far as possible by the divisional Royal Engineers. I was then told to issue the orders for attack. In answer to my protests that I could not make a plan of any worth I was told to get on with it as GHQ had issued orders for the tanks to move in this way. The result as you know was heavy and useless casualties to 1st Buffs and 8th Bedfords. It may interest you to know the true history of the three tanks with 16th Infantry Brigade on 15th September. One went north of the Quadrilateral and wasn’t much use to me. Then the tank which reported a broken tail came back, and while the subaltern in charge was waiting for a minute while I heard another officer’s report, he shot himself and left a paper on which he wrote, ‘My God, I have been a coward’. I concealed the manner of his death to save his parents unnecessary grief. The third tank was absent, lost its way.67
Brigadier Osborne, Headquarters, 16th Brigade, 6th Division
Perhaps Osborne was overly harsh in his judgement of a young officer driven over the brink of despair by the horrors of battle and a sense of responsibility for the failure that manifestly surrounded them. George Macpherson did not die instantly, but was taken back to a casualty clearing station for treatment where he succumbed to his injuries. Certainly Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques could testify to the strain imposed on young and inexperienced officers charged with the responsibility for the success of unreliable tanks.
The nervous strain in this first battle of the tanks for officers and crew alike was ghastly. Of my company, one officer went mad and shot his engine to make it go faster, another shot himself because he thought he had failed to do as well as he ought, two others, including myself, had what I suppose can be called a nervous breakdown.68
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques, Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Lieutenant Henriques’s splinter wounds looked far worse than they actually were, but in the confusion generally prevailing he was evacuated right back and eventually ended up in an ophthalmic hospital in London. He was haunted by feelings that he had not done his duty and had in a sense fled the battlefield.
If only we had been able to reconnoitre, if only we had some kind of training with the infantry, if only there had been some semblance of cooperation with the artillery, if only there had been proper practice over ground that was like the Somme, and if only we had a little more sleep and a little less showing off, what a marvellous story might this Somme battle have been.69
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques.Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Eventually he retrained as a tank reconnaissance officer, in which role he returned to the Western Front in 1917. He never commanded a tank in action again.
Their neighbours to their right in the 56th Division were forthright in their condemnation of the contribution of the tanks to their flanking operation. Hopes had been so high before the battle that the tanks’ failure caused a bitter reaction.
We were allotted one of the first tanks to land in France to do some training with our brigade. Everybody was staggered to see this extraordinary monster crawling over the ground. We did what training we could with this one tank, learning to follow it at suitable intervals. We knew it had to make gaps in the enemy barbed wire and a little column of infantry had to follow through the gap. Everybody thought it was a terrific thing until the first battle and then we rather lost our faith. Of the three tanks allotted to my brigade: one broke down before it reached the front line, one broke down in the front line, only one got across the front line and it broke down before it reached the German front line, so that they were a complete failure.70
Major Philip Neame VC, Headquarters, 168th Brigade, 56th Division
This was quite unfair; once again tanks were getting the blame for the tactical decision that had been taken in the Fourth Army to leave 100-yard gaps in the creeping barrage, which the troops depended on for any realistic chance of success. The whole of the 56th Division only had three tanks and as we have seen one failed altogether as Private Gray was leading them up to their jumping-off places the night before. Another one also ditched in the early stages of the attack in Bouleaux Wood but the other, C-16 under the command of Second Lieutenant Eric Purdy, got well forward before it was hit by a shell while firing into the Loop Trench. Although the detail of Neame’s statement is therefore incorrect, the overall gist reflects his experience as a brigade staff officer. Offered a new solution he found that normal methods of working were undermined by measures taken to facilitate a new weapon that proved unreliable and of minimal impact.
In analysing the overall performance of the tanks it is difficult to avoid the use of the word ‘failure’. Although Haig had ordered a large number of tanks as soon as he was aware of their potential, there had been a manifest disappointment in the inability of the hard-pressed British munitions industry to deliver them on time. The officers and crews had not had time to be properly trained; the infantry units that surrounded them in action had usually no chance to train with the tanks. The tanks that went into action were plagued with mechanical failure and their speed was too slow to keep up with the infantry when things were going well; too slow to rush to the point of need when things were going badly. The visibility from within the tanks and the environment of a mechanical hell meant that the efficiency of tank crews in fighting was severely compromised. Where things went well the tanks were a useful adjunct to the overall all-arms battle, but where the tanks fa
iled the artillery could not respond to sudden changes in plan and the infantry were left on their own.
Sensible officers avoided hyperbole and saw the tanks for what they really were. At this stage in the development of the tank, common sense counted for far more than specialist military knowledge in analysing their worth.
Reading about the tanks is amusing. I have been in them and examined them and know exactly what they have done in our area. Of course their virtues are exaggerated, but they are only in their infancy and did well—really well in some places. I would like to see them with double the horsepower; less impotent when they get sideways, and with some contrivance to reduce the noise.71
Chaplain T. Guy Rogers, 2nd Guards Brigade, Guards Division
As one new weapon came into blurred focus the cavalry once again found itself marooned on the sidelines of the war. They never quite seemed to be in the right place, in the right numbers, at the right time. When any fleeting opportunities did appear the cavalry always seemed to be easily thwarted.
We have made good progress, but I don’t think there is much chance of the cavalry being used today. Of course, everyone in high places was very optimistic and they thought that the chance would come. It may still come tomorrow, but today it is getting a bit late for a large forward movement. It would appear that if the cavalry does not get a chance this time it will be the end of them. I suppose that people at home are howling about the expense and so on. Today we used tanks for the first time. They seem to have been very successful in some places, especially towards Flers. We now hold most of the ridge—I shall be very sorry if we don’t get a chance this time, but it may come later when we least expect it.72
Brigadier Archibald Home, Headquarters, Cavalry Corps